



# **Pacific COP: Solidarity and Action to Realize the Promise of Paris**

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## Glossary

<b>AC</b>	Adaptation Committee
<b>AF</b>	Adaptation Fund
<b>AFOLU</b>	Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use
<b>COP</b>	Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC
<b>CTCN</b>	Climate Technology Centre and Network
<b>FD2018</b>	Facilitative Dialogue 2018
<b>GCF</b>	Green Climate Fund
<b>GST</b>	Global Stocktake
<b>ICAO</b>	International Civil Aviation Organization
<b>IMO</b>	International Maritime Organization
<b>IPCC</b>	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
<b>LDCF</b>	Least Developed Countries Fund
<b>LEG</b>	Least Developed Countries Expert Group
<b>LTS</b>	Long Term Strategies
<b>MOI</b>	Means of Implementation
<b>MPGCA</b>	Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action
<b>MPGs</b>	Modalities, Procedures, and Guidelines
<b>NAP</b>	National Adaptation Plan
<b>NDCs</b>	Nationally Determined Contributions
<b>PAWP</b>	Paris Agreement Work Programme
<b>PTA</b>	Periodic Technology Assessment
<b>REDD-LULUCF</b>	Land Use and Land Use Change and Forestry
<b>REDD+</b>	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
<b>SBI</b>	Subsidiary Body for Implementation
<b>SBSTA</b>	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
<b>SCF</b>	Standing Committee on Finance
<b>SDGs</b>	Sustainable Development Goals
<b>SED</b>	Structured Expert Dialogues
<b>SIDS</b>	Small Island Developing States
<b>SPR</b>	Second Periodical Review
<b>TEC</b>	Technology Executive Committee
<b>TF</b>	Technology Framework
<b>TM</b>	Technology Mechanism
<b>WIM</b>	Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage

# Executive Summary

Climate change impacts are unfolding before our eyes. 2017 looks set to join the previous three years as the hottest four years on record. Increasing extreme weather events are bringing untold damage, upheaval and loss of life, with subsequent costs spiraling into billions of dollars. The time for debate is over. Urgent international action is needed to limit warming to 1.5°C, and the window of opportunity to achieve this is closing fast. While the fossil fuel lobby and vested interests still delay urgent action, numerous governments, businesses and local communities are taking action with investments in renewable energy breaking new records on efficiency and financial competitiveness. The climate revolution is beginning, but it needs to be faster, quicker and more ambitious.

This year's United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP 23) is the first time a Pacific Island has held the COP Presidency. As communities at the frontlines of climate change, Fiji and the Pacific Islands are experiencing increasingly brutal climate impacts, but are also recognized international champions of climate action. The Fijian COP 23 Presidency provides a great opportunity to urgently ramp up global ambition, matched with domestic action by all nation states to implement the UNFCCC Paris Agreement adopted at COP 21 in 2015.

COP 23 marks two years since nation states of the world stood together at COP 21 to adopt the Paris Agreement. This was a promise of collective climate action that sparked real hope through its ambitious and collaborative climate objectives, particularly the commitment to pursue efforts to limit the global temperature rise to 1.5°C of pre-industrial levels. In the face of ever harder hitting impacts of climate change, the Paris Agreement provides an opportunity to deliver urgent emissions reductions, support for

adaptation and loss and damage, and finance and technological support to enable all to take action. This 'Paris Promise' given in December 2015 spurred political momentum which continued to build throughout 2016 and up to the current COP 23. Now we must make the delivery of the Paris Agreement a reality, countries must deliver upon their commitments to fulfill their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and go further, faster and deeper to deliver collaborative climate action by reducing emissions, supporting adaptation and tackling loss and damage.

In 2017, the Paris Agreement passed its first stress test when, in the face of the current US administration signaling its intention to undermine core values of the Agreement and withdraw from it unilaterally, countries and stakeholders pushed back with a unanimous, global response that the delivery of Paris is non-negotiable. The message is clear that any Party that weakens its ambition is not compatible with the principles of the Agreement. The Paris Promise was built with an environment of trust and collaboration between all countries. This first

Pacific COP, hosted in Bonn, Germany, should encourage all Parties to strengthen partnerships between actors and countries of differing levels of vulnerability and economic development.

At COP 23, Parties to the UNFCCC must realize the vision of Paris by making substantial progress on all agenda items under the Paris Agreement Work Programme. **The development of a zero draft of the implementation guidelines, in form of a text, will be a key milestone to measure success.**

**COP 23 must also lay the ground, in form of a roadmap, for a successful facilitative dialogue in 2018 to assess collective progress towards the goals of the Paris Agreement and indications of implications for revised NDCs.**

Several elements will be necessary for creating the right conditions for enabling both immediate and longer-term action:

#### **RAISING AMBITION TO AVOID INCREASING IMPACTS:**

- **The Ambition Mechanism** consists of three elements: a facilitative “Talanoa dialogue” in 2018 (FD2018), to assess collective progress against a 1.5°C pathway and to increase ambition thereafter, a second periodic review to translate science into policy, and a global stocktake to increase ambition every 5 years. Comprehensive progress must be made in the design of these elements at COP 23 to ensure they fulfil the potential for raising ambition that they embody.
- **Loss and Damage:** CAN believes that the first Pacific COP is a unique opportunity for the WIM to fully implement its mandate. This includes generating and providing finance for loss and damage, including from innovative sources, adopting a stronger five-year work-plan for the WIM than the one the ExCom approved in October, mandating the WIM and SCF to elaborate modalities for clear and transparent accounting of finance for loss and damage, and providing adequate finance to implement the mandate of the WIM.
- **Adaptation:** Adaptation must be part of the ambition mechanism. In order to make that happen, clear guidelines for adaptation communications need to be adopted by 2018 and the Global Goal on Adaptation needs to be operationalized. A more comprehensive review of the institutional arrangements on adaptation, including National Adaptation

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Plans (NAPs), must also be initiated to determine if they are fit-for-purpose.

- **Agriculture:** To enhance the implementation of the Paris Agreement and to identify and catalyze action to address gaps in knowledge, research, action and support, a joint SBSTA/SBI Work Programme on Agriculture and Food Security should be established by COP 23.

#### **SUPPORT FOR ACTION TO ENABLE INCREASED AMBITION:**

- **Finance:** COP 23 should result in progress towards ramping up climate finance to US\$100 billion a year by 2020 to be increased by 2025, progress in mobilizing private finance in developing countries, and improved transparency of finance mobilized and provided. The imbalance between mitigation and adaptation finance should also be recognized and lead to increased adaptation finance and confirmation that the Adaptation Fund will serve the Agreement.
- **Technology:** The Technology Framework must ensure support for climate technology towards the goal of successfully implementing NDCs. To this end, the periodic assessment must include metrics and indicators that will enable countries to make informed choices and predict the needs of developing countries for transformational technologies.

