



## **CAN Briefing Expectations for the UNFCCC SB56 May 2022**

Climate Action Network (CAN) is the world's largest network of civil society organizations working together to promote government action to address the climate crisis, with more than 1500 members in over 130 countries.

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With COP27 taking place in Africa and the Arab region, both among the most affected geographies, negotiations must center on the needs of those stricken hardest by the impact of the climate crisis. SB56 presents opportunities to set clear expectations and prepare key deliverables for Sharm el Sheik. This briefing lays out key expectations for SB56 negotiators and decision-makers on the road to Sharm el Sheik.

This SB takes place also takes place against the backdrop of intersecting crises: an ongoing pandemic, an inhumane war, and a looming food emergency. The recent IPCC reports have dramatically shown how harshly the climate crisis is hitting the most vulnerable, that adaptation needs to be scaled all major emitters, but in particular the richest countries, must enhance their mitigation efforts and that the limits of adapting to climate change are already met today. After the recent IPCC reports, rich countries can no longer deny the need to address Loss and Damage and must be ready to deliver at COP27.

### **Loss & Damage**

Loss and Damage (L&D) has gained political attention at COP26 like never before, however, progress towards supporting vulnerable developing countries in addressing it has been far from adequate. The recent IPCC 6th Assessment Report of WGII clearly warned that with increasing global warming, losses and damages will increase and additional human and natural systems will reach adaptation limits. As scientists underlined we must scale up adaptation and also provide finance to address climate-induced loss and damage.

### **Glasgow Dialogue**

At COP 26, G77+China - representing 85% of the world's population - demanded a Loss and Damage Finance Facility but instead were offered the Glasgow Dialogue. However, the Dialogue decision doesn't include a mandated outcome or guidance for its structure which

risks turning the Glasgow Dialogue into a “talk shop”. The Glasgow Dialogue can become a precedent of the UNFCCC process’s legitimacy - or this it needs to<sup>1</sup> .

- **Result in concrete outcomes that provide adequate, new, and additional, reliable, and grants-based support** for the most vulnerable people and countries in addressing L&D – otherwise, the dialogue fails. Concrete steps and meaningful outcomes to be achieved at the end of each year until 2024 should be defined in the first dialogue.
- **Result in the agreement on the next steps to define the modalities of an L&D finance facility**, its institutional arrangements, various sources of predictable, sustainable, adequate, new and additional L&D finance, and equitable and direct access for vulnerable developing countries based on need and priorities. A critical milestone to deliver will be COP27: in Sharm el Sheik countries must formally establish an L&D finance facility. Ministers should guide their negotiators at SB56 to work in that direction. Subsequently, the Glasgow Dialogue should flesh out the operationalization of such a facility, and how L&D finance is delivered and can be made accessible for the most vulnerable countries and most impacted people. These discussions should be conducted in coordination with other relevant processes such as the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance and the Global Stocktake.
- **Build on but don’t duplicate past processes**: The Glasgow Dialogue is not the first dialogue process of its kind and should not duplicate past dialogues and efforts including the 2018 Suva Expert Dialogue. The Glasgow Dialogue must build on previous processes but culminate into concrete outcomes
- **Be rooted in the UNFCCC’s foundational principles of equity, justice, fairness, and access**, incl. CBDR-RC, Polluter-Pays, Do-No Harm
- **Be organized as an open dialogue**, facilitating views of different country groups, and be transparent and accessible for different stakeholders to participate.

For the Glasgow Dialogue to result in concrete outcomes as soon as possible, it also needs to become an official SB agenda item under which guidance for a decision on a loss and damage finance facility at COP 27 will be discussed.

## **Santiago Network**

In 2019, decisions 2/CP.25 and 2/CMA.2 established the Santiago Network for averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change (SNLD) under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM). The Chilean COP25 texts mandated the establishment of the Santiago Network and outlined its basic functions. A core premise for establishing the Santiago Network is to fill the gap in action on the third function of the WIM, which is enhancing action and support including finance, technology, and capacity building by establishing a body that would be able to catalyse technical assistance for the implementation of approaches to address loss and damage in developing countries.

