




GLASGOW

Time for Solidarity and Ambition

CAN ANNUAL POLICY DOCUMENT
COP26 NOVEMBER 2021



To know more
scan this QR code:



Table of Contents

Glossary	3
Executive Summary: Glasgow: Time for Solidarity and Ambition	5
1 Finance for support and means of implementation	
- 1.1 Mobilising finance: \$100 billion commitment and addressing climate impacts	9
2 Addressing climate impacts	
- 2.1 Addressing Loss and Damage (L&D)	12
- 2.2 Enhancing adaptation action	14
3 Raising Ambition and Accountability	
- 3.1 Enhancing Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)	16
- 3.2 Aligning climate and biodiversity ambitions	18
- 3.3 Common timeframes	19
- 3.4 Rules for Article 6 which do not undermine the social and environmental Integrity of the Paris Agreement	20
- 3.5 Transparency	22
- 3.6 Global Stocktake	23
- 3.7 Agriculture	25
- 3.8 Action for Climate Empowerment for ambition and implementation	26
- 3.9 Science	27
Annexure	
CAN Regional and National Nodes	29
Working Group Co-Chairs	30

Glossary

ACE	Action for Climate Empowerment
AR6	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Sixth Assessment Report
BAU	Business as Usual
CAN	Climate Action Network
CBD	Convention on Biological Diversity
CBDR	Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CFS	Committee on World Food Security
CGE	Consultative Group of Experts
CMA	Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement
COP	Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC
CORSIA	Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation
CTF	Common Tabular Format
ETS	Emission Trading System
ExCom	Executive Committee
GCAP	Global Climate Action Portal
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GGA	Global Goal on Adaptation
GHG	GreenHouse Gases
GNI	Gross national income
GST	Global Stocktake
IEA	International Energy Agency
IPBES	Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
KJWA	Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture

Glossary

L&D	Loss and Damage
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
LTF	Long-term Finance
LTS	Long-term strategies
MPGCA	Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action
MPGs	Modalities, Procedures, and Guidelines
NAPs	National Adaptation Plans
NDCs	Nationally Determined Contributions
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee
SB	Subsidiary Bodies
SBI	Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
SCF	Standing Committee on Finance
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
SNLD	Santiago Network on Loss and Damage
SRCCCL	Special Report on Climate Change and Land
TACCC	Transparency, Accuracy, Consistency, Comparability and Completeness
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WG	IPCC's Working Group
WIM	Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage

Executive Summary

Glasgow: Time for Solidarity and Ambition

World leaders in Glasgow face a clear task: they must agree on a comprehensive package of outcomes that will accelerate the implementation of the Paris Agreement and deliver an outcome that responds to the needs of the most vulnerable people on the frontlines of the climate crisis.

From the unprecedented climate-induced disasters over the past year, it is clear we have entered the era of loss and damage. Glasgow must deliver on solidarity and ambition.

The largest forest fires on record in the northern hemisphere in Yakutia (Russia) during the hot and dry summer of 2021 produced carbon dioxide emissions in a few months equivalent to those produced by Germany in a full year. A devastating Pacific Northwest heatwave in North America, tropical cyclones Tauktae and Yaas in South Asia, catastrophic flooding in China, Germany, Netherlands, and Belgium, a late summer heatwave causing massive melt of the Greenland ice shield, droughts in Kenya and Syria, tropical cyclone Dante in the Philippines, wildfires in California, Turkey and Morocco and climate-induced drought in Madagascar all clearly confirm that "climate change is already affecting every inhabited region across the globe" (IPCC 2021).

The most vulnerable people are already gravely impacted by the climate crisis and are at risk of being pushed into further uncertainty and poverty. This has been exacerbated by vaccine apartheid and the lack of equitable access to Covid19 vaccines.

COP26 must take urgent and needs-based action to respond to the needs of the most vulnerable people, to protect ecosystems and to stop runaway climate change.

CAN urges leaders to come prepared to address the urgent and outstanding issue of Loss and Damage finance, and agree on the following actions and decisions:

- A permanent SB agenda item to discuss Loss and Damage - to increase political relevance and its profile, assess ongoing progress to secure financial resources for Loss and Damage, and provide a political space beyond technical discussions to ensure momentum and action.
- A COP decision on the operationalisation of the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage ensuring sufficient resourcing and effective governance.
- Provision of new, additional and needs-based loss and damage finance and a system to deliver it to vulnerable developing countries:
 - Inclusion of L&D in the discussion on the post-2025 finance goal and a COP26 decision to provide new and additional loss and damage finance until the post

2025 finance goal takes effect.

- A COP26 decision to establish a robust financing system for loss and damage within the UNFCCC based on an assessment of options for a system which delivers loss and damage finance to vulnerable developing countries and most vulnerable communities.

For COP26 to start on the right note, CAN calls for developed countries to come forward with new and additional climate finance and work together on a robust and transparent delivery plan that shows how the \$100 billion annual climate finance commitment will be met in aggregate over the period 2020 to 2025, as enshrined at COP21 in Paris. Developed countries must provide clear articulation of how the aggregate will be met by achieving well beyond \$100bn a year between 2022-2025 to make up for earlier gaps and reach \$50bn per year in adaptation finance in aggregate.

Developed countries must also enhance accountability for the quality and quantity of climate finance mobilised and provided, building on lessons learned from pre-2020 climate finance mobilization. COP26 must advance:

- How they will scale up local level access to climate finance for adaptation.
- A new and additional finance to address loss and damage.
- To timely disbursement of climate finance, particularly for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDs).
- How financial instruments that provide highly concessional finance will be prioritized, namely grants instead of loans that add to a country's indebtedness.

At COP26, countries should agree on and start the process to develop a new post-2025 long-term climate finance goal. CAN calls for this to be set up to be truly responsive to the needs of developing countries, science-based, and, depending on the length of the time-frame envisioned for reaching that goal, set with clear milestones

and intermediate targets for increasing the quantity of climate finance, well beyond \$100 billion per year, including a commitment to provide L&D finance and distinct subgoals for mitigation, adaptation, and L&D.

All climate finance must be 'new and additional', i.e. on top of the global standard of at least 0.7%, GNI commitment to ODA established in the 1970s. The current practice of over-reporting climate finance by donors must end.

Countries must close the mitigation gap to 1.5°C by 2030. This decade is decisive, and COP26 has to agree how that is going to be done. All countries - especially the G20 - must submit NDCs with stronger 2030 targets aligned with 1.5°C and fair shares by COP26, and outline further policies to achieve them.

To put emissions on a 1.5°C trajectory by the end of the decade, Parties should agree at COP26 to enhance their 2030 NDCs to be aligned with 1.5°C before the first Global Stocktake in 2023.

Countries urgently need to plan and accelerate the implementation of already agreed climate plans and policies, including consultation and engagement of civil society.

Climate ambition commitments need to be followed up with genuine climate action and accelerated implementation at the domestic level.

Economic recovery plans from the Covid19 pandemic are a make-or-break opportunity to either invest in transformative changes for the planet or to lock in climate chaos through misguided fossil fuel investment.

Countries must recognise that the only realistic way of reaching the 1.5°C goal is through emission reduction pathways that rapidly and fully phase-out fossil fuels while protecting biodiversity and ecosystem integrity. To effectively address climate and biodiversity in an integrated manner, halting and reversing the loss of forests and other ecosystems, accounting loopholes and key ecosystem provisions need

to be addressed at COP26. Parties should also ensure that the Global Stocktake effectively assesses how these provisions are being met.

Countries that have not yet done so should submit their long-term strategies (LTS) for achieving real zero by 2050 at COP26 and commit to align their 2030 NDCs with these targets to ensure action in the 2020s can get us back on track to avoid breaching the 1.5C limit. False solutions, and offsets including any support for a continued fossil fuel industry such as blue hydrogen, should not be supported.

Furthermore, countries must develop and design a roadmap to operationalise the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) that reflects the needs and capacities of developing countries where adaptation actions are an urgent priority, including:

- A shared process and guideline on how to measure progress including qualitative methods and participatory Impact Monitoring and Evaluation.
- Integration into the national framework and set up mechanisms for financial and technological support on the ground to scale up adaptation.

Parties must deliver strong rules for ambition, strengthening the implementation and ambition of the Paris Agreement - and not undermining it.