#### **TRANSPARENCY OF ACTION AND SUPPORT:**

- **Enhanced Transparency Framework:** A core set of robust and enforceable guidelines that build on and enhance the existing systems of transparency, towards a common framework, is critical in driving ambition. The modalities, procedures and guidelines (MPGs) should ensure that accurate and sufficient qualitative and quantitative information on adaptation, finance, policies and measures, and projections are submitted by Parties.

- **Transparency of Action:** MPGs must include transparency of mitigation and adaptation and should be broad enough to account for different NDC types towards providing up-to-date and relevant information to the global stocktake.
  - **Transparency of Support:** Key concepts of modalities for accounting climate finance must be identified at COP 23, including further guidance on how to report on non-financial support. Support should be provided to developing countries that will enable them to comply with common standards of the transparency framework.
  - **Flexibility in the Transparency Framework:** CAN encourages Parties to recognize flexibility in different ways for countries that need it while at the same time encourages Parties to make MPGs that could be implemented by all Parties that will ensure maximum levels of detail, accuracy, and comparability.
- **Accounting for Agriculture Forestry and other Land Use (AFOLU):** CAN believes that it is essential that all Parties account for emissions and removals from AFOLU in all land use sectors in a comparable and transparent way using the methodologies provided in the 2006 IPCC Guidelines and NDC-consistent base years measured using agreed methodologies.
  - **Accounting for International Transfers:** CAN believes that any transfer of international units should help enhance ambition of NDCs. This can be done by ensuring that the guidelines for Article 6 avoid double counting and are in line with the goals of transparency, enhanced ambition, environmental integrity, human rights, and sustainable development.
  - **Accounting for International Shipping and Aviation:** Parties should urgently take action through national, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures to reduce transport emissions and ensure that the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) give adequate account of measures and efforts in the FD2018. Parties should also include information on bunker fuel burn and relevant transport work in their NDCs and ensure that the use of any mitigation outcomes guarantees environmental integrity and is not double counted.

### **ROBUSTNESS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT NOW AND OVER TIME:**

- **Long-Term Strategies:** To encourage increased ambition and early adoption of pathways compatible with 1.5°C and achieving a balance between emissions and removals by sinks in the second half of the century, all countries should come forward with long-term strategies as soon as possible, following a fully participatory planning process with G20 countries leading the way and submitting well before 2020. Strategies should include countries' planned peak years, the year they expect to achieve a balance of sources and sinks, and details of conditions or support needed.
- **Action Initiatives for Increased Short-Term Ambition:** Limiting global warming to 1.5°C will require urgent, ramping up of pre-2020 action on mitigation, adaptation, and means of implementation. Criteria for inclusion of activities in the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action (MPGCA) should be redefined to ensure all initiatives are consistent with common guiding principles, including on human rights, gender equality, just transition and environmental integrity.
- **Civil Society Participation:** Fijian "talanoa" spirit should serve the Parties with a longer-term framework for fruitful and balanced deliberations. The principle of inclusive and transparent negotiations must remain the default rule at COP 23, and all negotiations should take place with the presence of observers and allowing for interventions in a manner that allows to channel the views and expertise of civil society into the negotiations.
- **Gender Action Plan and Indigenous People's Platform:** This year the Gender Action Plan should be adopted and the Local Communities and Indigenous People's Platform should be made operational to ensure that those that may be victims of climate change are being empowered.

# 1

# Ambition Raising to Avoid Increasing Impacts

## 1.1

### Ambition Mechanism

A key feature of the Paris Agreement is its “Ambition Mechanism,” a set of provisions which enable it to increase ambition over time. Current Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) are fundamentally inadequate to remain on a global warming pathway of well below 2°C or 1.5°C, and they do not reflect the potential for climate action that countries already possess, nor their capabilities. **The next few years will be crucial to closing this mitigation gap, requiring a sharp increase in mitigation ambition, climate finance flows, technology cooperation, and capacity building.** Climate finance, in particular, is still far from being able to facilitate the transformational change outlined in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement. Both adaptation action and loss and damage support urgently need to be scaled up to address the risks facing people, livelihoods and ecosystems and to secure survival, recognizing that severe impacts will be felt even at 2°C.

The Paris Agreement’s Ambition Mechanism facilitates the enhancement of NDCs through three key processes, each of which have a role to play in the overall process of increasing ambition:

1. The Facilitative Talanoa Dialogue 2018;
2. The Second Periodical Review;
3. The Global Stocktake.

#### Laying the ground for a successful Facilitative Talanoa Dialogue 2018

The facilitative dialogue 2018 (FD2018), scheduled to take place two years before the submission of updated or new NDCs are due, is a crucial moment to stimulate enhanced ambition to ensure the 1.5°C pathway remains open. **COP 23 must lay the groundwork to enable successful outcomes from the FD2018**, which is a vital opportunity to provide the information, conditions and political signals necessary to empower Parties to enhance the ambition of their revised NDCs

by 2020, while also providing clear direction on how critical pre-2020 action and support could be enhanced in the spirit of collaboration and trust – in Talanoa. Through constructive discussions at COP 23, the **FD2018 should be designed to enable it to identify opportunities for climate action that can also deliver on a broad set of sustainable development objectives.** Enhanced and new NDC targets should be consistent with long-term strategies and should inspire collaborative action between Parties.

#### The scope of the Facilitative Dialogue 2018

Given that many NDCs contain conditional components, **the facilitative dialogue will need to emphasize – in parallel to mitigation efforts - the means of implementation (MOI) necessary to unlock the additional ambition implied by conditional components of NDCs**, including further opportunities for international cooperation. The National Adaptation Plan (NAP) review in 2018 will provide important guidance on enhancing the adaptation components of the NDCs, including support provided and received. However, it must be stressed that **CAN will not be able to conclude that the FD2018 was successful if it does not result in increased mitigation targets.**

#### The design of the Facilitative Dialogue 2018

As the last meeting of the COP before the FD2018, a key outcome from COP 23 should be concrete guidance on the design and components of the FD2018. In CAN’s view, **the facilitative dialogue should consist of a series of technical events throughout 2018, that culminate in a high-level, political synthesis event at COP 24**, which should:

- Be **informed by synthesis reports from the technical phase**, which may include regional workshops which could, where applicable, identify the specific support needs for NDC implementation, preparation of future NDCs, and enhancement of ambition beyond the current NDCs;
- **Highlight successes from the regional level** that have the potential to be replicated internationally, and **showcase technological innovation in key sectors**;

## HOW CAN THE RESULTS OF THE IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON 1.5°C BE BROUGHT INTO FD2018?

The 46th Session of the IPCC Plenary in Montreal (September 2017) decided to adopt the Special Report on 1.5°C (SR1.5) at IPCC 48 in South Korea in early October 2018. This is later than previously planned and restricts opportunities for the UNFCCC to analyze the results of IPCC SR1.5 in a process similar to the successful Structured Expert Dialogue (SED) in the First Periodic Review.

