



Climate Action Network

Submission: Views on the approach to the consideration of outputs component of the first global stocktake

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Climate Action Network International (CAN) is the world's largest network of civil society organizations working together to promote government action to address the climate crisis, with more than 1800 members in over 130 countries.

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This submission outlines Climate Action Network International's (CAN-I) view on the approach to the consideration of outputs component of the first global stocktake (GST-CO).

Guiding principles for the consideration of outputs of the first global stocktake

CAN strongly suggests that any discussions, negotiations, elaborations by UNFCCC parties on the emerging first Global Stocktake (GST) need to put at the roots of their statements as well as proposed solutions the firm commitment to climate justice and social justice. It is very clear from natural and social science that both international and national justice issues are eroding. Both, climate justice and social justice belong closely together to address poverty, historic and present GHG emissions by the rich, colonial legacies, perpetuated racism. It has to be reflected in the GST process, in the political and technical outputs. The gap between rich and poor people is growing in almost all nations. So are the shares of rich peoples' GHG emissions. If we do not address the globally richest 1% or 10% to reduce their detrimental footprint accounting for about >20% and 40% , respectively, of global fossil fuel and GHG emissions, we won't be able to arrive at a 1.5 C trajectory. A GST that deserves its name, needs to address this continuing and widening social injustice¹.

The GST-CO is a critical phase of the first GST. The process of the GST-CO will lay the foundations for the final outcome of the GST, including a CMA decision and/or declaration at COP28. This output will ultimately define the multilateral political response to the findings of the GST.

Many of the most salient findings of the GST are already very clear. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), there is a rapidly shrinking window to limiting global warming to 1.5°C in this critical decade. Immediate and deep emissions reductions across all sectors this decade are required to limit warming to 1.5°C, in the order of at least 43% by 2030 compared to 2019 levels. Further, to limit warming to 1.5°C, there is no room for new oil, gas, and coal production.² The IPCC also repeatedly found that overshooting 1.5°C, even temporarily, will result in irreversible impacts, including damage to ecosystems and greater loss of human life. The impacts of climate change are already being severely felt with significant devastating impacts, and will only intensify without dramatic increases in action to limit warming below 1.5°C and protect communities from climate impacts.

¹ [New report on climate and inequality \(norad.no\)](https://www.norad.no)

² IEA (2022), *World Energy Outlook 2022*, IEA, Paris <https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2022>, License: CC BY 4.0 (report); CC BY NC SA 4.0 (Annex A), at p.79.

The political response to the conclusions of the GST - the culmination of the GST-CO - is an essential component of responding to this state of emergency with the urgency required by science. In this critical decade and with climate impacts rapidly increasing in severity, a robust, ambitious and science-aligned GST-CO outcome is essential to ensure the implementation of the Paris Agreement:

- **The GST must raise the ambition of Parties across all pillars of the Paris Agreement**, including across mitigation, adaptation, means of implementation and support, finance flows, loss and damage, science, technology transfer and capacity building, ecosystem conservation and restoration, equity, just transition, gender equality and human rights.
- **The GST must recognise the interconnection between the components of ambition**, and in particular that failure to limit warming to below the 1.5°C goal will significantly increase harmful climate impacts adding significant risks to people and the ecosystems we rely on around the planet, raising the requirements for adaptation and loss and damage actions and the associated finance. **The GST must provide an answer to how we can get on track to limiting warming to 1.5°C**, embedding a human rights-based approach, including the rights of Indigenous Peoples, consideration of inter-generational equity, a gender-responsive, and an ecosystem-based approach.
- **The GST must protect people, ecosystems, and their rights from the current and future impacts of climate change**, support them to mitigate and adapt, and address loss and damage to achieve climate justice, in an adequate and fair manner.

Recommendations on structure, process and events for the consideration of outputs of the first global stocktake

The GST-CO should aim to provide a clear process for building a common and ambitious vision for its outcome among Parties and Non-Party Stakeholders. A clear, inclusive, deliberative, science-led and facilitative process can ensure robust and ambitious GST-CO outcomes that fully build on and fairly reflect the findings of the technical assessment component.

