

# DURBAN EXPECTATIONS

**NECESSARY, AMBITIOUS AND ACHIEVABLE  
STEPS FOR COP17/CMP7**

**“It always seems impossible, until it is done.”**

– Nelson Mandela

## SUMMARY

**Cancun was a modest success as it buried the ghost of the failure of Copenhagen. However, the Cancun Agreements postponed important issues that underpin the success, or otherwise, of efforts to fight catastrophic climate change.**

The Cancun Agreements provide real opportunities to advance global cooperation in adaptation, forests, climate finance and technology transfer. If all opportunities outlined within the Cancun Agreements are grasped, and parties take the following thoughtful and logical next steps, it is possible that COP17 in Durban could lay the groundwork for a fair, ambitious and legally binding global climate change regime. If this does not happen, if instead there is delay and lack of ambition, then we risk losing the chance to keep global warming below 1.5°C and we must face the catastrophic consequences for loss of life, economic growth and natural habitat. Without adequate mitigation, finance, technology and capacity building we will have to accept that poor communities and countries who are already feeling the impacts of changing climate will have their homes and livelihoods destroyed.

This is why CAN believes that a compromised or low-ambition outcome is not an option for Durban, and why we set a high but achievable bar for COP 17. Parties can confront this historic challenge with new levels of solidarity and partnership and avert this pressing climate reality, by taking the following steps.

### Close the gigatonne gap.

- In Durban, developed countries must agree targets in line with the Cancun Agreements, of at least 25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020, as a target floor and agree a process to increase their ambition level to more than 40% for adoption by COP18/CMP8. This is part of their fair share to keep temperature increase below 2°C, and to keep open the pathway to stay below 1.5°C.
- In the lead up to Durban all developed countries must move to the high end of their current pledges and show how their targets are consistent with decarbonising their economies by 2050. Where their targets are less than 40% by 2020 they should indicate which other developed country should compensate for their low pledges by making higher cuts.
- Loopholes must be closed to ensure developed countries honestly meet their emissions reduction targets including:
  - Land use, land use change and forestry rules that increase accountability and strengthen the level of ambition of developed countries so that forestry and land use sectors deliver emissions reductions,

- Rules for any new market and non market mechanisms must not diminish already low levels of ambition and must disallow double counting of emissions reductions and financial flows,
- Agree rules to minimise damage from hot air (surplus AAUs) for example setting a discount factor or adjusting aggregate emission reduction targets for all developed countries to compensate for the hot air.

- At Durban agree the rules for a registry that both links developing country mitigation action with necessary support, and provides a separate record of developing country mitigation actions without support.
- The Durban COP must ensure that adequate, predictable and sustainable finance is available for REDD+ to deliver the substantial reductions required, in the range of \$15 – 35 billion per year by 2020. The COP should also decide on guidance on reference levels, measuring, reporting and verification of carbon, and information systems for safeguards based on recommendations made by SBSTA this year. This guidance is necessary to maximise the effectiveness of REDD+ and inform current capacity building efforts.
- Governments should agree to quickly and strongly reduce the use of HFCs, in a close collaboration between the UNFCCC and the Montreal Protocol, in order to immediately reduce emissions of these “super greenhouse gasses”.
- Governments must agree to peak emissions by 2015 and reduce global emissions by at least 80% below 1990 levels by 2050, within an equitable approach to sharing this effort.

**Secure a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol**, and thus preserve the only legally binding instrument with emission reduction targets and timetables.

- KP architectural elements are crucial to ensure that mitigation commitments are legally binding and have environmental integrity.

**Secure a mandate to negotiate a legally binding instrument under the LCA** to be adopted no later than 2015 and in force by the end of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.

- By 2015 at the latest, the commitments and actions of all Parties, while respecting the principles and

provisions of the Convention, should be inscribed in legally binding instrument[s].<sup>1</sup>

### **Establish a negotiating pathway to deliver adequate finance from 2013 to the new Green Climate Fund.**

- Agree a decision to mobilise adequate finance from 2013 onwards, including commitments to specific sources of public finance in 2013-2015, and a Work Program on mobilising adequate public finance over the long term from a range of sources. This should include delivery of scaled-up budgetary contributions from developed countries and supplementary innovative sources of public finance such as mechanisms in the shipping and aviation sector, a financial transaction tax and use of Special Drawing Rights.
- Decide to develop mechanisms to reduce emissions from international transportation (bunkers) in a way that can generate finance for developing countries while reducing emissions, and address common but differentiated responsibilities by ensuring no net incidence or burden on developing countries through a rebate or other mechanism.

Advance and agree **modalities and guidelines for National Adaptation Plans (NAPs)** which should be inclusive and integrate a country-driven, gender-sensitive, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems, and be flexible to address national circumstances, and **ensure support will be delivered to implement NAPs.**

**Agree on further activities under the work programme on loss and damage** and a clear mandate to work towards a decision at COP18, resulting in scaled-up action on disaster risk reduction and risk management, establishment of an international climate risk insurance mechanism, and a rehabilitation mechanism to deal with long-term climate loss and damage.

**Establish adaptation, finance, technology and capacity building institutions with sound rules** to ensure that they serve developing countries needs and deliver real action on the ground.

- Take key political decisions in Durban on the nature and form of the **Green Climate Fund**, including the appointment of the Board with arrangements for meaningful civil society participation, establishment of thematic funding windows and access modalities,

- Reach agreement by Durban on the functions of the **Standing Committee**, to ensure that the financial mechanism of the Convention operates effectively under the COP and to improve coordination between institutions involved in climate finance - inside and outside the UNFCCC,
- Establish a scoping exercise so that Durban can agree the structure, functions, components, locations and workplan for the **Climate Technology Centre and Network**,
- Establish an adequately resourced **Capacity Building Coordinating Body** and mandate it to design a dedicated 'fast start' capacity-building program,
- Agree modalities and composition for the **Adaptation Committee**, including meaningful observer access and participation, so that it becomes operational in 2012.

### **Build a robust Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) framework.**

- Adopt guidelines and timetables for biennial reports, which are critical for the 2013-2015 review and procedures for International Assessment and Review (IAR) for developed countries and International Consultation and Analysis (ICA) for developing countries,
- Establish a common reporting form for finance, and ensure that the Kyoto Protocol MRV rules continue in the second commitment period and serve as the basis for comparable provisions for developed country MRV under the Convention,
- Establish provisions for public access and participation in all MRV processes, especially for IAR and ICA,
- Adopt guidance relating to monitoring and implementation of REDD+ safeguards, and establish a comprehensive safeguard system for the Green Climate Fund.

<sup>1</sup> These instruments could either be the Kyoto Protocol with a parallel new Protocol or a single Protocol building on the Kyoto architecture; the point is that commitments and actions are inscribed in a treaty instrument of some kind resulting in a comprehensive legally binding regime.

## SHARED VISION

### Long term global goal and peak year

Parties must agree, through a COP decision at Durban and ultimately in a legally binding agreement, that setting the long-term global goal and peaking year(s) must ensure consistency with an emissions pathway that **keeps 1.5°C warming within reach while allowing for a very high probability of keeping warming well below 2°C** over pre-industrial levels, mindful that total cumulative emissions (the global carbon budget) are the central factor that define expected warming levels.