However, the results of the SR1.5 are central to a well-informed FD2018. For bringing the insights of SR1.5 into the FD2018, CAN believes it would be best to hold an intersessional meeting organized by the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) of the UNFCCC after IPCC 48 and before COP 24. This meeting would discuss the results of SR1.5 in a format similar to the SED over a period of 1-2 days and result in several clear messages for the FD2018. However, arranging such a meeting prior to COP 24 might be difficult given the new date of IPCC 48 in October 2018. It may instead be more realistic for SBSTA to organize a one-day sessional workshop at (or immediately prior to) COP 24 with characteristics comparable to those of the SED. Discussions at COP 23 should focus on finding a workable solution for how to condense the results of SR1.5 in a way suitable for the FD2018.

- **Facilitate learning by sharing**, particularly from front-runners, and **focus on barriers to implementation and solutions for addressing them**;
- **Emphasize the question of how greater international cooperation between and support by Parties, including the provision of finance, capacity building and technology transfer, can help overcome barriers and capture opportunities to unlock this additional mitigation ambition**, recognizing that many NDCs contain conditional components that reflect much greater collective ambition than unconditional NDCs alone;
- **Be informed by the IPCC's Special Report on 1.5°C and other best available science as well as equity considerations**. A dedicated session on the IPCC report should be held at the pre-COP or the beginning of COP 24 to brief delegates on the content of the Special Report and in order for the COP, or the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), to formally take note of it.

Against the scientific backdrop of urgency, the **ultimate outcome of the FD2018 should be that Parties develop the political will to close ambition gaps, particularly on mitigation and finance flows**.

The FD2018's design must ensure that relevant inputs from non-Party stakeholders can be adequately considered. **Active observer/ stakeholder participation should be guaranteed during the FD2018's examination of barriers to, and opportunities for, greater ambition**. This could include participation in planned events and activities such as submissions, a dedicated series of side-events, and workshop slots, as well as technical and regional events. The Facilitative Dialogue should also aim to identify best practices based on Parties' experiences in terms of consulting with their domestic civil society and sub-national entities, during the development of their initial NDCs and long-term strategies.

### Second Periodic Review

The Second Periodic Review (SPR) is also an important part of the overall ambition mechanism and the design of **the global stocktake must ensure that it can take the results of the SPR into account**, while not duplicating the important work of the SPR and its Structured Expert Dialogues (SED), which are **essential to bring the best available science into the formal UNFCCC process**. Furthermore, as the mandate of the SPR is the adequacy of the Convention itself, it can also consider important issues that would be out of scope of the global stocktake which is only concerned with the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

### The Global Stocktake

Through its five-yearly global stocktake, the Paris Agreement provides Parties with the opportunity to take stock of their collective efforts towards achieving the Agreement's long-term goals on mitigation, adaptation, and MOI. The global stocktake allows Parties to identify and assess options for revising and increasing the ambition of NDCs, in order to strengthen individual Parties' contributions. Given that current ambition is inadequate, **the global stocktake must be designed to enable overall ambition within the agreement to increase rapidly over time**, taking into account collective progress and implementation gaps towards the common objectives agreed within the Paris Agreement. Without a global stocktake that effectively raises ambition, the Paris Agreement will inevitably fail to deliver on its long term goals. At COP 23, **negotiations under APA Agenda Item 6 must make significant progress in the design of the global stocktake** in order to finalize the guidelines by COP 24.

**Civil society participation should also be considered in crafting the guidelines for the**

**global stocktake.** Civil society engagement has been proven to result in better policy-making, effective and sustainable implementation as well as robust accountability.

In CAN's view, there are **four major aims which should guide the design of the global stocktake<sup>2</sup>:**

1. To produce **collective assessments that help individual Parties identify next steps;**
2. To **identify implementation gaps** at global, regional and national levels;
3. To **create space for Parties to exchange views** about future collaboration and cooperative action;
4. To **send a strong signal to governments to increase ambition.**

In addition, there are some **key overarching issues** that Parties need to consider carefully:

- **Scope:** Whether Parties agree on a narrow or broad interpretation of the scope of the global stocktake will have implications for various aspects of its design, such as phases, workstreams, and inputs. These implications must be carefully considered when deciding on the scope of the global stocktake. CAN believes that while the stocktake should not be overly burdensome to Parties or to the UNFCCC system, it **must be broader than just a consideration of the aggregate of actions** communicated by Parties (through NDCs and other national reports) and **should include progress by all relevant stakeholders and opportunities outside of the UNFCCC to ensure an adequate picture of the overall progress towards achieving the long-term goals of the Agreement.**
- **Phases and workstreams:** Phases are necessary so that different types of analysis or discussion can take place over a period of time. CAN believes that **having multiple phases is important and that there should, at a minimum, be a distinct technical or preparatory phase.** In the meantime, workstreams could be organized around the long-term goals or thematic pillars identified in Article 14, additional workstreams might need to be considered.

Issues that need to be addressed under specific themes:

- **Financial flows and MOI:** CAN believes both **financial flows and MOI must be considered within the GST.** However, CAN also would like to stress that having a standalone workstream on MOI and financial flows assessment does not mean the topic cannot be discussed in other workstreams. On the contrary, **the issue of MOI and financial flows needs to be addressed in the context of mitigation and adaptation.**
- **Equity:** It is CAN's understanding that "equity" refers to equity between countries, and differentiation. As an overarching consideration, **equity considerations must guide the work in all global stocktake workstreams.** CAN suggests that a review of Parties' NDCs in terms of their references to equity, would enable a common Equity Reference Framework to emerge from Parties' own submissions, which they could then apply in their national determination processes. Overall, considering equity in the global stocktake must result in outcomes that allow Parties, civil society and other stakeholders to assess whether contributions are of comparable effort to other Parties, using equity criteria emerging from Parties' NDC submissions. The purpose is to **enable the global stocktake to be a robust ambition ratchet** where Parties can determine whether they are doing enough relative to their peers, based on equity criteria, across mitigation, adaptation and provision of means of implementation and support.
- **Loss and damage:** In the absence of a specific mandate, **loss and damage could be considered in the global stocktake** based on a number of existing generic provisions of the Paris Agreement such as Article 14 which states that the purpose of the global stocktake is to "take stock of implementation" of the Agreement.

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<sup>1</sup> See also: CAN Submission on the Design of the Global Stocktake (2017): <http://www.climatenetwork.org/publication/can-submission-design-modalities-global-stocktake-september-2017>

## 1.2

# Loss and Damage

The increasing number of record-breaking climate-related events that the world has recently experienced has made clear that we are now living a “new normal.” This post-400 ppm world is bringing with it havoc and destruction with regular super storms, more intense droughts, rising sea levels and melting glaciers. COP 23, which may be referred to as the ‘Pacific COP,’ is the first ever COP to be hosted by a small island developing country. We believe that this is a unique opportunity to put a spotlight the importance of the issue of loss and damage. COP 23 must demonstrate solidarity with those that are the most vulnerable yet have done the least to cause climate change, and ensure that the international community provides the finance needed to deal with loss and damage from climate change.