- The GST-CO must allow and support the **participation of observers** at every stage and at each meeting, including all workshops and high-level events as well as negotiations under the joint contact group. This must ensure the **representation of diverse knowledge**, especially youth, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, women, farmers, and most affected peoples including racial minorities, people with disabilities and LGBTQIA+ people.
- The high-level committee of the COP27 and COP28 Presidencies and SB Chairs should present a **work plan for the GST-CO** well in advance of potential high-level events to Parties at SB58 in June.
- The high-level events under the GST-CO should commence immediately after the end of SB58 until the end of COP28 (**June to December 2023**).
- The GST must be science and local knowledge-driven, with institutions such as the IPCC, but also indigenous people' knowledge and the experiences of affected communities on the ground. **It is not a space meant to allow the representation of private interests, especially those aligned**

with perpetuating business-as-usual emissions. When private interests are entering the GST space, conflict of interest must be avoided, especially by requiring a declaration of conflict of interest by all private actors attending the GST events in advance, as well as confirming the participants of the events 3 to 4 weeks before the event.

- More generally, the GST is the momentum to re-think the functioning of the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement implementations' in terms of participation of all actors of society, implementation tracking, mandate and missions of the secretariat. There should be concrete safeguards on conflict of interest in the whole UNFCCC sphere so that the crisis implementation mode can be highly ambitious. **At COP28, we are expecting the creation of a taskforce with Parties and constituencies to work on several institutional and policy reforms that should be implemented at least by 2025, for the next round of NDCs.** This task force should be piloted by the UNFCCC secretariat and supported by Parties and all UNFCCC constituencies.

April	The first workshop to discuss the political outcome of the GST should be held in April. We advocate for a virtual/hybrid format so that many participants can contribute. This workshop shall be open to observers and non-state actors. We expect discussions around the format and the messages of this GST outcome, and hopefully work sessions on a potential text for COP28 already, in order to have a basis for discussion in Bonn (during the last technical dialog, but also in the Joint Contact Group space). Also by that time, the IPCC AR6 Synthesis Report should be released and must be well integrated in the discussions of the workshop, as well as the other events around the GST this year.
June-November	<p>The 2023 GST work plan should outline a schedule of events throughout this period where critical political moments leverage political attention on the GST. It must be finalised at least for the SBs58 in June in Bonn. This includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The UN General Assembly and on the main agenda of the UN Secretary General's Climate Ambition Summit in September ● Pre-COP ● Key climate dialogues including the Petersberg Climate Dialogue, Regional Climate Weeks and at the summit on international finance to be hosted by President Macron of France in June ● The side-lines of the G20 Climate Ministers and Leaders Meetings and other ministerial and leaders level plurilateral fora ● A youth climate summit on the Global Stocktake <p>The UNSG Climate Ambition Summit is the most critical of these convenings. As the last multilateral leaders' level summit on climate before COP28, the Summit should seek to generate a clear outcome demonstrating that leaders are committed to agreeing an ambitious final COP28 GST outcome and implementing the required actions afterwards.</p>
Week 1 - COP28	A leaders-level summit on the GST outcome should take place during the leaders-level segment of COP28. The aim of this summit should be to provide

	<p>negotiators with a clear political mandate to deliver</p> <p>In order to be complementary to the GST, the high-level committee should consider organising pre-existing high-level ministerial roundtables in a manner that seeks to inform the GST-CO. This includes ministerials on mitigation ambition and implementation; just transition; and finance.</p> <p>The high-level committee should invite plurilateral initiatives outside the UNFCCC to convene ministerial-level discussions with the full participation of observers and non-party stakeholders that provide an update to progress and discussion of how GST outcomes can accelerate action in their focus areas. This can include: the Coalition of Ministers for Climate Action; the Coalition of Trade Ministers for Climate Action; and plurilateral initiatives including the Powering Past Coal Alliance, the Global Methane Pledge, the Glasgow Breakthroughs, the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance, the Glasgow Leaders Declaration on Forests and Land Use, etc.</p>
Week 2 - COP28	<p>Negotiations for a final COP28 Global Stocktake decision should take place under the Joint Contact Group.</p> <p>This should shift global climate action and the UNFCCC into ‘crisis implementation’ mode, and include a clear mandate for transforming global climate governance for 1.5C. This includes the creation of a task-force with Parties and constituencies to work on several reforms that should be implemented at least by 2025, for the next NDC round, in order to re-think the functioning of the UNFCCC in terms of participation of all actors of society, implementation tracking, mandate and missions of the secretariat and to commence work around a new format of non-state climate action evaluation and accountability mechanism.</p> <p>The final decision should adopt and endorse the synthesis report by the co-facilitators of the technical dialogues and contain clear, practicable and actionable guidelines for Parties to follow to raise ambition and accelerate implementation of climate action. This should include a definitive roadmap across all sectors, actors and regions on what actions are required to limit warming to 1.5C and build enhanced climate resilience, using a human rights-based approach.</p> <p>It is our view that a declaration instead of a decision would not necessarily reflect a multilateral consensus outcome from the GST, and would not be preferable.</p>

