



# Katowice: Spurring the Paris Agreement to Action

## **For John**

*With deep sadness and gratitude we remember the wisdom, generosity, and kindness of our friend, colleague and working group coordinator John Lanchbery. His strength and dedication to the fight against climate change is an inspiration to us all.*

# Table of Contents

Glossary	4
<b>Executive Summary</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>1 Raising Ambition for the Protection of People and Planet</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>1.1 Responding to the 1.5°C Report and the Talanoa Dialogue by Stepping Up Climate Ambition</b>	8
<b>1.2 Loss and Damage</b>	10
<b>2 Support for Action to Enable Increased Ambition</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>2.1 Meet and Scale-up Commitments in a Fair and Robust Way to Ensure the Implementation of the Paris Agreement</b>	11
<b>2.2 Lay the Ground for More Predictable, Adequate and Sustainable Climate Finance</b>	12
<b>2.3 Technology</b>	13
<b>3 Preserving the Spirit of Paris by Agreeing on Robust and Fair Rules</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>3.1 Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines for the Framework</b>	14
<b>3.1.1 Transparency of Action</b>	14
<b>3.1.2 Transparency of Support</b>	15
<b>3.1.3 Flexibility and Capacity Building in the Transparency Framework</b>	15
<b>3.1.4 Linkages with Other Elements of the Paris Agreement</b>	15
<b>3.2 NDC Guidelines</b>	15
<b>3.2.1 NDC Features</b>	15
<b>3.2.2 Information in NDCs to facilitate CTU</b>	16
<b>3.3 LULUCF Accounting</b>	17
<b>3.4 Flexible Mechanisms</b>	18
<b>4 Robustness of the Paris Agreement Now and Over Time</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>4.1 Five-Year Common Time Frame</b>	19
<b>4.2 Global Stocktake</b>	19
<b>4.3 Long-Term Planning for a Just Transition</b>	20
<b>5 Advancing Work Beyond the Paris Agreement Work Program</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>5.1 Modalities for the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture (KJWA)</b>	21
<b>5.2 Effective Operationalization of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform</b>	21
Contacts	23

## Glossary

<b>APA</b>	Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement
<b>CAN</b>	Climate Action Network
<b>CMA</b>	Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement
<b>COP</b>	Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC
<b>CORSIA</b>	Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation
<b>CTU</b>	Clarity, Transparency, and Understanding
<b>ETF</b>	Enhanced Transparency Framework
<b>ExCom</b>	Executive Committee
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organization
<b>GCAS</b>	Global Climate Action Summit
<b>GCF</b>	Green Climate Fund
<b>GST</b>	Global Stocktake
<b>IPCC</b>	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
<b>KJWA</b>	Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture
<b>L&amp;D</b>	Loss and Damage
<b>LULUCF</b>	Land Use and Land Use Change and Forestry
<b>MPGs</b>	Modalities, Procedures, and Guidelines
<b>NAMA</b>	Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions
<b>NAP</b>	National Adaptation Plan
<b>NDCs</b>	Nationally Determined Contributions
<b>ODA</b>	Official Development Assistance
<b>PA</b>	Paris Agreement
<b>REDD+</b>	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation plus conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks
<b>SBI</b>	Subsidiary Body for Implementation
<b>SBSTA</b>	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
<b>SDGs</b>	Sustainable Development Goals
<b>TD</b>	Talanoa Dialogue
<b>TF</b>	Technology Framework
<b>TfD</b>	Task Force on Displacement
<b>TM</b>	Technology Mechanism
<b>UNSG</b>	United Nations Secretary-General
<b>UNFCCC</b>	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
<b>USD</b>	United States Dollar
<b>WIM</b>	Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage

# Executive Summary

The IPCC report on 1.5°C is a siren alerting humanity to the urgency of the climate crisis. The report shows even half a degree of warming makes a huge difference in terms of impacts; more than was previously known. It also shows that, already, some communities and ecosystems are being forced beyond the limits of adaptation. The report further demonstrates the tools needed to meet the Paris Agreement goal of limiting warming to 1.5°C are within the scope of science and human capability. It is economically and technically feasible, but we need political will right now.

2018 brought together numerous leaders from states and regions, cities, business, investors and civil society at the Global Climate Action Summit (GCAS), to underline the transformational action they are already pursuing. The Virtual Climate Summit convened by the vulnerable countries reinforced efforts to fight climate change in solidarity with all those facing this threat on the frontline. The baton has now been passed on to all governments.