After the UNFCCC technical workshop in May the following issues remain;

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<sup>1</sup> Based on: Briefing Towards a Glasgow Dialogue that Matters. Available at: <https://climatenetwork.org/resource/briefing-towards-a-glasgow-dialogue-that-matters/>

1. The structure, especially the roles of advisory body vis a vis the ExCom, who guides and who decides what the SNLD will do?
2. Organisations, Bodies, Networks and Experts (OBNE) and membership, the who and how that Technical Assistance will ultimately be delivered?
3. L&D Needs assessment and how they guide the work of the SNLD?
4. Funding and how it will be mobilised, how will finance for Technical Assistance flow, will it be projectized with a rigid application process or will it be more dynamic and responsive?
5. Agreeing the terms of reference and identifying a possible hosting institution.

Developed countries are prioritizing the identification of the host institution for the Santiago Network and agreeing the terms of the hosting agreement. They argue that to get the Santiago Network up and running quickly we need to get the host organization agreed so that they can be mandated to start work. However developing countries are less focussed on the host organization and more interested in getting the functions right, they want to ensure the Santiago Network regardless of host institution has strong foundations, and is design to be fit for purpose.

Finally, the Santiago Network needs to respect the principle of CBDR-RC under the Convention, i.e. that while addressing climate change is a global responsibility some countries are far more capable than others of doing so, and that those countries who are more capable must help those that aren't. The SN must be guided by this principle and while it should build on existing efforts that may not be, such as humanitarian relief, the SN can build this principle into its work to ensure that particularly vulnerable developing countries receive the technical assistance they need and are entitled to.

## **Adaptation**

We would like to see the Global Goal for Adaptation (GGA) on the agenda - under the CMA and at SBs sessions. This will help the process of building coherence around the adaptation agenda and allow a dedicated space for Parties to discuss how to fully operationalise the GGA and achieve its ultimate objectives. To do this, at COP27 parties need to welcome the decision to establish a permanent agenda item on GGA as part of the CMA and SBs by COP28 when the Glasgow Sharm el Sheik work program (GlaSS) mandate finishes.

### **Global Goal for Adaptation and Glasgow Sharm el Sheik Work Programme**

The GGA's original purpose in 2015 was to give visibility to adaptation globally - to give parity to adaptation with mitigation. Thus, the GlaSS work programme should bear in mind the overarching goal of increasing adaptation actions to build the climate resilience of vulnerable people, biodiversity, and ecosystems according to national circumstances.

While the GGA has long been considered a methodological exercise, it has become clear, over the past year in the run-up to COP26, that implementing the GGA is rather a question of political will - alongside a need for capacity building and support provision. As such, the GlaSS work programme should be thought of as a "support and capacity-building" programme rather than primarily a methodological discussion.

It will require both. The GlaSS Work Programme should accelerate adaptation actions by:

**Driving understanding, coordination, processes, and actions on adaptation regionally, nationally, and sub-nationally.**

This should be an opportunity for countries to enhance knowledge and capacities on adaptation action, not solely to agree on a set of global indicators. The Work Programme should become a process that can accompany Parties and groups in accelerating existing discussions and actions on adaptation. The GlaSS work programme should create a platform and structure for ongoing discussions and workstreams which Parties and groups can organise themselves around - advancing various adaptation issues - including enhanced adaptation planning, implementation and Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL). The Work Programme must support countries in identifying the best way they can develop their own adaptation goals, plans and policies to achieve them.

The GlaSS work programme and the GGA are an important opportunity to reverse the top-down nature of international reporting and communication frameworks. The design of the GGA must drive contextually appropriate, national climate adaptation MEL systems, which in turn will inform the global assessments - rather than vice versa. Ultimately, this implies that the GGA should be composed of several “elements” or “approaches” entailing the use of multiple and flexible methods and indicators. There would be several goals – or sub-goals – assessed under the GGA with countries using both qualitative and quantitative methods to inform the GGA. A consensus on which dimensions should be included must evolve during multiple rounds of the GGA consultation.

