

WANTED :
Stephen Harper & Peter Kent

The actual government of Canada is threatening the negotiations process by refusing to act on climate change, failing to represent the interest of the majority of Canadians and refusing to clarify its position on crucial issues. The Harper government refuses to collaborate not only with members of the Convention, but also its own population.

**Support Canadians,
not Harper's government**

We ask you to prevent the government of Canada from hijacking the negotiations and move on without it.

"There is a fairly widely held perception in the developing world of the need for guilt payment" - Peter Kent, November 29th 2011

"We have seen, and I would expect, no helpful comment from the opposition environment critics in what will be for us a challenging COP17." - Peter Kent, November 16th 2011

"The oil sands are a very important resource for our country, it's a source of economic growth and jobs across the country." - Stephen Harper, January 7th 2011

"Les Canadiens ont élu un gouvernement conservateur majoritaire, fort, stable et écologiquement responsable pour prendre soin de notre environnement, et c'est exactement ce que nous faisons." - Peter Kent, September 29th 2011

**"Kyoto is the past"
- Peter Kent, November 28th 2011**

- Adaptation Finance, continued from page 1

huge amounts of money will be needed to address impacts of both more frequent extreme weather events and slow onset events. With emissions levels surpassing the IPCC's worst case scenarios it is clear that huge amounts of money will be needed to address the impacts of both more frequent extreme weather events and slow onset events.

Yet only 18% of US and 30% of EU fast start finance is being spent on adaptation in 2011. Australia provides a better example, with over half its climate finance spend dedicated to adaptation this year).

The amalgamated LCA text has the po-

tential to start addressing some of these significant shortcomings. There is concrete text on the table assuring developing countries there will not be a gap after 2012, and that climate finance will scale up between 2013 and 2020.

Another important matter is the balance between mitigation and adaptation finance, in particular option 2 which would guarantee at least 50% of all climate finance is earmarked for adaptation.

Finally, a work programme is needed to identify predictable and reliable long term sources of finance. As currently stated in the text, this should lead to concrete decisions by COP 18 and provide the best chance to

agree the most promising sources of climate finance, including innovative sources such as a financial transaction tax, and a global price on emissions from international shipping and aviation that has no net incidence of cost on developing countries.

Negotiators can aim to land in a zone where clear guarantees can be given to developing countries that they will not be left 'high and dry' (or maybe that should be 'hot, low and wet') without any money to address the climate impacts that they have done nothing to cause. As all Parties have committed to set up the Green Climate Fund here in Durban, let's make sure it is not an empty shell.

eco



ECO has been published by Non-Governmental Environmental Groups at major international conferences since the Stockholm Environment Conference in 1972. This issue is produced cooperatively by the Climate Action Network at the UNFCCC meetings in Durban in Nov-Dec 2011. ECO email: eco@sunlightdata.com - ECO website: <http://www.climatenetwork.org/eco-newsletters> - Editorial/Production: Fred Heutte



A clear demand from South African civil society.

Photo: Sierra Student Coalition

Basic Climate Equity

If Durban is to be at least somewhat successful then Saturday's release of the BASIC Experts paper on fair-shares global effort sharing will be recognized as a key breakthrough. That can help decide a 2nd commitment period for the KP while putting on the agenda serious consideration of a next generation mandate that's fair enough to support real ambition.

The BASIC Experts paper does not pretend that the global carbon budget hasn't already been essentially exhausted. Nor does it say that development-as-usual is still a viable option and we can muddle along with bottom-up accounting and a bit of technological optimism. These are things that just can't happen if we actually intend to stabilize the climate system. But in addition, developmental justice is a precondition of high ambition, and this report does foresee that soon we'll be ready to face this bottom-line reality.

The BASIC authors can be commended for illuminating the salient core of the climate-equity debate. That outcome has clearly involved compromise, and it has clearly had a cost. For example, the paper focuses on a 2000-2050 global emissions budget of 1440 Gt CO₂, one that many among us view as dangerously high.

All the same, the benefits of compromise are also visible. The authors were able to mark out a first-order consensus that, while vague, indicates a way forward. If 'equity' is defined as the human right to sustainable development, then only two approaches to a global fair-shares reference framework - cumulative per-capita budget sharing and

- Basic Equity, continued on page 2

The Lost Decade of Adaptation Finance

This year marks a decade since the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) was established at COP 7 in Marrakesh to finance the most urgent adaptation needs of least developed countries. Unfortunately little is said about the LDCF and there is less to celebrate. Ten years on, and only \$415 million has been pledged towards a total \$2 billion identified to prepare and implement national adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs), the fund's purpose.

Negotiators in Durban cannot reverse what has been a lost decade for adaptation finance. But they can and must secure an outcome in Durban that leads to reliable, sufficient and predictable flows of adaptation finance to developing countries in the

decade ahead.