Key findings to be discussed during the consideration of outputs of the first global stocktake

This section briefly outlines our view on the central findings from the GST in terms of forward-looking action that Parties should undertake in light of the technical assessment under the GST to date. We would hope the GST-CO reflects these key findings in its discussions and ultimate outputs including a final COP28 GST decision text. For general consideration, this process is about bringing higher attention to the need to take stock and hold accountable the Parties, but generally actors who are engaging for climate. **We expect the GST will acknowledge the need to improve accountability for non-state climate actors, and kick-start work on new evaluation mechanisms.** For example, as recommended by the UN

High-Level Expert Group on the Net Zero Emissions Commitments of Non-State Entities, as a minimum, non-state actors should report on progress made towards commitments in a standardised, open format and via public platforms that feed into the UNFCCC Global Climate Action Portal (GCAP). A new accountability system for non-state actors could include both coordinated support to improve reporting frameworks, and penalties for non-action (such as being ineligible to participate in the Race to Zero or Race to Resilience until such reporting is completed). Such an evaluation mechanism is critical to assess the progress of non-state actors on their climate commitments and the credibility of corporate transition plans. Finally, the GST has to signal to global governments the importance of legislating domestic climate governance systems that can anchor Party accountability and regulatory requirements for non-state actors.

An urgent, just, and equitable phase out of fossil fuels is essential for 1.5°C

Parties should acknowledge the need for an immediate end to expansion of fossil fuel production and use at COP28. A global and **equitable phase-out of all fossil fuels before 2050** should be announced, with significant reductions to be achieved in line with the need to reduce emissions by at least 43% by 2030 compared to 2019 to reach the 1.5°C target, alongside an urgent phase-out of all fossil-fuel subsidies and other harmful subsidies.³ Reducing the carbon intensity of fossil fuel production is insufficient, as the vast majority of emissions associated with fossil fuels are those resulting from them being burned, and so it is possible to reduce carbon intensity while increasing total climate pollution.⁴ Continued fossil fuel dependence harms people and communities not only through the health impacts of climate change, but through short term air pollution, compounded by the health impacts of extraction and processing⁵. Finance for new oil and gas exploration as well as fossil fuel infrastructure should be stopped here and now. These finance flows must be diverted from polluting industries to major investments in renewable energy, energy efficiency and related infrastructure like grids and power storage from wind and solar taking into account ecosystems' resilience, as well as their interconnection, conservation and sustainable use, as well as full clean, renewable energy access in developing countries by 2030 as principally agreed by Parties in the Sustainable Development Goals earlier.

Further, the Global Stocktake should reiterate the need for a sectoral approach to the energy transition. The electricity sector is particularly important as a decarbonized electricity sector is the basis for decarbonization of other sectors. The GST should acknowledge that all countries must completely phase out coal-fired power by no later than 2040, and by 2030 latest in wealthy nations.⁶ However, it is too late to only phase out one fossil fuel at a time. Countries must now start to phase out oil and gas power generation, as well as production, towards a global economy fuelled by 100% renewables in all energy consuming sectors at the latest by mid century.

³ David Tong and Romain Loualalen, Investing in Disaster, Oil Change International (2020), https://priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2022/11/Investing_In_Disaster.pdf, at p. 4; Navigating Energy Transitions: Mapping the road to 1.5°C, 2022, International Institute for Sustainable Development, pp. 15-18, <https://www.iisd.org/publications/report/navigating-energy-transitions>.

⁴ Only 15% of energy sector emissions relate to the production and transport of oil and gas rather than its burning: IEA, The Oil and Gas Industry in Energy Transitions (2020), <https://www.iea.org/reports/the-oil-and-gas-industry-in-energy-transitions>.

⁵ Global Climate and Health Alliance, 2022. Cradle to Grave: The health harms of fossil fuel dependence and the case for a just phase-out

<https://climateandhealthalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Cradle-To-Grave-Fossil-Fuels-Brief.pdf>

⁶ IEA, Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector (2021), [Net Zero by 2050 – Analysis - IEA](#)

It is essential that this fossil fuel phase out proceed on the basis of equity and reflect the principles of a just transition.⁷ This means Just transition policies around social dialogue, social protection, labour rights and decent work, consistent with gender and intergenerational equity. Parties should also acknowledge that so-called “natural” gas is fossil gas, and exclude all false solutions that prolong dependence on fossil fuels and come with high human rights risks and presently occurring impacts..