The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change (WIM) was established in November 2013 and yet in the three and a half years since its establishment, very little progress has been made in generating and providing finance for loss and damage. This must be addressed urgently. COP 23 must **make the WIM “fully operational” by giving it the mandate and the necessary resources to fulfil its mandate to ensure it generates adequate finance** to support those on the frontline of climate impacts.

Some have suggested that a target of generating at least US\$50 billion per year by 2022 and at least US\$200-300 billion per year by 2030, above that promised for adaptation, is an appropriate level of finance for loss and damage. COP 23 should agree to **establish a Fiji International Initiative for Loss and Damage Finance to generate and provide finance for loss and damage from innovative sources**, possibly including carbon levies and taxes, at a level adequate to aid those that suffer most from climate change loss and damages.

The **five-year workplan of the WIM** adopted by the Executive Committee (ExCom) in October 2017 is the result of intense discussions and work by ExCom members and fleshes out some

of the work areas mandated by COP22. However, CAN is of the view that there is a lack of attention to issues related to the enhancement of action and support and increase in available finance for loss and damage. Parties should ensure at COP 23 that these issues are further developed towards more ambitious implementation. Tasks included in the workplan, such as the development of a technical paper on finance, are overly focused on assessing the state of play rather than on seeking to develop a clear way forward to ensure that new and additional resources are generated.

CAN believes that the following should be undertaken to ensure that the workplan is fully operational and fulfilling the purpose for which it was established:

- Instigate a **two-year process to develop a range of instruments which can generate additional finance** at the scale of billions of US\$ adequate to address loss and damage, including through innovative sources, in conjunction with the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) and with input from the Green Climate Fund (GCF), Adaptation Fund (AF), Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and other bodies;
- Develop a **better understanding of the scale of finance required** to flow through a new mechanism that will address financing for loss and damage;
- Undertake work towards coming up with **pro-poor principles for climate insurance**, recognizing its important role in climate risk management **while at the same time expanding focus beyond insurance towards more practical options for communities** in the face of climate change impacts, whether extreme weather or slow onset events, including: increasing the capacity of communities to develop risk management strategies; risk reduction; contingency funds; effective risk sharing mechanisms; community cooperatives; social protection schemes; diversified livelihood strategies; transformational approaches; and recovery and rehabilitation, particularly addressing irreversible and permanent loss and damage;
- Develop an **action plan to promote gender equality** across the work of the WIM;
- Develop **fair solutions to avert, minimize and address climate-induced displacement**

and migration and their underlying causes, in coordination with other global migration regime processes;

- Provide **greater impetus to the WIM ExCom's Task Force on Displacement** and encourage the new UN Global Compact on Refugees and UN Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (both due to be finalized in 2018) and the existing Platform for Disaster Displacement (PDD) to **increase protection and solutions for those at risk of displacement** linked to climate change.

CAN recognizes that the new workplan includes **collaboration with the SCF** however, it is mostly limited to assessing existing financial flows. **It should include the development of modalities for a clear and transparent accounting of loss and damage finance** separate and distinct from adaptation finance and **the prioritization of enhancing finance through existing and innovative instruments** that can generate new resources.

In order to achieve such goals and enable the WIM to complete its work, **loss and damage must be addressed in the negotiations for the implementation guidelines of the Paris Agreement, in particular in the agenda item on the global stocktake, as well as in the SBI/SBSTA intersessions.** The WIM must also be provided with more resources that will enable it to fulfill its mandate. A voluntary body meeting 2-3 times a year, with modest support from the UNFCCC Secretariat and whose budget is entirely within the 'supplementary' UNFCCC budget is not up to the challenge that loss and damage poses. **Developed countries must step up with more finance for the WIM budget** and place it at the same level as the other elements of the Paris Climate Agreement.

## 1.3

# Adaptation

The Paris Agreement was celebrated not only for its ambitious mitigation goals but also for the establishment of a Global Goal on Adaptation. For the first time, adaptation was elevated to a level at par with mitigation due to the simple fact that there is no other choice since impacts of climate change are already being felt and will continue to be felt at an increasingly alarming rate. This problem will continue to increase as long as Parties delay on the necessary ambition required to slow it down.

If we are to realize the promise of Paris, much work is needed to **operationalize the Global Goal on Adaptation**. Parties must build upon the technical work of the Adaptation Committee (AC) and other bodies and provide clear and concrete recommendations by COP 25 on this matter. **Adaptation must inform the global stocktake and play into the ambition mechanism** for continuous progress. For this to happen, **clear guidelines for the adaptation communications** must be adopted not later than 2018 that will support an integrated and effective approach to communicating adaptation efforts.

The Global Goal on Adaptation also includes a mandate to ensure balance in finance for adaptation and mitigation. Parties should **urge the GCF to focus its attention on people that are most vulnerable to climate change, and strengthen its gender strategy and action plan.** Of course, none of this will have any real impact unless a **strong and adequate replenishment of the GCF is realized in 2018.** Parties must show that they are willing to realize the promise of providing US\$100 billion per year by 2020, and increase this amount every five years thereafter.

Lastly, while CAN recognizes the recommendations by the joint AC and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) Expert Group (LEG) work on the review of the institutional arrangements on adaptation, we believe that the mandate of the review was too narrow from its outset. This did not allow it **to address the core question of whether overall the adaptation institutional arrangements are fit-for-purpose** in terms of equipping Parties, in particular vulnerable developing countries, with the necessary capacities and support they need to effectively manage the dangerous threats of climate change. **A more comprehensive review** guided by this question is needed.

## 1.4

# Agriculture

Agriculture is the foundation of food security for most of the world and a source of livelihood and income for over three billion people. It is key to nutrition and health, and is the basis of identity for many around the world. Agriculture is both vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and a contributor to the problem. The issue of agriculture therefore requires special consideration in climate discussions, and Parties should approach actions holistically in line with the cross-cutting principles of the Paris Agreement.<sup>2</sup> CAN therefore calls on COP 23 to **establish a new joint SBSTA/SBI Work Programme on Agriculture and Food Security, to further the subsidiary body work on agriculture.**

This Work Programme should inform the priorities of, and provide guidance to, relevant Convention and Paris Agreement bodies and processes, and to financial mechanisms, and should include the guidance for NDCs and the Transparency Framework. Its **purpose should be to enhance implementation of the Paris Agreement, and to identify and catalyze action to address gaps in knowledge, research, action and support.**

The Work Programme on Agriculture and Food Security should:

- **Examine the impacts of climate change on agriculture** (including food security as well as other aspects such as livelihoods, rights and the impacts on different producer/provider groups, populations and genders);

- Examine and **enhance implementation of strategies** (such as adaptation) to safeguard food security, rights and the multiple functions associated with agriculture in the face of climate change;
- **Provide guidance for the development of, and reporting on, NDCs**, to ensure that cross-cutting principles and obligations contained in the Paris Agreement preamble (such as food security, human rights, including the rights of Indigenous Peoples, and ecosystem integrity) are safeguarded whenever action is taken in the land sector;
- **Tackle permanent reduction of non-CO2 emissions in agriculture** (ie. methane and nitrous oxide – CH<sub>4</sub> & N<sub>2</sub>O);
- Consider promising strategies such as agroecology, reduction of food loss and waste, and the promotion of sustainable consumption.