The IPCC WG II reports that current adaptation action is “small scale and incremental and not transformational”. The GlaSS work programme could initiate a workstream on transformational adaptation approaches - banking lessons on what has or has not worked with the aim to incentivise transformational adaptation approaches in the final GGA system.

**Supporting the inclusion of sub-national and locally derived goals and locally-led plans**

Achieving the GGA must involve the people affected most by climate impacts. Among the methodologies should be a thorough understanding of the efficacy of relevant, appropriate, participatory, flexible, inclusive, and protective locally-led adaptation (LLA). Progress in countries which are adopting LLA at scale should be considered as progress towards achieving the global goal on adaptation during the Global Stocktake (GST) process. Through the GlaSS work programme, Parties and groups can accelerate reflections on how adaptation plans and communications encourage community-driven adaptation practices to build the climate resilience of people, biodiversity, and ecosystems. What is good practice and what are the barriers to creating community-driven adaptation plans? Where can UNFCCC guidance be strengthened? How can LLA be incorporated at the national and local levels? The Work Programme at the regional and national levels must create spaces and opportunities for the participation of local, Indigenous, and marginalised people.

Planning for adaptation through National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), Adaptation Communication (AdComms) and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and the work programme should enable Parties to include LLA principles amongst their adaptation priorities. Monitoring and learning systems must be able to accommodate the broad diversity

of local adaptation actions and be able to evaluate their impact in an appropriate manner – such as adopting participatory monitoring and evaluation modalities. Both MEL systems and climate assessments should take into account information and actions at the national, regional, sub-national and local levels, within all relevant sectors (e.g: food, water, agriculture, biodiversity, ecosystems etc) and from multiple types of actors (climate impacted people, Indigenous groups, people with disabilities, youth, children, local communities etc). Planning and MEL systems should prioritise local and Indigenous knowledge and lived experiences as a means of contextualising climate risks.

### **Improve coherence and understanding of adaptation under the UNFCCC**

Much of the work on adaptation has been produced through siloed workstreams making it difficult to follow the various adaptation issues, not only logistically during negotiations, but also conceptually. As a result, there is work on adaptation under the UNFCCC that has not yet been discussed in detail and remains hard to access for those not familiar with UNFCCC structures.

The GlaSS work programme should provide a space to reconcile and discuss the different siloed adaptation mandates, workstreams and activities that have been undertaken to date under the UNFCCC (and other bodies). The GGA, and the GlaSS work programme represent an opportunity under which other learning and consolidation of adaptation items should be considered and bring coherence to the adaptation agenda in the UNFCCC that allows for better assessment of the collective progress on adaptation.

## **Mitigation**

COP26 requested parties to revisit and strengthen their 2030 targets in NDCs. The IPCC Working Group I (physical science base) and III (Mitigation) show how necessary this is. As it stands the emissions gap will not succeed in keeping the world within the 1.5C target to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. The historic emitters have the greatest capacity to act in urgency and it is their moral responsibility and under the convention, according to the principles of CBDR-RC it is necessary for them to do so urgently today. This would mean rapidly, and in accordance with justice, human rights, equity, and fair shares for developed countries to enact deep emissions reductions and scale implementation whilst supporting emerging and developing countries to follow suit. Integral to this is also the need for strengthened ecosystem approaches, restoring and conserving all natural ecosystems and preserving their integrity with strong safeguards in place.

### *Implementation*

The Egyptian COP27 presidency has highlighted the importance of implementing commitments; ambitious targets alone are meaningless without delivery that translates them into real emissions reductions. The Glasgow Climate Pact sets clear expectations on all countries to deliver accelerated action on coal, fossil fuel subsidies, methane, non-CO2 gases, and nature protection. The SBs are an important moment to raise expectations for progress on implementation this year. COP26 also saw scores of countries make sectoral commitments across coal, deforestation and land degradation, ZEVs, fossil fuel finance and methane; holding countries accountable to these commitments is a priority.