Consequently, in Durban, **Parties must collectively ensure that global emissions peak no later than 2015, as in the most ambitious of the IPCC AR4 scenarios.** Developed countries shall peak their emissions before this date, while recognising that the time frame for peaking will be longer in many developing countries and taking fully into account that low-carbon sustainable development is a prerequisite for poverty reduction and economic development.

In Durban, **Parties shall agree as a long-term global goal to collectively reduce global emissions by at least 80% by 2050** compared to 1990 levels, ensuring that global emissions continue to decline thereafter, and further ensuring that each country contributes its fair share to the required effort, recognising that providing financial support and technology transfer is part of developed countries fair share. Greenhouse gas concentrations will need to be reduced ultimately to 350ppm CO<sub>2</sub>e, likely in the 22<sup>nd</sup> century. The Review, with preparations in 2011-2012, should include reviewing the long term goal and allocation of effort in light of new science.

In Durban, **Parties should recognise if their collective and individual levels of ambition expressed by current pledges are not consistent with the required emissions pathways to meet the temperature goals described above**. To that end, Parties should seek further understanding on the scale of the remaining gap. This should be accompanied by a renewed commitment to engage in a process to negotiate closing the gap.

### Effort Sharing

The lack of an effort sharing agreement – an equitable approach to sharing the costs of mitigation and adaptation amongst countries - is a major stumbling block to agreeing a long term global goal. CAN sees this as a gap within the current negotiation agenda. Hence in Durban, **Parties should agree that each country shall contribute its fair share to the global effort.** Establishing each country's fair share should be consistent with the principles of the Convention, be determined on the basis of responsibility for historic emissions and capability for reducing emissions, and ensure the right (and access) to sustainable development. Parties should also agree **to increase**

**understanding of, and further agreement on, ways and options for the allocation of fair shares of the global effort, through a work programme,** based on submissions, technical papers, and workshops, with a view to agree an equitable effort sharing approach, for conclusion and adoption by COP18.

## REVIEW

Durban should agree a COP decision on the Review that includes detailed terms of reference, including scope and modalities of the Review, building further on the Cancun agreements and taking fully into account the findings of the IPCC AR5 and its contributing studies, and ensuring full civil society engagement. Parties should ensure that preparatory steps for the Review are undertaken in 2012 and that it is finalised no later than 2015.

As mandated by the Cancun Agreements, the Review should also assess overall progress to achieve the long-term goal. This should **include an assessment of both domestic actions by developed and developing countries as well as the provision of support** for mitigation actions in developing countries.

The Review should also include an **assessment of the gigatonne gap**, i.e. the gap between emission levels resulting from pledged or planned mitigation, and required emission levels that are consistent with an emissions pathway that keeps 1.5°C within reach and allows high probability for keeping warming below 2°C over pre-industrial levels. Guidelines for biennial reviews for both developed and developing countries must be agreed in Durban in order to facilitate the timely preparation of these critical inputs into the review process.

In Durban, **Parties should request a Technical Paper on the scientific, technical and socio-economic issues relating to temperature increase of 1.5°C**, to be delivered in 2012, in order to inform the review.

In Durban, parties need to recognise that timing of the adoption of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) Synthesis Report in October 2014 would mean there will not be sufficient time to ensure proper consideration of its findings when negotiating and adopting a decision concluding the review at the latest at the COP in 2015. Hence, Parties should agree in Durban that the review be informed by a workshop for Parties once the IPCC working group findings are available (final IPCC reports expected in April 2014, with much of the work available earlier). At this workshop, the findings of the IPCC working groups should be presented and discussed. The findings of the workshop should feed into discussions at SB sessions 2014 (continuation of consideration of the inputs and preparation of a stocktaking report), and consideration by the COP in 2014 (further enriched by the then available final IPCC Synthesis Report). The Durban COP decision on

the review should include the above process suggestions, request the secretariat to organise the workshop and secure the inputs from the IPCC working groups.

## ADAPTATION

**Agree modalities and composition for the Adaptation Committee**, including meaningful observer access and participation, so that the Adaptation Committee becomes operational in 2012.

- Members of the Committee should be adaptation and development experts and include non-governmental stakeholders such as civil society and research organisations with relevant expertise and experience. The committee should have a gender-balanced composition.

**Agree a further phase of the Nairobi Work Programme** that will facilitate the dissemination of knowledge on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation practices reaching local levels of government, civil society and communities.

**Agree on further activities under the work programme on loss and damage** and agree on a clear mandate to work toward a decision at COP 18, resulting in:

- scaling-up of disaster risk reduction and risk management,
- establishment of an international climate risk insurance mechanism, and
- a rehabilitation mechanism to deal with long-term climate loss & damage.

This decision should entail provisions for financial arrangement acknowledging principles such as polluter's pay and historic responsibility. Furthermore, the work programme should serve to galvanize immediate action, should compile different experiences in understanding loss & damage and addressing each of its components. The work programme should also highlight the outlook of loss & damage vis-à-vis current ambition in mitigation and adaptation finance and the implications of failing to reach the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC, and of Parties' failure to meet their commitments under the UNFCCC and its Protocol.

**Advance and potentially agree on the modalities and guidelines for National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) by Durban.** These should follow an inclusive and integrated country-driven, gender-sensitive, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems. It must be flexible so that it takes into account national circumstances and already existing strategies (e.g. NAPAs, and also comprehensive climate change strategies addressing

adaptation and mitigation). Furthermore, this process must provide clearer guidance to developed countries to provide finance for the development and implementation of such plans and strategies.

Parties should use the call for submissions on the modalities and guidelines to consolidate their views as well as the workshops. Together with inputs to be developed by the Least Developed Countries Expert, this can provide a thorough basis for progress on this matter in Durban.

**In Durban Parties should agree on a clear way forward to advance the role of regional centers**, including a call for submissions and a workshop to be programmed for 2012 on regional centres and their role, function and governance in supporting adaptation work (including national planning) in developing countries and at regional level,

In addition, the following matters impinge directly on adaptation and need to be agreed in Durban:

- ensure **adequate treatment of adaptation in Green Climate Fund** preparation,
- ensure **progress on public finance sources**, including innovative finance, to underpin the adaptation framework with sufficient means of implementation, ideally feeding directly into the Adaptation Fund and the GCF.

Within the **process** going forward, we want to:

- ensure adequate treatment of climate change impacts and associated adaptation needs and means of support in the modalities of the overall review (modalities to be worked out in 2011)
- ensure effective linkages and synergies with other issues (such as REDD, technology, capacity building)

## CLOSE THE GIGATONNE GAP

The Cancun Agreements set a long term goal to keep warming below 2°, but recognised that current ambition levels are inadequate, that deep cuts are required and that mitigation efforts must be ‘scaled-up’ -- with developed countries showing leadership. The Cancun Agreements failed to agree an equitable, top down science-based approach to setting mitigation targets, but they did urge developed countries (under both the AWG-KP and AWG-LCA) to increase the level of ambition to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, while taking into account the quantitative implications of the loopholes that exist such as the use of land use, land-use change and forestry activities, emissions trading and project-based mechanisms and the carry-over of units from the first to the second commitment period.