CAN calls for a COP26 decision on a single 5-year common timeframe for NDCs. Five-year timeframes are essential for the effective operation of the Paris Agreement ambition mechanism and carry clear advantages over a 10-year period in order to:

- Align with the Paris Agreement Global Stocktake process, which takes stock of Parties' progress towards meeting their objectives every five years.
- Provide more frequent and regular accountability moments to ensure countries are on track in implementing their NDC.
- Give negotiators more than two chances to solve the climate

emergency and put the world on track to achieving climate neutrality - compared to only two NDC implementation periods for 10-year Common Time Frames (in 2031-2040 and 2041-2050).

Parties must deliver common reporting tables, common tabular formats (CTF), various report outlines, and a training program by COP26 (CMA3).

The existing tables for developed country Parties offer a good starting point but must be updated to reflect the MPGs as decided in Katowice.

The enhanced transparency framework is the backbone of the Paris Agreement and the only instrument where your people, and we as civil society and parties know whether commitments are actually fulfilled in a regular and meaningful time frame.

The MPGs outline specific provisions where flexibility is provided to those developing country Parties that need it in light of their capacities, as a way of adhering to the MPGs while enabling them to highlight specific capacity-building needs. Operationalizing flexibility in the tables is a key challenge facing Parties therefore, Parties must uphold the TACCC principles (transparency, accuracy, consistency, comparability, and completeness). It should be recognized that Parties have different starting points, thus, flexibility should not compromise efforts to compare reports.

CAN reiterates the importance of paragraph 77(d), its role in upholding vital Paris Agreement principles, and applicability to Article 6 in its entirety.

A decision on Article 6 guidelines can only be taken if it would not undermine environmental integrity, ambition, or harm people. While no agreement on Article 6 is not a desirable outcome - as unregulated carbon markets could undermine both ambition and transparency - Parties should not accept compromises that create loopholes under the Paris Agreement. Transparency and proper accounting are sine qua non-conditions to a functioning climate

agreement, and this should rule out double-counting in all circumstances. Parties should further reject the use of any and all Kyoto Protocol units under the Paris Agreement, adopt a mandatory system to move beyond zero-sum offsetting, set strict provisions for baselines, and enable the respect and promotion of human rights as well as the rights of Indigenous People and local communities.

Currently, the world is far off track to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement. Starting the process for input under the Global Stocktake is critical to adjust ambition needs in order to make sure we meet the Paris Agreement goals. With the first GST to kick-off following COP26, important decisions are being taken on the structure and process it will involve.

First, a wide range of stakeholders need to be able to meaningfully participate and input contributions to the GST; for this purpose, technical and financial support must be organised and provided to developing countries parties, as well as non-state actors such as civil society, youth organisations or indigenous people.

Secondly, it is **vital that guiding questions are based on the following principles:**

- Limiting global warming to 1.5°C.
- Enabling and facilitating the input of Indigenous Peoples knowledge and local communities' practices that are sometimes transmitted in informal ways.
- Centering of human rights.
- Including all pillars of the Paris Agreement, with a dedicated section on loss and damage, that is currently missing.
- Assessing polluting practices contributing to climate change, namely the use of fossil fuels.

A new work program for Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE) must ensure better mainstreaming of ACE across relevant workstreams through:

- Human rights-based approaches.
- A coherent and incremental 5-year action plan and an ambitious road map.
- An expert group or Task Force would gather Party and non-Party stakeholders that are already conducting work outside of the UNFCCC that is relevant to ACE.
- Inclusion of the Green Climate Fund (GCF), Global Environmental Facility (GEF), and Adaptation Fund should be included in ACE workshops and meetings.
- Integration of ACE in Nationally Determined Contributions and National Reports.

Finance for support and means of implementation

1.1

Mobilising finance: \$100 billion commitment and addressing climate impacts

► Delivering on the existing climate finance goal through to 2025

The success of COP26 in 2021 relies on the delivery of a comprehensive and ambitious finance outcome. Developed countries have not met their promise to ramp up climate finance to \$100 billion a year by 2020. This undermines a critical element of the balance of trust between developing and developed countries. Urgent action is now needed to ensure the \$100 billion is delivered and any shortfalls are compensated for in the future to provide reassurance to Parties on the willingness of contributors to meet their financial obligations.

Since 2016, the governance of climate finance flows has been characterised by opaqueness of accounting by contributors, problems with accessibility, and a growing reliance on loans, including non-concessional ones, which has also contributed to the increase in unsustainable debt burdens in developing countries.

For the entire year, the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG), Antonio Guterres, has repeatedly urged all developed countries to double their climate finance pledges.

So far, the vast majority have not doubled their climate finance. Only two countries have doubled their pre-2020 pledges, and in both cases, whether these new pledges are "new and additional" must be questioned. Given the failure so far to meet the \$100 billion goal based on existing climate finance pledges, the UK has asked Germany and Canada to put forward a delivery plan on climate finance by COP26.

CAN expects that before COP26 developed countries will come forward with new money and a robust, transparent, and needs-based roadmap that shows how the \$100 billion annually will be met and exceeded for each of the years through to 2025, as promised at COP21 in Paris.

Developed countries must also enhance accountability for the quality and quantity of climate finance mobilised and provided, building on lessons learned from pre-2020 climate finance mobilisation. The roadmap must outline how they will scale up local level access to climate finance for adaptation and new and additional finance to address loss and damage (L&D). Critically, the plan must commit to timely disbursement of climate finance, particularly for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDs), and how they will prioritise financial instruments that provide highly-concessional finance, especially delivered in the form of grants instead of loans that add to a country's indebtedness.

► **Looking forward to a new collective quantified goal (Post-2025 climate finance)**

At COP26, countries will agree on and start the process for the adoption of a new post-2025 long-term climate finance goal. It is imperative for the legitimacy of the process to ensure that these deliberations are conducted transparently and in an inclusive manner with all relevant documents made publicly available.

CAN calls for the setting of a new collective post-2025 goal that is truly responsive to the needs of developing countries, that is science-based, and, depending on the length of the time-frame envisioned for reaching that goal, sets clear milestones and intermediate targets for increasing the quantity of climate finance, well beyond \$100 billion per year. It is also critical to define specific targets for all three crucial areas of climate action, to ensure that the new goal is divided between mitigation and adaptation and that there is a new allocation for loss and damage.

The new goal must promote and advance the rights of Indigenous Peoples and integrate their perspectives as well as be provided in a way that is gender-responsive and prioritising and facilitating access of climate-impacted local communities.

All climate finance must be 'new and additional', i.e. on top of the global standard of at least 0.7%, GNI commitment to ODA established in the 1970s. The current practice of over-reporting climate finance by donors must end. The new goal must be based on clear definitions of climate finance and on what constitutes 'new and additional finance'. This will ensure that donors know what to deliver and recipients know what to expect.

► **Fossil finance phaseout**

Urgent action is needed to ensure 2021 marks the end of international public finance to fossil fuels. This would free up significant support

for clean energy and a just and equitable transition worldwide. Energy scenarios, including from the International Energy Agency (IEA), stress that drastic emission cuts are needed now to limit global warming to 1.5°C. Instead, governments are propping up fossil fuels with huge amounts of public money. G20 members still provide at least three times as much public finance for fossil fuels (\$77 billion) as for clean energy (\$28 billion) every year. But momentum is growing to end international finance to not only coal but also oil and gas. We call on governments and public finance institutions to immediately rule out any new international public finance to coal, oil, and gas projects across the entire value chain (extraction, transport, distribution, and power generation), including through export credit agencies, and to close loopholes that allow indirect public finance for fossil fuels to continue through associated infrastructure, technical assistance, or financial intermediaries.

1. Negotiations and formal process

Maintaining the Long-term Finance (LTF) programme

At COP26, to increase transparency and accountability on the delivery of the annual \$100 billion commitment, countries must agree on a process that helps keep momentum on climate finance until 2025. While the Long-term Climate Finance Programme was supposed to conclude in 2020, many developing countries would like to extend it to ensure climate finance continues to be a priority at each COP. The new LTF programme must be more inclusive than the previous one, ensuring participation of Parties and non-party stakeholders. It must include more ministerial sessions and invite the participation of finance ministers. The LTF must serve as a space to discuss a range of issues, including the predictability of climate finance, climate finance

needs, and fostering trust between countries. The monitoring, reporting and transparency aspect of the ex-ante discussions on climate finance mean that it would be prudent to ensure that the LTF programme continues past COP26 under the CMA and the COP.

