COP27: TIME TO DELIVER CLIMATE JUSTICE

OCTOBER 2022

Climate Action Network
A report prepared by:
CAN Working Groups and the CAN International Secretariat
GLOSSARY

ACE: Action for Climate Empowerment
AOSIS: Alliance of Small Island States
BAU: Business as Usual
BTR: biennial transparency report
CAN: Climate Action Network
CBD: Convention on Biological Diversity
CBDR-RC: Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities
CCS: Carbon Capture and storage
COI: conflict of interest
CMA: Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement
COP: Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC
CVF: Climate Vulnerable Forum
ExCom: Executive Committee
FSV: facilitative sharing of views
GBF: Global Biodiversity Framework
GCF: Green Climate Fund
GGA: Global Goal on Adaptation
GHG: GreenHouse Gases
GlaSS: Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work programme
GNI: Gross national income
GST: Global Stocktake
IEA: International Energy Agency
IPBES: Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services
IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPLCs: Indigenous Peoples and local communities
KJWA: Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture
LDFF: Loss & Damage Finance Facility
LTS: long-term strategies
MDBs: multilateral development banks
MPGs: Modalities, Procedures, and Guidelines
MWP: Mitigation work programme
NAPs: National Adaptation Plans
NAPAs: National Adaptation Programmes of Action
NBSAPs: National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans
NCQG: New Collective Quantified Goal
NDCs: Nationally Determined Contributions
NPS: Non–Party Stakeholders
ODA: Official development assistance
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PR2: Second Periodic Review (PR2)
SB: Subsidiary Bodies
SCF: Standing Committee on Finance
SDGs: Sustainable Development Goals
SIDS: Small Island Developing States
SNLD: Santiago Network on Loss & Damage
TPR: Third Periodic Review
UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WIM: Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss & Damage
KEY DOCUMENTS

Overarching

- Fair Shares: Lessons from Practice, Thoughts on Strategy

Protecting people and ecosystems

- Loss & Damage Finance Facility: Why and How
- Briefing Towards a Glasgow Dialogue that Matters
- Letter to the Heads of Delegation: Agree on the Loss & Damage Finance Agenda Item for the COP27 Climate Conference
- CAN Submission: Call for input “Promotion and protection of human rights in the context of mitigation, adaptation, and financial actions to address climate change, with particular emphasis on Loss & Damage”
- The debt and climate crises: Why climate justice must include debt justice
- CAN Submission: Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh (GlaSS) Work Programme on the Global Goal on Adaptation – views on how to achieve the objectives under the work programme (April 2022)
- CAN Submission: Second Workshop of Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheik Work Programme theme “Enhancing adaptation action and support”, August 2022

Phasing out Fossil Fuels, Promoting Energy Democracy & Security

- Ideas On A Work Programme For Urgently Scaling Up Mitigation Ambition And Implementation
- Letter to the Heads of Delegation - Deliver Urgent Mitigation Ambition and Climate Finance
- Untapped Potential – Raising The Bar On G20 Ambition
- 1.5°C: A Tipping Point for the Arctic

People-Driven Implementation & Accountability of Climate Action

- CAN Submission: Principles On The Aims Of The New Collective Quantified Goal (February 2022)
- CAN Submission on New Collective Quantified Goal: Working towards a equitable new global goal on Climate Finance (August 2022)
- CAN Submission for the First Input Phase of the Global Stocktake (February 2022)
- CAN Submission for the First Input Phase of the Global Stocktake (August 2022)
- CAN Submission: Elements For The New Action Plan On Action For Climate Empowerment (Ace) And Modalities For The In-Session Technical Workshop On Ace (March 2022)

Many more resources available on the CAN website
COP27: Time to Deliver Climate Justice

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Multiple crises are unfolding before our eyes: in the Horn of Africa, communities are facing famine-like conditions due to drought, while record-breaking heatwaves are witnessed all across Europe, the US, and China where the central Chinese province of Jiangxi has declared a water supply "red alert" for the first time as well as supercharged hurricanes sweeping through the US, and extreme flooding in Pakistan, Nigeria, Australia and Spain.

More than 3 billion people are already living in contexts highly vulnerable to climate impacts and are suffering from multiple intersecting crises compounded by climate change resulting in violation of their human rights. This happened as one-third of Pakistan was under water from historic floods. We are in an era of Loss & Damage from climate change. COP27 must be the COP to deliver for those vulnerable to the climate crisis. Business as usual will not do, the slow pace of negotiations is not acceptable, not aligned with ambition, and not conducive to the deep system transformations we need to ensure a just, climate-safe world for current and future generations.

The context of human rights challenges of this COP are broad, deeply concerning and intolerable. In addition, the trend towards shrinking civic space, disregard for basic human rights and authoritarianism across the world is growing. From the lens of climate action and climate justice, it is important to emphasise that there can be no climate justice without human rights. Anything said and done to the contrary is just lip service. Therefore the discussions and outcomes of the COP must reflect a strengthening of human rights and take concrete steps to safeguard these rights as also highlighted in the report\(^1\) by the Special Rapporteur for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the Context of Climate Change.

It has never been acceptable that those who are least responsible and the most vulnerable must carry the majority of the burden of this climate crisis and other crises. Equity and Justice must be a cornerstone for the discussions and outcomes. The wealthy must do their fair share. The polluters must pay.

With each passing year of inaction and unkept promises, trust in the Paris Agreement erodes. Rich countries have continually failed to deliver on their finance pledges whilst the invasion of Ukraine has been used as an excuse to backtrack on the mitigation commitment of some countries. At COP27 Parties

\(^1\) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change (2022). Promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change mitigation, loss and damage and participation, A/77/226
need to restore trust in the purpose of the Paris Agreement by conducting negotiations in a manner that demonstrates the appropriate sense of urgency and strengthened solidarity around the climate crisis. This would mean delivering across the board on mitigation, adaptation, Loss & Damage, and finance across issue spaces framed by the equity principles of the convention, climate justice and human rights.

**Safeguarding People and Ecosystems for Climate Justice and Intergenerational Equity**

- **As the very first and central step COP27 must address climate-induced Loss & Damage, a topic that has been neglected for far too long.** This starts by agreeing on a substantive agenda to financially address Loss & Damage as recently requested by over 400 Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). From there COP27 must deliver a robust decision to set up a Loss & Damage Finance Facility and request the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) to produce a biennial Loss & Damage Financing Gap report to inform the set up of this facility. COP27 must also meaningfully operationalize the Santiago network for Loss & Damage.

- **In addition COP27 must be a real milestone for adaptation, this would mean substantive outcomes on adaptation finance and the Global Goal on Adaptation.** On adaptation finance, we need an agenda item on implementing a 50% share and doubling of adaptation finance as well as a transparent implementation plan showing progress towards the 2025 doubling target in an equitable and accessible manner. Espousing the principles of locally-led adaptation, the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) should also have a permanent agenda item, and through it, furthering transformative adaptation. The Glasgow Sharm-el-Sheik (GlaSS) programme must deliver a clear workplan on how to fully operationalise the GGA.

- **At COP27, Parties also have the opportunity to take forward insights shared over the course of seven insightful Koronivia workshops and provide key guidance to improve the quality, as well as the quantity of climate finance for agriculture and especially adaptation.** The next phase of Koronivia agriculture negotiations must provide a basis for deepening discussions and policy recommendations on agroecology, gender responsiveness, food loss and waste, and adaptation finance.

- **Furthermore, the scientific consensus is clear: if action to protect biodiversity fails, climate action will fail and vice versa. Integrated action is critical.** At COP26, the essential role of biodiversity in achieving 1.5°C was formally recognised but more is urgently needed. The UNFCCC must progress toward ambitious outcomes for biodiversity and climate integration across negotiations and work programmes. COP27 must hold Parties accountable to deliver on existing nature initiatives agreed upon at COP26 and elsewhere in terms of both action and integrity. It should prioritize rapid fossil fuel phase-out alongside protecting, restoring and improving the management of carbon and species-rich ecosystems through a rights-based approach.

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PHASING-OUT FOSSIL FUELS, ENSURING ENERGY DEMOCRACY & SECURITY

- With both 2030 mitigation goals and implementation fundamentally off track, COP27 negotiations must demonstrate an appropriate sense of urgency and enhanced ambition. This would mean delivering a robust COP27 decision text addressing realignment with the goals of the Paris Agreement while reflecting on this challenge in the Global Stocktake (GST) and ongoing UNFCCC processes, such as the Mitigation Work Programme\(^3\) (MWP) as recently requested by \textit{nearly 200 Civil Society Organisations}\(^4\).

- COP27 must respond to the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) Synthesis Report and Long-Term Strategies (LTS) Synthesis Report in the decision text and deliver a decision that reminds Parties that successive NDC should represent a progression, should reflect its highest possible ambition, can be updated at any time, and that Parties should verify that current NDCs are equitable and are in line with the IPCC’s latest scientific recommendations.

- COP27 must define and deliver an ambitious, equitable MWP. The MWP must be complementary to the GST, and must be based on equity and fair shares and the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC). It must Strengthen and expand on the Leaders’ pledges made at COP26 that are showing progress and call for their inclusion in NDCs and LTS.

- As has been continually reaffirmed by the latest scientific analysis, it is necessary for all countries to completely phase-out coal-fired power, as well as phase-out oil and gas to levels that ensure the achievement of more than 50% nature-safe renewables in their energy mix by 2030 based on equity and fair shares and the principle of CBDR-RC. Finance must be diverted from polluting industries to major investments in renewable energy and clean energy access in developing countries with a focus on Africa. Initiatives announced on the sidelines of COP27 by countries, multilateral and bilateral financial institutions, and businesses must be in line with advancing the adoption of renewables, ensuring universal energy access, and furthering energy security and sovereignty.

\textit{Climate Finance}

- Noting that finance is a critical enabler of ambitious climate action, COP27 must reaffirm the need for adequate, scaled-up finance that is equitable (in scale and instruments deployed) and in line with climate justice. Finance to address the climate crisis cannot be debt-inducing. In this regard, COP27 should also further the definition of climate finance.

- We must also see significant and urgent progress on the delivery of the long-awaited US $ 100 billion in climate finance. This figure, whilst inadequate, unjust and problematic still matters. Developed countries must make good for the lack of delivering the 100 billion on time.

\(^3\) See CAN, (2022). \textit{Ideas On A Work Programme For Urgently Scaling Up Mitigation Ambition And Implementation}. Briefing paper
\(^4\) CAN, (2022). \textit{Letter to the Heads of Delegation - Deliver Urgent Mitigation Ambition and Climate Finance}
The continued deliberations around the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) must show progression to improve on the current inadequate and unjust system of climate finance. The NCQG cannot repeat the mistakes of the past and be designed as a needs-based and science-based goal. Parties must furthermore decide to establish an agenda item on Aligning Financial Flows under Article 2.1c of the Paris Agreement.