The Cancun Agreements acknowledge that developed countries ought to reduce their emissions in line with the recommendations from the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, which call for developed countries to collectively reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 25-40% below 1990 by 2020. This level of emission reduction is only 50% likely to keep warming below a 2-2.4° range, and is likely to foreclose on keeping warming below 1.5°. No developed country pledge is even close to its fair share in the globally needed mitigation effort. The recent UNFCCC Technical Paper (FCCC/TP/2011/1) shows that even the best case scenario<sup>2</sup> at the top end of current pledges would lead to no more than 18% reduction by developed countries, far away from both the 25-40% IPCC range and the more than 40% reductions required by developed countries as a group for a 1.5°C/2°C pathway.

Independent reports highlight the extent to which loopholes can further undermine already weak pledges. The UNEP Emissions Gap report pointed to an emissions gap of 12 gigatonne in 2020, partly arising from forest accounting rules that don't accurately reflect what the atmosphere sees and Assigned Amount Units (AAUs), or allowances, that countries want to carry-over from the first to the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Analysis by Ecofys and Climate Analytics found that current loopholes and underlying assumptions will significantly weaken the ambition level of developed countries emission reduction targets to just 2% below 1990 levels.

At Panama, **Parties should hold a workshop to consider ways to increase the levels of ambition** (following the yet-to-be-fulfilled mandate within the Cancun Agreements). Parties must recognise that even in a best case scenario, there will still be a big gap between pledges and emissions pathways consistent with 1.5°C/2°C. While each country should contribute its fair share of the globally needed

mitigation effort, most countries will have to move even beyond the high end of current pledges. **For developing countries, this would also mean increasing understanding of required financial, technological and capacity building support.** Parties should share information on the potential for further reductions beyond their existing pledge and identify the domestic and international conditions (cost, policies etc) to achieve them.

At the next session in Panama, **Parties should request a Technical Paper that combines current pledges by developed and developing country Parties to assess the scale of the gigatonne gap** between current pledges (and their underlying assumptions) and emission levels needed to keep 1.5°C warming within reach and allowing for a high probability of meeting the 2°C target.

### **Developed country mitigation**

Between now and Durban, **developed countries must provide full clarity on what their net domestic emissions would be in 2020 resulting from current pledges and underlying assumptions** such as existing or planned domestic policies, LULUCF accounting, AAU carry-over, the use of carbon offsets etc. This is needed to understand what real domestic efforts countries are planning until 2020. The Secretariat's Technical Paper (FCCC/TP/2011/1) should be updated accordingly. Developed country Parties should also provide information how their pledges are consistent with near-zero decarbonisation by 2050.

Developed country Parties must provide information to better understand why their pledges fall short of the agreed ambition level of 25-40% reductions and in some cases even below Kyoto CP1 targets. Developed country Parties with low ambition should indicate which other developed country should compensate for their low pledges by making higher cuts instead.

By Durban at the latest, **developed countries with high and low pledges or a pledge range must move to the high end of their pledges as a first step.** These countries must, between now and Durban, clarify (a) what the objectively measurable criteria are, against which conditions are measured; (b) what part of the conditions has been met so far and (c) what is needed to fulfil the remaining conditions.

Between now and Durban, negotiations on developed country efforts must build on the acknowledgement within the Cancun Agreements of the need to increase ambition. **Developed countries must increase their pledges to more than 40% reductions by 2020<sup>3</sup>** as part of their fair share to provide a reasonable chance of staying below 2°C, and to keep open the pathway to stay below 1.5°C. **In Durban, developed countries must agree to aggregate targets of at**

<sup>2</sup> Developed countries move to high end of pledges under strict rules and with loopholes closed, developing country taking ambitious supported and non-supported NAMAs.

<sup>3</sup> Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources Defense Council and The Nature Conservancy do not endorse this position.

**least 25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020 as a target floor, and a process to increase their ambition level to more than 40%, for adoption by COP18/CMP8.**

By Durban, **Parties must agree common accounting rules for developed countries and close/minimise loopholes** to ensure the environmental integrity of the system. This would include:

- (a) Rules on land use, land use change and forestry that increase accountability and ensure that forestry and land use sectors deliver net emissions reductions. This requires, in particular, using historical reference levels, rather than projected reference levels, for all developed countries. The rules would also have to account for all emissions, including other land uses such as cropland and grazing land management, and rewetting and drainage. *See separate section below.*
- (b) Rules for any new market and non-market mechanisms that ensure that such mechanisms not diminish already low levels of ambition, not distract from decarbonising developed countries and must not allow double counting, ensuring additional emissions reductions and funding flows. *See separate section below.*
- (c) Rules to minimise damage from hot air by e.g. setting discount factors for surplus AAUs or higher aggregate emission reduction targets for developed countries to compensate for hot air, and strengthening some Parties' 2020 pledges that are designed to bring in new hot air into the system.

In Durban, **Parties should agree common templates, guidelines and review procedures for the Low Carbon Development Strategies<sup>4</sup> for developed countries.** The 2020 target resulting from developed countries' pledges should be seen as a point on a long-term trajectory to near-complete decarbonisation by developed countries by 2050, identifying transformation pathways and intermediate indicative targets through 2030, 2040 and 2050, underpinned by and consistent with the rolling 5-year legally-binding QELROs under the UNFCCC system and policies and measures to achieve them, with plans updated every 5 years in line with most recent science. Developed countries should submit the first iteration of their Low Carbon Development Strategy or Plan<sup>5</sup> by October 2012 and the first report should be submitted with the country's sixth National Communication in 2014.

### **Land use change and forestry (LULUCF)**

The land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector has the potential to contribute significantly to the deep,

early cuts in emissions required to avoid dangerous climate warming. It is therefore essential that emissions from this sector are accounted for in a way that reflects what the atmosphere sees. However, a number of independent reports including the UNEP Emissions Gap report<sup>6</sup> and analyses by Ecofys and Climate Analytics<sup>7</sup> have highlighted the role that proposed lax accounting rules for the LULUCF sector could play in undermining the ambition of a climate agreement.

As we move towards final negotiations in Durban, CAN therefore remains extremely concerned that parties are determining LULUCF rules in a way that encourages hiding emissions rather than taking responsibility for emissions in this sector. To address this, Parties should move to enhance ambition in the LULUCF rules and, as highlighted in the Cancun agreements, discussions on Annex I targets should also take into account the impact of loopholes including LULUCF.

In particular:

- Parties must respond to the recent Review which provides technical clarity on the extent to which unaccounted emissions and a reduction in removals from managed forests decreases the ambition of Parties' emissions reductions targets. Parties should address this accounting gap of potentially hundreds of megatonnes of unaccounted emissions by ensuring that accounting for increases in net emissions from forest management relative to historical net emissions is mandatory for Annex I countries.
- Parties must actively invest in creating the technical and administrative capacity to account for emissions and removals from cropland management, grazing land management, revegetation and rewetting and drainage so that accounting for these activities should become mandatory.
- Parties must move over the next year to significantly enhance data quality in LULUCF in order to enable Parties to take on comprehensive accounting for emissions from land as soon as practicably possible. Resolving data quality issues could follow the "key categories" approach detailed in the IPCC Good Practice Guidance for LULUCF.
- Parties must account for bioenergy / biofuels emissions by ensuring that all bioenergy emissions from domestic and imported feedstocks of wood and crops are included in LULUCF or the energy sector accounting. Under current guidance, these emissions are not accounted in the energy sector and many Parties' reference level proposals also exclude emissions from forest-based biomass energy

4 As mentioned in paragraph 65 of the decision listed in FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1

5 As outlined in paragraph 45 of 1/CP.16.

6 <http://www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsgapreport/>

7 [http://www.climateactiontracker.org/briefing\\_paper.pdf](http://www.climateactiontracker.org/briefing_paper.pdf)

from accounting, meaning that substantial emissions from bioenergy could be ignored from the accounts of Annex 1 countries. Additionally, the lack of a mandatory accounting requirement for cropland management allows Parties to omit emissions from crop-based bioenergy from their accounts.