2. Issues outside the UNFCCC process

Ensuring that debt does not prevail during a climate disaster

As climate impacts become more prevalent and devastating, highly indebted developing countries are being saddled with the additional costs of addressing losses and damages, despite having scarce resources to do so and having contributed the least to the climate emergency. In the aftermath of climate disasters, debt repayments should be suspended and unconditional debt cancellation should be granted to all countries in need of it, and to all countries that have unsustainable and illegitimate debts, particularly those generated by fossil fuel projects.

This is in addition to providing climate finance on highly concessional terms, and primarily as grants, especially for SIDS and LDCs. Debt-generating instruments such as loans must be avoided and the provision of non-concessional loans must be stopped. Instead, grants and other forms of highly concessional finance should be prioritised.

CHAPTER 2

Addressing climate impacts

A devastating Pacific Northwest heatwave in North America, tropical cyclones Tauktae and Yaas in South Asia, catastrophic flooding in Germany, Netherlands, and Belgium, a late summer heatwave causing massive melt of the Greenland ice shield, droughts in Kenya and Syria, tropical cyclone Dante in the Philippines, wildfires in California, Turkey and Morocco – 2021 has clearly shown that “climate change is already affecting every inhabited region across the globe” (IPCC 2021).

The first and most essential step is to avoid and minimise future climate change impacts through ambitious mitigation actions and effective adaptation and risk reduction measures. However, due to delayed climate action, not all climate change impacts can be prevented or minimised. Hence, climate change is already causing and is set to increase losses and damages due to more frequent and severe extreme weather events like floods and hurricanes; and slow-onset processes such as sea-level rise, glacial melt, and increasing pace of desertification. Such impacts hit the poorest countries, communities, and ecosystems the most, as they lack the economic and financial capacity to rebuild and recover as quickly compared to those in rich countries and those able to adapt better.

Climate change violates human rights and creates a daily climate emergency for millions of people. The outcomes from COP26 must reflect this urgency and provide solutions that address the scale of the needs in developing countries and the vulnerable communities therein. Its decisions need to contribute

to ensuring that adequate and needs-based support is available and is accessible to the most vulnerable people for upscaling adaptation and responding to loss and damage.

2.1

Addressing Loss and Damage

COP26 should take adequate and needs-based action on loss and damage (L&D) under UNFCCC that supports the most vulnerable people, communities and ecosystems in addressing unavoided and unavoidable climate impacts. In order to do so, the following actions and decisions should be taken:

► A permanent Subsidiary Bodies (SB) agenda item on L&D

The Paris Agreement anchors L&D as the third pillar of the climate regime. However, so far, L&D is mainly discussed at the technical level within the annual report of the Executive Committee (ExCom), which is submitted to the COP for consideration by the Parties. CAN urges Parties to establish a permanent L&D agenda item for SBs so that it is considered at each session. This would create room for political (and not solely technical) discussion on loss and damage, further raise the profile of the issue that it deserves and demonstrate the political will and ambition to develop solutions. Parties could

discuss their challenges and needs in minimising and addressing loss and damage and how to mainstream the topic into other processes, particularly financial support, capacity building, and technology transfer, as well as progress on the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage.

► **A COP decision on the operationalisation of the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage**

COP25 in Madrid established the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage (SNLD). Appropriately designed, the Network has the capacity to catalyze reliable action and support to countries and communities most at risk of loss and damage, including local, sub-national and national initiatives. However, in Decision 2/CMA.2, Parties did not establish a process for operationalising the Network, including modalities and resources for carrying out its work. Since COP25, the UNFCCC Secretariat has established a website for the SNLD, and the COP Presidencies have conducted a survey and a series of consultations to explore the shape of the network.

COP26 must now decide on the operationalisation of the Santiago Network. This includes¹:

- Setting up a clear governance structure: COP26 should define the Network as the technical component of the Warsaw Mechanism. This would complement the political component of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM), the ExCom, with a technical component to ensure that countries and communities receive the necessary support. This requires a comprehensive operationalisation of the SNLD, beyond the currently established website.
- Define an adequate structure and funding: COP should establish a secretariat/coordinating body that can adequately assist vulnerable developing countries as well as secure sufficient funding - both for the network's

operational capacity and for catalysing action and support on L&D for developing countries.

- Ensure that catalysed support is additional and needs-based: COP needs to ensure that the technical assistance catalysed through the SNLD is new and additional to existing funding commitments and channels and delivered based on the needs to address loss and damage in the most climate vulnerable developing countries and communities.

The process of operationalisation should be completed by COP27. The performance of the SNLD should be annually reported to the COP by its Secretariat.

► **Provide new, additional and needs-based L&D finance and a system to deliver it to vulnerable developing countries**

Based on the principles of solidarity and Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), Parties should decide at COP26 to provide new, additional and needs-based loss and damage finance and assess options for a system to deliver it to vulnerable countries with the objective of establishing a robust financing system for loss and damage. This includes:

- **Adequate inclusion of L&D in the post 2025 finance goal** recognizing that L&D finance has to be new and additional to increased and balanced funding allocations for adaptation and mitigation finance, guided by the needs of developing countries. It must be given the same importance as mitigation and adaptation finance while keeping the accounting separate. As an input for the discussion on the concrete definition of the post 2025 finance goal for L&D, the **COP should decide on the commission of an annual L&D finance gap report to take stock of national financial needs to address L&D.** Similar to Adaptation and Emissions Gap reports, this report

¹ Link to our joint constituency call for action on the SNLD: <https://climatenetwork.org/resource/joint-constituency-climate-action-network-demand-climate-justice-official-youth-constituency-of-the-unfccc-and-women-and-gender->

should analyse the availability of loss and damage finance against the needs of developing countries to address current and projected climate impacts. The document provides the basis of a needs-based approach to L&D finance.

- **A COP 26 decision to provide loss and damage finance until the post 2025 finance goal takes effect** that supports developing countries to respond to climate impacts by providing adequate support for relief, recovery and rehabilitation as well as non-economic loss and damage resulting from extreme weather events and slow-onset processes.
- **A COP 26 decision to establish a robust financing system for loss and damage within UNFCCC based on an assessment of options for a system which delivers loss and damage finance to vulnerable developing countries and most vulnerable communities.** Providing loss and damage finance is only a first step; effective systems are also needed to channel funding to countries and their affected communities keeping in view rising climate impacts and in conjunction with humanitarian aid. There are already a number of options for the design of such systems that have been developed and proposed by countries, country groups, civil society and academia. These include a L&D fund or facility, a Solidarity Fund and a L&D finance window under the Green Climate Fund. COP 26 needs to assess these options and must decide on a L&D financing system which allows for the channeling of adequate L&D financing to vulnerable developing countries, either under the existing UNFCCC financial architecture or through the establishment of additional mechanisms. This system should get fully operationalized by COP27. In order to organize the operationalization, the COP should **task the ExCom and its Expert Group on “Action and Support” in collaboration with the SCF (Standing Committee on Finance)** with the elaboration of

the design for the L&D finance system to be approved at COP27.

► **Adequate inclusion of L&D as part of the Global Stocktake (GST)**

Supporting developing countries in averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage is one key indicator of success for the implementation of the Paris Agreement. The global stocktake must therefore adequately include information on progress in the area of addressing loss and damage. The first step in achieving this is including questions that allow for measuring progress regarding averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage - so far, the questions raised by the Co-Chairs at the SBs do not cover this area.

► **Incorporating Loss and Damage as a part of a country’s long term strategy (LTS) and their NDCs**

For many countries, addressing the climate challenges is not just about mitigation but also on how to adapt to climate impacts and build climate resilience, as well as how to address loss and damage when adaptation is no longer possible. Even if we limit the global average temperature rise to 1.5oC, widespread loss and damage will still occur, impacting millions of people and nature. Addressing loss and damage should be an integral part of any country’s LTS and their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Therefore, COP26 should provide guidance on how to include loss and damage as a core element of LTS and the NDCs.

2.2

Enhancing adaption action

Countries must agree on how to track efforts, assess progress and ensure adequate finance for adaptation to respond to the needs of vulnerable

people and countries and build resilience to climate impacts.