**People Driven Implementation and Accountability of Climate Action**

- **COP27 is an important staging-post for the Global Stocktake (GST) on the way to its ultimate political conclusions at COP28.** Parties and the COP27 and COP28 Presidencies must work together in Sharm-El Sheikh, via the Joint Contact Group, to deliver a COP27 decision text to address the glaring ambition gap. COP27 should ensure an inclusive, discussion-oriented and equitable GST technical dialogue and deliver a COP27 decision text that establishes a GST work plan for 2023. COP27 must, therefore:
  - Signal that COP28 will need to set out forward pathways closing the gaps in 3 key areas encapsulated in a needs-based approach: Fossil fuels phase-out & energy transition; Ecosystems protection, restoration and management; Finance (mitigation, adaptation and Loss & Damage);
  - Signal a readiness to develop a final decision/declaration in 2023 on how to oblige Parties to consider the following points for the improvement of climate action by 2025;
  - Mandate the High-Level Champions to develop a dedicated format for the evaluation of non-state climate action.

- **As the rulebook was finalized at COP26, and countries are in the implementation phase, COP27 must ensure adequate and effective capacity-building support for transparency is provided to fully implement the enhanced transparency framework and ensure consistent application.** Parties should also agree to allow the voluntary request of technical expert reviews of the information reported on climate change impacts and adaptation.

- **COP27 will also see the adoption of the new Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE).** It is essential that all activities under the Action Plan are grounded in human rights and allow meaningful and inclusive participation. Including by providing information in accessible formats, of civil society and Indigenous Peoples’ organizations, and people with disabilities whose contribution is essential to advance the six pillars of ACE at the local, national, regional, and international levels. It must also recognise the critical need to protect environmental defenders.

- **The COP process must provide a space at the decision-making table for the most affected people.** As we see the worrying shrinking of civic space in these integral avenues, this and all other COPs must champion and enable meaningful civil society participation. Their existential purpose is to ultimately deliver for the people.

- **As the COP of the vulnerables - COP27 must strive to raise the ambition and accelerate the work on climate justice and gender equality in the implementation of**
the Paris agreement, across all relevant workstreams. As highlighted by the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and climate change, Parties should establish a process to revise and improve the Gender Action Plan, for agreement at COP28.

- Lastly, COP should not be an enterprise. Looking onwards, the selection process of countries to be entitled to host this important conference, must see the development of mechanisms that ensure people's rights and well-being from an access rights perspective. The inclusion of a protocol for risk assessments and preventive measures to enable the safe and effective participation of the public in the selection of host countries could ensure that the minimum conditions for effective participation are guaranteed. In line with what COP is trying to achieve and for whom, States wishing to host a COP meeting must demonstrate their commitment to human rights and people's participation.

The deep systemic transformations needed to address the multiple crises that we are facing can only be achieved through transformational change focused on healing our broken systems and relationships while addressing structural inequalities. In a world of finite resources, we must challenge the models of growth that rest on a capitalist worldview and hold States accountable to respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, including the rights of children, and intergenerational equity, when taking action to address climate change.

We are the people and we have the power. Together we are stronger.
INTRODUCTION

THE WORLD TODAY

The world is in a state of polycrisis as economic, societal and environmental systems experience compounding and interrelated shocks which are a product of long seeded institutional failures driven by corporate interests and expansion grounded in colonial legacy and racial injustice. The impact of human activities on our Planet has been so profound that it has been proposed as a new geological epoch - the anthropocene.

Wealthy nations and entrenched fossil fuel interests have delayed action in mitigating climate change since it became apparent in the early 1970’s that our atmospheric commons was being detrimentally changed by human activity.

"the different tributaries of harm are leading us to the same river of colonisation"
As governments and historical polluters have failed to act at the scale and speed of urgency needed, this cost has significantly mounted. Models show the cost of a further delay to stay within the 2°C and 1.5°C targets. For the 2°C scenario, each additional year of delay in implementing mitigation would cost an additional 0.3–0.9 trillion US dollars in total discounted future mitigation costs.⁵


Least cost pathways for global temperature goal

An illustration of (a) 1980–2020 and (b) 2020–2040 emissions trends required for least-cost 1.5 and 2.0 degree non-exceedance cases as a function of abatement start date. The peak rate (c) and time (d) of negative emissions are also shown. Solid lines show the ensemble median (a–c), (d is a mean over discrete values), while shaded regions show (a–c) show the 10th and 90th percentiles of the perturbed ensemble distribution.⁶

⁶ Source: ibid
Delayed mitigation and adaptation action has increased the burden of Loss & Damage, foremost impacting the vulnerable and those with the least adaptive capacity. The atlas of suffering\(^7\), for humans and non-human species alike, has been delivered with devastating clarity in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) WG II Impacts report\(^8\). We see the complexity of the burdens borne through the example of displacement. When you look at the roots, when you trace the journey you see the jagged cliffs of injustice that those least responsible for the climate crisis must climb. For example, human mobility and displacement from ongoing extractive practices, land-use change, unjust transitions and increasing climate impacts are driving millions out of their homes and across borders, with no adequate system to help them.

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The unfolding debt crisis in the Global South which in itself is rooted in colonial legacies\(^11\) is closely tied to the failure of wealthy nations to pay up for climate action. Without finance for addressing Loss & Damage & Adaptation, Sub-Saharan African countries will have to take on an additional US $1 trillion\(^12\) in debt over the next 10 years. This represents a 50% increase in current debt levels as a percentage of GDP.

Wealthy nations who have profited from the historic and continued destruction of Indigenous lands, ecosystems and our atmospheric commons, still refuse to do their fair share. They refuse to pay up for Loss & Damage and to act in solidarity and cooperation to ensure developing and vulnerable countries can transition to a just and climate-safe future for all.

Fossil fuel companies have been reporting windfall profits in 2022 whilst inflation, the cost of living crisis and the energy crisis rage on. BP, ExxonMobil, Chevron, Shell and TotalEnergies together made US $55 billion\(^13\) in the second quarter of 2022.


\(^8\) IPCC, (2022): Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change


\(^11\) Debt Justice, (2022). Colonialism and debt - How debt is used to exploit and control

\(^12\) CAN-I & Debt Justice, (2022). The debt and climate crises: Why climate justice must include debt justice

Whilst trillions are needed - we are still discussing billions as wealthy nations responsible for delivering the annual US $100 billion by 2020 in climate finance, which was pledged in 2009, have failed to do so, eroding trust in the multilateral climate process. This pledged amount is in itself deeply and unequivocally flawed, not based on needs nor specifying any rules on what counts as climate finance.

All nations, rich or poor, will need to step up if we want to have any chance of staying within the 1.5C target but the wealthy must go first and support others to follow suit. The IPCC WG II Impacts report notes that whilst 1.5°C would cause unavoidable increases in multiple climate hazards and present multiple risks to ecosystems and humans, it would substantially reduce projected losses and damages in comparison to higher warming levels, but cannot eliminate them all.

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The world we want

Today, we have all the solutions to move towards a just, equitable and climate-safe world for all. Climate change and its impacts need to be addressed through the lens of justice and human rights. Such a people-centered and rights-based approach enables us to emphasise and unpack the political and moral choices that shape institutions and governance structures.

It is unequivocal that climate change has an impact on human rights across the world and that the current unjust political and economic systems are the driving forces behind climate change. Centering human rights is not only important to address climate change but is critical in its own right.

- The #WorldWeWant is grounded in justice for all people, rooted in solidarity and compassion. People use their power to shape policies that uproot harmful current systems through deep, collaborative democracy that is grounded in advocating for one another and valuing traditional wisdom.

- In the #WorldWeWant institutions are reformed and restructured and they contribute to dignifying and bringing hope to people.

- The #WorldWeWant is complex, interconnected, and interdependent. Humans are part of the web of life and act decisively to turn around and prevent the 6th mass extinction of the Earth's evolutionary history.
This essential framing in justice and human rights can be strengthened by supporting the call\textsuperscript{15} initiated by Pacific Youth and elevated by Vanuatu to take the world’s biggest problem by seeking an Advisory Opinion on climate change from the International Court of Justice for intergenerational equity. Working with other UN bodies and expanding outside of the unnatural siloes created around the most connected crisis of our day is also critical to systematically address the issue of climate change - as for instance, we see in the \textit{Intergovernmental Declaration on Children, Youth and Climate Action}\textsuperscript{16}

Whilst states have a legal obligation to uphold the rights of their citizens, historical polluters also have a moral debt to pay by upholding their fair share of mitigation, adaptation action and addressing Loss & Damage. We do not need to unpack the climate crisis by much to realise that it is a result of a history of failures and denial, of oppression, colonial extractive practices and greed built on the notion that humanity, but particularly men, have dominion over nature. The human rights and justice lens returns us to the frontlines, to indigenous people and communities, to people of colour, women, children, people with disabilities, LGBTQI the displaced and the marginalised. In doing so it gives us a framework through which to navigate to the heart of the problem and draw out the simple solution for a climate justice, safe and equitable world for all.

False solutions offered by polluters and wealthy nations are dangerous distractions that will delay action. Some examples include:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Gas expansion under the guise of a bridging fuel
  \item Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) as a viable strategy through which to curb emissions
  \item Investing in brown infrastructure to facilitate net zero transition in the Global South
  \item The unbounded pursuit of economic growth and development which does not align with the reality of achieving a climate-safe world for all

\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Offsets which undermine real ambition and allow for dangerous greenwashing
  \item Insurance as a panacea to address Loss & Damage
  \item Relabelling adaptation finance to address Loss & Damage
  \item Diverting development aid to finance adaptation and to respond to Loss & Damage
  \item Lending rather than grant-based finance for adaptation,
\end{itemize}

However, as CAN we reject dangerous distractions and only offer viable solutions encapsulated by the climate justice and rights-based lens. These include:

\section*{Solution 1: Polluters pay and a new climate finance architecture}

\textbf{Finance} is the key that can unlock progress. The way in which wealthy nations provide international cooperation is systemically broken and rooted in colonial, subjugating architectures of power, extraction and inequality. The Bretton Woods institutions of the World Bank and the IMF have created debt traps for the poor and vulnerable for the benefit of the wealthy few. There are of course solutions to a just and equitable world. These include:

- **Debt cancellation** to enable countries the fiscal space to enact sustainability measures and to invest in a just transition whilst building climate resilience. Debt cancellation is not a replacement for climate finance obligations which need to be new and additional.

- **Developed economies to tax the windfall profits of fossil fuel companies** with those funds redirected to address Loss & Damage and facilitate adaptation and enable just transition.

\textsuperscript{15} ICJAO Campaign
\textsuperscript{16} UNICEF, (2019). \textit{Declaration on Children, Youth and Climate Action}
- For the deep system-wide transformations needed we need to shift the trillions through adequate, predictable, new, and additional needs-based public finance that is not debt-inducing. The governance of climate finance needs to be recalibrated to serve peoples and communities in the Global South. The New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG)\(^\text{17}\) is a means through which to implement climate action at the scale required.

“Today, I am calling on all developed economies to tax the windfall profits of fossil fuel companies, those funds should be redirected in two ways – to countries suffering loss and damage caused by the climate crisis and to people struggling with rising food and energy prices. Excellencies let’s tell it like it is, our world is addicted to fossil fuels and it’s time for an intervention. We need to hold fossil fuel companies and their enablers to account.”

**SOLUTION 2: CALLING AND END TO THE FOSSIL FUEL ERA**

To achieve the Paris goals, all countries must phase out coal, oil, and gas extraction before 2050, with wealthy nations first.