- Only compliance risks from extraordinary natural disturbances should be factored out of LULUCF accounting – extraordinary being defined as statistically rare. In addition, high quality spatially explicit data is essential (i.e. Tier 3). Key safeguards that must be included are ensuring that emissions from salvage logging, land use change and future harvesting are not excluded. Parties should also be demonstrating efforts to control and rehabilitate affected areas.

Parties should seek to conclude negotiations on LULUCF ahead of final discussions on Annex 1 emissions reductions targets in order to ensure that the implications of LULUCF rules on targets are taken into account.

#### ***Developing country mitigation action***

In Cancun it was agreed that developing country Parties take nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) in the context of sustainable development that would be supported and enabled by climate finance, technology transfer and capacity building support with the aim of achieving a deviation in emissions relative to 'business as usual' emissions in 2020. Parties also decided to develop a registry to record mitigation action seeking international support and to facilitating the matching of action and support. Developing country parties were encouraged to develop low-carbon development strategies or plans in the context of sustainable development.

By Durban, **developing country Parties should provide clarity on their net domestic emissions in 2020 resulting from current pledges/NAMAs**, including assumptions such as baseline projections and underlying key factors such as energy use, economic growth, population trajectories etc.

Between now, Durban, and beyond, **developing countries that have yet to submit pledges and/or NAMAs should do so as soon as possible**. Developing countries that are in a position to do so should further strengthen existing pledges/NAMAs.

By Durban, developing country Parties should provide clarity on what proportion of their pledges (and which NAMAs) they are planning to undertake unilaterally, and **what proportion (or NAMAs) are dependent on the provision of finance, technology and capacity building support**, and identify the level and type of support required to implement their pledged mitigation actions.

By Durban, **Parties should aim to develop clear guidelines for NAMAs, and the underlying assumptions such as business as usual (BAU) projections**, to enhance the understanding of developing country action, contribute to a robust assessment of the overall effort and environmental integrity of the combined effort of all Parties.

By Durban, **Parties should agree a robust system of MRV for both action and support (see below)**, coupled with a clear plan how finance, technology and capacity building support will be provided for the development and implementation of NAMAs.

At Durban Parties must agree the design and modalities for a registry that both links developing country mitigation action with necessary support, and provides a separate record of developing country mitigation actions without support. Parties must agree to operationalise the registry early in 2012. The registry should be developed as an integral part of the MRV system and also allow recognition of early action and matching enhanced action with support.

At Durban, developing countries in a position to do so should agree to inscribe their NAMAs in the NAMA registry before COP18/CMP8 using common guidelines for timelines, baselines, expected emissions reductions, expected costs and indicate what support, if any, is required. Developing countries with low capacity may need more time to inscribe their NAMAs, and must be enabled through finance and capacity building support to develop and register NAMAs, in the shortest possible timeframe in order to be able to take advantage of funding for NAMAs.

In both Panama and Durban, **Parties should make progress on longer-term low-emission development strategies for developing countries<sup>8</sup>**. This should be done with a view to ensure a nationally appropriate, phased approach regarding scope and ambition of such strategies, allowing for an increasing integration of NAMAs into such strategies, based on national circumstances and linked to available financial, technological and capacity building support, for both the development and the implementation of countries' strategies. Developing countries with sufficient institutional capacity should agree to produce low carbon development strategies before COP18/CMP8. Those with lower capacity may need more time to provide the above information and must be enabled through finance and capacity building support.

#### ***REDD+***

This year the COP needs to decide on a mechanism for REDD+ that delivers adequate, predictable and sustainable finance. The Cancun Agreement also requires SBSTA to provide guidance on reference levels, measuring, reporting and verification of carbon, and information systems for safeguards.

8 As referenced to in paragraph 65 of 1/CP.16.

### **Ensure sufficient finance**

A host of mechanisms have been proposed for REDD+, ranging from market-based ones, through market-linked ones (for example, using money from emissions allowance auctions in developed countries) to straightforward funds. It is not clear which of these (or a combination of them) might be adopted although the levels of finance required are clear, being widely estimated to be in the range US\$15 to 35 billion per year by 2020. This year the COP needs to decide on a mechanism for REDD+ that delivers adequate, predictable and sustainable finance at this scale.

### **Information systems for safeguards**

Decision 1/CP.16 requests SBSTA to develop guidance by COP 17 on “a system for providing information on how the safeguards referred to in Annex I of the Cancun Agreement LCA are being addressed and respected throughout the implementation...” of REDD+. A system for providing information, will play an important role in assuring that REDD+ safeguards are addressed and respected and can, thus, improve overall implementation and effectiveness of REDD+. SBSTA guidance will be critical in ensuring the adequacy of these systems.

### **Measuring, reporting and verification of carbon**

Emerging national forest carbon measuring, monitoring, reporting, and verifying frameworks must provide transparency, consistency, and comparability of REDD+ results. Existing IPCC guidelines and good practice guidance should form the basis of modalities and methodologies for use in REDD+ frameworks. Some additional guidance is necessary so that countries can begin to develop robust, transparent and comparable forest carbon frameworks. SBSTA should build on existing guidance and COP decisions to outline the range of approaches that can be used.

### **Reference levels**

The Cancun agreement on REDD+ requires SBSTA to develop modalities for setting reference levels. In general, any reference level chosen for REDD+ should meet at least three basic principles: increase transparency, lead to emission reductions and prevent leakage of those emissions. In particular reference levels should:

- Contribute to the mitigation of climate change. REDD+ should permanently reduce emissions, increase removals and conserve and enhance carbon stocks (thereby avoiding emissions). Reference levels should be set within this framework, in accordance with the goal for REDD+ agreed in Cancun.
- Be based on national historical baselines. Basing reference levels on national historic baselines should be the basic starting point for establishing reference levels. This will help to ensure REDD+ contributes to mitigation. It is also consistent with previous UNFCCC decisions.

- Encourage maximum participation. Broad participation in REDD+ is required to maximise its mitigation potential and minimise international leakage. It is also consistent with the second paragraph of the Cancun agreement on REDD+. Participation by countries with high carbon stocks and low deforestation rates is especially important in order to ensure that those stocks are not lost to the atmosphere.
- Be fully transparent. The UNFCCC must require disclosure and transparency behind the reference levels approach for all participants. Values, calculations, and assumptions for developing reference levels should involve in-country consultations with all stakeholders and should be posted freely and openly online, with sufficient time for comment, before reference emissions levels are accepted by the COP.
- Ensure consistency. Modalities for setting reference levels should be common for all countries.

### **International transport**

Governments should agree to work together to strongly reduce emissions from aviation and shipping. The COP should develop strong guidelines, including an emission reduction target, and set a clear deadline for IMO and ICAO to create a framework for these sectors to quickly reduce greenhouse gas emissions, that at the same time enable a fair contribution of funding to mitigation and adaptation in developing countries, and ensure no net incidence of impacts on developing countries.