► Operationalisation of the Global Goal on Adaptation

At COP, we call upon parties to develop and design a roadmap to operationalise the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) as outline under Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement, that reflects upon the needs and capacities of developing countries where adaptation actions are most required. The parties should also agree on a shared process and guideline on how to measure progress including qualitative methods and use of Participatory Impact Monitoring and Evaluation ensuring the adaptation actions are socially inclusive and driven across multiple scales. Also, the reporting process should involve non-Party actors. Additionally, GGA should be integrated into the national framework and set up mechanisms for financial and technological support on the ground to scale up adaptation.

Moreover, the GST process should outline the questions that will be able to assess the overall progress on the objective of the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) as well as the questions in terms of adequacy and accessibility of adaptation finance, enabling national policy and environment for building climate resilience and adaptation actions, quantifying adaptation actions based on different themes (Agriculture, Water, biodiversity, health etc), quantifying the number of vulnerable people resilience build, good practices etc.

► Ensuring adequate funding on climate adaptation for developing countries

A COP26 decision is needed to ensure that at least 50% of international public climate finance in the context of the \$ 100 billion goal is allocated to climate change adaptation for developing countries². 70% of the adaptation

funding should be gender-responsive and committed to reaching the poorest and the most vulnerable communities. The funding for climate adaptation must be new and additional to the existing Official ODA and delivered in the form of grants and not loans. There is a need to create an enabling environment and ensure the access of climate adaptation finance is easy and direct. There must be capacity building for accessing funding, along with increasing the overall share of adaptation finance including allocation of share of proceeds from the market mechanism under the Paris Agreement (Article 6.2 and 6.4) into the Adaptation Fund. Moreover, during COP, parties need to commit to scale-up action and finance to enable locally-led adaptation and leadership support. Such support for a locally-led adaptation should be accessible and responsive to the needs and rights of women, children, Indigenous Peoples, people with disabilities, and other marginalised groups.

► National Adaptation Plans (NAPs)

COP26 should decide on enhancing support for the urgent implementation of the National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) priorities and adaptation component of the developing countries NDCs. COP should also encourage all developing countries to prepare and submit their National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) no later than 2022 who have not done yet, in advance of the GST process, and immediately begin implementing adaptation priorities. As of July 2021, only 24 developing countries have submitted NAPs.

²Funding in the context of the post 2025 goal should be balanced for mitigation, adaptation and addressing loss and damage.

CHAPTER 3

Raising Ambition and Accountability

The first part of the IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) shows more comprehensively and clearly than ever before that the window to comply with the 1.5°C limit is closing fast. The instruments to still avoid global warming of more than 1.5°C are readily available. However, if global emissions do not fall rapidly in the next few years, we will exceed that temperature rise and increase the risk of breaching climate tipping points. There is no option but to reduce global emissions by at least half by the end of this decade.

According to the recent UNFCCC NDC Synthesis Report, which includes NDCs submitted by countries up to July 31, 2021, countries' collective efforts are far from enough to avoid 1.5°C warmings. The 2030 ambition gap is obvious and needs to be addressed as soon as possible, not least as this would reduce loss and damage and make adaptation more possible.

COP26 needs to make a decision on adequately raising ambition in the early 2020s and back that decision with a clear timeline as well as with robust national policies to accelerate the implementation of climate action, such as phasing out fossil fuels and fossil fuel subsidies and initiating transformative policies and plans that are just, inclusive, equitable and aligned with priorities and needs of local communities and civil society.

► NDC Enhancement

With COP26 postponed until November 2021, countries have been given a longer window to submit new or updated NDCs. As of 30 July 2021, 58% of Parties had submitted new

or updated NDCs. The secretariat will publish a third update to the synthesis report on 25 October, considering additional submissions up to 12th October. CAN's asks on NDC enhancement include:

- Parties - especially G20 countries - should have submitted new or updated NDCs with 2030 targets by 12th October 2021 at the latest. Countries that do not have sufficiently ambitious NDCs inline with 1.5°C should use the opportunity to re-submit NDCs with more ambitious goals and targets, and outline the policies to achieve them.
- NDC enhancement should be organised in clear, inclusive, meaningful, transparent and participatory processes that enable also marginalised and often less-represented groups to make their voices heard and bring forward solutions that address the main concerns and challenges of those affected by climate change.
- A COP26 ambition decision as a result of discussions on equitable, fair, ambitious, and urgent emission reductions consistent with a 1.5°C trajectory needs to clearly spell out how governments are planning to close the 2030 ambition gap and agree on a political timeline leading up to the first GST.
- Countries urgently need to plan and accelerate the implementation of already agreed climate plans and policies. This process must include consultation and engagement of civil society organisations that are active, knowledgeable, and community aligned on priorities for a low carbon transition. Parties

must also urgently consider their planning to realise a socially just, equitable, and nature-positive sustainable transformation of society.

- Economic recovery plans from the Covid19 pandemic are an important means to make transformative changes.
- Countries should maximise the potential of nature-based solutions for climate change mitigation and adaptation in NDCs, NAPs, LTS and other domestic plans.

► Long-term strategies (LTS)

Countries that have not yet done so should announce their LTS for achieving real zero by 2050 at COP26. Any long-term net-zero announcements must be supported by:

- ambitious 2030 targets with plans towards that target covering the next five years,
- implementation plans and policies that frontload action as far as possible to within the next decade,
- real solutions with no greenwashing,
- efforts to support the conservation, restoration and sustainable use of healthy land and ocean sinks.

LTS has been an important driver in global climate action and in spurring countries to set ambitious short-term climate targets. However, the mandate under the UNFCCC inviting countries to submit LTS expires at COP26. Negotiators should agree to extend this mandate, and in recognition of the urgency of limiting global warming to 1.5°C as outlined in the latest IPCC AR6 WG1 report should request that Parties submit revised LTS aligned with a 1.5°C compatible trajectory ahead of the Global Stocktake which will be finalised in 2023.

► Race to Zero and the real economy

The IPCC's Special Report on 1.5 C from 2018 concludes that global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions need to reach net-zero around

2050 to avoid more than 1.5C of warming. Therefore, emissions must be cut as quickly as possible. While the UN-backed Race to Zero has the intention to support climate leadership and ambition to achieve net-zero, its environmental and human rights criteria for net-zero are not robust enough. To have an impact in the real economy, members of the Race to Zero initiative would have to: emphasise abatement measures, without relying on any offsets; including all scopes of emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3) in their emissions reduction targets; separate targets for emission reductions and removals; have governance and accountability that is not voluntary; demonstrate fair share of halving emissions by 2030, and have a definition of residual emissions, sources, and credits.

Concluding, COP26 should deliver an ambition decision that:

- Acknowledges with serious concern the 1.5°C gaps as outlined by the NDC Synthesis Report and the UNEP Emissions Gap Report.
- Notes the IEA Net Zero Report that says in order to limit warming to 1.5°C no new fossil fuels should be allowed in the world energy system and should be nearly phased-out by mid-century.
- Requests Parties to commit to phasing out coal and achieving a Just Transition through genuine social dialogue and stakeholder engagement.
- Recognises the IPCC as the most authoritative body on climate science and notes with concern the findings of IPCC's Working Group 1 report, which attributes climate change undoubtedly to human activity and presents the worsening of climate impacts making any increase in warming no longer safe. Notes and commit to act on the report's clear message for the need for immediate, dramatic and consistent emission reductions.
- Requires Parties to urgently take efforts to further enhance

their NDCs in order to close the 2030 ambition gap by 2023 COP28, recalling that Article 4.11 which allows Parties to enhance their NDC at any time and that Art 4.3 requires each NDC to be a progression on the Party's current NDC.

- Commits countries to further enhance NDCs between 2025-2030 and after 2030, updating and/or enhancing targets, policies and/or measures, or improving the information used in their NDC according to their fair shares and historic responsibilities.
- Extends the invitation for LTS and strengthens the request to align them with a 1.5°C compatible trajectory.

Ambition is also linked to other areas of the COP agenda: the NDCs generally can be seen as the high watermarks of ambition, with loopholes agreed e.g. under Article 6 and in accounting having the potential to greatly undermine the headline ambition figures.