This year, Parties engaged in a facilitative dialogue (Talanoa Dialogue) to take stock of the collective efforts towards the Paris Agreement's long-term goal and to inform Parties on the preparation to update their Nationally Determined Contributions. The Talanoa Dialogue also considered pre-2020 action and support. At COP24, during the High-level Ministerial Talanoa Dialogue, governments will commit to step-up their national ambition and review and enhance their NDCs by 2020.

Tools for implementation are essential for enhanced implementation of climate action. Predictable, sustainable and transparent finance — both public and private — is at the core of climate action and it is necessary for developing countries to fully implement their NDCs and instill trust in the Paris regime.

Clarity on the delivery of finance is vital. The Green Climate Fund board meeting in October agreed to a replenishment process in 2019 and sent a clear signal that the fund is back on track with a commitment to deliver US\$1 billion for climate action in developing countries. At COP24 we need additional signals and concrete agreements on predictability and accountability to make the Paris Agreement work.

The Paris Agreement is a promise to the people that governments will take collective climate action to protect us. At this year's United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP 24) governments are working towards a December 2018 deadline to adopt the key elements of the implementation guidelines to operationalize the Paris Agreement. The Agreement is the most collaborative piece of legislation in human history and it has sparked real hope. This year is the time to embrace multilateralism and spur the Paris Agreement into action by agreeing on robust, fair and cohesive rules. The rules will expand on the Paris Agreements ability to act as a foundation for countries' collective action to tackle climate change and to increase ambition over time.

**At COP 24, Parties to the UNFCCC must realize the vision of Paris by:**

- Agreeing on a robust, fair and cohesive set of implementation guidelines to solidify the Paris regime and a roadmap to finalize outstanding issues;
- Stepping up and committing to enhancing their NDCs by 2020 in line with climate science.

**Several elements will be necessary to enable both immediate and longer-term action:**

**RAISING AMBITION FOR THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE AND PLANET:**

- **Informed by the IPCC Special Report on 1.5°C, the Talanoa Dialogue must send a strong signal to step-up climate ambition: through a COP Decision recalling paragraph 23 and 24 of Decision 1/CP.21 to enhance current NDCs by 2020.** Countries need to take the discussions and outputs of the Talanoa Dialogue into account when updating their NDCs and they need to reflect progression over time.
- While urgent action is required to avoid the worst impacts the vulnerable countries already face severe damages and displacement that require urgent support.  
**Five years after the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM) was established at COP19, it is time to fully operationalize it.** COP 24 must deliver high-level guidance for the review of the WIM in 2019, including a need-assessment for loss and damage finance.

**SUPPORT FOR ACTION TO ENABLE INCREASED AMBITION:**

- **Contributor countries should strongly reaffirm the collective commitment to scale up climate finance to \$100bn per year by 2020, and back it up with concrete commitments, including the reaffirmation of their commitment to the GCF through sending political signals towards an ambitious replenishment and agree on accounting rules for climate finance which are robust and provide full transparency on actual assistance provided to developing countries for mitigation, adaptation and L&D.**

This needs to include agreement on accounting rules which ensure contributor countries report grant equivalent amounts for loans and other non-grant instruments; that non-concessional instruments are not counted as climate finance; and that only the climate-specific part of finance provided is counted.

- To make climate finance more predictable, countries shall fully operationalize Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement. It requires that Parties at CMA1-3 agree on a process to provide qualitative and quantitative information in accordance to all sections of this article.  
**All contributor countries should agree to provide similar types of ex-ante information for every channel and source to ensure comparability and coherence, including a timeline and the format for submissions.**
- Parties must agree to discuss the post-2025 finance goal in a structured, inclusive and balanced way. **At COP24, the APA should recommend that the CMA1 adopt a process to discuss this goal and ensure sufficient time for Parties and observers to provide input.** This process should include a clear timeline for the agreement of the target and should welcome technical and scientific inputs from all bodies of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, including an updated needs assessment and review of past climate finance and its effectiveness.
- **COP24 must achieve a Technology Framework which ensures the focus of technology development and transfer is on the most climate vulnerable populations, achieving a balance in addressing adaptation and mitigation technology support.** The Periodic Assessment must stipulate that the bodies of the Technology Mechanism collect data to assess its impact on technology development and transfer and contribution towards achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement.