A global climate response must be accepted as sufficiently fair if it is to be effective. Equity and fair shares must underpin the transition. No country can continue in uncontrolled and irresponsible GreenHouse Gases (GHG) production without adversely affecting all others. All countries, but foremost advanced economies, need to take responsibility as well as assist developing countries, including by providing them with the financial support that they need. As CAN’s discussion paper on equity and fair shares\(^\text{18}\) notes: “the planetary mobilization now required cannot be successfully mounted, or sustained unless it is very broadly accepted as fair both between and within countries.”

\(^{17}\) See CAN (August 2022). CAN Submission on New Collective Quantified Goal: Working towards a equitable new global goal on Climate Finance

The protection and restoration of biodiverse and carbon-rich ecosystems like wetlands and tropical forests are crucial for reducing CO₂ emissions and storing carbon towards a 1.5°C pathway in line with phasing out fossil fuels.

**100% sustainable renewables by 2050 supported by energy efficiency** in all economic sectors with wealthy nations first and supporting the just transition for all others.

**Solution 3: Delivering on need-based, locally led adaptation for climate resilience**

Locally-led, transformational adaptation\(^{19}\) practices to build the climate resilience of people, biodiversity and ecosystems backed by scaled, accessible, additional and needs-based finance

- Respecting and being led by Indigenous and local knowledge holders
- Adaptation action is planned, managed and assessed at the most local level possible, and is the basis for the most effective, equitable and sustainable adaptation actions.

- Espousing transformative adaptation to manage climate risks. Such adaptation requires and presents an opportunity for society to fundamentally challenge and change the relations of social and gendered power and the socio-structural constraints that deepen vulnerability through discrimination and exclusion while at the same time reducing the negative consequences of climate change impacts.

**Solution 4: Delivering climate justice to the impacted by addressing loss & damage**

Loss & Damage is a climate justice issue, and the response to it must be aligned with a climate justice-oriented approach. Wealthy nations must pay-up for Loss & Damage.

Overarchingly, Loss & Damage finance should adhere to the principles of 1) international solidarity, historical responsibility and the polluter pays principle; 2) new and additional; 3) needs-based, adequate, predictable and precautionary; 4) locally driven with subsidiarity - enrolling gender responsiveness and equitable representation; 5) public and grant-based; 6) balanced and comprehensive.

\(^{19}\) For the IPCC 'transformation' refers to a change in the fundamental attributes of natural and human systems. Some adaptation is incremental, which only modifies existing systems. Other actions are transformational, leading to changes in the fundamental characteristics. Transformational adaptation encompasses incremental adaptation and is increasingly being proposed as a sustainable approach to managing climate change risks. The [2012 IPCC 5th Assessment Report WGII](https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/) stated that ‘transformational adaptation seeks to change the fundamental attributes of systems in response to actual or expected climate and its effects, often at a scale and ambition greater than incremental activities.

Transformative adaptation requires and presents an opportunity for society to fundamentally challenge and change the relations of social power and the socio-structural constraints that deepen vulnerability while at the same time reducing the negative consequences of climate change impacts.
Rebalancing Power through Transformational Change

The deep systemic transformations needed to address the multiple crises that we are facing can only be achieved through transformational change focused on healing our broken systems and relationships while addressing structural inequalities. In a world of finite resources, we must challenge the models of growth that rest on a capitalist worldview and hold States accountable to respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, including the rights of children, and intergenerational equity, when taking action to address climate change.

"The best thermometer to the progress of a nation is its treatment of its women"

At the edge of chaos is where innovation happens and the entrenched ways of doing are eventually overthrown - this is the place where the institutions which have upheld the systems of failures that have deepened the states of crises we are in must change and must give way to systems that directly prioritize the interests of the people, instead of the interest of a few and lead to the deep transformations for a climate just, equitable future for all.

Box 1 - Values of the World We Want

★ Solidarity, trust, inclusiveness, fairness, generosity, cooperation, integrity, and equality are among the core values of the world we want.
★ Diversity is considered a strength.
★ Collective decision-making allows ideas and actions to flourish and grow from the ground up.
★ People and communities are united by a sense of community and committed to positive change, willing to push boundaries, and challenge the authority and the status quo.

We are the people and we have the power.
Together we are stronger.

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CHAPTER 1: SAFEGUARDING PEOPLE AND ECOSYSTEMS FOR CLIMATE JUSTICE AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY

1.1 LOSS & DAMAGE

Loss & Damage is an issue of climate justice. It must be approached through the lens of human rights, equity and fair shares. Whilst Loss & Damage is experienced globally (as evidenced by wildfires and flooding in the US and EU) it is developing countries and in particular the most vulnerable, communities and people, with limited capacity to respond, that are impacted the most. We see this very recently in Pakistan where 33 million people have been impacted by devastating floods and displaced from their homes. Small Island Developing States (SIDS) see new disasters strike as they are still recovering from the last. The complexity of Loss & Damage does mean that issues such as climate-induced migration should be on the agenda of the UN inter-governmental bodies, and specifically should have a standalone space under the political COP/CMA agenda, pulling it out of the solely technical and often hidden areas of work it sits under.

You do not need to unpack Loss & Damage by much to see clearly that the burden keeps falling back on the communities impacted as the scale of finance to respond to these disasters and their aftermath is insufficient and financing mechanisms for delivery are not fit for purpose. There is currently no finance to address Loss & Damage in the climate finance architecture.

At COP26 G77 and China, representing the majority of the world, proposed the delivery of a finance facility to address Loss & Damage. The compromise of the Glasgow Dialogue for Loss & Damage\(^ {21} \) was instead reached. Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), which has been seeking finance to address Loss & Damage for the last three decades, made it clear that it was their understanding that the aim of this Dialogue was to consultatively define the facility and make a recommendation to COP27.

The first Dialogue took place during the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) meeting in Bonn in June 2022. G77 and China, AOSIS and other developing nation blocs made it plain that progress was insufficient. The Dialogue provided no real direction for moving further in terms of providing funding to remedy Loss & Damage. COP27 must finally address Loss & Damage through the following objectives:

CAN DEMANDS FOR COP27

- Get Loss & Damage on the Agenda
- Loss & Damage Finance on the agenda as a sub-item of 'Matters relating to finance'
- Loss & Damage as a standing agenda item for COP/CMA
- Deliver a Decision on setting up a Loss & Damage Finance Facility
- The COP requests UNEP to produce a biennial Loss & Damage Finance Gap Report
- Establish the advisory body for the Santiago Network for Loss & Damage (SNLD)

\(^ {21} \) CAN, 2022. Towards a Glasgow Dialogue that Matters, Briefing Paper
**LOSS & DAMAGE ON THE AGENDA**

- Support the inclusion of the agenda item proposed by G77 and China (Matters relating to funding arrangements for addressing Loss & Damage” as a sub-item of “Matters relating to finance”)

Such an agenda item is integral as it will facilitate a discussion on the wider narrative of Loss & Damage as the third pillar of climate finance whilst offering a direct route through which to conclude a decision on the establishment of a Loss & Damage finance facility. **This agenda item must result in a concrete decision on the foundations of providing new and additional finance to address Loss & Damage under the Financial Mechanism of the UNFCCC.**

Currently, the **agenda for adoption** shows as follows for COP27 and CMA4:

8. Matters relating to finance:
   f. Matters relating to funding arrangements for addressing Loss & Damage

The parameters of the agenda item have not been agreed upon. To ensure a real outcome CAN, therefore, demands that the agenda's parameters should be to:
- Acknowledge there is no funding arrangement to provide a fit-for-purpose response to address Loss & Damage
- Agree to establish a new **Loss & Damage Finance Facility**\(^\text{22}\) to address this gap as an operating entity under the UNFCCC Financial Mechanism through 1/CP27 1/CMA4 decision
- Agree that this, or some variation of this, must be a standing permanent agenda item
- Agree on a pathway to design and operationalise the facility mandating an ad-hoc committee, complementing the Glasgow Dialogue, to pursue intersessional work a) to design and operationalise the facility by COP28/CMA.5 b) continue further work to ensure the functionality of the facility

As yet, finance for addressing Loss & Damage is not recognised nor provided as the third financing pillar within multilateral climate change funds or bilateral climate finance support or by the multilateral development banks (MDBs). There are already serious concerns with the accounting of climate finance flows (such as overcounting of adaptation finance provided while still falling short of a balanced allocation with mitigation) and bilateral budget support often reflecting developed country priorities and provided with conditions and criteria reflecting dated models of development assistance, not aligned to climate justice and the principles of CBDR-RC. Therefore addressing Loss & Damage must not be conflated with other complementary forms of support from development or humanitarian assistance.

To facilitate a better understanding of the gap in Loss & Damage finance, either through the vehicle of this agenda item or as a decision under the overarching agenda “Matters relating to finance”, CAN recommends the COP/CMA to request UNEP to produce a Loss & Damage finance gap report for consideration in the NCQG and the Global Stocktake. This is also necessary to learn from the critical failings of the past which have locked this multilateral process in an unjust spiral of wasted time and inequity in the form of a completely unacceptable US $100 billion goal pledged 13 years ago, with no follow through and no significant uptick in ambitious action which has deepened the climate crisis and the profound cost of Loss & Damage.

**BOX 2. SOME THOUGHTS ON NOMENCLATURE**

CAN has espoused the term ‘facility’. In some instances, the terminology can lend to confusion, especially when seen from a traditional investment lens. The general premise

remains that the ask here is for a new and additional pot of grant-based finance that is earmarked for addressing Loss & Damage. The GCF and the GEF are both considered multilateral climate finance funds. The GEF as a facility houses a set of funds. For the Loss & Damage Finance Facility this could represent two initial funding windows - for slow onset and rapid onset events.

**LOSS & DAMAGE FINANCE FACILITY DECIDED**

A Loss & Damage finance facility (LDFF) should make a significant and ambitious contribution to combat climate change by focusing exclusively on addressing Loss & Damage, becoming the third financing pillar in addition to adaptation and mitigation funding under the Financial Mechanism of the UNFCCC which also serves the Paris Agreement. Taking into consideration core climate justice and human rights principles, it is recommended to set up the facility as an operating entity of the Financial Mechanism. This would ensure that the facility would be accountable to the COP and CMA as well as the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss & Damage (WIM) and function under their guidance to support projects, programmes, policies, planning, coordination and other activities to address Loss & Damage in developing countries.

As both a coordination and financing mechanism, it should be the primary vehicle to coordinate, mobilize and channel new, additional, adequate and predictable financial resources to address Loss & Damage for developing countries and affected communities and people driven by country- and in particular local-level ownership. It should be capable of receiving and administering financial inputs on an ongoing basis from a variety of public, private, as well as innovative/alternative sources.

The facility could offer direct budget support. Channeling finance through the facility for direct budget support would be aligned with a justice-oriented approach.

Since COP26, several initiatives to advance Loss & Damage finance have been pushed forward by different country groups outside of the UNFCCC, reflecting also differing priorities and interests, but falling short of the comprehensive approach to financing for addressing Loss & Damage required. While the G7-driven Global Shield and a Loss & Damage funding program under the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF) & V20 Joint Multi-Donor Fund can serve to provide a learning opportunity, their restricted scope, scale and eligibility underscore that they cannot substitute for, nor offer an excuse for not pursuing, a Loss & Damage Finance Facility under the UNFCCC.