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<sup>2</sup> The cross-cutting principles of the Paris Agreement preamble state that Parties should safeguard food security, human rights including the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities, gender equality and women’s empowerment, and note the importance of ecosystem integrity and public participation.

# 2

## Support for Action to Enable Increased Ambition

### 2.1

#### Finance

Climate finance has a key role to play in enhancing trust and confidence between Parties, and in providing developing countries with the necessary support to adapt to the impacts of climate change and develop low-carbon and resilient economies. It is **essential that climate finance remains high on the political agenda in the run up to COP 24** in order to help accelerate the implementation of the Paris agreement by 2020.

At COP 23, discussions on climate finance need to reflect key principles and pave the way for achieving clear progress by 2018. This should include: **progress towards fulfilling developed countries' promise to ramp up climate finance to US\$100 billion a year by 2020, while also urgently increasing assistance for adaptation; progress in mobilizing private finance in developing countries** in a way that responds to their specific needs; and **improved transparency of finance** mobilized and finance provided.

CAN also encourages Parties to **work constructively on shifting all financial flows, public and private, towards low-carbon, climate resilient development**, consistent with the temperature objectives of the Paris Agreement, as stated in Article 2.1c.

In the context of growing impacts of climate change, COP 23 will also be an important moment for Parties to **develop sources and tools to mobilize loss and damage finance**. Finally, COP 23 should reflect the **importance of enhancing communications** between donor countries, recipient countries, the private sector and civil society in order to translate financial needs into climate action and country ownership.

In order to be on track to meet these goals, COP 23 must make significant progress in the following areas:

- **Identifying concrete options for donor countries to demonstrate, in 2018, progress**

**in meeting the \$100 billion goal**, including significant increases in the provision of finance for adaptation. This should happen in consultation with donors together with the Fijian and Moroccan Presidency during the COP 23 informal consultations related to the facilitative dialogue 2018, taking into consideration options in the context of the third biennial assessment and the high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance taking place in 2018;

- Recognizing, within decisions on long-term finance, the imbalance between mitigation and adaptation, as well as the need for increased transparency in the allocation of climate finance, and **committing developed countries to significantly increase adaptation finance from public sources;**
- **Advancing discussions on action required to ensure the Adaptation Fund (AF) will serve the Paris Agreement.** COP 23 should clearly identify the specific issues to be resolved, and outline options for each of the issues, with a view to decide on these options at COP 24. In addition, developed countries, including those who have not yet made any (or only comparably small) contributions, should pledge additional resources to the AF in the order of at least US\$100 million;
- Making progress in deliberations on the **post-2025 finance target** which need to be completed no later than 2024. **COP 23 should recognize that setting the target will require adequate negotiating time through a due process, and decide to launch such a process at COP 25.** In CAN's view, the post-2025 finance target could actually be a target matrix, with sub-targets for specific purposes (e.g. a sub-target to mobilize private investment, a sub-target to assist developing countries in adaptation to climate change, etc.) and include qualitative and quantitative elements;
- Proposing concrete actions related to long-term finance-related needs, such as enhancing granularity of climate finance information in future NDCs as a regular exercise.

## 2.2

# Technology

Technology will be critical to successfully implementing NDCs. The Technology Framework, being developed under SBSTA, must promote, facilitate and enable access to existing and new technologies, as well as the development of new technologies. Currently, access to technologies and their benefits are not equitably shared. As such, **SBSTA must ensure that the needs, concerns and innovative capacities of disadvantaged and vulnerable communities are fully integrated into the design of the Technology Framework.** Specifically, the Technology Framework should include goals and targets to ensure support for climate technology in line with the long-term goal of the Paris Agreement of pursuing efforts to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5°C.

The **goals and targets of the Technology Framework** must:

- **Set parameters for the assessment of benefits and potential risk impacts** of technologies to enable countries to make informed technology deployment decisions;
- **Guide the development of enabling environments to implement the NDCs**, including sufficient, sustained capacity-building of institutions, companies, and communities;
- **Include early demonstration and deployment targets for climate technologies** to support implementation at scale;
- **Guide the Periodic Assessment to acquire and share necessary** evidence to assess projects' success on the ground, share data and lessons learned, and support the Paris Agreement transparency framework requirements;
- **Address pricing, maintenance and transaction cost barriers to access.**

The Technology Framework should, in particular, guide the Periodic Technology Assessment of the Technology Mechanism to collect appropriate data. This **Periodic Assessment must include metrics and indicators developed from the mandate of the Technology Mechanism.** The Technology Framework should establish links between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism to ensure sufficient project funding.

In order to **strengthen NDC implementation in relation to technology**, CAN believes:

- The Technology Framework should ensure use of **a technology assessment tool that enables countries to make informed decisions on potential risks and benefits of technologies.** That tool must be underpinned by a Technology Framework that is supported by sufficient and sustained capacity-building from the CTCN to assist institutions, companies, and communities and is informed by Horizon Scanning that can help to guide investment for technology pathways and future tech forecasting;
- The role of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) in Horizon Scanning should be to **use the data of the Periodic Assessment to help predict the needs of developing countries for transformational technologies**, including comprehensive analysis of those technologies to inform country level assessments;
- The **Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) must integrate Technology Assessment into its Technical Assistance** to developing countries.

*“Specifically, the Technology Framework should include goals and targets to ensure support for climate technology in line with the long-term goal of the Paris Agreement of pursuing efforts to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius.”*

# 3

## Transparency of Action and Support

### 3.1

#### Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines for the Framework

Mutual trust and accountability are imperative for guiding the design and implementation of the enhanced transparency framework. The modalities, procedures and guidelines for this framework need to be completed by no later than 2018. The framework should adhere to the principles of the Paris Agreement including ensuring the highest levels of environmental integrity and avoiding double counting.