**PRESERVING THE SPIRIT OF PARIS BY AGREEING ON ROBUST AND FAIR RULES:**

**A core set of robust and enforceable guidelines — that build on and enhance the existing systems of transparency — will be critical to ensure trust and drive ambition:**

- For transparency of action, it is essential that accurate and robust information is provided by Parties in a methodological manner concerning efforts on greenhouse gas inventories, NDC implementation and achievement, adaptation, finance, and allowing for non-state actors to contribute to the framework;
- Flexibility under the Enhanced Transparency Framework should be reflected in each element of the Enhanced Transparency Framework and be used as an enabling vehicle allowing progression over time. Parties should agree on minimum floors for the frequency, scope, and level of detail provided as well as guidelines for how flexibility is applied.
- **Parties should adopt constructive guidelines for NDCs, including guidance for features of the NDCs, for the information in the NDCs to facilitate their clarity, transparency, and understanding, as well as for the accounting used in the NDCs.** Guidance should include an invitation for Parties to provide information regarding how rights-related considerations, including a gender perspective, have informed the planning of the NDC. Such guidance may be differentiated, but not bifurcated.
- **Develop accounting guidance based on inventory reporting under the Convention for REDD+ and LULUCF well before 2020.**
- Any transfer of international emissions reductions should help to enhance ambition of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). **At COP 24, parties should phase out the Kyoto Protocol's flexible mechanisms and not recognize Kyoto emissions units for compliance with non-Kyoto mitigation commitments.**
- In their transfers of international emissions reductions, Parties should avoid all forms of double counting as well as support and encourage all Parties to move toward economy-wide emission targets as called for in Article 4.4 of the Paris Agreement.

#### **ROBUSTNESS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT NOW AND OVER TIME:**

- **Parties need to decide on a single five-year common time frame for NDC implementation at COP24 in line with Article 4.1 of the Paris Agreement to enhance consistency and comparability of NDCs as well as better harness rapidly evolving real-world opportunities and incentivize early action and enable the best synchronization with the Paris climate regime.**
- **Parties need to finalize the general design of the Global Stocktake (GST) at COP 24. To serve its purpose, to ratchet-up ambition, the design needs to include the following elements:**
  - sufficient duration of 18-24 months, wherein some phases (e.g. input gathering and technical consideration) can overlap.
  - the GST should be organized in workstreams oriented towards the three long-term goals of the Paris Agreement in Article 2 (temperature, resilience, and finance flows) and include a workstream on loss and damage.
  - additionally, means of implementation (finance, technology, and capacity building) should be considered a cross-cutting issue of these workstreams.
  - for the stocktake to be "conducted in the light of equity" means to treat equity as an overarching issue across all work streams and with regards to the design of the GST.
- Submit long-term greenhouse gas emission development strategies in line with Article 4.19 of the Agreement to transitioning to a future that is compatible with the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement and Just Transition.

#### **ADVANCING WORK BEYOND THE PARIS AGREEMENT WORK PROGRAM:**

- The work of the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture (KJWA) must enable Parties and other actors to take action that builds adaptive capacity and resilience, contributes to the equitable achievement of the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C goal, and safeguards food security, the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities, gender equality, environmental integrity, and human rights.
- COP24 must now finalize the effective operationalization of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform, learning from good practices in other multilateral forums and collectively agreed principles as well as providing it with adequate resources to perform its work.

# Raising Ambition for the Protection of People and Planet

## 1.1

### Responding to the 1.5°C Report and the Talanoa Dialogue by Stepping up Climate Ambition

The current Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) are fundamentally inadequate to keep the world on a pathway to well below 2°C or 1.5°C global warming; the current collective ambition of the NDCs take us to a global 3°C – 4°C temperature increase.

The recently published **IPCC Special Report on 1.5°C** clearly spells out that limiting global temperature increase to maximum 1.5°C is necessary, possible and urgent. Massive reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in the next decade are critical to protect ecosystems, avoid impacts and promote sustainable development. The report must serve as a key input to the Talanoa Dialogue

at COP24 and its main findings and conclusions should be reflected in any outputs from the Talanoa Dialogue. **The findings of the IPCC report should be reflected in a COP decision committing Parties to review and enhance their NDCs by 2020, thereby initiating the ratchet mechanism of the Paris Agreement.**

Apart from the mitigation gap, the current NDCs do not adequately reflect the potential for climate action on a national level, taking into account technological developments, overachievement by countries, and actions and initiatives by non-state actors as also expressed at various opportunities throughout 2018; latest at the Global Climate Action Summit, where non-state actors committed to a range of climate mitigation initiatives and called on national governments to follow suit and step up climate action and enhance climate ambition towards 2020.

