

# ECO

## THE BACK TO BUSINESS ISSUE

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## And Here Comes the IPCC

It's all well-known - the UNFCCC negotiations are progressing at a slow pace, the workload and delivery is lagging behind schedule, and the parties' enthusiasm on rapid and early enhancing of ambition to meet the Paris objectives is hardly visible, particularly with the looming COP in Poland. But here comes the IPCC to the rescue - hopefully.

As we all know, as a result of the Paris negotiations in 2015, Parties commissioned the largest global climate science authority, the IPCC, to assess in a Special Report the feasibility of meeting the objective to limit global warming to 1.5°C, and what failing to meet the goal would entail. After two years of work by a large number of expert scientists, the report and particularly its Summary For Policymakers (SPM) will be negotiated and agreed upon in Korea by Parties in early October. By nature, the findings of the IPCC will have significant impacts on governments' climate policies and domestic implementation, the Talanoa Dialogue and the necessary enhancement of the 2030 NDC. The question remains - which political impacts?

ECO has always defended the IPCC and its many products over the years as fundamental parts of advocating awareness and solutions to the global climate crisis. And ECO will keep doing so.

This is arguably the most important piece the IPCC has produced for a long time. While the report certainly has shortcomings,

ECO strongly calls on the governments negotiating in Korea to maintain the solid integrity of the report and its key findings.

ECO is calling on all, and in particularly on developing countries' and some progressive European countries, to withstand the very likely attack by the usual suspects from countries in the hand of, or influenced by, powerful fossil fuel lobbies that will likely oppose crucial scientific results. While acknowledging that 1.5°C in itself entails significant climate change impacts already and requires enhanced adaptation resources for the poor, these results include the limiting of global warming to 1.5°C, which is morally and ethically an imperative for the survival of entire nations, vulnerable communities, many ecosystems, and in reducing the risk of irreversible climate change impacts; for instance through run-away terrestrial polar ice melting resulting in unmanageable sea level rise in later times.

New research confirms IPCC findings that meeting the 1.5°C objective is technically feasible, by halving global emissions by 2030 and reaching a full global net zero decarbonisation by sometime between 2040 and 2055. It is economically and socially beneficial, a precondition to meeting the SDG objectives, and avoids much higher costs with climate pathways for higher temperatures. But to achieve that, we need progress on ambition at COP24.

## The Technology Mechanism and the Right Fit for Data

The beauty of the Technology Mechanism (TM) is that it has dozens of "TEC Briefs" on a large number of topics that can help countries understand which adaptation and mitigation technologies might be best for deployment in their own countries.

These TEC (Technology Executive Committee) Briefs are invariably based on data collected from sources such as Technology Needs Assessments and Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) efforts that date back to as far as two decades and Technical Assistance that is given via the CTCN. In addition,

the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) data might also be used to inform transparency and the Global Stocktake.

But here's the rub. Despite decades of helpful data collection, the new TM transparency tool, the Periodic Assessment of the TM, is being designed in a way that turns more toward qualitative indicators and much less toward the quantitative **data** that is so helpful, for example, to identifying Transformational Technologies. In fact, the word "DATA" is nowhere to be found in the paper. This is a mistake of monumental importance. Informed by the Technology Framework it is

understandable that LDCs and others need to conserve resources in the collection of data. But a serious plan for collecting both qualitative and quantitative information can be devised to minimize cost while retaining content. Retaining the precious data that early implementations can provide is worth the price of helping these countries share the lessons learned.

The Technology negotiators must set priorities for the most useful data and **include** them among the information that will be considered in evaluating the impact of the TM. Without it, we are walking in the dark.

# Annex to the Opening: Remember the Talanoa Dialogue

Four months have already passed since our last meeting, and ECO is glad to see you back in Bangkok. Something we did not hear in the Opening, which is a crucial point, there's only three months until COP24. That is where the Talanoa Dialogue must end with a strong outcome calling on countries to step-up ambition of NDCs and support by 2020.