*“The final transparency framework as well as the process of developing it must both be transparent and inclusive. CAN calls on Parties to allow greater input from observer organisation in the process of developing Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines (MPGs) for the transparency framework.”*

**A core set of robust and enforceable guidelines, that build on and enhance the existing systems of transparency, will be critical** in driving forward the ambition necessary to ensure the success of the Paris Agreement. The guidelines must ensure that **adequate relevant information for the global stocktake and the compliance mechanism is provided by Parties and should be sustainable** enough to cope with the review of all Parties' submissions every five years, taking into account financial and human resource implications.

A robust transparency framework will provide:

- Confidence to the public that emissions are being reduced and that their political leaders are following through on their promises;

- Confidence to investors in the clean energy and low-carbon economies of the future;
- Confidence to Parties that they can raise their ambition, since others are taking promised action;
- Confidence in the environmental integrity and credibility of global efforts.

The modalities, procedures, and guidelines (MPGs) that govern the enhanced transparency framework under Article 13 should ensure:

- That **accurate and sufficient information is provided** by Parties in a methodological manner concerning efforts on **adaptation, finance, quantification of impacts of policies and measures, and projections** to enable a consistent assessment of the quality of data, comprehensive understanding of progress, and to enhance trust between Parties and drive further implementation;
- The careful consideration of the interconnected nature of the provisions of the PA must to ensure that they are **workable, coherent, efficient, and mutually reinforcing**;
- That **qualitative as well as quantitative information** that can add additional confidence and assist in meeting the enhanced transparency framework's goal of "tracking progress" in the NDCs is provided by Parties.

Information about policies, laws, regulations, standards and other enforceable provisions that are planned or implemented, for example, constitutes a leading indicator rather than a trailing indicator, and can thus complement quantitative information from inventories, particularly for those Parties that may be unable to produce comprehensive emissions projections. Clear and accurate information of this type could not only help build confidence in NDC achievement, but could also identify areas where international cooperation or capacity building might be most helpful.

The final transparency framework as well as the process of developing it must both be transparent

and inclusive. CAN calls on Parties to **allow greater input from observer organisation in the process of developing Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines (MPGs) for the transparency framework**, amongst others through allowing submissions. Once established, CAN believes the framework should follow experience from other successful multilateral processes such as Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council, by **enabling observer organisations with expertise to intervene in the process of multilateral assessments**.

### Transparency of Action

It will be particularly important to **specify what types of reports under the enhanced transparency framework could serve as input into to the global stocktake** and how the transparency framework relates to REDD+, mitigation accounting for NDCs, cooperative approaches and the mechanism under Article 6, the implementation committee and loss and damage. It will also be **important to get the timing right for both the reporting and review elements** of the transparency framework which will be crucial to ensuring the information that contributes to the global stocktake is as up-to-date and relevant as possible.

Transparency of information on mitigation can be enhanced by clear accounting rules. Due to the diversity of NDC types, a single system for tracking progress on the implementation of NDCs, and aggregating and comparing them, will be challenging to design. **CAN supports the provision of further guidance for the accounting of different NDC types and accompanying information** as soon as possible, to facilitate the development of MPGs for the transparency framework.

Given that the purpose of transparency of action includes adaptation, the **MPGs must include transparency of adaptation** as well. It will be useful to further define what transparency for adaptation actions entails, especially when not supported by international finance. Which actions should be reported? How should they be measured? CAN encourages Parties to develop further guidance for monitoring and evaluating adaptation actions (including guidelines for National Adaptation Plans) to deepen and improve the information reported on adaptation.

### Transparency of Support

To ensure enhanced transparency of information on support, **key concepts of modalities for the accounting of climate finance negotiated under**

**SBSTA must be identified**, to be included in a draft text by the end of COP 23. It should ensure reporting at project-by-project level, reporting of grant-equivalent for non-grant instruments, reporting of actual climate-specific (proportion of) funds and mutual agreement between countries about projects/funds to be included in future reports.<sup>3</sup>

The MPGs must include accounting modalities for financial support received and the use, impacts, and estimated results of it. Parties should also develop **further guidance on how to report on non-financial support** needed and received to be able to fully capture all contributions and remaining gaps.

Support provided to developing countries should also **consider allocations that enable them to comply with the common standards** of the transparency framework. In particular, donors should provide significant support to LDCs and SIDS for them to increase the frequency and quality of their reporting on support needed and received.

### Flexibility in the Transparency Framework

It is clear that a fair and comprehensive transparency framework should respect the national circumstances and the sovereignty of each country. CAN encourages Parties to **recognize flexibility in different ways for countries who need it, while at the same time encouraging Parties to make modalities and procedures that could be implemented by all Parties in order to ensure maximum levels of clarity, accuracy, and comparability**. Flexibility could be reflected in the transparency framework in different ways such as in the scope of reporting and review, level of detail and accuracy of information based on data availability, and type of review, among others.

The capacity building mechanism must provide sustainable models and align with the needs of developing countries under the Transparency Framework to help them achieve maximum clarity and accuracy in submissions and to continually improve as implementation progresses.

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<sup>3</sup> These principles are already reflected, to some degree, in the informal note by the co-chairs of the relevant contact group at SBSTA46 and should be included in any subsequent working document on modalities for accounting.

## 3.2

# REDD-LULUCF

About one quarter of all human induced emissions come from AFOLU, mainly from land-use change, fertilizer use, livestock and peatland degradation. Land-based vegetation is also one of the two natural systems that remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, together with the oceans. The potential for both reducing emissions and increasing removals in the AFOLU sector is thus very large, although it must be ensured that AFOLU mitigation does not compromise adaptation, food security or other social and environmental safeguards.

Reducing emissions (for example, by reducing deforestation) and enhancing removals (for example, by reforestation) are important components of many countries' NDCs. Land use is mentioned in 77% of all countries mitigation contributions in their NDCs, second only to the energy sector, and 95% of LDCs include AFOLU in their NDCs.

Decision 1/CP.21 paragraph 31 requests the APA to elaborate guidance on accounting for Parties' NDCs for consideration and adoption by the first meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement. The decision refers to both emissions and removals, implicitly including AFOLU where it is included in NDCs.

It is vital that **all countries account for all emissions and removals from AFOLU in all land use sectors – including subsectors - in a comparable and transparent way**, and at the very least all countries which intend to include emission reductions or increased removals from the sector as part of their NDCs. However, special consideration should be given for countries with the least capacity, notably, LDCs and Small Island Developing States (SIDS).