#### KEY FINDINGS FROM THE SPECIAL REPORT ON GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 °C (SR1.5):

- Climate models project robust differences in regional climate characteristics between present-day and global warming of 1.5°C, as well as between 1.5°C and 2°C. These differences include increases in mean temperature in most land and ocean regions, hot extremes in most inhabited regions, heavy precipitation in several regions, and the probability of drought and precipitation deficits in some regions;
- Marine ice sheet instability in Antarctica and irreversible loss of the Greenland ice sheet could result in multi-meter rise in sea level over hundreds to thousands of years. These instabilities could be triggered around 1.5°C to 2°C of global warming;
- Risks from droughts and precipitation deficits are projected to be higher at 2°C compared to 1.5°C global warming in some regions;
- Climate-related risks to health, livelihoods, food security, water supply, human security, and economic growth are projected to increase with global warming of 1.5°C and increase further with 2°C

- There are multiple lines of evidence that since the last IPCC report levels of risk increased for four of the five Reasons for Concern (RFCs) for global warming to 2°C (high confidence), including extreme weather events, unique threatened systems, and distribution of impacts.

CAN recalls the Summary for Policy Makers in stating "Social justice and equity are core aspects of climate-resilient development pathways that aim to limit global warming to 1.5°C as they address challenges and inevitable trade-offs, widen opportunities, and ensure that options, visions, and values are deliberated, between and within countries and communities, without making the poor and disadvantaged worse off (high confidence)."

CAN recognises the statement in SR1.5 "in model pathways with no or limited overshoot of 1.5°C, global net anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions decline by about 45% from 2010 levels by 2030 (40–60% interquartile range), reaching net zero around 2050 (2045–2055 interquartile range)." CAN demands higher probability (up to 90 %) to keep warming at 1.5°C and thus a more ambitious emission reduction than 45 % until 2030 from 2010 levels.

The next two years will be crucial to closing the mitigation gap. **Increased climate ambition and the transformative change that is needed to keep within the 1.5°C limit also requires adequate and increased support in terms of finance and financial flows, technology cooperation and capacity building.**

**During 2018, much of the ambition mechanism discussions were centered in and around the facilitative “Talanoa Dialogue” which was mandated by Parties at COP23 to take stock of where we are in our efforts to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible and to inform mitigation ambition increase in NDCs thereafter.** The mandate of the Talanoa Dialogue included a clear link and provided a separate space to consider the main findings and conclusions of the IPCC 1.5 report. Ultimately, the outcomes of the Talanoa Dialogue will feed into the ambition ratchet mechanism, where countries raise their ambition every five years.

**COP24 must heed the need for increasing climate ambition by securing political ownership of the operational next steps going into the national processes for reviewing and enhancing NDCs through transparent, inclusive and participatory national multi-stakeholder processes.** The Talanoa Dialogue must, therefore, guide the preparations of NDCs to be tabled in 2020 and support countries in assessing what is needed from them in terms of limiting warming to 1.5°C.

The national process reviewing climate ambition should also identify opportunities for climate action that can deliver on a broad set of sustainable development objectives. Enhanced and new NDC targets should be consistent with long-term strategies and should inspire collaborative action between Parties.

The outputs from the Talanoa Dialogue should therefore also contain an actionable, next steps recommendation from the Presidencies, laying out the practical next steps countries need to take on the national level to assess the areas, opportunities, and solutions for enhancing their NDCs. Likewise, the **UNFCCC SB49 Session** needs to provide enough space for countries, international organisations and other actors, to report back on the progress at the national level on enhancing their climate ambition. Additionally, the **UNSG Summit in 2019** is a critical opportunity to further assess whether enough progress is being made collectively on the global level to ensure the 1.5°C target and would be a critical milestone for reporting on progress in the national review process.

## THE IPCC'S SPECIAL REPORT ON GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C AT COP24 AND BEYOND

CAN welcomes the SBSTA special event on the SR1.5 during which IPCC authors present major results of SR1.5 and recommends that the Chairs of SBSTA compile a summary of the event to be forwarded and to inform the Talanoa Dialogue. CAN also welcomes the IPCC to provide the main conclusions and findings of the Special Report on 1.5°C in the closing of the preparatory phase of the Talanoa Dialogue feeding into the political phase. CAN encourages Parties to fully consider the SR1.5 in the Talanoa Dialogue, responding by:

- Recognizing the need to significantly step-up ambition in current NDCs
- Committing to update NDCs by 2020 in line with the best available science

After COP24, CAN would like to see more in-depth analysis of SR1.5 by SBSTA and in the Second Periodical Review (SPR). An exchange on how to proceed could be prepared in Katowice.