In this context, we welcome the recent call by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change\(^\text{23}\) for the establishment of a Loss & Damage Finance Facility with new funding at scale including from innovative sources of financing, based on the “polluter-pays” principle and an inclusive, human-rights based approach and supported by debt cancellation and relief. We stress that to be line with CBDR-RC, a justice and rights-oriented approach, and to ensure the oversight of finance to address Loss & Damage and with public finance flows under the Financial Mechanism of the UNFCCC, a finance facility to address Loss & Damage must remain under the UNFCCC.

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SANTIAGO NETWORK

The promised technical expert body to catalyze technical assistance for climate-impacted people and communities in climate-vulnerable countries to support them in addressing Loss & Damage that was mandated at COP25 in Madrid has made little substantive progress, despite numerous meetings and discussions. The negotiations are stuck between two issues:

- developed countries pushing for agreement on a hosting body and a strong role for the Executive Committee (ExCom) in the governance of the Santiago Network,
- while developing countries are pushing for establishing a representative and inclusive advisory body, a body which can make decisions on the delivery of technical assistance based on needs on the ground and not availability of resources or political alignments.

We need a Santiago Network that is fit for purpose, inclusive and transparent, guided by an effective representative body and adequately and predictably resourced to enable it to address technical and capacity-building needs to address Loss & Damage on the ground. The Santiago Network should enable countries to assess economic and non-economic Loss & Damage from sudden- and slow-onset events as it relates to human rights harms, and develop effective responses to these harms.

While the operationalization of the SNLD could provide some support to vulnerable communities, it has a narrow and limited mandate therefore it will not in any way be able to address the magnitude of Loss & Damage needs, not the least financially. Therefore, the establishment of the LDFF by COP27 is absolutely critical.

As COP27 comes to the African continent, it is the most near-term opportunity to ensure that it can deliver for the vulnerable by ensuring strong outcomes on Adaptation and Loss & Damage. Delivering on one would not mean delivering any less on the other.

1.2 ADAPTATION

CAN DEMANDS FOR COP27

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adaptation Finance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>➔ COP27 and CMA should include an agenda item on implementing 50% share and doubling of adaptation finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>◆ Commit with urgency to ensure 50% of the total share of [pre-2025] climate finance for adaptation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>◆ Agree on a transparent implementation plan showing progress towards the 2025 doubling target in an equitable and accessible manner demonstrating funds flowing to country-led programs establish a clear time-bound - separate tracking on adaptation Finance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Global Goal on Adaptation

➔ Advance the GlASS programme based on the best available science and human rights and needs [delivering] a clear workplan on how to fully operationalise the GGA by COP28 reflected in the cover decision 1.CP/27

➔ A permanent agenda item on Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) to ensure a substantive outcome on adaptation - furthering transformative adaptation^{24}

➔ CAN commends the adoption of the Principles for Locally-Led Adaptation

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^{24} Please see footnote 4 for a definition
Enshrined in Article 7, Adaptation has always been a key pillar of UNFCCC, however, as yet it remains unrealised. IPCC 6th Assessment report clearly states that climate change impacts are more severe and widespread. Both developing and developed countries will face and, in some cases, are facing severe impacts from climate change, with the continent of Africa being particularly vulnerable. With the continued failure of ambitious mitigation action, the urgency of adaptation action becomes increasingly crucial to minimise the growing cost of Loss & Damage.

As a key enabler of adaptation, the need for balanced, new and additional finance for adaptation is evermore critical. Currently, adaptation finance lags well behind mitigation with the most recent Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimate for 2020 is US $28.6 billion for adaptation and 48.6 billion for mitigation, with the majority (70%) of finance provided in the form of loans which increase the burden of debt in developing and vulnerable countries. There are also significant concerns about the tracking of adaptation finance. The flawed methodology of the OECD approach has been shown to exaggerate adaptation finance flows, and disregard the critical component of new and additional.

The African Group of Negotiators (AGN) have long sought the recognition of the special needs and special circumstances of Africa under the Paris Agreement. Such a status is linked to global priorities for funding adaptation to climate change. In this African COP, Egypt, it is time that we scale-up actions on adaptation, provide necessary support and deliver an ambitious outcome. COP27 must:

1. Agree on a roadmap (delivery plan) on at least doubling Adaptation Finance by 2025 and for a time-bound - separate tracking on adaptation Finance.

Climate Change adaptation is increasingly becoming a part of policies and planning at the national and international levels. The Standing Committee of Finance (SCF) found that the costed needs of adaptation as reported in Biennial Updated Reports amounted to US $3.6 trillion. However, the adaptation finance needed to implement such plans remains fundamentally inadequate. Increased, equitable and accessible finance for developing countries’ efforts will include the proper appreciation and support for National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) to ensure that countries’ plans are properly funded.

a. Developed countries must honour and fulfil their commitment to at least double adaptation finance by 2025 and go beyond doubling (the doubling means US $40 billion by 2025, which is inadequate in the current context). Adaptation finance must be new and additional to Official development Assistance (ODA), primarily grant-based as a matter

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26 CARE, (2021). Climate Adaptation Finance – Fact or Fiction?
27 CARE, (2022). That’s Not New Money: Assessing how much public finance has been “new and additional” to support for development

29 UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance, (2022). Executive summary by the Standing Committee on Finance on the first report on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement

24
of climate justice, and to respond to the rising indebtedness of developing countries facing multiple intersecting crises

b. COP27 and CMA should include an agenda item on implementing the doubling of adaptation finance as per paras 26 and 27, and 1/CMA.3 paragraph 18

i. CMA4 must provide a clear and political mandate for both, the roadmap to reach 50% adaptation finance and the delivery plan of the commitment to double adaptation finance. Mechanisms to facilitate equitable access and control for people most affected, such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF) Enhanced Direct Access and the expanded Adaptation Fund must be promoted in the realisation of the GGA, forward projections of the GST and formulations of the NCQG, and in all decisions made by the SB’s and COP

ii. COP27 must decide to establish a Separate, Clear and Time-Bound tracking of Adaptation Finance

2. Advance the Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work programme (GlaSS) based on the best available science and human rights and needs [delivering] a clear workplan on how to fully operationalise the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) by COP28 reflected in the cover decision 1.CP/27

- The GGA was established under the Paris Agreement with an objective to increase focus on adaptation, provide a system of tracking and assessing countries' progress on adaptation and catalysing adaptation finance. It was only at COP26 that we saw some progress with the GlaSS work programme on GGA established to further the work and fully operationalise GGA by 2023. Furthermore, at COP27, through the progress on the Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh Work programme, we should have

a. A decision on the definitions and structure of GGA, including approaches and processes.

b. A common understanding of the GGA and how to assess collective progress by all relevant stakeholders by consolidating a bottom-up approach.

c. An understanding of how the GlaSS progress links to the GST process and the need to avoid top-down indicators that don't represent the diversity of adaptation action.

d. A process to provide input to NCQG on adaptation finance needs.

e. A Process to track adaptation finance commitments made by Parties as well as the assessment of the adequacy, accessibility, and effectiveness of adaptation finance and finance flows and present the progress at COP28.

f. A Decision to produce a synthesis report on the progress of adaptation actions reflected in the NAPs, NDCs and Adaptation Communication and to be presented to Parties for their further consideration by COP28.

3. A permanent agenda item on Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) to ensure a substantive outcome on adaptation.

- Currently, adaptation does not have the same critical political space as other agenda items without which the scale of action needed will not be achieved. At COP27, we must agree to establish a
permanent CMA and SB agenda item by COP28 as the GlaSS mandate concludes. This will help the process of building coherence and continuity. A permanent agenda item will ensure that we break silos, bring parity with mitigation, ensure coordination between adaptation mandates and bring ambitious adaptation actions - moving from planning to implementation.

- Future plans for adaptation support and implementation need to be based on this notion of fundamental change. ‘Transformative adaptation’ requires and presents an opportunity for society to fundamentally challenge and change the relations of social power and the socio-structural constraints that deepen vulnerability while at the same time reducing the negative consequences of climate change impacts.

Lastly, the contribution of local and Indigenous people at all stages of the adaptation cycle must be recognised. CAN commends the adoption of the Principles for Locally-Led Adaptation recognising that adaptation action planned, managed and assessed at the most local level possible is the basis for the most effective, equitable and sustainable adaptation actions.

### 1.3 Food Security and Sovereignty

**CAN Demands for COP27:**

Parties have the opportunity to take forward insights shared over the course of seven insightful workshops and provide key guidance to improve the quality of agriculture, as well as the quantity of climate finance for agriculture and especially adaptation, in line with the principles outlined above.

➔ The next phase of Koronivia agriculture negotiations must provide a basis for deepening discussions and policy recommendations on agroecology, gender responsiveness, food loss and waste, and adaptation finance.

➔ Initiatives announced on the sidelines of COP27 and led by countries and/or corporations, must advance the above principles, and not be used for greenwashing or business-as-usual approaches.

Agriculture and food security are highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Crop and livestock systems are susceptible to the effects of drought, floods, cyclones, rising sea levels, erratic rainfall and the effects of changing temperatures and variations in seasons, on pests and pollinators. Devastating droughts this year across East Africa, India and China this year have highlighted this vulnerability, and the urgent need to scale up finance for adaptation in agriculture.

At the same time, agriculture – particularly industrialised agribusiness – is one of the world's largest contributors to greenhouse gas emissions. The world cannot stay under 1.5°C warming unless agriculture is reformed. The UNFCCC's Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture (KJWA) has a key role to play in ensuring that food systems are fit for purpose in an era of climate change.

It is now widely recognised, including by the IPCC that a shift towards agroecological approaches is urgently required. (See “Ten elements of Agroecology” as defined by FAO, and “13 Principles of Agroecology” as defined by the UN Committee on World Food Security). By strengthening the organic matter, water-carrying capacity and natural fertility
of soils, and spreading risk through crop diversification and enhancing agricultural biodiversity, agroecology is a highly effective adaptation strategy. Furthermore, agroecology avoids emissions associated with the production and application of synthetic nitrogen fertilisers. It also provides numerous benefits to human health and biodiversity, allowing farmers to retain more of their income, and is particularly beneficial for smallholder and women farmers. As the current war in Ukraine has triggered escalating prices for synthetic nitrogen fertilisers, agroecology is an especially apt solution for farmers around the world at this time.

In countries with high per-capita meat consumption, industrialised and factory-farming livestock systems have been enabled through vast global supply chains dependent on deforestation and unsustainable feed production, with harmful consequences for the entire planet. Systems must therefore be reformed to encourage a “less and better” approach to meat, reflecting agroecological principles and pastoralist approaches that protect nutrition and livelihoods while avoiding excess and inequality. There is also huge potential to significantly reduce food loss and waste, providing significant contributions to both mitigation and food security. Human rights – including the right to food, as well as farmers’ rights, land rights and gender-responsiveness must be centered in policies and practices relating to agriculture and food.