3.2

Aligning climate and biodiversity ambition

Protecting and restoring nature is crucial to addressing the climate, biodiversity, poverty and health crises in an integrated and mutually supportive manner. This is central to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). Importantly, **this must be done through a rights-based approach and in parallel to, not instead of, an urgent fossil-fuel phase-out and economy-wide emissions reductions.** Having at COP25 underlined "the essential contribution of nature to addressing climate change and its impacts and the need to address biodiversity loss and climate change in an integrated manner" (Paragraph 15, 1/CP.25), **Parties now need to operationalise this provision as well as other vital ecosystem provisions under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement³, and anchor nature in**

the formal text outcomes that will be adopted at COP26. CAN asks Parties to adopt decisions that:

1. Recognise the crucial role played by nature in limiting global temperature rise to 1.5°C and supporting adaptation, and ensure that the 1.5°C goal is reached through emission reduction pathways that support biodiversity and ecosystem integrity, food security and human rights (i.e. pathways that don't rely on large-scale land-based CDR deployment).
2. Call on Parties to (1) better reflect the essential contribution of nature to addressing climate change and its impacts, and (2) tackle biodiversity and climate in an integrated and coherent manner, **in NDCs, NAPs, and LTS.**
3. **Request that the IPCC work with IPBES to set out a joint special report on the integration of climate and biodiversity synergies and trade-offs** to feed into the 2023 Global Stocktake, building on the foundations of the 2021 IPCC-IPBES workshop outcomes.
4. **Operationalise the ecosystem provisions under the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement and 1/CP.25 by:**
 - a. Ensuring that the Global Stocktake effectively assesses how these provisions are being met.
 - b. Recognising the key outcomes of the two SBSTA dialogues on Ocean and Climate Change, and Land and Climate Change adaptation, and creating a process to further anchor oceans in the UNFCCC regime.
 - c. Revising the forest definition so that it no longer incentivises the transition of natural to plantation forest.
 - d. Revising current carbon accounting rules by implementing a comprehensive accounting system as per the approach developed by the UN

- Statistical Division (UNSEEA-EA) to help guide and inform integrated climate and biodiversity action.
- e. Setting up an SBI and SBSTA joint work programme to address and agree on common approaches to conserve, restore, enhance and support the long-term stability of carbon sinks and reservoirs in ways that support biodiversity.
5. **Uphold and secure the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities** by ensuring that a rights-based approach is followed when embedding the role of ecosystems in climate action and agreeing on robust rights-based social and environmental safeguards under Article 6.
 6. **Commit to more structured engagement between the UNFCCC and the CBD in both the COP26 and COP15 decision texts and in the future**, to maximise synergies and minimise trade-offs in implementing both conventions.
- It will align with the Paris Agreement Global Stocktake process, which takes stock of parties' progress towards meeting their objectives every five years: Parties will set their next 5-year NDC after having assessed collective progress during the previous 5-year period. This approach is more logical than reviewing 10-year NDCs every five years.
 - It will reflect an existing practice from several Parties to revise and step up their targets during the implementation phase (i.e. the European Union, the US).
 - It will provide more frequent and regular accountability moments to ensure countries are on track in implementing their NDC.
 - Crucially, it would give negotiators more than two chances to solve the climate emergency and put the world on track to achieving climate neutrality - compared to only two NDC implementation periods for 10-year Common Time Frames (in 2031-2040 and 2041-2050).

3.3

Common timeframes

► **CAN calls for a COP26 decision in favour of a single 5-year common timeframe for NDCs**

Agreement on common implementation periods for future NDCs is essential for the effective operation of the Paris Agreement ambition mechanism. The option of 5-year Common Time Frames has clear advantages over a longer, 10-year period:

- It will provide more regular opportunities to increase ambition of targets, and readjust ambition to respond to emerging science, public concern and opportunities from falling costs of low and zero-emission technologies and energy sources.

► **An agreement at COP26 in Glasgow is crucial for planning the post-2030 period**

The lack of agreement to align the implementation period has already generated confusion in the first round of NDCs, where some parties submitted NDCs with an endpoint of 2025 and others with 2030. This made it more difficult, if not impossible, to compare countries' climate contributions in a clear and transparent manner, and to communicate about the level of ambition needed collectively and from individual countries. It also undermines the effectiveness of carbon markets and other initiatives which require collaboration between countries.

Many countries are already planning for the post-2030 period and the next round of commitments and further delay would create similar chaos for the global stocktake in 2023, where some parties will submit NDCs for the period up to 2035, and others for

2040. With the next NDCs submission due by 2025, the Paris Agreement implementation processes cannot suffer delays any longer.

3.4

Rules for Article 6 which do not undermine the Social and Environmental Integrity of the Paris Agreement

Flexible mitigation mechanisms must not harm local communities, and must not delay the efforts needed to decarbonize economies and to protect the climate. Any transfer of international emissions reductions must help enhance the ambition of NDCs in line with Parties' fair shares of what is needed to stay below a 1.5°C increase in global temperature.

Under the Kyoto Protocol, flexible mechanisms have been counterproductive as they led to an increase in overall emissions due to the use of non-additional credits and the transfer of significant volumes of hot air. Furthermore, some projects have harmed local communities and Indigenous Peoples and failed to respect human rights. Such mistakes cannot be repeated under the Paris Agreement. It is crucial to ensure not only that old credits are not eligible for use after 2020, but the success of the Paris Agreement also depends on not harming communities and the successful correction of all the design flaws of pre-2020 flexible mechanisms⁴.

The promotion of sustainable development and human rights under the Sustainable Development Mechanism is of the utmost importance so that local communities and indigenous peoples are not harmed by these activities, but instead benefit from and are empowered by them.

To do so, CAN calls on Parties to:

- **Establish clearly defined social and environmental safeguards** for flexible

mitigation mechanisms that are applied throughout project activities, that are consistent with international obligations, including human rights obligations and the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development framework, and that reflect the local environmental and social context.

- **Define rules for the mandatory consultation of local stakeholders and indigenous communities** in the implementation of Article 6 activities, including respecting and ensuring the free, prior, and informed consent of Indigenous Peoples.
- **Establish an accessible and rights-based grievance mechanism governed by an independent body** other than the supervisory body.

In addition, Parties should agree on the following to promote environmental integrity under Article 6:

- **Phase-out the Kyoto Protocol's flexible mechanisms and not recognise Kyoto emissions units for compliance with Paris Agreement mitigation contributions.** Existing projects and methodologies should be re-assessed against robust environmental and social criteria before they can be transitioned to qualify under Article 6 mechanisms. Most projects registered under the CDM today will continue to reduce emissions regardless of their potential access to carbon market revenues, and do not require continued support to be viable. Continuing to credit such projects would negatively impact the climate by allowing Parties to transfer credit for existing efforts that would have happened anyway instead of contributing additional reductions.
- **Establish rules to ensure environmental integrity** by requiring that emission reduction are: **real, measurable, additional, verifiable, and permanent.** **They must be supplemental** to ambitious national mitigation which would place the country on a 1.5°C-compatible trajectory; and **ensure overall mitigation.**
- **Units exchanged under Article 6 should be expressed in CO₂-**

⁴ Greenpeace supports a holistic interpretation of Article 6, understanding Article 6 to be about international cooperation - excluding carbon offsets markets - to equitably support mitigation and adaptation with the provision of finance, technology transfer, knowledge sharing and capacity building.

equivalents (CO₂e). If non-CO₂ metrics were to be recognised under Article 6, which CAN does not support due to the complexity and risks such a system would create, trading of such units should be restricted to those Parties which have expressed an NDC in a metric other than CO₂e. Units expressed in a metric other than that used by a Party to establish its NDC target should not be eligible for use by that Party (e.g. a Party with an NDC expressed in kWh of renewable energy should not use units expressed in CO₂e, and vice-versa).

- **Avoid all forms of double-counting (including double claiming, issuance and use) by establishing and ensuring use of a publicly accessible common accounting system for all internationally transferred mitigation outcomes that cover transfers inside and outside of the Article 6 mechanisms. Enable the application of corresponding adjustments for all credits,** including those purchased by non-Party stakeholders such as private companies on the voluntary market. Double counting should be avoided with all types of targets, including voluntary programs and those set out under the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA). Parties should, therefore, track all units and apply corresponding adjustments. If the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) decides to allow issuance of credits from activities outside the scope of a host country's NDC, a corresponding adjustment should be applied also for the transfer of those units, except in specific cases such as domestic use of credits under an Emission Trading System (ETS).
- Set participation criteria allowing **only countries that have ambitious, quantifiable, and verifiable absolute emission caps expressed in carbon dioxide to generate and use international emissions unit transfers.**
- For all transferred credits, Parties should agree to move beyond zero-sum trading, including through the **application of a well-designed mandatory automatic partial cancelation rate,** to achieve overall mitigation in global GHG emissions.