### *Work Programme to Scale Mitigation Ambition and Implementation*

The Work Programme (WP) to Scale Mitigation Ambition and Implementation will need to reflect and result in sound technical work and outputs, but at the same time must be “political” in the sense of leading to actions and decisions which make a real world difference in terms of closing the emission gap to the 1.5°C limit. In order to succeed in this regard, it must strongly reflect the principles of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, justice and equity. The expectation therefore is for technical deliverables (such as technical dialogues on sectoral mitigation/implementation barriers and solutions) as well as high-level decision making within the COP with clear decisions to be taken at COP27 and beyond to ensure that the 1.5°C goal is not surpassed.

As such the WP will need to be defined at SB56 to be presented for a decision at COP27. The WP should

- (a) Enhance the ambition and implementation of Parties’ efforts to reduce emissions in global aggregate by at least 43% [34–60%] reductions by 2030 over 2019 levels to be in line with **limiting global warming to 1.5°C**
- (b) enable the reflection of sectoral commitments to be **in NDCs, and Long Term Strategies (LTS)** (ensuring alignment between the two), and synthesis report
- (c) Enhance the role of **Non-Parties Stakeholders** towards raising 2030 ambition and implementation by strengthening the link between Non-Parties’ contributions and efforts by Parties’ and enable Non-Party contributions to the Work Programme.
- (d) Enhance the implementation of Parties’ **sectoral** decarbonisation commitments, including sectoral commitments under the Glasgow Climate Pact and plurilateral initiatives for just sectoral decarbonisation made by Parties’.
- (e) Facilitate the mobilization of **finance** to raise mitigation ambition and deliver implementation and potential overachievement of Parties’ 2030 climate targets, especially for developing countries and their just energy transitions
- (f) Strengthen coordinated, robust **support** structures for the development and implementation of NDCs, in particular by developing country Parties
- (g) Defining **enabling conditions for implementation**
- (h) Strengthen Parties’ and non-Parties’ individual and collective actions to **just phasedown of coal power** and the **just phase-out of fossil fuels** and subsidies, in a manner that supports the poorest and most vulnerable, recognising national circumstances and just transition
- (i) Strengthen Parties’ and non-Parties’ individual and collective actions to **protect and restore natural ecosystems** and sustainably manage working lands, including the just phase-out of harmful subsidies that drive ecosystem loss, in a manner that advances the rights of Indigenous peoples, supports the poorest and most vulnerable, and protects biodiversity, recognising national circumstances

## **Finance**

Following COP26, Parties must recognize that a new approach to finance is needed — missing finance is at the core of crises around loss and damage, adaptation, and mitigation.

The lead-up to COP27 is an unmissable window for Parties to agree on lessons learned from the 100bn process and on big and bold ideas for the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG).

We know that to cut emissions by half and build resilience trillions are needed. And the IPCC report has made clear that we have the resources to scale up ambition. Yet, developed countries failed to keep their promise to ramp up new and additional climate finance to \$100bn a year by 2020. It is critical to **demonstrate how the \$100bn Delivery Plan is being implemented**: Developed countries must put forward **new and additional, gender-responsive climate finance and reach the \$100bn goal this year and exceed it in 2023-2025**, to make up for earlier gaps.

Those countries who have not increased their climate finance pledges last year should announce new climate finance commitments in 2022. - (e.g. France, Australia).

Other developed countries such as Germany or the US, whose planned future provisions fall far behind their pledges from last year must urgently show that they are not backtracking from their pledges.

**Furthermore, countries must demonstrate concrete progress to double adaptation finance with a view to reaching a 50% share for adaptation in overall climate finance and ensuring it is accessible to LDCs and SIDS**: Ministers from developed countries should commit to present, well **ahead of COP27, a clear and predictable plan to at least double adaptation finance by 2025 including tracking and capture this plan in the formal COP27 outcome**. This plan should be backed up by concrete commitments by individual developed countries to substantially increase their adaptation finance provisions. Climate vulnerable communities urgently need to be able to carry-out community and locally-based adaptation measures, but can't do this without accessing new and additional, predictable adaptation finance.