Apart from a few exceptions, we haven't seen much evidence yet that climate finance won't be falling off a cliff when fast start finance runs out at the end of 2013. Finance for adaptation in particular is an overriding priority for LDCs, SIDS and the most vulnerable countries. But it remains an orphan in the bigger finance picture past, present and future. The current nose-diving of the international carbon price also means that the Adaptation Fund, which takes a fixed share of 2% from CDM projects, is at risk of having barely any money next year.

With emissions levels surpassing the IPCC's worst case scenarios, it's clear that

- Adaptation Finance, continued on page 4

Guide to De-Bracketing MRV

ECO is here to help negotiators remove some brackets from that new MRV text that is hot off the press, and insert a few critical items that Parties have somehow forgotten.

So pick up your erasers (or warm up your Delete keys) and let's get to work!

Stakeholder participation – Observer participation is still bracketed in the ICA and largely absent or conditioned in the IAR. Inexcusable! Stakeholders, including NGOs, businesses and municipalities, have a right to participate and contribute important scientific and technical information to the negotiations.

Accounting and compliance – These two words seem to be toxic to some developed country parties, like the USA and Canada, but including them in international assessment and review (IAR) is fundamental. The IAR must review the accounting of emission reductions and lead to future compliance mechanisms under the Convention. You can see where things go otherwise; the lack of good accounting and compliance played a big role in the financial crisis.

Adjustments – A tonne is a tonne is a tonne. Not only do we need common accounting rules, in the IAR technical review, the review teams need to be able to adjust data when the rules aren't followed. Brackets around adjustments – off!

MRV and the Review – Biennial reports, biennial update reports, and the IAR and international consultation and analysis (ICA) processes are key to providing an accurate picture of global emissions for the 2013 Review. This link is reflected in the IAR preamble but inexplicably has been deleted from the ICA preamble. This link and an appropriate timeline should be agreed. Developed country reports should be in by 1 January 2013 and developing country reports on 1 January 2014; and the IAR and ICA should start in May 2013 and May 2014, respectively. This timeline is crucial for providing effective input in the review process.

Developed country Biennial reports – It is troubling to see that the information on LULUCF and market mechanisms for developed country targets is bracketed. Remove the darn []'s! We need the information and it should be based on common rules.

New and additional finance – A key part of enhanced transparency in climate finance is defining "new and additional". So don't forget to keep that box in the Common Reporting Format for finance.

National Communication guidelines

need updating all around. Parties must agree in Durban to update the guidelines for both developed and developing countries. Currently, the text only has a provision for revising developed country guidelines.

Low Carbon Development Strategies – Most Parties seem to be forgetting paragraphs 45 and 65 from Cancun about low carbon plans, even if a lot of countries are moving forward domestically with them. Biennial reports focus on what has been achieved; but planning for a decarbonized future is crucial and that is where these strategies come in. We need a process to report on the development of those plans and share best practices.

Response measures don't belong in IAR. (Do we need to say it again?) Consideration of the adverse impacts of mitigation actions is already done more than adequately as part of the annual review of GHG inventories. It has no place in the IAR process. This is a climate change convention, after all.

REDD+ reporting – A summary of REDD+ activities, including actions, methodologies, accounting and safeguards information systems, should be included in Biennial Update Reports and NatComms.

Beyond the text itself, countries could move the process forward if they made some concrete announcements. Take for example the USA. For all its rhetoric on transparency, they have yet to put forward serious money to support developing country biennial reports and the ICA process. The entire developed world has an interest in and an obligation to support these initiatives. Announcements of support in Durban would go a long way to ensure robust guidelines are adopted.

– *Basic Equity, continued from page 1*
"responsibility and capacity index" based effort sharing – are at all promising, and the BASIC paper clearly moves these two approaches forward.

There certainly are problems as well. The report, for example, gives almost no attention to economic stratification within countries. Even South Africa, while speaking for an approach that includes economic capacity as well as historic responsibility, passes too lightly over that subject. But all told it's the accomplishment here that are highly notable. The BASIC Experts report is a signpost to the debate that's actually needed.

JAPAN NEEDS ATTENTION

Last year in Cancun, Japan was heavily criticized and often appeared in media breaking stories when they announced that they would never accept the 2nd commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.

A year later in Durban, the Japanese delegation seems a lot more relaxed. Nobody is writing about them and they haven't even been designated for a Fossil yet.

Does this mean that Japan has reformed its ways and taken a revised position that is now acceptable? Of course not! Japan's position is just as destructive as it was before, during and after Cancun. In fact, their position seems only to be getting worse with recent reconsideration of their 25% domestic target.

So let's review. Japan has come to Durban with a position to refuse the 2nd commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol while having no strategic alternative or strong domestic policy in place. It is actually a very sad thing that a country that wishes to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council just cannot seem to play a positive role in these crucially important international negotiations on climate response.

MAMA KONATE

*Dear friends and colleagues,
During this African COP we honor the life and share great sadness in the passing of Mama Konate. He served as Director-General of the Mali Meteorological Service, permanent representative of Mali with WMO, former Chair of the LDC Group and the Expert Group on Technology Transfer, Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and UNFCCC Focal point for Mali.*

He was widely known for his constructive and engaging approach to the problems of his country and our world.