### 1.4 Ecosystem

**CAN Demands for COP27:**

The science is clear: if action to protect biodiversity fails, climate action will fail and vice versa. Integrated action is critical. At COP26, the essential role of biodiversity in achieving 1.5°C was formally recognised but more is urgently needed:

- The UNFCCC must send a strong political signal to drive ambitious outcomes in the CBD COP15.
- The UNFCCC must progress ambitious outcomes for biodiversity and climate integration across the Global Stocktake (GST) and other key work programmes on mitigation, adaptation and Loss & Damage, recognising the role of nature in enhancing ambition and increasing resilience as well as the impacts on ecosystems.
- COP27 must hold Parties accountable to deliver on existing nature initiatives agreed at COP26 and elsewhere in terms of both action and integrity. Rapid fossil fuel phase-out must occur alongside protecting, restoring and improving the management of carbon and species rich ecosystems through a rights-based approach.

**Sending a strong political signal in the UNFCCC for ambitious CBD outcomes**

In December 2022, countries must deliver a truly ambitious, robust, and synergistic Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) to reverse the dangerous decline of nature at the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) COP15. After two years of delay, CAN urges governments to increase their efforts, political awareness and buy-in to resolve the sticky issues that hampered recent progress, including resource mobilization. Immediately before CBD COP15, COP27 represents a key opportunity to increase this political attention and deliver results, especially on the interconnectedness of nature and climate crises. Including through GST, Mitigation Work Programme, and the GGA.

CAN requests that the UK and incoming COP Egyptian Presidency work closely with the COP15 Chinese Presidency and its host Canada, to help build political momentum on the integration of the joint climate and biodiversity agendas. A Ministerial roundtable jointly hosted by Egypt and China at COP27 would be a useful approach to identify areas of consensus and enhance political
leadership towards the CBD summit, recognising the linkages between the UNFCCC and the CBD GBF.

**Ambitious outcomes for climate and biodiversity integration at COP27**

COP27 outcomes must integrate and reflect commitments to tackle the biodiversity crisis under the Paris Agreement and current UNFCCC processes. CAN urges Parties to:

- Adopt a COP27 decision that recognizes the importance of an ambitious post-2020 GBF in achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement.
- Ensure that the 1.5°C goal is reached through science-based emissions reduction pathways that support biodiversity, ecosystem integrity and human rights including the development of national safeguards to support this as emphasized in **1/CP.23 para 38**.
- Recognize and strengthen tenure rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities (IPLCs), and uphold and guarantee their meaningful and effective participation in developing and implementing national climate and biodiversity policies.
- Deliver adequate, new and additional finance to IPLCs and developing countries to protect and restore their ecosystems while supporting climate-resilient development.
- Effectively implement recent ocean, land-use and deforestation commitments including ending gross deforestation and forest degradation by 2030**30**.
- Use the GST as an opportunity to assess progress on the Paris Agreement’s ecosystems provisions**31** and identify risks and perverse outcomes for biodiversity.
- Include ambitious rights-based ecosystem protection and restoration action in national adaptation and mitigation plans, aligning NDCs with National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs).
- Request the IPCC to work with the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) to set out a joint special report on the integration of climate and biodiversity synergies and trade-offs, building on the foundations of the 2021 IPCC-IPBES workshop outcomes.

1.5 **SCIENCE**

**CAN DEMANDS FOR THE COP:**

- The Second Periodic Review (PR2) on the science and informed by IPCC must inter alia a) endorse the recent IPCC findings, b) confirm that limiting temperature rise to 1.5°C with little to no overshoot is the only acceptable representation of the long term goal, but even that is not a safe place c) address the risks of the irreversibility of impacts even with only temporary overshoots, d) support the need for strongly enhanced funding for poorer nations. The PR2 needs to provide clarity on the needed achievement of net zero global emissions and the phase-out of fossil fuel use.
- All decisions by the COP need to be based on and reflect clear science and hence the COP should release a strong statement supporting the recent findings of the 3

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**30** At the COP26 in November 2021 in Glasgow 141 countries signed the Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forests and Land Use

**31** Paris Agreement preamble and Article 5

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Environmental Defense Fund characterizes global warming and its impacts as follows: The fingerprint of human influence has been found in changes to all the major climate system components, many of which are accelerating, unprecedented, and irreversible over human timescales. Every additional increment of global warming, changes in extremes continue to become larger and tipping points closer.
IPCC Working Groups and endorse that those must be part of the decisions on the Global Stocktake which will determine the procedures for the next round of parties’ NDC for 2035.

Concerning the preparations for the Seventh Cycle of IPCC and its Assessment Report CAN demands that the originally planned timetable be kept and that the publishing of the final reports will be available for the Third Periodic Review (TPR) in 2027 which should feed the GST in 2028.

For CAN the Second Periodic Review of the Long Term Global Goal (PR2), which will be finalised at COP27, is a critical element of bringing climate science into the international negotiations.

The recently agreed reports from the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report offer a few interesting elements that should be integrated into the Periodic Review:

1. The rate of global warming is occurring in line with projections. But global warming is happening faster and more drastically than anticipated earlier while the projections for future climate impacts in coming decades might be exceeding the short-, mid, and long-term projections even under low emissions scenarios. That is true for temperature rise, terrestrial and polar ice melting and sea level rise, harvest and food security, freshwater scarcity, biodiversity and ecosystem resilience, forest fires, and extreme events like heat waves, droughts as well as flooding. This brings us closer to Tipping Points that might trigger a complete instability and extinction of entire ecosystems, irreversibility of weather and other patterns and resilience of human communities. Even before exceeding 1.5°C.

2. The number of people negatively affected is and will be growing rapidly, particularly in developing, vulnerable, coastal, and/or poorer communities.

3. Economic, social and other pressures, like lack of resources and functioning health and education systems, growing inequality within nations, overfishing and destruction of ecosystems and overall air and water pollution, accelerates the impacts of climate change and reinforce the exposure of people to diseases, unemployment, displacement and extreme poverty.

4. There is a super-glaring gap between observed climate change impacts and direly needed support for adaptation and resilience building and/or Loss & Damage provisions for the poor. Adaptation support and funding are necessary also in low/zero carbon 1.5°C pathways which by no means are low-risk development pathways.

5. While the challenge is growing with increasing carbon pollution, it is still possible to stay on a trajectory of 1.5°C and avoid the worst impacts with immediate and rapid action. By far the largest cost-effective and technical potentials until 2030 lie with solar and wind power as well as energy efficiency. Followed by ecosystem protection as well as behavioral changes by the global rich and middle classes. The global investment needs particularly in the clean and efficient energy sector for doing so require massive growth, particularly in Europe, North America and China.

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33 WMO, (2022). United in Science
CHAPTER 2: PHASING OUT FOSSIL FUELS, ENSURING ENERGY DEMOCRACY & SECURITY

2.1 Mitigation

CAN DEMANDS FOR COP27

Parties need to:

Address the immediate ambition gap by:

➔ Delivering a COP27 decision which reminds Parties that successive NDCs should represent a progression, should reflect its highest possible ambition, can be updated at any time, and that Parties should verify that current NDCs are equitable and in line with the IPCC’s latest scientific recommendations.

➔ Reflecting on progress since COP26 in the context of the Glasgow decision text and Leaders’ pledges made at COP26.

➔ Responding to the NDC Synthesis Report and Long-Term Strategies (LTS) Synthesis Report (published in October 2022) in the decision text, in the formulation of the MWP and the GST, and as input to the GST’s second technical dialogue.

➔ Developing a follow-up of the provision of the Glasgow Ambition Pathway on fossil fuel phase-out, ecosystem protection, restoration and a just transition, recognising social co-benefits including for health and employment.

➔ COP27 must reaffirm the need to provide adequate, scaled-up finance that is equitable and in line with climate justice. Noting that finance is a critical enabler of ambitious climate action.

Address the immediate implementation gap:

➔ Define and deliver an ambitious, equitable MWP (as defined below). The MWP must be complementary to the GST, and must be based on equity and fair shares and the principle of Common but Differentiated

Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC).

➔ Strengthen and expand Leaders’ pledges made at COP26 that are showing progress and call for their inclusion in NDCs and LTS.

THE OUTCOMES OF COP26 WHICH MUST BE DELIVERED BY COP27

At COP26 the Glasgow Climate Pact34 expressed alarm and utmost concern that human activities have caused around 1.1°C of global warming to date and stressed the urgency of enhancing ambition and action in relation to mitigation, adaptation, and finance in this critical decade whilst also reiterating the need to scale up action and support to address Loss & Damage. The IPCC 6th Assessment Reports have shown that the window of opportunity to stay within the temperature target of 1.5°C as resolved in the Glasgow Climate Pact is rapidly closing. Together with assessments, including the UNFCCC NDCs Synthesis Report, this highlights an alarming ambition (and implementation) gap between Parties’ ambition and what mitigation is needed to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement35,36. The future which lies before us, if significant transformative action continues to be delayed, will be one of unavoidable human suffering and ecosystem destruction.

341/CP.26.

31 In the context of the carbon budget consistent with a 50% likelihood of limiting warming to 1.5°C cumulative CO2 emissions for 2020–2030 based on the latest NDCs would use 87% of the remaining carbon budget and broadly consistent with 2030 emission levels of cost-effective long-term pathways staying below 2.5°C.

36 Further, an implementation gap exists between the projected emissions of ‘current policies’ and the projected emissions resulting from the implementation of the unconditional and conditional elements of NDCs, and is estimated to be around 4 and 7 GtCO2-eq in 2030.
In response to this, COP26:

- Decided to establish a ‘work programme to urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation’ (MWP) in this critical decade, and requested the Subsidiary Bodies to recommend a draft decision for consideration and adoption by CMA4, in a manner that complements the Global Stocktake;
- Decided to convene an annual high-level ministerial round table on pre-2030 ambition, beginning at CMA4;
- Urged Parties who had not done so yet to communicate their enhanced NDCs by CMA4;
- Requested Parties to revisit and strengthen the 2030 targets in their NDCs as necessary to align with the temperature goal by the end of 2022.

2.2 The Mitigation Work Programme (MWP)

To limit global warming to 1.5°C, emissions must immediately reach their peak and then be cut in half by 2030. This can only be achieved via equitable, justice and rights based deep systems and sector wide transformation to sustainable futures (including the restoration and protection of ecosystems) which must be supported by significant upscale in finance. According to the most recent Needs Determination Report from the SCF, and based on 78 NDCs, developing nations will require at least US $ 5.8–5.9 trillion cumulatively to reach their individual NDC commitments for adaptation and mitigation by 2030. However, the financial requirements as assessed by SCF report are significantly lower in particular for clean energy than the analysis by IPCC (Working Group 3, 2022) for the same timeframe to meet a 1.5°C trajectory by 2030.