The design and application of such a partial cancelation rate should avoid significant adverse effects, and under no circumstance serve as a way to justify a lower level of integrity or a higher level of uncertainty.

- Adopt provisions to ensure that baselines function to generate high integrity credits. This means incorporating and elaborating on principles of **setting the overall baseline below Business as Usual (BAU), utilisation of best available technology, implementation of best management practices, and dynamic updating for economic development and delivery of climate finance.** These principles should allow the Supervisory Body to objectively take into account what is actually available or feasible in a given country, but any so-called "menu approach" that allows a Party to subjectively project future emissions risks the same mistakes as under the Kyoto Protocol where baselines did not deliver additional ambition.
- **Set a quantitative limit on the number of international emissions reduction credits/units which can be transferred,** in order to avoid the transfer of hot air. This limit should be set at 1% of historical emissions (2010-2012 average). In line with the principle of complementarity, the use of international mitigation outcomes should be limited (e.g. to 10% of a countries' required emission reductions for the achievement of its NDC target).
- **Support the adoption of project type restrictions,** to be considered and reviewed by the Supervisory Body under Article 6.4, and incorporated into the Guidance under Article 6.2. Fossil fuel projects and other projects with a clear lack of additionality, lack of systems to address permanence of emissions reductions, lack of domestic liability and monitoring schemes, negative environmental or social impacts, and facing strong local/regional opposition or/and that counter the SDGs, should not be eligible. Particular emphasis should be placed on supporting sustainable small scale renewable energy and energy efficiency projects that contribute to the

sustainable development of rural or poor communities, e.g. through electrification of remote areas, taking into account the necessity for such projects to be additional.

- Include a substantial **Share of Proceeds** for the Adaptation Fund.

Finally, Article 6.8 can and should do more than just offering workshops and **technical papers. While duplication of institutions should be avoided, the work programme should operationalize a concrete mechanism to facilitate matching of support** - such as finance, technology, and capacity building - with the needs of participating Parties, to unlock opportunities for ambition.

3.5 Transparency

A lot of work remains at COP26 for Parties to operationalise the enhanced transparency framework. **Parties must deliver common reporting tables, common tabular formats (CTF), various report outlines, and a training program by COP26 (CMA3).**

CAN believes that the existing tables for developed country Parties offer a good starting point, but must be updated to reflect the Modalities, Procedures, and Guidelines (MPGs) as decided in Katowice. As the Paris Agreement decision noted, Parties must not “backslide” on any of their reporting requirements. CAN appreciates that the use of these tables will represent a step forward for many developing country Parties and that capacity building is a critical component of the implementation of the enhanced transparency framework and the use of the new tables and formats. Capacity building and support will be central in discussions on the tables, training program, reporting software, and Consultative Group of Experts (CGE). **CAN urges Parties to have a cohesive discussion about effective capacity building models and the support required to achieve the transparency objectives.**

The MPGs outline specific provisions where flexibility is provided to those developing country Parties that need it

in light of their capacities, as a way of adhering to the MPGs while enabling them to highlight specific capacity building needs. Operationalising flexibility in the tables is a key challenge facing Parties therefore, **Parties must uphold the TACCC principles (transparency, accuracy, consistency, comparability and completeness).** It should be recognized that Parties have different starting points, thus, flexibility should not compromise efforts to compare reports. CAN believes deleting columns, rows, or tables is not an appropriate application of flexibility.

For the tables on support provided, mobilized, needed, and received:

- Parties should build on the existing CTF. At the same time, the new CTF should provide the opportunity for better quantitative and qualitative information to be communicated. Data reported under the UNFCCC should be able to match the one reported under the OECD DAC. Support should be reported at the activity level, not only the aggregated figures.
- Parties should incorporate “climate specificity” and “grant equivalent” in the new CTF, by including them in a specific and separate column, next to the overall amount of the reported activity.
- Finally, there should be comparability between the tables for the support provided (or mobilised), and the support received and needed. To make this happen, both contributors and recipients should agree on the amounts to report so they match in the corresponding tables.

CAN is closely observing the multilateral assessment and facilitative sharing of views taking place during COP26.

CAN appreciates the usefulness of these processes and congratulates all participating Parties.

There are a number of linkages between Article 6 and the enhanced transparency framework and CAN believes work, during COP26, on both can proceed in parallel without prejudging outcomes. The provisions of paragraph 77(d) of 18/CMA.1 are crucial to ensuring no double counting

and upholding environmental integrity. Given the risk of little international oversight to govern cooperative approaches under Article 6.2 and the need for a high level of transparency throughout Article 6, **CAN reiterates the importance of paragraph 77(d), its role in upholding vital Paris Agreement principles, and applicability to Article 6 in its entirety.**

3.6

Global Stocktake (GST)

Under the bottom-up architecture of the Paris Agreement, countries submit national climate pledges through several instruments, including Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). However, the Paris Agreement structure recognises the need to monitor collective progress of countries over time. This process, known as the Global Stocktake (GST), is to provide a periodic check-in, and indication on whether, how and where ambition needs to be adjusted in order to make sure we meet the Paris Agreement goals. The GST covers mitigation, adaptation, means of implementation and support, finance flows, and cross-cutting issues such as equity. Thus, **the ultimate goal of the GST is to ensure that the Paris Agreement is fulfilling its mandate to protect people from the impacts of climate change and support them to mitigate, adapt and address Loss and Damage. It is the only way to ensure the safety of people and nature across the globe.**

With the first GST to kick-off following COP26, important decisions are being taken on the structure and processes it will involve. There are two key areas for Parties to resolve at, or by, COP26:

► **The first one concerns the process for collecting non-party stakeholder contributions to the GST:**

There appears to be consensus among Parties on the importance of collecting contributions from non-party stakeholders in order to ensure a complete, credible and transparent process. The exact

process by which the UNFCCC will absorb these inputs is still uncertain, however. The Secretariat has proposed to develop 'rules of engagement' to organise non-party stakeholder inputs, by using the existing structure of the UNFCCC's nine observer constituencies. In this scenario, CAN, as one of the focal points, would coordinate and submit inputs on behalf of ENGO, the environmental NGOs constituencies.

In assessing collective climate action, the UNFCCC recognises that non-party stakeholders are an important source of information. We, as NGOs, can contribute to important data analysis, such as relating to gaps in the quantity and quality of finance flows. We may often have more interesting and detailed contributions on **best practices and lessons learned at the local level**. We can also report on **what is not functioning and why**, what are the technologies that should not be used and why, etc. Finally, we can also provide expertise on inclusive, transparent and meaningful civil society participation in national climate policy development, implementation and review.

Besides, the GST is a moment not only to assess Parties, but also non-state actors' climate action.

Many actors and climate initiatives are registered by the UNFCCC through the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action (MPGCA) with its Global Climate Action Portal (GCAP). The data gathered by this portal should be used by the GST to draw an assessment of the results achieved by these initiatives and actors. For this, it should become mandatory for them to report all the information required on the portal every year.

► **The second aspect concerns the guiding questions of the GST.**

These questions will be asked to Parties in order to assess collective progress on reaching the goal of the Paris Agreement. The Secretariat proposed a list of indicative questions ahead of the

meeting of the subsidiary bodies in June 2021 in a 'non-paper'. CAN found gaps in how equity, indigenous knowledge, loss and damage and nature featured in the existing set of questions. Finalising the list of guiding questions is a prerequisite to kicking off the GST process and thus the aim will be to finalise this at COP26.

At its essence, **the GST as a major component of the Paris Agreement is about safeguarding people. It is vital that this should be reflected in the guiding question, via the following six principles:**

- The questions should be able to answer whether we are on track to limiting global warming to **1.5°C**. The guiding questions should ensure that appropriate benchmarking is established across the several GST areas.
- **The GST should enable and facilitate the input of Indigenous People's knowledge** and local communities' practices that are sometimes transmitted in informal ways.
- The GST should have a **human rights approach** including evaluating whether activities implemented by Parties consider and respect Human Rights.
- Guiding questions related to **loss and damage** should be integrated, in terms of finance, but also data, best practices, and more, as loss and damage is key to a successful global response to climate change.
- **Nature is critical in the fight against climate change** while also providing us with food, energy, medicines, and genetic resources, and more, and it is vital that this is acknowledged through the GST and its guiding questions to ensure we have a complete picture of progress thus far, and what is still to be done.
- The GST should assess polluting practices contributing to climate change, such as the use of **fossil fuels**, and should evaluate how much of these projects are still taking place, and how they should be stopped/phased out.