To finish, we demand an effective and real equitable phase-out of fossil fuels, with strict, immediate emissions reduction. The GST must not be a place for false solutions and misleading greenwashing wording such as low-carbon, efficient or unabated fossil fuels, massive off-setting or deployment of technologies based on fossil fuels such as carbon capture, utilisation and storage, and any nuclear power.

Additionality and transparency of financial contributions

Developed country parties have failed to fulfil their previous climate finance pledges, i.e. the collective goal to provide 100 billion USD per year for mitigation and adaptation as of 2020, agreed in 2009 at COP15. Public climate finance must be new and additional to ODA, as agreed at COP15 and 16. However, according to a study, only 6% of the climate finance accounted by the OECD is additional to the pledge to provide 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) for ODA, and around 55% is diverted or displacing prior ODA commitments, based on a baseline of the ODA disbursed by rich countries in 2009 (before the \$100bn goal was agreed).⁸ This non-additionality is not transparent. In addition to this, recent studies indicate that parties also invested in irrelevant projects⁹, with analyses indicating overestimation of the climate component of funds for a reported project or programme.¹⁰

This lack of additionality and transparency has caused major disappointment and erosion of trust on the side of developing country parties. In this context, the GST should address the necessity of additionality and transparency in climate finance and in its reporting, and encourage improvement in this space, particularly with grant equivalence of further pledging and the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG). This will be an essential element to ensure mutual confidence and strengthen accountability.

Finance for adaptation and for loss and damage

Parties should clarify the process for scaling up both quantity and quality of climate finance provision, with Parties confirming public grant financing at the core of financial support, with a focus on at least doubling adaptation finance before 2025 and with Parties confirming public grant financing at the core of financial support, and additional funding including for addressing loss and damage, with concrete contributions to the new Loss and Damage Fund decided in Sharm El Sheikh in 2022.

The GST should reflect the global gaps in funding to meet the rising costs of adaptation and of loss and damage, while aiming to spur greater commitments from Parties. Parties should clarify their plans, collectively and individually, to scale-up climate finance for adaptation and loss and damage. According to commitments undertaken at COP26, adaptation finance from developed countries has to be at least doubled before 2025, but the pathway to this is uncertain. Adaptation finance should grow to levels equal to mitigation finance.

⁷ For a discussion of equity in fossil fuel phase out, see: Greg Muttitt and Sivan Kartha, Equity, climate justice and fossil fuel extraction: principles for a managed phase out, *Climate Policy* (2020), Vol. 20, Issue 8, 1024-1042.

⁸ CARE Denmark (2022) [That's Not New Money](#)

⁹ Toetzke, M., Stünzi, A. & Egli, F. Consistent and replicable estimation of bilateral climate finance. *Nat. Clim. Chang.* 12, 897–900 (2022)

¹⁰ Assessing the credibility of how climate adaptation aid projects are categorized. *Development in Practice*, Vol. 27, no. 4, p. 458–471. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2017.1307325>

On Loss and Damage, new and additional contributions are needed for the new funding architecture agreed at COP27." Finance for loss and damage is distinct from finance for adaptation, however. In light of unmet needs with growing losses and damages worldwide, significant new and additional contributions are necessary, and must support the new funding architecture agreed in Sharm El Sheikh in 2022. To remain consistent with the Paris Agreement, new developed country ODA funds for loss and damage must not displace, or represent a reorientation of, finance for adaptation, mitigation, or sustainable development goals (SDGs) more widely.

Scale-up of finance for just clean transitions

The GST should proactively address how to scale up adequate public and private financing for climate action to reduce emissions. For instance, there is a consensus in the wider scientific community that at least about a tripling of the joint and cumulative global investments towards about USD 4.5 trillion annually by 2030 is necessary compared to today, for rapid and successful decarbonisation in the energy sector based on rapid electrification. This encompasses renewables expansion, mainly solar and wind, energy efficiency in all energy consuming sectors of targeting 4% annually, infrastructure development including power storage and grid development, both small scale mini-grids as well as large scale international and regional high-voltage grids for efficient and reliable renewable electricity transport to the centres of consumption. Moreover, small-scale renewable energy solutions should have a big part dedicated to women-led enterprises and community led programmes.