Despite the recent IPCC reports, there was a considerable and concerning lack of urgency at the intersessional meeting in June. We must see a different mood and sense of urgency at COP27. COP27 negotiations could support this through:

- **Defining and delivering an ambitious, equitable Mitigation Work Programme:**
  The objective of the MWP should be to urgently enhance the ambition and implementation of Parties’ efforts to deliver global aggregate emissions reductions of at least 43% [34–60%] by 2030 compared to 2019 levels in order to be in line with limiting global warming to 1.5°C. This is the most recent and ambitious science based option. In order to reach this target, we need emissions reductions across all sectors, in line with the Glasgow Climate Pact.
  - The MWP must be based on equity and fair shares and the principle of CBDR-RC.
  - The MWP should be a check-in and accountability process of Parties’ voluntary sectoral pledges and commitments.
  - The MWP must follow up on the Glasgow Pact provisions on energy by developing a timeline for the phaseout of all fossil fuels – coal, oil and gas, as well as fossil fuel subsidies with developed countries taking the lead.
  - The MWP must ensure that countries’ NDC implementation promotes an equitable and just transition that respects human rights.

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37 FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/L.16

38 UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance, (2022). Executive summary by the Standing Committee on Finance on the first report on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement

39 WG III SPM C.1.1

40 An alternative target is 45% (40–60%) reductions by 2030 compared to 2010 levels.
rights, children’s rights and results in access to clean, reliable and affordable energy for their populations. It must be supported through international cooperation and governance measures.

- Ministerial roundtables should be informed by the technical work of the MWP, allowing a political check-in on strengthening and revisiting NDCs and implementation.
- The MWP should enhance the implementation of Parties’ sectoral decarbonisation commitments, all of which will need to be fully transformed. This includes sectoral commitments under the Glasgow Climate Pact (including coal, oil and gas, all fossil fuel subsidies, clean power generation, energy efficiency, industry, protecting and restoring ecosystems, and methane) and plurilateral initiatives for just sectoral decarbonisation made by Parties.
- The role of Non–Party Stakeholders (NPS) towards raising 2030 ambition and implementation should be enhanced, by strengthening the link between their contributions and efforts by Parties, and by enabling the contributions of NPSs to the Work Programme.

- **Demonstrating strong and appropriate linkages with the Global Stocktake:** Recognising that the MWP is aimed at mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade, the MWP and the GST should be complementary and mutually reinforcing. The experience gained through the MWP should be taken into account in the GST outcomes, and in turn the GST outcomes should inform the future implementation of the MWP through to the end of the decade. The first GST outcomes should inform the future implementation of the MWP through to the end of the decade, and in turn the MWP should be taken into account in the second GST round.

- In this decade Parties must rapidly scale up the deployment of clean power generation and energy efficiency measures, and immediately move towards the equitable phase out of all fossil fuel extraction and use. This means that we need to denounce all false solutions including Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), and gas as a bridging fuel.
- **Requesting the IPCC in its forthcoming synthesis report to include a 1.5°C degrees compatible emissions scenario for 2035,** as a way to emphasize the need for revised and more ambitious 2030 targets, whilst also looking forward.

## 2.3 Nationally Determined Actions

In response to the request to the Glasgow decision to revisit and strengthen their 2030 targets, as at September 2022, nineteen Parties have submitted NDCs since COP26. This includes:

- 14 NDCs (74%) from Parties that had not yet communicated an enhanced NDC including India and Egypt;
- Five NDCs from Parties that had already communicated an enhanced NDC. This included Brazil, the Republic of Korea and Australia. None are aligned with a 1.5°C pathway.

51 Parties to the Paris Agreement have submitted Long Term Low Emissions Development Strategies (LTS). 45% were submitted before 2021 and only four LTS have been submitted after COP26.

COP27 must deliver a decision which reminds Parties that successive NDCs should represent a progression, should reflect its highest possible ambition, can be updated at any time, and that Parties should verify that current NDCs are in line with the IPCC’s latest scientific recommendations and also aligned with their LTS.
2.4 Renewable Energy

### CAN Demands for COP27

- **All countries phase-out coal-fired power completely, as well as phase-out oil and gas to levels that ensure the achievement of more than 50% nature-safe renewables in their energy mix by 2030 based on equity and fair shares and the principle of CBDR-RC.**

- **The negotiations must provide the basis for building on the economically and socially viable opportunities of renewable energy and energy efficiency solutions to phase out all fossil fuel use in line with common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and divert the money to major investments in renewable energy and clean energy access in developing countries with a focus on Africa.**

- **Initiatives announced on the side lines of COP27 by countries, multilateral and bilateral financial institutions, and businesses must be in line with advancing the adoption of renewables, ensuring universal energy access, and furthering energy security and sovereignty.**

To achieve the objective of the Paris Agreement, the world must break free from fossil fuels and rapidly accelerate renewable energy deployment. Despite this imperative, 2021 saw a record 6% increase (around 2 Gt) in CO₂ emissions, crushing all hopes that the drop in CO₂ emissions in 2020 would be the turning point as far as global emissions were concerned. The resurgence of global energy demand by around 4% in 2021, post the first waves of the COVID-19 pandemic, was met largely by coal and fossil gas despite a record increase of renewable power capacity by 17% in 2021. However, the share of sustainable renewables are still small with solar and wind providing little more than 10% of the world's electricity, and about 3% of all energy use and has not changed significantly in the last decade. For governments to meet their existing NDCs, oil, gas, and coal production and consumption must fall. Further, the science is very clear that the pathway to limiting the global temperature rise to 1.5°C will require that almost all electricity generation should come from renewable power by 2030.

The cost of most renewable energy technologies has declined sharply, and in many parts of the globe is more competitive than fossil fuels, especially coal. This added to the role that renewables can play in improving energy security, reducing health impacts of air pollution, costs and reducing economic import dependence on fossil fuels, a particularly critical issue in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This invasion was fueled by fossil fuel export revenues. The ongoing energy crisis will not be solved by deepening dependence on fossil fuels, but by accelerating deployment of renewable energy. Governments must step in to manage the decline in fossil fuel production and consumption.

With almost 770 million people still lacking access to electricity, 2.6 billion lacking access to clean cooking fuels, and an estimated 1.09 billion people being exposed to significant risk due to lack of access to cooling which leads to large scale food production wastages and health impacts, access to energy can catalyse sustainable development across different areas such as education, health, food security, improving productivity, and so on. Renewables, especially Decentralised Renewable Energy (DRE), can also play a very significant role to help achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG7) of universal access to affordable and clean energy by 2030, as well as facilitate the achievement of many other global sustainable development goals.

At COP27, Parties have the opportunity to push further on the Glasgow COP26 resolution for the phase down of coal power, and removal of all fossil fuel subsidies. The negotiations must provide the basis for building on the economically
and socially viable opportunities of renewable energy and energy efficiency solutions to phase out all fossil fuel use in line with common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and divert the money to major investments in renewable energy and clean energy access in developing countries with a focus on Africa.

Initiatives announced on the side lines of COP27 by countries, multilateral and bilateral financial institutions, and businesses must be in line with advancing the adoption of renewables, ensuring universal energy access, and furthering energy security and sovereignty.

### 2.5 CLIMATE FINANCE: PUBLIC AND FINANCIAL FLOWS

**CAN Demands for COP27**

- Concrete outcomes in decision text on the use of innovative sources of finance to ensure urgent needs for scaled, equitable international climate finance are met. This includes redirecting fossil fuel subsidies to adaptation and Loss & Damage.
- No backsliding on ending international public finance to fossil fuels as pledged at COP26 and securing new signatories to the Glasgow Statement on International Public Support for the Clean Energy Transition and ensuring signatories’ have aligned policies in place to stop backsliding and turn the COP26 pledge into reality.
- Transitioning finance from fossil fuels to international climate finance.
- A standing agenda item on achieving Article 2.1c of the Paris Agreement for the subsidiary bodies and COP28/CMA.5 going forward.*41*

To achieve adequate climate financing to respond to needs, it will be essential to establish innovative new sources of climate finance, preferably those that simultaneously support fossil fuel phase-out and other activities to the climate. Fossil fuel subsidies (such as international public finance) can be converted into climate finance. Revenues from carbon taxation as well as levies on fossil fuel companies’ profits, levies on shipping and aviation,*42* and levies from market-based mechanisms — should be repurposed to ensure adequate international climate finance. Discussion on these options must advance and lead to concrete outcomes at COP27.

It remains essential to end international public finance to fossil fuels, while massively scaling up international public finance for a just energy transition. From 2018-2020, G20 countries and the multilateral development banks (MDBs) they govern provided at least US $63 billion per year in international public finance for oil, gas, and coal projects. Canada, Japan, Korea, and China provided the most public finance for fossil fuels between 2018 and 2020 at US $11.0 billion, US $10.9 billion, US $10.6 billion, and US $7.3 billion a year respectively, together accounting for 46% of the MDB and G20 fossil fuel finance.

While there has been growing momentum to shift international finance for coal, oil and gas into finance for renewable energy, there have been concerns over countries backsliding on ending international public finance to fossil fuels. At COP26 in Glasgow, 39 governments and public finance institutions committed to end international fossil fuel finance by the end of 2022 and shift that means through which to deliver on the Paris Agreement, being a critical enabler of implementation of the long-term goals on mitigation (Article 2.1a) and adaptation (Article 2.1b).

*41* Art 2.1c of the Paris Agreement refers to “making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development”. It is an essential progressive way to tax aviation.

*42* "Frequent flyer” levies can be a more socially
finance into renewable energy. If fully implemented, this could directly shift US $28 billion in international public finance for fossil fuels toward a clean and just energy transition each year. We must have progress on this agenda at COP27, including securing new signatories to the Glasgow Statement and ensuring signatories’ have aligned policies in place to stop backsliding and turn the COP26 pledge into reality.

Despite subsequent efforts to instrumentalize poverty and development arguments to justify continued public investments in coal, oil, and gas, public investments in both large-scale and decentralized renewable-based energy systems are the best way to address issues of energy security, energy access and energy poverty. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) Net Zero Report, “to reach net zero emissions by 2050, annual clean energy investment worldwide will need to more than triple by 2030 to around US $4 trillion. This will create millions of new jobs, significantly lift global economic growth, and achieve universal access to electricity and clean cooking worldwide by the end of the decade.

### 2.6 Carbon Markets

Humanity will not limit global warming to 1.5°C without dramatically reducing emissions from burning fossil fuels and land-use change. Whilst CAN strongly advocates financing for climate action, including for the protection and restoration of carbon-rich and biodiverse ecosystems, CAN rejects the practice of offsetting to tackle the climate crisis. We reject public, governmental and corporate offsetting. There are far better and more valid alternatives for protecting biodiversity than offsetting. These include effective regulations, contributions, donations, protection of the rights of indigenous communities, and other means.

It is clear that many offset projects, for instance, under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in the Kyoto Protocol, did not deliver “additional” reductions and that the CDM mechanism has failed to reduce emissions.

**CAN rejects offsets because of the following reasons and principles**

44 Wetlands International does not agree with this position and is of the opinion that offsetting can bring the necessary funding for conserving and restoring nature and preventing further degradation that leads to more serious climate impacts. However, offsetting should be done responsibly, following the mitigation hierarchy and social and environmental standards, respecting local and indigenous standards and ecosystems’ integrity.

Environmental Defense Fund does not agree with this position and believes differentiation among carbon credits is needed, as high-quality carbon credits – including from the land sector – that meet key social and environmental integrity requirements can help channel investment towards the Global South and local communities, support adaptation and other co-benefits, and complement other policies that together are needed to achieve ambitious climate goals.