For the **New Collective Quantified Goal**, CAN is clear that the starting point for its design should be principles of Adequacy, Equity, Fair Shares, and Intersectionality.

#### **Adequacy:**

The evidence shows that trillions in climate finance are needed today to address ongoing loss and damage, to carry out adaptation measures, and to engage in a just-transition to net-zero economies. This must be enshrined in corresponding subgoals for mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage and linked to a ratchet-up mechanism to increase the goal periodically, linked to the Global Stocktake. The NCQG and its subgoals must be formulated in a needs-based and informed manner, with a differentiation between and inclusion of both, investment and support needs.

#### **Equity:**

Equitable access for those who need it most also includes simplifying access to climate finance and ensuring that there is greater access to climate finance for all who need it, not only government and/or national entities.

Particularly for vulnerable countries, finance must be provided as grants or highly concessional finance. Loans carry a high risk to only to increase a country's national debt levels.

**Fair Shares:**

Historic responsibilities demand that climate finance providers pay their fair shares and that climate finance is new and additional to existing financial commitments and obligations. Climate finance providers support and deliver on funding gap analyses, including by determining existing climate action funding streams, and a historical analysis of extreme climatic events impacts and costs, to help determine where the finance is most needed. Climate finance providers must not avoid diverting money away from development finance, humanitarian aid or any other financial flows, and should adopt safeguards and standards to prevent this from occurring.

**Intersecitonality:**

The NCQG needs to reflect the various intersecting crisis and must be formulated as a INdigenous Peoples led, feminist goal which centers equity, respects peoples rights and their communities, and ultimately reforms a broken financial system which currently does not respond to the needs of developing countries, people and the planet.

**Global Stocktake**

2022 is the preparation year for the Global Stocktake (GST). As the process started at the COP26 in Glasgow, it was mostly approached with a very technical aspect, especially with the preparation of the first technical dialogue, planned during the SBs56.

As the first Technical Dialogue, there is no precedent for what these should look like. Their design will be critical to ensuring they play a full and proper role in delivering on the GST's goals, allowing deep interrogation of their guiding questions and driving forward the GST process towards maximal ambition outcomes at its conclusion at COP28. The TDs must avoid harsh quotas on the number of constituency observers that are able to join the sessions and allow broader participation, beyond UNFCCC constituencies. Special attention should be given to frontline communities and indigenous knowledge inside the dialog. The proposed format by the co-facilitators in April 2022 is a basis to be tested in Bonn as several recommendations from the civil society were implemented, but not all of them, especially allowing more than 1 or 2 seats for each constituency. Next to the technical aspect of these SBs, the TD is an opportunity for informal reception to gather GST organisers, Observers and UNFCCC experts to help generate a common understanding on "What is our vision for the concrete outcomes of the GST, what technical and political inputs are needed from key stakeholders to ensure this is fully realised?" This discussion is intended to support consensus on what inputs can support the process and guide engagement between and with other key stakeholders, including Parties and non Party Stakeholders in order to ensure a successful process/outcome.

On non-party stakeholders, the SBs should also deliver concrete ideas of an assessment of non-state climate action for the COP28. For years now, non-state actors have been engaging in tackling climate change inside the UNFCCC (specifically through the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action, MPGCA) and are registered on its non-state climate action portal. Despite efforts to showcase some results of these engagements, there is no



clear measurable overview of what has been done by these actors which leads to a space for greenwashing and could damage the credibility of the Paris Agreement. Parties should engage with the MPGCA team and the Global Climate Action Portal to find a format that can create more transparency every 5 years on non-state climate action.

As a reminder, the GST should represent a high accountability and political moment in the UNFCCC NDC cycle: the GST is the guardian of the Paris Agreement, and a key part of the ratcheting mechanism. Early indications from (for example) the IPCC 6th Assessment Report, the UNFCCC NDC Synthesis report, and UN Environment Emissions Gap reports indicate that the world is still dangerously off track to meet the aspirations of the Paris Agreement - The GST must serve as a means to guide urgent realignment of nationally determined climate ambition and action. This is about ambition for our climate, our nature and our lives. We need the mobilization of decision-makers and parties for this event and we need political pressure that needs to be built-up this year already.