Protection and restoration of ecosystems

The GST should address the need to align responses to the climate and biodiversity crises. Protecting and restoring ecosystem integrity in terrestrial, inland water, and coastal and marine ecosystems is critical to keep global warming to 1.5°C; limiting and adapting to the inevitable climate impacts and stop biodiversity loss¹¹. It should also recognize the role of agriculture as the dominant driver of nature loss and degradation and the need to transform food systems and subsidies towards agro-ecological, community and gender led solutions that reverse losses, deforestation and land degradation, delivering significant mitigation, productivity and landscape resilience co-benefits. National climate plans have interlinked implications for a wide array of environmental, cultural and societal challenges¹². Parties should raise their ambition in the land, freshwater and ocean sectors through a rights-based approach in their next round of NDCs, NAPs and Long Term - Low-emissions Development Strategies in coherence with their National Biodiversity Strategies And Plans (NBSAPs). This process must consider the net effect of mitigation measures and pathways for achieving both climate and non-climate goals, and addressing perverse incentives.

Pre- and Post-2030 emissions reductions

It is vital that policy reflects the latest science. Based on the IPCC 6th Assessment report, Parties should collectively peak by 2025 and achieve at least 43% emissions reduction by 2030 (below 2019 levels) to align with 1.5°C pathways. And respect, comply with policies and financing including bilateral and

¹¹ WWF, Our Climate Secret Ally, November 2022

https://www.panda.org/wwf_news/?6811966/climate-nature-secret-ally#:~:text=Our%20Climate's%20Secret%20Ally%20%7C%20WWF&text=Healthy%20nature%20is%20an%20ally,resilient%20to%20a%20warming%20planet.

¹² Assessing the credibility of how climate adaptation aid projects are categorized. Development in Practice, Vol. 27, no. 4, p. 458–471. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2017.1307325>

international support that richer countries need to do much more than poorer ones to address the climate challenges across all aspects. Yet, the mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation ambition gap to achieving the long term target of the Paris Agreement is well established in the scientific and political narratives. Specifically, CAN recalls the findings of the UNFCCC NDC synthesis report which finds that the implementation of NDCs are projected to lead to total GHG emission levels that are only 0.3% lower than in 2019. Further, the level of cumulative projected CO₂ emissions in 2020–2030 would use 86% of the remaining carbon budget aligned with 1.5°C warming.

CAN insists that meeting the 2030 GHG emission reduction targets and the strong move to a managed decline of all fossil fuels is paramount for all governmental activities to remain in an accountable trajectory for a global 1.5 C pathway in this decade. This is the overall paradigm for the Global Stocktake in line with a Just Transition and equity. Governments, particularly the wealthier ones and those with a high historic and per capita CO₂ emission must recognise that any failure of meeting targets by 2030 or in this decade will automatically require strengthening GHG emission reduction commitments for later years to stay within the boundary of a 1.5 C survival target for the most vulnerable communities and fragile ecosystems.

CAN urges that an equitable and fair phase out of fossil fuels, both production and consumption, must be at the heart of any short-, mid-, and long-term credible climate policy.

Recognising Wider Adaptation Action

The Glasgow-Sharm-el-Sheikh Work programme on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) is meant to conclude at COP28, and its outcomes should be an important pillar on which the GST-CO can guide Parties on the necessary actions to step up adaptation and support in order to accelerate towards the achievement of the GGA. It must absolutely reflect contributions and participation from local actors, in particular Indigenous People, Women, small-scale food producers or youth. In a general manner, it is important to remind the strong link between the pillars to fight climate change: Mitigation, Adaptation, Loss and Damages. All three are equally important and must be treated with the same ambition. If adaptation is not well considered, mitigation policies or loss and damages measures will not succeed to protect the people from climate change and to enhance their resilience.

Human Rights

As recognized by the Paris Agreement, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote, and consider their respective obligations on human rights. To respect their human rights obligations, Parties must ensure a human rights-based and intersectional design, implementation and monitoring of all relevant planning documents and processes related to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, with a strong focus on public participation and Indigenous Peoples' rights to self-determination and Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC). Although an increasing number of NDCs make explicit reference to human rights, the majority of these do not elaborate on how human rights were actually considered in planning and will be considered in the implementation¹³. The political outcome of the GST must therefore include a concrete and detailed commitment by and guidance for Parties to effectively integrate human rights in the design, implementation and evaluation of NDCs, NAPs

13

https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Integrating-Human-Rights-in-Nationally-Determined-Contributions_Toolkit-for-Practitioners.pdf

and other relevant policy instruments related to the implementation of the Paris Agreement. This commitment and related guidance can build on existing guidance developed by human rights institutions and civil society organisations, and should include concrete approaches to increase synergies with human rights institutions and mechanisms such as the UN Human Rights Office (OHCHR), the UN Special Rapporteur on climate change and human rights, and regional and National Human Rights Institutions. The work plan should also include specific commitments and guidance on how Parties will protect the rights of environmental defenders, and how to guarantee access to information, public participation, and Indigenous Peoples' consultation.