Emissions from aviation and maritime transport are not included in the Kyoto targets and current pledges do not cover these emissions. If a solution to these emissions remains unsolved and the sector grows under business as usual, this will add another 6% to the emissions of industrialised countries, as compared with 1990<sup>9</sup>.

### **HFCs**

Governments should agree to quickly and strongly reduce the use of HFCs, in a close collaboration between the UNFCCC and the Montreal Protocol, in order to immediately reduce emissions of these “super greenhouse gasses”.

## **FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS**

The Cancun Agreements established two processes to discuss “market-based” and “non-market-based” mechanisms respectively, scheduled to conclude in Durban. There are a number of ongoing processes that could either make progress in 2011 or could undermine the environmental effectiveness of the entire system.

9 Assuming that these emissions will continue growing at the same rates from 2005-2020 as they have done 1990 to 2005

### **Reform of existing mechanisms (CDM, JI and international emissions trading)**

Despite the unclear future of the KP it is important to bear in mind that any decisions taken on the reform process of existing mechanisms can result in major impacts. For example, new standardized baselines in the CDM can affect the system's ability to screen out non-additional projects with potential massive consequences for the Gigatonne Gap. On the other hand, a stringent discount-factor of credits could contribute to net global emission reductions.

The issue of surplus AAUs needs to be solved this year. If not eliminated, surplus AAUs will further weaken the already low level of ambition. Rules must be agreed at Durban to minimise damage from hot air (surplus AAUs) for example setting a discount factor or adjusting aggregate emission reduction targets for all developed countries to compensate for the hot air.

Another issue of concern is the inclusion of new project types into the CDM. In CAN's view, discussions about the future of the flexible mechanisms including the consideration of new project activities should be firmly grounded in an analysis of their performance so far. The potential inclusion of carbon capture and storage (CCS) and forests in exhaustion (FIE) is highly likely to fail most of the requirements in this specific offset framework. Therefore CAN does not believe that including either CCS nor FIE in CDM is an appropriate way forward.

### **Key Principles for possible new mechanisms:**

1. Raising the level of ambition: First and foremost, discussions around flexible mechanisms must depend on the level of ambition. Without an ambitious emission reduction target, there is no need for flexible mechanisms. Therefore, discussions must focus on how to move beyond zero-sum offsetting and must contribute to net global emission reductions.
2. Avoiding crediting business as usual reductions: Poorly designed mechanisms can cause double counting of emission reduction and overestimate emissions reductions and falsely give double meaning to financial flows.
3. Avoiding double-counting of emission reduction and financial flows: Possible future market-based mechanisms have to make sure that there is no double-counting of the units traded. While mentioning several important principles, the text of the Cancun Agreements is missing this important item: the principle for avoiding double counting of emission reduction and financial flows.

4. Safeguard environmental treaties, international obligations and sustainable development, including human rights.
5. Departure from project-based mechanisms: Experience so far has shown that it is impossible to accurately assess the additionality of emission reductions achieved by individual projects.
6. Getting the crediting threshold right in sectoral approaches: CAN's most serious concern lies in the setting of the crediting/trading threshold. If this threshold is set too lenient, it would risk creating even more "hot air" emissions certificates. The threshold has to be set substantially below conservative BAU emissions projections.
7. Supplementarity of emission reductions: To further ensure that new mechanisms do not undermine the environmental integrity of the UNFCCC regime, they must be supplementary to substantial domestic emission reductions in Annex I countries
8. Share of proceeds: CAN believes that a share of proceeds levy should be applied to the trade of all units generated by any new market-based mechanisms, set at a non-distortionary, but nevertheless effective rate. Proceeds generated by this levy should flow through the UNFCCC's Green Climate Fund.
9. Supplementarity to international support: The financial flows, technology transfers and capacity-building associated with tradable units generated by any new mechanisms must also be supplemental to the financing and technology promised by developed country parties to enable and support mitigation actions in developing countries pursuant to decision 1/CP.13 paragraph 1.b.ii<sup>10</sup>.
10. Low-hanging fruits: Any new market-based mechanisms must not lead to the deprivation of negative or low cost mitigation opportunities ("low-hanging fruits") of developing countries by crediting such action for purchase by developed countries – such activities must be retained for developing country unilateral and MRV-supported domestic action.

## FINANCE

### **Sources of Finance for 2013-2020 and beyond**

- The decision in Durban must include significant new and additional budget contributions for 2013 onwards according to an effort sharing framework.

<sup>10</sup> This requirement is closely related to the second type of double-counting described above in that credit generating mechanisms cannot replace the financial obligations of developed countries with respect to 1/CP.13, 1.b.ii.

It should also set out a clear and ambitious Work Program to operationalise supplementary sources of long-term finance (which should include international transport - see below) and reach agreement on a further set of public sources needed to meet the financing requirements for climate action under the UNFCCC. A credible trajectory for scaling up public finance in the period 2013-2020 would build on fast-start commitments of \$10 billion per year in 2010-2012, and increase by \$10 billion each year, so that the commitment of \$100 billion by 2020 is met predominately with public finance, and be able to leverage much greater amounts of private finance for mitigation actions. Revenue generating measures to address emissions in the shipping and aviation sectors, Financial Transaction Taxes and Special Drawing Rights, could help meet these goals and provide reliable sources of financing for the Green Climate Fund.

- To achieve this outcome in Durban, a workstream on sources of public finance must start now, and involve submissions by Parties, workshops on finance in Panama and Durban, ministerial and expert meetings, and input from outside bodies, including the AGF, G20, civil society, and other institutions that can contribute relevant expertise and knowledge.
- Adopt a decision on international transport under “Sectoral Approaches” that gives guidance to the IMO and ICAO on how to address CBDR and ensure no net incidence on developing countries, achieve appropriate mitigation ambition, and generate finance for mitigation and adaptation in developing countries.
- The decision in Durban should specify that:
  - The mechanisms adopted for the maritime transport and aviation sectors must generate significant finance for climate action through the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC;
  - The principal of CBDR can be addressed through the use of the revenue generated, including through a rebate mechanism to ensure no net incidence on developing countries;
  - Emissions reduction targets for these sectors are compatible with global emissions trajectories that ensure global temperature stabilization at less than 1.5 degrees C above pre-industrial levels.
- Ensure that the governance of the Green Climate Fund and its secretariat are fully independent of any international financial institution or multilateral development bank and, consistent with Article 11 of the UNFCCC as referenced in paragraph 102 of the Cancun Agreement, is under the guidance of and fully accountable to the UNFCCC.
- Ensure that dedicated funding windows are established for specific funding areas (eg: adaptation, mitigation, REDD+, technology and/or capacity building). To reduce the imbalance between adaptation and mitigation finance, an initial share of 50% of the resources should be allocated to adaptation. The appropriateness of these initial arrangements should be kept under regular review.
- Ensure that the GCF plays a transformative role in accelerating the shift to low-carbon, climate resilient development pathways by (1) scaling-up resource flows for ambitious and effective climate-related policies and actions, including through incentivising synergies between the GCF’s strategic objectives and the production of other development co-benefits (while avoiding double-counting towards finance commitments), and (2) only supporting clean, safe, sustainable and efficient and non fossil fuel-based energy technologies.
- Ensure an environmental and social safeguards framework for appraisal and evaluation that is consistent with existing international conventions and best practice standards, and helps further the UNFCCC objective of allowing economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.
- Ensure that the Green Climate Fund guarantees the meaningful participation of a diversity of civil society and community-level organisations at the Board level and in national decision-making processes, and at all stages from the development of proposals through monitoring and evaluation.
- Ensure that socio-economic development and gender expertise are represented throughout the Green Climate Fund structures (including, for example, the board, windows, and advisory groups) to ensure that funding is being equitably accessed by both women and men and is reaching the most vulnerable persons and communities, including indigenous peoples, who most urgently need funding.
- Limit the role of the trustee to holding the financial assets of the Green Climate Fund, maintaining appropriate financial records, and preparing financial statements and other reports required by the Board of the Green Climate Fund, in accordance with international fiduciary standards.