## **Article 6**

In the Article 6 work programme, Parties should focus on identifying the most urgent items that need to be resolved before any market activity can start. The operationalization of the grievance mechanism should be part of this, and it is shockingly missing from the current workplan. Other important items include rules on baselines and additionality, on safeguards, and the review of existing methodologies from the CDM and the voluntary market.

Given the uptake in voluntary use of carbon credits, and the high expectation from market participants, it will be key to ensure that Article 6 rules are fit for purpose. Offsetting is not and should not be the only use-case for carbon credits, and CAN strongly encourages Parties to establish a system that can be used for other claims, e.g. financial contributions. Reducing emissions domestically – or internally for companies – remains the number one priority, and financing mitigation actions elsewhere should not come at the expense of domestic/internal action.

## **Transparency**

Since 2016, Parties have worked diligently to develop modalities, procedures, and guidelines (MPGs), common reporting formats, common tabular formats, outlines, and training programmes to support the implementation of the Paris Agreement's enhanced transparency framework. These elements are now firmly in place and Parties must begin their preparations to submit their first biennial transparency report (BTR) by the end of 2024.

One remaining element not yet finalized is whether Parties could voluntarily elect to have information reported on climate change impacts and adaptation subject to technical expert review. The Paris Agreement only notes that information on greenhouse gas emissions, progress towards NDCs, and support provided/mobilized are mandatorily subject to review. However, many Parties have noted their interest and preference for voluntarily electing to have their adaptation information reviewed by technical experts. Reviews are critical components of the Paris Agreement's and Convention's transparency and reporting

processes; reviews ensure compliance with MPGs, allow for exchanges among technical experts, build capacity, and enhance the level of information reported and, thus, available to the public. **At SB56, Parties should agree to allow Parties to voluntarily request technical expert reviews of the information reported on climate change impacts and adaptation.** Parties will then be able to use the period from SB56 to COP27 to adequately design a training program so that technical expert reviewers can be in place for the first BTRs.

CAN congratulates those Parties which will be participating in the Facilitative Sharing of Views (FSV) at SB56: Andorra, Chile, Cuba, Egypt, Malaysia, Namibia, Panama, Singapore, Thailand, and Zambia. The FSV is an important opportunity for Parties to share their experiences, successes, and challenges. CAN looks forward to learning from the participating Parties.

This year, Parties will also consider revising the modalities and procedures for the international assessment and review and international consultation and analysis processes under the Convention. These processes include the multilateral peer learning sessions of the FSV and the Multilateral Assessment. Parties should take this opportunity to allow the FSV and MA to build upon the expertise and perspectives of civil society and non-governmental organizations. Parties should decide to allow for observer organization active participation, including by posing questions to participating Parties.

## **Action for Climate Empowerment**

Failing to include human rights as one of guiding principles of the Glasgow Work Programme was a huge missed opportunity, as taking a human rights-based approach to ACE would drive more inclusive development and implementation of ACE at the national level. By taking into account the specific needs and perspectives of the most disenfranchised communities with limited access to decision-making, a human rights-based approach would ensure that these communities are empowered and that ACE is implemented in a manner that truly “leaves no one behind”. The Action Plan that will be adopted by Parties at COP27 provides the opportunity to fill this gap, and ensure a set of coherent activities that can support Parties in implementing the ACE elements in a coherent and structured manner. Activities and events set forth in the Action Plan should be aligned with priorities and timeframes under the UNFCCC, including the gathering of information and lessons learned from the ongoing cycle of NDC enhancement and updating (2022), the Global Stocktake (2022-2023), and the preparation of new NDCs (2025). The adoption of a 5-year Action Plan would provide some visibility and clarity regarding how events and activities held under ACE contribute to a strategic vision and would ensure that despite limited resources, the Work Programme is well positioned to foster the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

The operationalization of the linkage between ACE and human rights also requires for ACE to address the situation of environmental human rights defenders, working to demand climate action by exercising the rights of access to information and participation. The ACE Action Plan should first recognize the role of environmental defenders under ACE, and the importance of their work in the context of the climate crisis. The action plan should also include commitments for Parties to guarantee an enabling environment for environmental

defenders working on ACE, and to ensure the protection of the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, access to information, and participation as essential to enabling the participation and mobilization of all stakeholders under the ACE framework.