Birdlife does not agree with this position and is of the opinion that carbon offsetting should not be encouraged in place of reducing emissions for either companies or individuals. Nevertheless, BirdLife recognises that carbon trading and offsetting mechanisms under strict regulatory standards have potential value in mitigating unavoidable emissions, and in combining climate change and biodiversity benefits. BirdLife will continue to explore the potential of natural habitat conservation and management for responsible carbon offsetting, monitored and certified to a high standard.

NWF does not support this position, as they are of the position we cannot achieve climate targets without land sector mitigation, and current financing remains woefully insufficient.

High-integrity carbon credits that complement drastic fossil fuel emissions reductions, implemented in a manner that respects legal and environmental standards, can provide a significant ancillary benefit to biodiversity conservation efforts, and can help reduce future forest degradation and deforestation. However, it is crucial that these projects are rigorously monitored and certified according to the highest standards, and that they are implemented in a manner that respects local and indigenous rights, and are differentiated among carbon credits – including from the land sector – that meet key social and environmental integrity requirements. It is also important to ensure that all offset projects, particularly those in the land sector, are aligned with the protection and conservation of biodiversity and ecosystems, and that they do not contribute to climate change or biodiversity loss.

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As the rules of Article 6 are finalized and we move to the implementation phase, it is critical no Article 6.2 or 6.4 credits should be issued for claims of avoidance of emissions. Any crediting of “avoidance” towards NDCs would risk repeating mistakes under the Clean Development Mechanism, and within the framework of the Paris Agreement would have the effect of backsliding ambition and supporting perverse incentives that fail to discourage fossil fuel expansion and deforestation."

Further work at the CMA and Article 6.4 Supervisory Body must operationalize the rules adopted at COP26 to ensure environmental integrity. The Supervisory Body should carefully develop rules for ambitious baseline methodologies that go beyond "business as usual," and incorporate the best available science with regard to removals. The Supervisory Body should implement social and environmental safeguards, not limited to but in particular for the the rights of Indigenous Peoples, by establishing an accessible and rights-based grievance mechanism governed by an independent body other than the supervisory body.

While duplication of institutions should be avoided, the Article 6.8 work programme should operationalize a concrete mechanism to facilitate traditional rights and sustains biodiversity, could help to close the emissions gap–especially in the near-term–and to address legacy emissions.

Treeaid does not agree with this position
CHAPTER 3: PEOPLE-DRIVEN IMPLEMENTATION & ACCOUNTABILITY OF CLIMATE ACTION

3.1 BETTER ACCESS TO FINANCE

CAN DEMANDS FOR COP27

➔ Developed countries must make good for the lack of delivering the 100 billion on time by at least delivering US $100 billion on annual average (i.e. 600 billion total) over the period 2020-2025, with 50% of that going to adaptation.

➔ The continued deliberations around the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) must show progression to improve on the current inadequate and unjust system of climate finance. The NCQG must not repeat the mistakes of the past and be designed as a needs-based and science-based goal.

➔ It must be new and additional.

➔ The new goal must take the format of a matrix with sub-goals including (i) Mitigation, (ii) Adaptation, and (iii) Loss & Damage. The NCQG should prioritise grants first, then highly concessional finance, over non-concessional loans and equity (finance).

➔ The new goal must offer systems transformation on financing more widely, including through reforms of the international financial architecture, innovative sources that can provide new and additional climate finance, as well as new mechanisms for accountability, based on principles of climate justice and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.

➔ The new goal should prioritize direct access to climate finance for people and communities, enabling direct access mechanisms for often marginalised and disproportionately impacted people and racialised communities, including Indigenous Peoples, women, children and youth, and disabled communities.

The current system of climate finance is inadequate and unjust. Developed countries failed to meet the annual US $100 billion goal in 2020, and COP27 is an opportunity to learn the lessons of the failures in this process, particularly for implementation and accountability. The promise still matters, however, and so developed countries must make good for the lack of delivering the US $100 billion on time by at least delivering US $100 billion on annual average (i.e. 600 billion total) over the period 2020-2025, with 50% of that going to adaptation. Developing countries have repeatedly signaled this is one of their top priority issues, and so exceeding US $100 billion in later years to compensate for earlier shortfalls is the only way to build essential trust among countries. As trust is hard-won but easily lost, delivering the US $100 billion promise is vital for collectively agreeing on ways forward on climate issues in general.

To avoid exacerbating existing injustices in society, climate finance must better prioritise providing direct benefits to people and communities in a way that acknowledges and seeks to redress persistent and intersecting inequalities and discriminations; based on gender identity or sexual orientation, age, economic class, ethnicity, indigeneity or ability. One mechanism to achieve this is by increasing direct access to climate finance for often marginalised and disproportionately impacted people and racialised communities, including Indigenous Peoples, women, children and youth, and disabled communities. Climate finance should also prioritise the least developed countries and climate-vulnerable countries that need the finance the most. Lastly, locally-led adaptation measures
should respect and take into account local, traditional and indigenous knowledge and experiences.

The New Collective Quantified Goal is an important mechanism for ensuring that global climate finance is adequate and matches the needs set out in ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions. US $100 billion/year, even if it had been met, does not match the scale of needs. The NCQG must therefore be designed as a needs-based and science-based goal. This means the new goal must take the format of a matrix with sub-goals including (i) Mitigation, (ii) Adaptation, and (iii) Loss & Damage. The NCQG should prioritise grants first, then highly concessional finance, over non-concessional loans and equity (finance), potentially by establishing subgoals for the first two desirable categories of instruments.

The new goal should offer systems transformation on financing more widely, including through reforms of the international financial architecture, innovative sources that can provide new and additional climate finance, as well as new mechanisms for accountability, based on principles of climate justice and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accountability should also be furthered by agreeing on clear definitions of climate finance and methodologies that ensure that only the support component of loans etc are counted. New and innovative sources of climate finance should also be accompanied by well-managed debt cancellation, which would free up fiscal space and allow vulnerable and developing countries to use domestic budgets to carry out climate action and ensure vital public services are maintained during and after severe climate impacts.

The goal requires a process that allows for the NCQG to be reviewed and adjusted upwards over time, taking into account the evolving needs of developing countries. The five-year GST offers a logical timeframe for the NCQG to be reviewed and updated in line with other areas of climate action since the GST seeks to review all areas of implementation of the goals of the Paris Agreement. Reviews must take into account the scientific evidence (particularly from the IPCC), grey literature, and local knowledge on the evolving needs of developing countries and climate-vulnerable communities.

Delivery of adequate climate finance in general and of the NCQG, in particular, requires that such financing be new and additional to prior support. Particularly as climate financing is set to significantly increase, old approaches of robbing historical ODA budgets can no longer be accepted. Presenting money repackaged from existing assistance budgets (e.g. within the 0.7% of Gross national income (GNI) for ODA target, which is not met by most contributors) as new climate funding is disingenuous, because it displaces funds for traditional objectives such as poverty relief, threatening development goals. To help ensure additionality, climate finance reporting must evolve new modalities, and the NCQG process should lead to new % GNI targets for climate finance above the 0.7% for ODA, as recommended by developing countries including such as India in their submissions.

### 3.2 Global Stocktake (GST)

**CAN demands for COP27**

COP27 should ensure an inclusive, discussion-oriented and equitable technical dialogue and deliver a COP27 decision text that:

- Establishes a GST work plan for 2023.
- Signals that COP28 will need to set out forward pathways closing the gaps in 3 key areas
  - Fossil fuels phase-out & energy transition
  - Ecosystems protection, restoration and sustainable management
  - Finance (mitigation, adaptation and Loss & Damage)
Signal a readiness to develop a final decision/declaration in 2023 on how to oblige Parties to consider the following points for the improvement of climate action by 2025

Mandate the High-Level Champions to develop a dedicated format for the evaluation of non-state climate action

COP27 is an important staging-post for the Global Stocktake (GST) on the way to its ultimate political conclusions at COP28.

Decisions needed on the GST at COP27: Parties and the COP27 and COP28 Presidencies must work together in Sharm-El Sheikh, via the Joint Contact Group, to deliver a COP27 decision text that:

- Establishes a GST work plan for 2023. Under the lead of Egypt and the UAE, a calendar of activities for an ambitious GST at COP28 should be proposed, with a series of Political Dialogues with Parties and Non-Parties. This should reach out to fora outside of the UNFCCC (e.g. G7, G20) and set a platform for Parties and Non-Parties to discuss the formulation of the synthesis report to the Technical Assessment.
- Signals that COP28 will need to set out forward pathways closing the gaps in 3 key areas encapsulated in a needs-based approach
  - Fossil fuels phase-out & energy transition: a dedicated outcome at COP28 to accelerate the global equitable phase-out of all fossil fuels before 2050 and speed up the shift to socially-just renewable energies to be implemented according to common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities
  - Ecosystems protection, restoration and management: establish specific measures for the next round of NDCs, NAPs and LTSs to protect and restore ecosystems including land and ocean sinks, with dedicated targets and requirements for ecosystem conservation and restoration
  - Finance: identifying strategies to reduce the finance gap establishing a feedback loop between GST process and NCQG process as well as a post-2025 finance vision. In doing so it should ensure a balance between adaptation and mitigation finance and create a separate and additional finance facility for Loss & Damage.
- Signal a readiness to develop a final decision/declaration in 2023 on how to oblige Parties to consider the following points for the improvement of climate action by 2025
  - Guide Parties on a collective emissions reduction target for 2035 in line with the Paris Agreement and a pathway to achieve net zero CO₂ by 2050, based on the latest science for the IPCC 6th Assessment Report
  - Recommend that Parties revisit existing 2030 targets within the mandate to submit NDCs in the 2025 ambition cycle.
  - Integrate the targets and outcomes of the Gender Action Plan, precise processes to ensure the integration of indigenous knowledge and their rights protection, as well as the promotion and respect of human rights when developing climate action
  - Present an integrated list of ambition-enhancing measures in a “GST Ambition Handbook” containing best practices and guidance on how to implement them as an annex to the GST decision/declaration to be discussed in 2024; as well as to support the review of the ICTU in 2024 for consideration and adoption by 2026.
  - Underline cross-cutting actions Parties should include in their next climate policies such as the development metrics to quantify the social benefits of climate action, including the co-benefits for public health
- Mandate the High-Level Champions to develop a dedicated format for the evaluation of non-state climate action to be used in the final summary report in 2023. The GST is an opportunity to show the results of the partners registered under the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action and demonstrate the credibility of their actions.
Continuation of the technical dialogues: COP27 should ensure an inclusive, discussion-oriented and equitable technical dialogue in collaboration with the co-facilitators, Parties and non-parties. A dedicated roundtable or world café on equity should be provided, as this topic did not have enough space at the SBs56 in June 2022.

### 3.3 Transparency

**CAN Demands for COP27**

- Ensure adequate and effective capacity-building support is provided to fully implement the enhanced transparency framework and ensure consistent application.

- Agree to allow Parties to voluntarily request technical expert reviews of the information reported on climate change impacts and adaptation.