► **For a successful GST, support is needed!**

We want to ensure that the GST is developed in a way to ensure our effective participation. We are ready to be part of the GST process, however **this would be a substantial undertaking from our side**. We ask the Parties and the UNFCCC secretariat to consider ways to **better support financially and ensure the participation of civil society**, local community organisations, and parties from the global South. Support for translation, technical guidance, possibility to report via video or other formats, should be considered during COP26. If this is accepted, **the UNFCCC will require more financial and human resources** to be able to support delegates and non-party stakeholders during this process.

CAN's demands for COP26

COP26 is crucial to the effective launch of the GST. If the best conditions and principles are not set, there is a high risk that the GST will not be able to support Parties to enhance ambition. **Our main vision for the GST at the COP26 is to decide on an ambitious, inclusive and participatory process.** This could be achieved by:

- Allowing all stakeholders and Parties to report on the GST via the **same platform**.
- **Providing technical and financial resources** to Parties, civil society, Indigenous Peoples and local communities to contribute and participate in the GST process, especially from the Global South. This requires more human and financial capacities for the UNFCCC.
- **Diversifying the guiding questions** especially concerning participation in the NDCs processes, loss and damage, quality and quantity of finance, equity, phase-out of fossil fuels and biodiversity.
- **Include an assessment of non-state climate action** by using and strengthening the GCAP,

with an obligation for actors and initiatives to report each year on all the questions that are asked on the portal. Also information on actions outside GCAP should be possible inputs to GST.

3.7

Agriculture

Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture (KJWA) negotiations at COP26 should work towards developing meaningful **guidance or “no regret options”** to inform climate action in agriculture. These should be based on the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) Special Report on Climate Change and Land (IPCC SRCCL) and the 6th Assessment Report Working Group 1 (AR6 WG1), to provide guidance to NDCs, LTS and climate finance. To align with the IPCC's recommendations, the guidance should work to ensure that climate action in agriculture is structured to deliver on the principles of food security and nutrition, adaptation, absolute and equitable emission reductions, ecosystem integrity and gender responsiveness.

The KJWA must take forward key lessons from the series of workshops held, including that:

- Agroecological practices have been specifically recommended by the IPCC SRCCL and the Committee on World Food Security (CFS)⁵ as they avoid emissions from industrialised agriculture systems, improve resilience to erratic weather conditions and address environmental problems such as accelerated biodiversity loss, pollution, soil destruction and water scarcity. Synthetic nitrogen fertilizers were spotlighted during the KJWA workshop as a major component of agriculture's harmful contribution to the climate as they are not only unnecessary but receive billions in public subsidies in many countries. The KJWA must take this learning forward and recommend policies
- and measures that lead to **shifts towards agroecological methods** and production with direct support for smallholder farmers, including through shifting subsidies away from synthetic nitrogen fertilisers, monoculture animal feed, and overproduction of unhealthy food.
- The IPCC AR6 WG1 stresses the need to urgently bring down methane emissions in the coming years, to buy time to limit warming to 1.5°C. As livestock produce one-third of global methane emissions, KJWA should recommend **absolute (not intensity-based) emission reductions in the livestock sector, particularly in large-scale factory farming systems** in surplus meat and dairy-producing countries. Reducing the number of animals in production will lead to reduced feed production, which has an outsize impact on deforestation and contributes to food insecurity and land grabs. An equitable approach to reducing meat consumption within planetary boundaries, and a “less and better” approach to livestock that also increases healthy vegetable proteins in diets, will also make a significant contribution to reducing global GHGs while ensuring food security and nutrition.
- Gender-blind or gender-biased policies that mean women farmers do not have secure access to land, finance, extension services and markets, and which do not acknowledge the additional care burdens that women face, all undermine women farmers' rights, food security and ability to invest in sustainable land-use strategies, as confirmed by the IPCC SRCCL. KJWA must encourage **gender-responsive approaches** to address these gaps, including through inclusive and participatory policy development, based on inputs from women farmers and marginalised communities.
- The IPCC AR6 WG1 confirmed that land-based sequestration options are in jeopardy as temperatures continue to rise, and this is particularly so for soils. In addition, the high likelihood of soil carbon “reversals” back into CO₂, the difficulties of monitoring, reporting and verification of soil carbon, and the potential risk

⁵ <http://www.fao.org/agroecology/database/detail/en/c/1402652/>

of conflicts over land and food security, make **soils inappropriate for carbon offset mechanisms**.

With Article 6 discussions on carbon markets taking place in parallel to KJWA negotiations at COP26, KJWA must not promote strategies that will lead to polluters purchasing soil carbon offsets as an excuse to avoid taking real action to cut emissions. Instead it must recognise the complexity of local adaptation needs, requiring holistic and systemic approaches to addressing agriculture in the climate context, rather than narrow technological fixes or on counting carbon.

- KJWA must ensure that **Just Transition** principles are at the heart of food and agricultural system changes towards agroecology and “less and better” livestock.
- The lack of finance and means of implementation (MOI), particularly for adaptation, is holding back the necessary shifts in agriculture. KJWA outcomes can play a role in recommending **increased finance flows**, and better application of the use of climate finance to strengthen climate action in agriculture.
- We recognise that the KJWA process of workshops has been innovative and participatory, and has benefited from a wide range of perspectives. If the process results in meaningful outcomes and recommendations that can improve agricultural practices in the context of climate change, the next phase of the KJWA could include **workshop topics on agroecology, gender, consumption and land use**.

3.8

Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE) for ambition and implementation

At COP26, Parties should adopt a new Work Programme on Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE), building upon the review of the Doha Work Programme, which has come to an end. The new

work programme should ensure better mainstreaming of ACE across relevant workstreams, stronger guidance to Parties and more robust implementation of the six equally important ACE elements (Education, Training, Public Awareness, Public Access to Information, Public Participation and International Cooperation) through:

- **Human rights-based approach:** Human rights, including procedural rights, should underpin the new Work Programme. The new Work Programme should include stronger references to human rights, and acknowledge the links between ACE pillars and the rights to public participation, access to information and the rights of children to environmental education.
- **5-year action plan:** The Doha Work Programme should be followed by an adequate and effective ACE action plan. Such a coherent and incremental action plan and an ambitious road map, spanning across 5 years and in line with other timeframes of the Paris Agreement (like the GST), would be essential to ensure that ACE is mainstreamed across other relevant UNFCCC workstreams. Moreover, the action plan should build a strong link to the implementation of UNESCO's Programme “Education for Sustainable Development: Towards achieving the SDGs”, running until 2030, as it holds key aspects for ACE.
- **ACE Task Force:** An architecture for mainstreaming of ACE is vital to the new work programme. An expert group or Task Force would gather Party and non-Party stakeholders that are already conducting work outside of the UNFCCC that is relevant to ACE pillars. Such a Task Force would provide guidance to Parties, including on monitoring and reporting, identify and leverage funding for ACE activities, and promote policy coherence between the implementation of ACE and that of other international frameworks and commitments, among others.
- **Finance:** In order for ACE-related activities to be implemented, financial support is key. Therefore,

the Green Climate Fund (GCF), Global Environmental Facility (GEF), and Adaptation Fund should be included in ACE workshops and meetings.

- **Addressing barriers and threats to ACE:** The new work programme should set out a process to review the barriers to ACE implementation as well as identify opportunities and good practices to overcome those. Hence, the activities under the new Work Programme should enable exchanges of good practices, lessons learned and relevant knowledge for effective implementation of ACE.
- **Integration of ACE in Nationally Determined Contributions and National Reports:** There is substantial national and regional work happening on ACE which are not yet well-acknowledged or documented. The new work programme should ensure that the process of developing the NDCs include ACE elements as well as set out clear and measurable goals for each of the elements of ACE including reporting on the progress made with regards to their implementation. Moreover, the new work programme should request that all state Parties report adequately on ACE in their national reports submitted under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, and should mandate the Secretariat to develop guidance on how to report effectively.