Specifically:

- **Accounting under the Paris Agreement should follow a land-based system of reporting** as employed by the Convention. Parties should **use the methodologies provided in the 2006 IPCC Guidelines**, which employ a land-based approach, or methodologies consistent with them;

- Parties with **economy-wide NDCs** with absolute emission reduction targets should comprehensively **report on and account for their emissions and removals from all sectors, including land use**. Parties should account for 'what the atmosphere sees' in terms of emissions and removals, when they occur, since all emissions contribute to climate change and removals help to mitigate it;
- Parties with **NDCs that are not economy-wide** with absolute targets should **account comprehensively and completely for those elements which are included in their NDCs**, and should explain why other emissions and removals are excluded, in line with 1/CP.21 paragraph 31d, and commit to overcome the deficit through capacity building on comprehensive AFOLU accounting;
- The **base year or period used for reporting and accounting for AFOLU should be consistent with a Party's overall NDC** to facilitate comparability, i.e., baseline periods should be the same for the AFOLU sector as for other sectors, and be historical and not projected ones. Furthermore, the **AFOLU base year/period should be measured using agreed methodologies** to estimate the emissions, removals, and stocks of the sector. It may be advisable to use a multi-year base period rather than a base year, as this may be more reliable for forestry and other land types because annual natural fluctuations of GHG emissions and uptake are levelled out over this average.

### 3.3

## Paris Agreement Article 6 Mechanisms

Parties have requested SBSTA to develop and recommend both guidance for cooperative approaches and rules, modalities, and procedures for the Sustainable Development Mechanism.

In these deliberations, it is essential that flexible mitigation mechanisms should enhance ambition and not delay the action needed to decarbonize economies to protect the climate.

**Any transfer of international units should help enhance ambition of NDCs in line with Parties' fair shares of what is needed to avoid a 1.5°C increase in global temperatures.**

**To ensure environmental integrity in the whole of Article 6, it is essential to:**

- **Guarantee robust accounting** and avoid double counting, by defining prerequisites allowing only countries that have economy-wide targets with NDCs set well below business as usual to generate and use international transfers;
- **Establish rules to ensure environmental integrity** by requiring that emission reductions are real, additional, verifiable, and permanent; are supplemental to ambitious national mitigation, and ensure net atmospheric benefits;
- **Avoid double counting**, claiming and use by, *inter alia*, ensuring a common accounting system for all international transfers used to meet an international commitment, including commitments outside the scope of NDCs or the UNFCCC such as international aviation or voluntary action;
- **Limit eligible activity sectors to within the scope of NDCs** to support and encourage all Parties to move towards economy-wide emission targets as called for in Article 4.4. The ability to sell reductions not included within NDCs would provide a perverse incentive against such expansion and undermine ambition.

Furthermore Parties should therefore **phase out the Kyoto Protocol's flexible mechanisms and not recognize Kyoto units for compliance with non-Kyoto mitigation commitments.**

In order to improve governance of the body designated to oversee the 6.4 mechanism we call on Parties to invite board member nominations from civil society.

**The promotion of sustainable development and human rights under the Sustainable Development Mechanism is also of the utmost importance.** In order to do so, CAN calls on Parties to:

- **Establish clearly defined international sustainable development criteria** that are applied throughout the activity, consistent with international obligations, including the human rights and sustainable development frameworks;
- **Ensure respect for human rights when developing and implementing actions under the flexible mitigation mechanisms**, including by creating a grievance process for those adversely affected by activities under Article 6.4;
- **Establish clear guidance for local and global stakeholder consultation processes** to ensure meaningful and effective participation (including free, prior and informed consent when appropriate).

## 3.4

# International Shipping and Aviation

Projected emissions growth of international shipping and aviation is not compatible with a carbon budget necessary to limit global warming to well below 2°C, let alone 1.5°C. It is urgent that Parties raise ambition and **take action through national, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures to reduce transport emissions**. Action by states on the sum of their domestic and international aviation and shipping emissions must be sufficient to meet the goals of the Paris (Article 4.1).

Member states and the UNFCCC should **ensure that the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) give adequate account** of such measures and efforts in the FD2018 and global stocktake:

- States should work to **establish emissions targets for the aviation and shipping** sectors in line with the 1.5°C goal and call on **ICAO and IMO to input to the FD2018**;
- In their report to COP 23 on the design of the FD2018, **the COP 22 and COP 23 Presidents should provide for inputs from ICAO and the IMO** on emissions from international aviation and shipping, and planned and potential measures to reduce these emissions;
- Parties to the UNFCCC should **request participation of ICAO and IMO in the FD2018** and report on activities linked to international transport emissions;
- **The global stocktake should be designed to account for all sectors with anthropogenic emissions** and allow for inputs and assessment of the compatibility of measures from international transport with long term goals.

As most states will have mandatory climate action for international transport they must ensure comprehensive MRV and accounting for action at home and for their ships and planes. We call on Parties to the Paris Agreement to:

- **Include information on bunker fuel burn and relevant transport work** under the transparency framework in order to ensure a comprehensive monitoring, reporting, and verification regime under the UNFCCC.

In the case of aviation, ICAO is in the process of creating a market for purchasing offsets, and notes "that emissions units generated from mechanisms established under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement are eligible for use in the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), provided that they align with decisions by the Council."<sup>4</sup> To ensure environmental integrity between the two systems, **Parties must ensure that the use of any mitigation outcomes guarantees environmental integrity, is not double counted towards other climate commitments**, and must encourage a rapid move beyond offsetting to the reduction of in-sector emissions.

Ensuring robust accounting between NDCs and ICAO requires **proper tracking and accounting of transferred emission reductions**. We therefore call on Parties to:

- Call for **formalized cooperation between ICAO and UNFCCC to avoid double counting** for emission reductions;
- Make corresponding **adjustments to national inventories when emissions reductions achieved in the host country are used towards aviation's carbon market**;
- Provide **information on units used in ICAO** in reports and updates under the Transparency Framework.

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<sup>4</sup> [https://www.icao.int/Meetings/a39/Documents/WP/wp\\_530\\_en.pdf](https://www.icao.int/Meetings/a39/Documents/WP/wp_530_en.pdf)

# 4

## Robustness of the Paris Agreement Now and Over Time

### 4.1

#### Long-Term Strategies

The Paris Agreement calls for countries to formulate long-term low-GHG emission development strategies, in line with pursuing efforts to limit global temperature increase to 1.5°C, and for global peaking as soon as possible to achieve a balance between emissions and removals by sinks in the second half of the century. **Developing a long-term strategy gives countries a long-term framework within which to consider sustainable emissions reductions and development pathways, in a manner that plots a mutually reinforcing path for sustainable development and climate action to limit warming to 1.5°C, to ensure robustness of the Paris Agreement over time.**

A comprehensive strategy can: identify opportunities, including co-benefits such as cleaner air and water, jobs creation, energy access, better health, and biodiversity conservation; work-through challenges; create the space for democratic consultation; and plot a just transition for workers and communities that currently depend on a fossils-based economy, an essential part of a 100% renewable energy powered future. **A robust long-term strategy sets the benchmarks for safe emissions curbs to ascertain how development should take place, while Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and national development priorities entail what this climate-safe development looks like for each country.**

Credible long-term strategies, when they are clearly used to inform near-term national planning, can also encourage increased ambition and early adoption of low-carbon pathways within the private sector. Such strategies reduce uncertainty around a country's commitment and

ability to transition away from a fossil fuel based economy, thereby decreasing risk of investing in renewable energy business models. **This makes long-term strategies not only a tool for better near-term planning and target setting, but for sending signals that can increase immediate climate action on the ground and enable the mobilization of private funds.**

In line with the Paris Agreement and recognizing the importance of long-term strategies in ensuring ambition is in line with achieving its long-term goals, CAN calls for:

- **All countries to come forward with long-term strategies as soon as possible, following a fully participatory planning process;**
- **G20 countries to lead the way and communicate their strategies well before 2020** and to participate in best-practice sharing through platforms such as the 2050 Pathways Platform;
- **Parties to include in their strategy the year in which they plan their emissions to peak, as well as the year they expect to achieve a balance of sources and sinks;**
- Country strategies to **include details of conditions or support** (such as technical, research, financial) needed to enable achievement of the highest GHG reduction ambitions.