### **Green Climate Fund**

The Transitional Committee should conduct a transparent process that enables active civil society participation in all phases of its deliberations, and produces recommendations to the Conference of the Parties in Durban that will:

- Consider the relationship of the GCF with other institutions and bodies under the UNFCCC.

### **Standing Committee:**

- The AWG-LCA should form a working group to draft a terms of reference and framework documents to be approved by the Parties at COP17. The working group should elaborate the roles and functions of the Standing Committee, including the creation of a registry, procedures to measure, report and verify financial contributions, and procedures to periodically assess the adequacy of available finance.

## **TECHNOLOGY**

It is positive that Cancun agreed to establish a Technology Mechanism consisting of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). The TEC should be the decision making body and will decide on the programmes and projects that will be carried under the climate technology cooperation framework, and the CTCN will mostly work as an implementing body.

The future work of the Technology Mechanism needs to address access to climate friendly technologies and ensure that the technologies it promotes are socially and environmentally sustainable. The Parties need to discuss and strengthen the elements of the technology mechanism that will enhance the technology cooperation and access to appropriate technologies. Until now the Parties have not dealt with the contentious technology cooperation issues which will ensure a robust framework is established within the UNFCCC. Now is the time to take up the issues of reporting structure, transparency, accountability of the bodies, and develop a post Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) robust technology framework.

Issues that should be prioritized in the lead up to Durban:

- The structure for the CTCN and how the Climate Technology Centre(s) will coordinate with the Network. Establish the reporting lines of the TEC and the CTCN to ensure robust accountability and transparency in the process.
- Developing a set of key objectives for the CTCN. A preliminary list of tasks includes: capacity building, providing technical help for diffusing and deploying technologies, support for country-driven regulatory policies (eg Feed in Tariffs FITs), technology assessment, guidance for countries developing funding proposals to submit to the Green Fund. Overall, resources should be focused on filling gaps and not duplicating efforts. The priorities should be driven by developing country needs based on mitigation and adaptation priorities.

- Launch a scoping exercise for where the center(s) should be located and what existing and new institutions could participate in the network (could draw on the World Bank CIC scoping exercise). See if there are gaps in areas of technical expertise that may require the creation of new institutions. A separate inventory for mitigation-related and adaptation-related institutions/expertise should be conducted.
- Launch a scoping exercise for the scale of resources (funds, technical expertise, human resources) needed to make this a robust, successful endeavour to help transition countries to a low-carbon pathway while addressing their development and energy needs.

Durban should:

- Establish the reporting structure of CTCN to the TEC and the TEC directly to the COP.
- Define how the Technology mechanism will be linked to the Finance mechanism.
- Address the lack of focus on adaptation technologies, including through the Technology Mechanism focusing on developing functional linkages to appropriate adaptation bodies.
- Develop a clear picture of the scale of resources needed for the Technology Mechanism in order to make this a robust, successful endeavour to help transition countries to a low-carbon pathway while addressing their development and energy needs.
- Nail down the structure, functions, components and locations of the Climate Technology Centre (CTC) and the Network.
- Detail the workplan for the CTCN.
- Select a CTCN host with a record that demonstrates choices consistent with equitable distribution of resources, strongly promoting renewable energy sources and taking special care in safeguarding the environment and public health with respect to new technologies.
- Agree details of a MRV framework for the work of the Technology Mechanism.

Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) has been a difficult issue for parties to deal with. No resolution was reached at Cancun, which leaves IPR a festering sore in the side of technology cooperation. CAN believes that discussions on IPR are essential, but that any unfortunate lack of progress should not impede other progress on technology. In order to progress the issue of IPR CAN recommends that SBSTA commission a study by the Secretariat about the role of IPR in technology transfer, and organise a workshop in 2011

for the same. Additionally, parties should work towards creating a one year High Level Commission on Climate Change, Technology Cooperation and Intellectual Property Rights which should be mandated to examine if, when and how, specific intellectual property standards and tools may be a barrier or enabler of technology innovation and access. This commission should make recommendations for adoption at COP18.

## CAPACITY BUILDING

CAN believes that a new operational framework for truly integrated, properly designed, new and additional, cross-cutting and in-country capacity-building is urgently required from the LCA negotiations.

Cancun failed to agree on any early-stage institution-building for radically scaled-up capacity building. There is thus now an even more urgent need for Parties to concentrate throughout 2011 on co-operatively and collaboratively building a capacity building framework that can dock institutionally, and seamlessly, with emerging new architecture(s) for adaptation, finance and technology.

In order for developing countries to successfully get on to low-emission development pathways they are currently likely to be expected to design, build and implement their National Adaptation Plans of Action (NAPAs), Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action (NAMAs), Technology Needs Assessment (TNAs) and MRV frameworks (including inventories and fiduciary-standard reporting) more or less simultaneously.

Building in-country capacity for any one of these activities in isolation from others is not only deeply inefficient in both the technical and organisational sense, but also deeply cost inefficient.

### **Capacity building actions and needs**

Capacity-building is required to assist developing countries to:

- Successfully prepare NAMAs and/or LCAPs;
- Operate successfully within a direct access framework;
- Successfully implement NAPAs (and/or operate within any new adaptation framework);
- Maximise Technology Needs Assessment (TNAs) (and/or operate within any new Tech framework);
- Operate and maintain MRV;
- Prepare and/or implement REDD and/or REDD+;
- Build and prepare inventories;
- Fully operationalise an effective Designated National Authority (CDM).

CAN believes that capacity-building programmes should be based on a coordinated, cross-cutting, country-driven, bottom-up, needs-based assessment, operated on a partnership-of-equals basis, subsequently delivered nationally, regionally and sub-nationally, as appropriate.

Operationalising this position in the LCA negotiations means that, as a minimum, CAN supports:

- A dedicated space in the negotiations for capacity building as a stand alone subject (i.e not “mainstreamed” as a minor sub-topic within the adaptation, finance and technology negotiations);
- Dedicated and focused negotiations on the establishment on an institutional basis of a Capacity Building Coordinating Body (CBCB) by COP-17/CMP-7;
- The CBCB to be tasked with the design and build of a new programme for enhanced CB based on scaled-up, new and additional capacity building funding delivered either through a multilateral fund of its own, or as part of a multi-window new financial mechanism;
- Support for capacity building in developing countries to become a legally-binding obligation for Annex-2 Parties (with consequences for non-compliance).

CAN believes the CBCB’s main tasks should include:

- Operational design of the institutional, administrative and legal arrangements for a dedicated capacity building window within the post-2012 architecture;
- Close co-operation with transitional frameworks for future finance and technology institutions in the design of a capacity building window that is simultaneously cross-cutting and integrated, aimed at efficient delivery of resources, and capable of rapidly focusing and building in-country capacity to manage and deliver national adaptation, technology, REDD and mitigation resources and actions, aligned with developing countries’ own sustainable development objectives;
- Provision of clarity on the exact nature of a legally-binding commitment to capacity building as well as precise modalities for MRV of support and results.