There is a saying in South Africa, when an activist has passed, that we must pick up the spear that has fallen.

Mama's spear was the most powerful of all weapons - his voice, his wisdom and his great humanity. Mama's spear will be as sorely missed as it will be difficult for any of us to pick up and carry. We must do good in Durban.

LULUCF Reference Levels: Technical Review Good, Policy Deeply Flawed

ECO recognises that significant time and effort have gone into improving the transparency and technical robustness of Annex I Parties' proposed reference levels for forest management.

However, although the review process achieved those objectives, this is in no way sufficient to ensure the environmental integrity of the reference level approach to forest management accounting. Put bluntly, the policy premise of the reference level approach is deeply, irrevocably flawed.

Although the review process was able to identify and correct technical issues and inconsistencies in individual country reference levels, it was never intended to assess the broader policy implications of the reference level approach. These implications include the following:

Environmental integrity. The reference level approach would allow Annex I Parties to increase net emissions of greenhouse gases relative to current levels over the next commitment period without penalty. Over time, this approach could seriously undermine global climate change mitigation and result in a loss of forest carbon stocks in developed country forests.

Economy-wide mitigation. The for-

est management reference levels for some Annex I Parties have been set in a way that allows them to hide increases in emissions from managing their forests and therefore allows them to avoid undertaking mitigation actions in other sectors.

Comparability. One supposed strength of the reference level approach is that it is flexible enough to allow all Annex I Parties to adopt mandatory forest management accounting.

However, reference levels overshoot the flexibility actually needed several times over. The result is a framework in which a tonne of mitigation in one country is not necessarily equivalent to a tonne of mitigation in another country.

The review was designed to assess the technical robustness and transparency of Parties' reference levels, and it did its job. It is now plainly and utterly apparent just how bad the effects of the reference level approach could be.

ECO therefore implores Parties to take a step back, consider the broader implications of the reference level approach and reject it in favour of one of the more robust options on the table as we head into the critical second week of negotiations here in Durban.

CCS in the CDM: Time to End the Charade

Treating the world's most carbon intensive fossil fuel as an emissions offset may sound like a joke but it's no laughing matter.

You know, ECO is usually pretty quick on the uptake, but even we were shocked to learn that there are 45 – count them! -- coal projects in the CDM pipeline.

If all of the proposed projects are approved, they would emit 400 million tons of CO2 every year for many decades -- more than the France or South Africa.

Diverting billions of euros in scarce climate finance to an already lavishly subsidized industry that causes severe human health and ecosystem damage will run our common mission right into the ditch.

How could this be? It's a scandal that the CDM and the UNFCCC can ill afford. The demand to permanently exclude coal from the CDM makes complete sense.

The call for exclusion comes on the heels of last week's CDM Executive Board suspension of the crediting rules for coal power projects.

The suspension was decided after an investigation found that the flawed rules could lead to over-issuance of millions of carbon credits that do not reflect real and additional emission reductions.

It was good to see the suspension, but that doesn't close the matter. Merely adjusting the current rules will not be a solution.

An independent study confirmed the flaws in the methodology and says those flaws are inherent to this project type. In essence, there is no way to revise the methodology and ensure emissions reductions.

Given the urgency of the climate crisis, only the exclusion of coal from the CDM at COP 17 can ensure that these projects do not undermine developed countries' mitigation commitments under the Kyoto Protocol or divert significant levels of scarce climate finance to dirty energy projects.

That represents a clear and definite opportunity toward restoring the environmental integrity of the CDM here in Durban.

Be Consistent, Norway!

You might have noticed ECO is having some targeted bilateral discussions in these pages. Today is with Norway. Time and time again we have reminded Parties of the urgent need to clarify the content of the pledges put on the table by developed countries.

On this issue, Norway has been an unwavering ally, and its credibility has been boosted by the transparent clarification of its own pledges. And no wonder, Norway regularly leads the league tables on transparency.

Throughout these negotiations, Norway has repeatedly made clear that out of its total emission reduction target of 30-40% emission reductions by 2020, about two-thirds will be achieved through domestic measures. But rumours have reached distant Durban that prominent political figures now want Norway to backtrack on this promise to the international community, by abandoning its pledge to achieve two-thirds of its target domestically.

So, Norway, that's why we are having this little chat. You of all countries should not have to be reminded that promises are made to be kept, and levels of ambition should increase rather than decrease. Nothing could be more damaging to a country's credibility in these negotiations than the perception that it is not taking the necessary action back home.

The world expects from Norway's own position that its plans and policies will keep the promise of meeting at least two-thirds of its 2020 target through domestic action. What we don't need is another Annex I country running away from its responsibilities. As Norway asks other countries to clarify their pledges, Norway should clarify whether it is a leader or an also-ran when it comes to reducing its own emissions.



**#1 TURKEY
ROLE CONFUSION OVER
ANNEX I & MECHANISMS**

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