Recalling decision 17/CP.22 paragraph 2, **CAN also underscores the essential role of civil society in every step of the development and implementation of long-term strategies.**

A participatory process should be an integral part of LTS in order to maximize its effectiveness, increase credibility and ensure full implementation.

## 4.2

# Action Initiatives for Increased Short-Term Ambition

Enhanced near term climate action can also enhance long term action. The *Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action* (MPGCA), often called the *Action Agenda*, focuses on cooperation on climate action initiatives by states and non-state actors such as cities and companies in forests, agriculture, oceans, water, energy, transport, cities, and industry. CAN believes **each self-organized MPGCA thematic area should provide input to national long-term strategy development processes** by conducting long-term analyses of their sector's contributions and a long-term sectoral vision of a decarbonized future, including what government signals they need from a long-term strategy. The Action Agenda provides opportunities to raise awareness on the need for robust long-term strategy, as well as for non-state actors to promote their solutions and vision of a decarbonized future. However, in order to fully deliver, and gain support and enthusiasm, the **structure and the governance of the Action Agenda must be clearly defined**. Equally, in order to exclude all false solutions and to strengthen commitments made by the actors and initiatives engaged, it is **essential to redefine criteria of inclusion**. Any initiative should be **consistent with common guiding principles, including human rights, gender equality, just transition and environmental integrity**.

## 4.3

# Civil Society Participation

CAN supports the Fijian COP 23 Presidency's goal of building on trust towards an inclusive, participatory and transparent dialogue that builds empathy and leads to decision making for the collective good. This will be essential for ensuring robust implementation of the Paris Agreement. **CAN believes this "talanoa" spirit should not only be the basis of discussions at COP 23, but should serve the Parties with a longer-term framework for fruitful and balanced deliberations** which foster stability, trust and inclusiveness, and reciprocal respect in a multilateral process to ensure a better future for all.

Article 12 of the Paris Agreement, decision 1/CP.21 paragraph 83, and the outcomes of COP 22 and SB 46 specifically mandate the Parties to work to promote and enhance participation, both in domestic implementation of NDCs and within the UNFCCC process itself, to 'further enhance the openness, transparency and inclusiveness of the effective engagement of non-Party stakeholders,' including through 'increas[ing] opportunities for admitted observer organizations to make interventions and provide regular briefings on the advancement of work [and] mak[ing] greater use of inputs by non-Party stakeholders in workshops and technical meetings, as well as through submissions.'<sup>5678</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Article 12 of the Paris Agreement states that 'Parties shall cooperate in taking measures, as appropriate, to enhance climate change education, training, public awareness, public participation and public access to information, recognizing the importance of these steps with respect to enhancing actions under this Agreement.'

<sup>6</sup> Decision 1/CP.21 para 83: Invites the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, at its first session, to explore ways of enhancing the implementation of training, public awareness, public participation and public access to information so as to enhance actions under the Agreement;

<sup>7</sup> Decision 17/CP.22 paragraph 2: Encourages Parties to continue to promote the systematic integration of gender-sensitive and participatory education, training, public awareness, public participation and public access to information into all mitigation and adaptation activities implemented under the Convention, as well as under the Paris Agreement, including into the implementation of their nationally determined contributions and the formulation of long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies.

<sup>8</sup> (FCCC/SBI/2017/7): paragraph 119

*“CAN believes the “talanoa” spirit should not only be the basis of discussions at COP 23, but should serve the Parties with a longer-term framework for fruitful and balanced deliberations which foster stability, trust and inclusiveness, and reciprocal respect in a multilateral process to ensure a better future for all.”*

In line with these decisions, **CAN looks forward to working with parties to identify ways to strengthen the participation of all segments of civil society, taking into account gender balance and the needs of women, in developing and implementing climate policies and in the UNFCCC process.** Not only is greater participation good for reasons of transparency and inclusiveness, but civil society participation has been proven to result in better policy-making, effective and sustainable implementation, and robust accountability.

Specifically, at COP 23: the principle of **inclusive and transparent negotiations must remain the default rule** and all negotiations should take place with the presence of observers and allowing for interventions in a manner that allows to channel the views and expertise of civil society into the negotiations. More specific proposals regarding how participation of civil society can strengthen individual aspects of the international climate framework have been included in the sections of this document addressing FD2018, global stocktake, transparency, Article 6 and long-term strategies.

CAN believes that:

- **The voice of Indigenous Peoples must be strengthened in the UNFCCC process,** as stewards of the land who are uniquely situated to provide critical perspectives on climate governance. **CAN calls for the effective operationalization of the Indigenous Peoples Platform.** The design of the platform must continue with full participation of indigenous peoples. CAN welcomes the inclusiveness of this process up to now. The platform must also be mandated to provide significant opportunities to strengthen participation of indigenous peoples in all UNFCCC related processes, capacity building for indigenous peoples and for decision-makers, and the facilitation of the sharing of traditional knowledge in a manner fully respecting the rights of indigenous peoples. Resources for the effective operationalization of the platform must be guaranteed and institutional linkages with existing UNFCCC bodies and process established so that it can deliver on its mandate, including with the Global Stocktake, Facilitative Dialogue, and the Global Climate Action Agenda.
- The adoption of the **UNFCCC Gender Action Plan** at COP 23 must also guarantee that the principles of gender equality and the empowerment of women as emphasised in the Paris Agreement are fully reflected across all agenda items and at all levels of climate policy. To do so, the Gender Action Plan must scale up significantly the gender-responsive climate policy development, delivery and reporting at national level; promote the availability of sex and gender disaggregated data and analysis; provide tools to meet the goal of gender balance in all aspects of climate change policy-making; and set a goal for all climate finance and other means of implementation to be gender responsive.

**Climate Action Network (CAN)** is a worldwide network of over 1100 non-governmental organizations in more than 120 countries, working together to promote action to limit human-induced climate change.

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