3.9 Science⁶

COP26 should strengthen the resolve to limit global warming to 1.5°C to avoid the worst of the climate crisis. Compared to 2°C of warming, 1.5°C would see much less severe extreme events and fewer disruptions to human and ecological systems, and consequently fewer people would be impacted by water scarcity, crop yield loss, food insecurity and extreme poverty. IPCC-AR6 has most recently confirmed that 1.5°C **warming limit**

is still within reach but requires very urgent and rapid action. Stringent emission reductions need to take place in the very near-term to halve current projections for 2030 CO₂ emissions. 1.5 C pathways require CO₂ emissions to peak now and reach net zero by mid-century, with total greenhouse gases quickly following suit in the second half of the century.

While the world is not on track for 1.5°C and most countries still lack sufficient climate targets, recent updates in national climate targets are a step forward to limiting warming to 1.5°C.

► The Second Periodic Review

To better understand where we are in achieving the long-term temperature goals and what consequences this could have for mitigation targets in NDCs, **the Structured Expert Dialogue on the long term goal of the Paris Agreement 2020 -2022 must elaborate on the following questions:**

- What does the temperature threshold of the Paris Agreement mean for emission reductions for regions and sectors and the remaining carbon budget? Are there potential tipping points for e.g. coastal zones from sea-level rise, food production systems, drinking water, health problems from high temperatures, global and regional ecosystems, ice sheets and sea ice at 1-2°C global temperature increase up to 2300? What can we learn from science on the damages and losses if we could limit warming to 1.5°C degrees compared to a limitation of warming to well below 2°C? What are the socio-economic, environmental, and ecological effects of 1.5°C overshoot scenarios?
- How can projected emissions trajectories be best adapted to the 5-year ambition cycle of the Paris Agreement? For the

⁶ <https://climatenetwork.org/resource/1-5c-to-survive-evidence-from-the-ipcc-special-reports/>
<https://climatenetwork.org/resource/overview-briefing-on-the-ipcc-special-report-on-climate-change-and-land/>
<https://climatenetwork.org/resource/overview-briefing-on-the-ipcc-special-report-on-the-ocean-and-cryosphere/>
<https://climatenetwork.org/resource/overview-briefing-on-the-ipcc-special-report-on-global-warming-of-1-5c/>

current round of NDC revisions, there is considerable attention to and awareness of where emissions need to be in 2030 to meet temperature targets. This should move ahead in regular 5-year steps, so that in the 2023 GST and the next round of NDCs by 2025, the scientific community produces comparable awareness of where emissions need to be in 2035, and so on.

- Should the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement - well below 2°C and 1.5°C - be defined as a thresholds or should they be understood as a multi-year or multi-decadal average? Will parties adopt the average over a 30-year period as defined by the IPCC?

► **Stringent reduction in emission of greenhouse gases must not rely on technological fixes that could pose further harm to the environment, biodiversity and human health such as geoengineering.**

CAN's vision for a safe climate is focused on rapid economy-wide decarbonisation and a transition to a just, equitable and sustainable future. A range of solutions and climate mitigation tools can help achieve this vision, including shifting to sustainable consumption patterns, renewable energy, energy efficiency, forest conservation, reforestation, and reduced meat consumption. Geoengineering proposals distract from the need to take concerted action across multiple sectors in the near term to dramatically reduce emissions. Overall, to meet the 1.5°C limit, we need to consume less, consume efficiently and to consume sustainably as far as possible.

CAN Regional and National Nodes

AFRICA

- **Africa (CAN Africa)**
Jacquiline Dominic Massao, jacquiline@cantz.or.tz
- **Eastern Africa (CANEA)**
Geoffrey Kamese, kamese@acanea.org
- **Uganda (CAN-U)**
Miriam Talwisa, mtalwisa@yahoo.com
- **CAN Arab World (CANAW)**
Fatima Ahouli, info.canarabworld@gmail.com
- **Southern Africa (SARCAN) and South Africa (SACAN)**
Thando Lukuko, coordinator@sacan.africa
- **Tanzania (CAN-TZ)**
Sixbert Mwanga, sixbert@cantz.or.tz
- **West and Central Africa (CANWA)**
Aissatou Diouf, dioufastou@hotmail.com
- **Zimbabwe (CAN ZIM)**
Wellington Madumira, madumira@gmail.com

AMERICAS

- **Canada (CAN Rac Canada)**
Shannon Franssen, shannon@climateactionnetwork.ca
- **Latin America (CANLA)**
Alejandro Aleman, milenio@humboldt.org.ni
- **United States (USCAN)**
Keya Chatterjee, kchatterjee@usclimatenetwork.org

ASIA

- **China (CAN China)**
Xiangyi Wang, wangxiangyi@cango.org
- **Japan (CAN Japan)**
Kimiko Hirata, khirata@kiconet.org
- **South Asia (CANSA)**
Sanjay Vashist, sanjay@cansouthasia.net
- **Southeast Asia (CANSEA)**
Nithi Nesadurai, nithiya@pc.jaring.asia

EUROPE

- **Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia (CAN-EECCA)**
Olha Boiko, olhaboiko206@gmail.com
- **Europe (CAN Europe)**
Wendel Trio, wendel@climnet.org
- **France (RAC France)**
Morgane Creach, morgane@rac-f.org
- **UK (CAN UK)**
Catherine Pettengell, cpettengell@bond.org.uk

PACIFIC AND OCEANIA

- **Australia (CANA)**
Julie-Anne Richards, julianne@cana.net.au
- **New Zealand (NZCAN)**
Rachel Dobric, racheldobric@gmail.com
- **Pacific (PICAN)**
Lavetanalagi Seru, lavetanalagis.pican@gmail.com
Lorenzo Raplili, iraplili.pican@gmail.com

Climate Action Network International (CAN) is the world's largest network of civil society organizations working together to promote government action to address the climate crisis, with more than 1500 members in over 130 countries.

Working Groups Co-Chairs

Working Group	Co-Chairs	Email
Adaptation and Loss and Damage	Laura Schäfer, Germanwatch	schaefer@germanwatch.org
	Nouhad Awwad, Greenpeace	awwad.nouhad@gmail.com
Agriculture	Teresa Anderson, Action Aid	teresa.anderson@actionaid.org
	Jazmín Rocco Predassi, FARN	jrpredassi@farn.org.ar
Ambition	Fernanda Carvalho, WWF	fcarvalho@wwfint.org
	Rixa Schwarz, Germanwatch	schwarz@germanwatch.org
Communications	Dharini Parthasarathy, CAN Secretariat	dparthasarathy@climatenetwork.org
Ecosystem	Melanie Coath, The RSPB	Melanie.Coath@rspb.org.uk
	Catalina Maria, FARN	cmariagonda@farn.org.ar
Energy	David Tong, Price of Oil	david.tong@priceofoil.org
	Sena Alouka	yvetogo@gmail.com
Finance	Eddy Pérez, Climate Action Network Canada	eddy@climateactionnetwork.ca
	Iskander Erzini Vernoit, E3G	iskander.erzini.vernoit@e3g.org
	Leia Achampong, Eurodad	lachampong@eurodad.org
Flexible Mechanisms	Andy Katz, Sierra Club	andykatz@sonic.net
	Gilles Dufrasne, Carbon Market Watch	gilles.dufrasne@carbonmarketwatch.org
Global Stocktake	Marine Pouget, CAN France	marine.pouget@reseauactionclimat.org
	Tom Evans, E3G	tom.evans@e3g.org
	Julian Theseira, MYD (CANSEA board member)	juliantheseira@gmail.com
G20	Enrique Maurtua Konstantinidis, Farn	enriquemk@farn.org.ar
	Nakul Sharma, CANSAs	nakul@cansouthasia.net
NGO Participation and Human Rights	Sébastien Duyck, CIEL	sduyck@ciel.org
Science Policy (Review)	Manfred Treber, Germanwatch	treber@germanwatch.org
	Reinhold Pape, Air Pollution and Climate Secretariat	reinhold.pape@snf.se
	Neth Dano	neth@etcgroup.org
Technology	Colin McQuistan	Colin.McQuistan@practicalaction.org.uk
Transparency	Nathan Cogswell	Nathan.Cogswell@wri.org
	Nobert Nyandire	nobnyandire05@gmail.com

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION:

WWW.CLIMATENETWORK.ORG

FOLLOW US ON TWITTER:

[@CANINTL](https://twitter.com/CANINTL)

SUBSCRIBE TO OUR ECO NEWSLETTER:

WWW.CLIMATENETWORK.ORG/ECO-NEWSLETTERS

CONTACT:

POLICY@CLIMATENETWORK.ORG