Since 2016, Parties have worked diligently to develop modalities, procedures, and guidelines (MPGs), common reporting formats, common tabular formats, outlines, and training programmes to support the implementation of the Paris Agreement’s enhanced transparency framework. These elements are now firmly in place and Parties must begin their preparations to submit their first biennial transparency report (BTR) by the end of 2024. **CAN** appreciates that the enhanced transparency framework will represent a step forward for many country Parties and that capacity building is of critical importance. Analysis of current BR and BUR submissions shows that there is a lack of consistency in information shared with the UNFCCC. However, consistency is key to truly track progress in the implementation of the parties’ commitments. Therefore, **CAN** urges Parties to ensure adequate and effective capacity-building support is provided to fully implement the enhanced transparency framework and ensure consistent application.

One remaining element not yet finalized is whether Parties could voluntarily elect to have information reported on climate change impacts and adaptation subject to technical expert review. The Paris Agreement only notes that information on greenhouse gas emissions, progress towards NDCs, and support provided/mobilized are mandatorily subject to review. However, many Parties have noted their interest and preference for voluntarily electing to have their adaptation information reviewed by technical experts. Reviews are critical components of the Paris Agreement’s and Convention’s transparency and reporting processes; reviews ensure compliance with MPGs, allow for exchanges among technical experts, build capacity, and enhance the level of the information reported and, thus, be available to the public. At **COP27**, **Parties should agree to allow Parties to voluntarily request technical expert reviews of the information reported on climate change impacts and adaptation.**

**CAN** will be closely observing the facilitative sharing of views (FSV) taking place during COP27. The FSV is an important opportunity for Parties to share their progress in implementing climate actions and learn from one another. **CAN appreciates the usefulness of this process and congratulates all participating Parties.**

### 3.4 Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE)

**CAN Demands for COP27**

The new **Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE)** Action Plan to be adopted at COP27 must:

- It is essential that all activities under the Action Plan are grounded in human rights and allow the participation, including by providing information in accessible formats, of civil society and Indigenous Peoples’ organizations, and people with disabilities whose contribution is essential
to advance the six pillars of ACE at the local, national, regional, and international level.

➔ Recognise the critical need to protect environmental defenders
➔ Include specific activities related to human rights

Parties will adopt the new Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE) Action Plan at COP27, which will include a set of activities at the national and international level to implement the Glasgow Work Programme on ACE across its six pillars (education, training, public awareness, public participation, public access to information, and international cooperation) and priorities areas (policy coherence; coordinated action; tools and support; and monitoring, evaluation, and reporting). It is essential that all activities under the Action Plan are grounded in human rights and allow the participation, including by providing information in accessible formats, of civil society and Indigenous Peoples’ organizations, people with disabilities, whose contribution is essential to advance the six pillars of ACE at the local, national, regional, and international level. A number of dimensions are particularly relevant to ACE, and should be included in the new Action Plan.

The Action Plan should recognize the need to protect effectively environmental defenders and the role that ACE can play in this context and include Parties’ commitments to ensure the protection of the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, access to information, and participation as essential to enabling the participation and mobilization of all stakeholders under the ACE framework. This must ensure that environmental defenders, a large number of which are Indigenous, and their communities are not subjected to criminalization, assassination, intimidation, or harassment.

ACE is particularly relevant to other workstreams, such as the Gender Action Plan and the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform. The Action Plan should help break silos across processes and ensure constructive exchanges among constituted bodies, Parties, and non-Party stakeholders. The action plan should include specific activities related to human rights for each of the four priority areas. These activities must aim at breaking silos across workstreams under the UNFCCC and across legal frameworks. These activities should require that Party and non-Party stakeholders report on specific measures taken, and that they convene workshops with Parties, observers, constituted bodies, and other UN entities. The Secretariat should also be mandated to produce reports and guidance documents.

In terms of timeline, we share the view of many Parties and observers alike to have a short-term Action Plan, reviewed in 2026 at the midpoint of the Glasgow Work Programme, focused on activities aligned with priorities and timeframes under the UNFCCC, including the gathering of information and lessons learned from the ongoing cycle of NDC enhancement and updating (2022), the Global Stocktake (2022-2023), and the preparation of new NDCs (2025).

3.5 Observers’ Participation at the COP Negotiations

CAN Demands for COP27
➔ Champion and enable meaningful civil society participation
➔ Provide a space at the decision table for the most affected people and areas
➔ Ensure support for safe and equitable participation for persons with disabilities inline with the Convention. Develop mechanisms that ensure people’s rights and well-being from an access rights perspective. The inclusion of a protocol for risk assessments and preventive measures to ensure safe and effective participation of the public in the selection
of host countries could ensure that the minimum conditions for effective participation are guaranteed (as outlined below).

States wishing to host a COP meeting must demonstrate their commitment to human rights and people’s participation.

Climate change is a threat multiplier, exacerbating already existing crises and inequalities. This means that already marginalized groups such as women, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, youth, people with disabilities, displaced people and others suffer the worst consequences. Yet, these groups are often absent from the negotiation tables and not the final beneficiaries of support, such as climate finance and energy access projects. International climate negotiations continue to be inaccessible for frontline communities and defenders. Civil society organizations have denounced restrictions on participation through visa denials, deportations, and limited opportunities for UN-accredited organizations to register representatives.\(^\text{45}\)

Meaningful civil society participation is not just an imperative from a justice perspective, it also is an important aspect in ensuring that policies are ambitious and accepted. In order to ensure that participation is implemented in a meaningful way, there are several aspects to take into account when setting up the structures:

- Inclusive: a broad stakeholder mapping should be conducted in order to ensure that all relevant societal and ethnic groups are represented. To enable the stakeholders to take part, invitations need to be delivered in a timely manner, translation needs to be offered and barrier-free access needs to be guaranteed.
- At eye level: the entire process needs to be based on trust, respect and cooperation. A process in which stakeholders are simply informed does not constitute meaningful civil society participation.
- Transparent: a clear mandate needs to be delivered that informs all participants about which decisions are to be made. Additionally, all relevant documentation needs to be freely accessible.
- Enabling: the participants’ capacities to fully engage in the process need to be strengthened.
- Continuous: the process needs to be both continuous and binding, with institutional entities in place that support stakeholder engagement.

Not including the most affected people and areas at the decision table for climate action can in the worst cases result in false solutions and maladaptation, where these groups end up being worse off than they were from the start. Inclusion is imperative to achieve a just transition for everyone. The UNFCCC and its stakeholders must ensure that these voices are heard and not spoken for. There are repeated issues with accreditation and visa applications. According to recent data, the share of women in the party delegations is only 34%.\(^\text{46}\)

Corporate capture is a particularly worrying phenomenon, as corporate interests are slowing down climate action. The “Guidelines for the participation of representatives of non-governmental organizations at meetings of the bodies of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change” should be reviewed. In order to be effective, fit for purpose, and aligned with both the evidence-based and best practice, this revision should introduce a rigorous UNFCCC Accountability Framework to guide engagement with representatives from non-governmental organizations which includes:

- Setting a definition of what constitutes a ‘conflict of interest’ (COI)

\(^{45}\) CIVICUS, (2019). \textit{We will not be silenced. Climate activism from the frontlines to the UN}

\(^{46}\) La Ruta Del Clima, (2022). \textit{COP26 Participation Summary}
• Setting protocols that comprise the Accountability Framework, including i) determining criteria for distinguished types of representatives and non-party stakeholders; ii) establishing rules of engagement; iii) and providing guidance on handling potential conflict of interest cases across existing representatives or new applicants.

• Establishing COI accountability mechanisms to enforce and monitor the Accountability Framework. To enable diverse, safe and effective participation of the public during COPs it is important to develop mechanisms that ensure people's rights and well-being from an access rights perspective. The inclusion of a protocol for risk assessments and preventive measures to ensure the safe and effective participation of the public in the selection of host countries could ensure that the minimum conditions for effective participation are guaranteed.

Such a protocol can help ensure that all states hosting climate negotiations commit to ensuring the freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression of civil society participants and observers and fulfill guidelines to guarantee people's participation. A State's full guarantee of the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association should be a prerequisite for the nomination of a State to host international climate forums as recommended by the UN Special rapporteur on Freedom of Assembly and Association in its 2021 report presented to the UN General Assembly.47

States wishing to host a COP meeting should demonstrate their commitment to human rights and people's participation and show leadership at the global and regional level and national levels on climate issues.

Furthermore, while it is positive that COP27 takes place in Africa for the first time, the chosen location of Sharm El-Sheik means that any involvement outside of the facilities from Egyptian civil society and individuals will be non-existent.

3.6 HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER

CAN DEMANDS FOR COP27

➔ As the COP for the vulnerable - COP27 must strive to raise the ambition and accelerate the work on climate justice, human rights, and gender equality in the implementation of the Paris agreement, across all relevant workstreams.

➔ As highlighted by the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and climate change, Parties should “[e]stablish a process to revise and improve the Gender Action Plan, for agreement at the twenty-eighth session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change”

It is unequivocal that climate change has an impact on human rights across the world and that the current unjust political and economic systems are the driving forces behind climate change. Centering human rights is not only important to address climate change but is critical in its own right. At the same time, measures to mitigate and adapt to climate change have the potential to undermine the human rights of the communities involved. It is thus crucial that climate action be people- and human rights-centered. The COP27 negotiations must have a rights-based approach and strive to raise the ambition and accelerate the work on climate justice and gender equality in the implementation of the Paris agreement, across all relevant workstreams.

The effects of climate change are not gender-neutral. Women worldwide take a larger

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47 UN Doc A/76/222
caring responsibility for children and the elderly and are more dependent on natural resources and agriculture to secure food and fuel. The latest report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change\(^48\) pointed out that 80\% of those displaced by climate disasters are women.\(^49\) The report further states that “[d]ue to the power imbalance caused by patriarchal systems, women of various classes, castes and creeds are disproportionately affected socially and economically, in particular, indigenous and disabled women”.\(^50\) Women and indigenous peoples are also more likely to live in energy poverty.

The concept of a just transition may look very different in the global north and the global south. Given the many interlinkages between climate change and development, it is imperative to take a holistic approach to support countries in building resilient and gender-equal societies. This means including and giving women opportunities to be part of the just transition. Where the 66th Session of the Commission on the Status of Women agreed conclusions\(^51\) state that “The Commission recognizes the importance of relevant International Labour Organization standards related to the realization of women’s right to work and rights at work which are critical to ensure a just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with nationally defined development priorities towards an inclusive, low greenhouse gas emission and climate-resilient development and sustainable economy...”\(^52\)

As highlighted by the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and climate change, Parties should “[e]stablish a process to revise and improve the Gender Action Plan, for agreement at the twenty-eighth session of the Conference of the

\(^48\) UN Doc A/77/226
\(^49\) Ibid. para 44
\(^50\) Ibid.
\(^51\) UN Doc E/CN.6/2022/L.7
\(^52\) Ibid. para 20

We are the people and we have the power.

Together we are stronger.
# ANNEXURE

## REGIONAL / NATIONAL NODE CONTACTS

The CAN-International Secretariat works closely with our regional/national nodes. For specific information on regional activities and projects, please contact the appropriate coordinator directly. Contact details for the node coordinators can be found on CAN’s website.

### CAN Regional Networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Coordinator Name</th>
<th>Contact Information</th>
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<tbody>
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