If the Paris Agreement is an aircraft, the rulebook is the engine - it requires a lot of technical knowledge and its reliability is crucial. ECO knows many technical experts came to Bangkok to prepare some of the necessary hard work on the engine and want to spend time in the machine room. But ambition and the Talanoa Dialogue are the wings of the aircraft. *And only if they are big enough, will it fly.* Ambition is part of the overall package that Parties need to deliver at the COP — surely this is something that Parties and COP Presidencies alike recognise.

The stories shared in Bonn lay the groundwork and can be explored further around the world, to learn from, and build on them when updating the national climate plans. ECO was glad to see many promising elements in the Summary Report such as the need to enhance ambition, references to the IPCC Special Report and the UNSG Summit as well as a call for increased cooperation.

But additional work and thinking is required to make the Talanoa Dialogue and COP24 a success story. ECO congratulates those Parties who have worked tirelessly between Bonn and Bangkok to make the stepping up of ambition more concrete. ECO believes it will be helpful to focus on the third question, 'how

do we get there?' in Katowice and was glad to see the Co-Chair's Conclusion of the Petersberg Dialogue also highlighted the need to focus on the third question of the Talanoa Dialogue.

'How do we get there?' might be the most challenging question of the three. ECO understands that. But that's also why we believe negotiators should start exploring further opportunities how to answer this question.

For instance, ECO was surprised to hear only few stories at the May-Talanoa about the need to, and benefits of reducing short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) such as methane and black carbon - and none in the summary report of the Talanoa Dialogue. According to UNEP, significant reductions of SLCP emissions could generate very rapid climate benefits — helping to reduce near-term climate change by as much as 0.5°C before 2050. SLCPs are some of the most harmful air pollutants. SLCP reduction would have multiple other near-term health and development benefits. Significantly reducing methane and black carbon emissions could avoid annual crop losses of over 30 million tons annually, according to estimates by the UN Environment. Other critical aspects include to empower local communities and indigenous peoples to participate in decision-making that affects them; more inclusive partnerships of actors on the ground; and the deployment of adequate adaptation strategies, including those with mitigation co-benefits.

We look forward to continued consultations by the Presidencies on this issue.

## KP2 — Slow and Steady Just Won't Do

Remember this table, Parties? It has changed slightly, but not nearly enough since Bonn. It is now too late for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (KP2) to enter into force by COP24 and the stocktake on pre-2020 implementation and ambition. Slow and steady just won't do when we're trying to honour and implement treaties to fight global disasters.

Thank you, Belize, Benin, Eritrea, and Niger, for ratifying the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol since we were all together last time. *We still need 29 more Parties* to join them and the other KP2 ratifiers in order to reach the threshold of  $\frac{3}{4}$  of Parties to the KP to secure entry into force, however. Paradoxically, we find more than 29 candidates among some of those countries and groups most vocal about the urgent need

for Doha ratification, as you can see from ECO's helpful table.

In January 2018, non-ratifiers received letters from the Fiji COP President and the UNFCCC Executive Secretary, urging them to ratify the amendment. If your decision-makers have failed to see the relevance, please remind them that the Doha ratification will make it possible to hold developed countries accountable to their pre-2020 commitments, and that failure to ratify and implement the KP2 sets a worrying precedent for the Paris Agreement.

In addition to the BASICs and their impressive and encouraging complete score, there's one other group that is very close to 100%. *Dear Poland, will you make the EU's dreams come true by COP24?*

2/3 ABU members have ratified	67%	5/6 Environmental Integrity Group members ratified	83%
27/54 Africa Group members have ratified	50%	27/28 EU member states have ratified	96%
5/8 AILAC members have ratified	62%	71/134 G77 & China members have ratified	53%
5/11 ALBA members have ratified	45%	14/24 LMDC members have ratified	58%
24/39 AOSIS members have ratified	62%	4/9 Umbrella Group members ratified (2 ineligible)	44%
6/22 Arab Group members have ratified	27%	13/20 CVF parties have ratified	65%
4/4 BASIC members have ratified	100%	21/47 Least Developed Countries have ratified	45%
<b>115/192 Parties to the KP have ratified the Doha Amendment</b>			<b>60%</b>