Through the new Action Plan, the Glasgow Work Programme should also strive to build upon and amplify existing protection mechanisms and initiatives by Party and non-Party stakeholders that contribute to guaranteeing and protecting a safe environment for members of the public to enjoy the six elements of ACE - including from any threat that non-state actors might pose to the public involved in climate action. It should also enhance Parties' effort to put in place effective mechanisms to prevent and address conflict of interest in climate action at the national level - including by facilitating the sharing of experience through activities held under the Glasgow Work Programme. Activities under the new Action Plan should thus enable exchange of good practices, lessons learned and relevant knowledge, and strengthening of national institutions, in order to identify and address any hindrances and threats – as well as their enablers – to full and effective contributions of members of the public to climate action.

Improving the quality and consistency of reporting on national processes would be essential to assess the extent to which Parties integrate the right to public participation and access to information, along with the other elements of ACE. For this purpose, specific indicators could be developed. The ACE Action Plan can help improve monitoring and reporting, in order to reliably evaluate the implementation of ACE components across Parties' climate action. ACE should be included into formal monitoring and reporting exercise as a requirement of National Communications and Nationally Determined Contributions, underpinned by an evidence-based approach to monitoring and reporting.

## **Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue**

We call upon parties to ensure that:

- the first Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue sets concrete, action-oriented goals for itself
- the dialogue addresses the most relevant and pressing issues of the ocean-climate nexus with a clear focus on:
  - a) mainstreaming ocean-climate action within the UNFCCC and other UN bodies,
  - b) drawing upon and integrating existing ocean-related outcomes, workstreams and processes of relevant other bodies under the UNFCCC,
  - c) addressing knowledge, capacity and process gaps and
  - d) identifying means of implementation.
- the dialogue encourages countries, especially coastal ones, to include corresponding commitments in their updated NDCs, NAPs, LTEs, GST submissions, etc.
- the dialogue identifies emerging issues in the context of ocean-climate action, such as ocean-based geo-engineering, that would need to be dealt with in future sessions of the dialogue series.

Following the close of the dialogue, the UNFCCC Secretariat should prepare a **summary report** to share and inform relevant decisions at COP27 that includes key discussion points and focuses on the action items and clear recommendations identified by Parties and observers during the dialogue.

## **Science Policy**

With regards to the third meeting of the Structured Expert Dialogue (SED) under the Second Periodic Review (PR2) of the long-term global goal under the Convention CAN lays out seven priority areas:

### **1. Definition of the long-term goal**

CAN considers limiting temperature rise to 1.5°C compared to pre-industrial levels by the end of this century as the only acceptable long-term goal which truly reflects the Paris Agreement.

### **2. Consideration of the risks of overshooting the long-term goal**

There are many risks and uncertainties both around the impact of even a temporary overshoot as well as on realistic possibilities to bring the temperature down, at least at the scale that might be needed.

### **3. Scenario development to reach the long-term goal**

The Structured Expert Dialogue should present an overview of the latest findings of 1.5°C pathways with limited or no overshoot.

### **4. The Recognition of the gap to reach the long-term goal**

### **5. The Identification of action and implementation delivered until now**

### **6. Contribution from the IPCC to the third Structured Expert Dialogue**

The Third meeting of the Structured Expert Dialogue should provide sufficient time for an extensive presentation by lead authors of the findings of IPCC Working Groups II and III.

### **7. Proposals for further research on the long-term goal**

We recommend for the Structured Expert Dialogue to request the IPCC to develop further Special Reports on the following specific areas: Tipping Points; Cities; and carbon Dioxide Removal in the next cycle.