## LEGAL

The Cancun Agreements did not make progress on the question of the legal form of the ultimate outcome of the negotiations – however, they formalised the discussions on legal form that were begun in the second half of 2010. And they provide opportunities to continue discussions in 2011 with a view to agreeing a legally binding framework. As an initial step we welcome the KP Chair’s identification of the urgency of action in order to avoid a gap between commitment periods.

The KP contains important architectural elements which are crucial to ensure that mitigation commitments are legally binding and have environmental integrity. There

is no time to negotiate a new approach without leaving a substantial, and environmentally devastating, gap in binding commitments from developed countries – magnifying the already substantial gigatonne gap. To prevent this gap Kyoto Protocol parties must commit to a second commitment period at Durban.

### ***The important architectural elements of the Kyoto Protocol include:***

- **Long-term viability:** the KP provides a framework that can be updated for each commitment period, while maintaining its essential elements.
- Top down approach, setting an overall objective, an aggregate goal, for developed countries, allowing appropriate consideration of the **science and of equity (including the CBDR principle)**. Comparability of effort between developed countries is established through their respective targets (Article 3.1).
- Legally binding, economy-wide, absolute emissions reduction **targets** for developed countries, expressed as a percentage below the 1990 base year (Annex B).
- System of 5-year commitment periods, with comparability of effort measured against a common 1990 base year (Articles 3.1 and 3.7).
- **Monitoring, review and international verification** system (Articles, 5,7,8 and associated decisions).
- **Compliance** mechanism, composed of two tracks – facilitative and enforcement (Article 18).
- Mandatory **review** of provisions of the Protocol for subsequent commitment periods (Article 3.9).
- Supplementarity of external action (ie CDM) to **domestic actions** (Article 6.1d).
- Required **reporting** on "demonstrable progress" for developed countries, establishing an important reporting requirement and stocktaking (Article 3.2).
- Basket approach to GHGs, and the ability to list new gases and classes of gases (Annex A).
- Use of Global Warming Potentials (GWP) to allow comparability of the impacts of different gases on global warming (Article 5.3).
- Common accounting (scope, methodologies GWPs etc), common reporting, common sources etc - the things that allow comparability.

In addition to securing the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, all Parties must agree on a **mandate to negotiate a legally binding instrument covering all Bali**

**Building Blocks under the LCA.** This instrument should be adopted no later than 2015 and enter into force by the end of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.

A legally binding instrument is the highest form of commitment; given the urgency of climate change, the greatest level of commitment is needed from all parties regarding their respective commitments and actions. By 2015 at the latest, the commitments and actions of all Parties, while respecting the principles of the Convention, should be inscribed in legally binding instrument[s]. In the interim, all Annex I Kyoto Protocol Parties' targets should be listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol, while their finance and other support commitments and the commitments or actions of all other Parties should be inscribed in respective COP decisions. A robust MRV/IAR/ICA regime for mitigation and support under the Convention, along with balanced progress on all Bali building blocks is needed to complement the system under the Kyoto Protocol, and is critical for this period.

## MEASUREMENT, REPORTING AND VERIFICATION (MRV)

- Progress on all MRV provisions is needed by Durban (COP17), with special emphasis on adopting biennial reporting guidelines for developed and developing countries and modalities for International Assessment and Review (IAR) and International Consultation and Analysis (ICA). Parties must also make significant progress in updating guidelines for National Communications and national inventory arrangements. New or updated reporting, review, IAR and ICA guidelines should be completed no later than COP18.
- Parties should agree on timelines for the biennial reports with the objective of informing the 2013-2015 review and the next iteration of national communications.
  - Consistent with the timeline agreed by the COP for the 6th National Communications by Annex I parties, to be submitted by 1 January 2014, Annex I parties should submit their first biennial reports in October 2012 -- so they can inform COP18 and the 2013-2015 review process.
  - A timetable for the next iteration of NA1 National Communications must be agreed as well. Subject to capacities and support, developing countries should submit their next national communications in 2014 if the last one was submitted in 2010. Biennial reports should be submitted in accordance with the differentiated time table.
  - Expedited completion at Durban of guidelines for the biennial review, with the understanding

that all reporting requirements for biennial reports should eventually become part of the guidelines for reporting through for National Communications, is critical for the successful completion of the 2013-2015 review.

The increased frequency and rigor of reporting by developing countries will only be possible with adequate financing and capacity building to support them in this endeavour. Streamlined and enhanced procedures for developing countries to access these resources could be agreed in Durban.

- The accounting and expert review rules embodied in Articles 5, 7, and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol should continue in the second commitment period of the Protocol and serve as the basis for a comparable agreement on developed country accounting guidelines and the review of reporting under the Convention.
- Developed country accounting guidelines should be standardised and comprehensive.
- A common reporting format for finance is critical to help ensure comparable, consistent, accurate, and transparent reporting. Other elements that Parties should consider are: distinction of types of financing, distinction of public and private finance, separation of climate change funding within bilateral and multilateral flows and in projects with multiple components; effectiveness of support provided, including indicators for effectiveness; and reporting on other support (capacity building and technology).
- Although standardized guidelines for MRV of developing country mitigation actions are critical, flexibility is needed in order to accommodate different types of policies and capacities of different countries. LDCs and SIDS should be allowed significantly greater flexibility.
- Developing country emissions data in the GHG inventory should be reported in a transparent, consistent, and comparable manner with complete and accurate information, following the latest IPCC guidelines, and be submitted with national communications and, subject to capacities and support, in biennial updates. Guidelines for developing country reporting in national communications and domestic MRV systems should be enhanced and developed, and must include provisions for support and technical assistance to build necessary capacity.
- Guidelines for domestic and international MRV of supported actions should take into account the safeguards and related monitoring processes developed under the REDD+ and GCF processes.
- ICA should facilitate a collaborative review of biennial reports by independent technical expert panels, as well as have a capacity building role available to Parties for improvement of inventories and NAMA implementation. The process should be open for public participation.
- IAR should strengthen the review process under the Convention, including of mitigation commitments and support obligations, and should empower reviews to flag early warning signs of non-compliance; the process must allow meaningful public participation throughout.
- Parties should provide guidance to the secretariat through a COP decision on the design and development of the registry, including on the process for the facilitation of actions with support, on how information should be submitted to the registry, and the relationship of the registry with the financial mechanism.
- Enhancement of MRV processes for both developed and developing countries should also include: provisions for public access and participation throughout the MRV process; guidance for reporting on Low Carbon Development Plans; requirements to report on fossil fuel subsidies; adaptation-related reporting, in particular with respect to local-level impacts; and information on how safeguards are being implemented.
- Guidance from SBSTA regarding the system of information sharing on the implementation of REDD+ safeguards must be developed in time for consideration and adoption at COP17 in Durban. Because information on how REDD+ safeguards are implemented is needed as soon as possible during the fast start finance period, Parties must communicate relevant information as soon as guidance is adopted.
- In conjunction with developing social and environmental safeguards under the Green Climate Fund, Parties must develop a system for monitoring and reporting on implementation of the safeguards.

For further detailed information on MRV of Annex 1 mitigation commitments and actions; MRV of developed country support obligations; MRV of developing country actions; other reporting considerations including low carbon development plans; monitoring of safeguards; and views on the schedule of work, please see CAN's submission on MRV to the UNFCCC: [http://climatenetwork.org/sites/default/files/CAN\\_MRV\\_Submission\\_Mar\\_2011.pdf](http://climatenetwork.org/sites/default/files/CAN_MRV_Submission_Mar_2011.pdf).

**The following links are provided for useful additional material.**

**Adaptation:**

Submission on National Adaptation Plans, August 2011: [climatenetwork.org/publication/can-submission-national-adaptation-plans-august-2011](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/can-submission-national-adaptation-plans-august-2011)  
Submission on work program on loss and damage, February 2011: [climatenetwork.org/publication/can-submission-work-program-loss-and-damage-february-2011](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/can-submission-work-program-loss-and-damage-february-2011)  
Submission on Adaptation Committee, February 2011: [climatenetwork.org/publication/can-submission-adaptation-committee-february-2011](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/can-submission-adaptation-committee-february-2011)  
Views on the effectiveness of the Nairobi Work Programme, July 2010: [unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/smsn/ngo/188.pdf](http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/smsn/ngo/188.pdf)  
Views regarding the terms of reference for the review of the Adaptation Fund, March 2010: [unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/smsn/ngo/181.pdf](http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/smsn/ngo/181.pdf)

**Mitigation – developed countries:**

Mitigation Talking Points, June 2011: [climatenetwork.org/publication/mitigation-talking-points-bonn-june-2011](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/mitigation-talking-points-bonn-june-2011)  
Developed country mitigation workshop presentation, June 2011: [climatenetwork.org/publication/mitigation-workshop-presentation-bonn-june-9-2011](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/mitigation-workshop-presentation-bonn-june-9-2011)  
Observations on current developed country mitigation pledges, April 2011: [climatenetwork.org/publication/observations-current-developed-country-mitigation-pledges-can-presentation-developed-cou](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/observations-current-developed-country-mitigation-pledges-can-presentation-developed-cou)  
Lessons to be taken from the workshop on developed country QELROs, April 2011: [climatenetwork.org/publication/lessons-be-taken-workshop-developed-country-qelros](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/lessons-be-taken-workshop-developed-country-qelros)

**Mitigation – developing countries:**

Presentation at the developing country mitigation workshop, June 2011: [climatenetwork.org/publication/can-i-presentation-developing-country-mitigation-workshop-bonn-2011](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/can-i-presentation-developing-country-mitigation-workshop-bonn-2011)  
Observations on NAMAs and pledges by developing countries: presentation to mitigation workshop, April 2011: [climatenetwork.org/publication/observations-%0bnationally-appropriate-mitigation-actions-and-pledges-developing-countries](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/observations-%0bnationally-appropriate-mitigation-actions-and-pledges-developing-countries)

**Effort sharing:**

CAN fair effort sharing discussion paper, June 2011: [climatenetwork.org/publication/can-fair-effort-sharing-discussion-paper](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/can-fair-effort-sharing-discussion-paper)

**LULUCF:**

Bioenergy briefing: [climatenetwork.org/publication/LULUCF-briefing-bioenergy](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/LULUCF-briefing-bioenergy)  
Brief for negotiators, December 2010: [climatenetwork.org/publication/LULUCF-briefing-negotiators-cop-16](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/LULUCF-briefing-negotiators-cop-16)  
LULUCF presentation, August 2010: [climatenetwork.org/publication/can-LULUCF-presentation-bonn-iii](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/can-LULUCF-presentation-bonn-iii)  
Closing the LULUCF loophole, June 2010: [climatenetwork.org/publication/closing-LULUCF-loophole-high-level-note-bonn-ii-2010](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/closing-LULUCF-loophole-high-level-note-bonn-ii-2010)

**REDD+:**

Letter to the chairs of the interim REDD+ partnership, April 2011: [climatenetwork.org/publication/can-international-letter-chairs-interim-redd-partnership](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/can-international-letter-chairs-interim-redd-partnership)

**Finance:**

Submission to the Transitional Committee for the Green Climate Fund, August 2011: [climatenetwork.org/publication/climate-action-network-international-submission-transitional-committee-green-climate-fund](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/climate-action-network-international-submission-transitional-committee-green-climate-fund)  
CAN letter to global sustainability panel, February 2011: [climatenetwork.org/publication/can-letter-global-sustainability-panel-february-2011](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/can-letter-global-sustainability-panel-february-2011)  
CAN position on scale and sources of finance, 2009: [climatenetwork.org/publication/can-finance-position](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/can-finance-position)  
CAN finance position paper principles for climate finance, September 2009: [climatenetwork.org/publication/can-principles-climate-finance-september-2009](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/can-principles-climate-finance-september-2009)

**Flexible mechanisms:**

Submission on CDM Validation Process, August 2011: [climatenetwork.org/publication/can-submission-cdm-validation-process-august-2011](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/can-submission-cdm-validation-process-august-2011)  
HFC-23 abatement projects, June 2011: [climatenetwork.org/publication/can-position-paper-hfc-23-abatement-projects](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/can-position-paper-hfc-23-abatement-projects)  
Views on the CDM appeals procedure, June 2011: [climatenetwork.org/publication/can-position-views-cdm-appeals-procedure](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/can-position-views-cdm-appeals-procedure)  
Views on carry over of Kyoto surplus of assigned amount units (AAUs), June 2011: [climatenetwork.org/publication/can-position-views-carry-over-kyoto-surplus-assigned-amount-units-aaus](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/can-position-views-carry-over-kyoto-surplus-assigned-amount-units-aaus)  
Views on enhancing the cost-effectiveness of, and promoting, mitigation actions, Feb 2011: [climatenetwork.org/publication/can-submission-views-enhancing-cost-effectiveness-and-promoting-mitigation-actions-feb-2](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/can-submission-views-enhancing-cost-effectiveness-and-promoting-mitigation-actions-feb-2)  
Views on new market-based mechanisms, Feb 2011: [climatenetwork.org/publication/can-submission-views-new-market-based-mechanisms-feb-2011](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/can-submission-views-new-market-based-mechanisms-feb-2011)  
CCS in the CDM, Feb 2011: [climatenetwork.org/publication/can-submission-ccs-cdm-feb-2011](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/can-submission-ccs-cdm-feb-2011)  
Development of standardised baselines submission, August 2010: [unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/smsn/ngo/194.pdf](http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/smsn/ngo/194.pdf)  
Development of standardised baselines, March 2010: [unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/smsn/ngo/180a.pdf](http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/smsn/ngo/180a.pdf)  
CDM appeals procedure, April 2010: [climatenetwork.org/publication/can-submission-cdm-appeals-procedure](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/can-submission-cdm-appeals-procedure)  
Possible improvements to emissions trading and the project based mechanisms, March 2009: [climatenetwork.org/publication/can-position-possible-improvements-emissions-trading-and-project-based-mechanisms](http://climatenetwork.org/publication/can-position-possible-improvements-emissions-trading-and-project-based-mechanisms)

**MRV:**

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## DURBAN EXPECTATIONS

Version 2, September 2011

Climate Action Network International (CAN) is the world's largest network of civil society organizations, with 700 member organisations in over 90 countries, working together to address the climate crisis.

For more on CAN please see [climatenetwork.org](http://climatenetwork.org)

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