In 2019 the SPR will re-start its work. As during the First Periodical Review from 2013 to 2015 where over 70 experts, mostly from the IPCC, came together for a Structured Expert Dialogue (SED), it could be worth, during the Second Periodical Review, to analyze the IPCC SR1.5 and the other two IPCC Special Reports in a similar format.

*“The outputs from the Talanoa Dialogue should contain an actionable, next steps recommendation from the Presidencies, laying out the practical next steps countries need to take on the national level to assess the areas, opportunities, and solutions for enhancing their NDCs.”*

## 1.2

### Loss and Damage

The IPCC Special Report has clearly demonstrated that climate change is already depriving the most vulnerable groups from basic universal rights. With millions already feeling the impacts, the IPCC shows that things can get much worse. COP24 must step-up action to address loss and damage to protect the most vulnerable.

Katowice will mark the five year anniversary of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM) establishment at COP19. Coincidentally, also the year the COP returns to Poland. Katowice must be the COP that starts the process to fully operationalize the WIM so that it can really deliver on vulnerable countries' needs and its agreed functions:

- Address loss and damage in the Paris rulebook and the Global Stocktake**

When countries start implementing their NDCs based on guidelines agreed by the Parties, these guidelines should also help them understand the loss and damage (L&D) dimensions in their approach to climate change, how L&D in their countries might adversely affect their capability to achieve their NDC goals, and where action to address L&D, in addition to mitigation and adaptation, is required. The Global Stocktake must include L&D considerations, because without taking L&D into account, countries will be misinformed about the collective progress towards the Paris Agreement's objectives, including the Global Goal on Adaptation, and what additional actions are required.

- Initiate a strong review of the WIM in order to raise additional support to address L&D**

While Parties agreed in Paris that they would cooperate to avert, minimise and address L&D more broadly, the WIM's mandate must be focused on addressing L&D, and this focus must be further strengthened through the 2019 review.

Insufficient attention has been given so far to addressing the support needs of developing countries and raising additional support (including finance) to address L&D under WIM. The COP should give a clear, high-level signal that the review undertaken in 2019 must put strong emphasis on ensuring the WIM lives up to its promise to enhance action and support and have a full-fledged discussion on the

availability of finance to address L&D beyond adaptation and similar finance provided, the needs of vulnerable countries, and potential sources to reduce the gap between the two. In that light, the technical paper on L&D finance, for which the ExCom recently elaborated Terms of Reference, must go beyond a mere "contributor perspective" and include information on the needs of vulnerable developing countries and new sources for finance — instead of allowing contributor countries to self-identify what will count as "loss and damage finance", it must start from the perspective of vulnerable countries' needs, and then look for ways to meet those needs. Most of the currently available financial tools dealing with L&D are modeled on insurance/risk transfer and are essentially market-based instruments. We need a set of tools that are based on solidarity, including polluter-pays-principles, and are able to provide grants, or solidarity funds, and not loans. Tools such as Financial Transaction Tax, levies on shipping and aviation, Climate Damage Taxes on the fossil fuel industry etc. must be covered under the scope of the paper.

- Adopt recommendations on displacement and mandate further work**

CAN welcomes and is engaged in the elaboration of recommendations by the Task Force on Displacement (TfD). These include a number of important suggestions which governments, the UN and other organisations should start to apply, also complementing action areas mapped in the Global Compact on Migration in relation to climate change and displacement. The COP should adopt the report presented by the ExCom and the TfD; and should provide strong guidance for the next phase of work of the TfD in order to fill gaps. An important point, which was largely absent from the TfD's work plan so far, is to generate a better understanding of the financial support needs of vulnerable developing countries to address climate change displacement effectively, and to identify which means and sources can help to reduce the gap between the needs of developing countries and support provided by developed countries. This should also inform the 2019 review.

# 2

# Support for Action to Enable Increased Ambition

The latest IPCC special report reaffirmed the critical role of climate finance to limit global warming to 1.5°C, and to help countries — specifically those most vulnerable — adapt and respond to the effects of climate change. **At COP24, providing real money for real action will be key to ensuring the full implementation of the Paris Agreement.** Climate finance can create enabling conditions to fully implement NDCs, even their conditional parts, and step up ambition by 2020.

It will be critical for contributor countries to provide the political signals that can enhance trust between all Parties and ensure the adequate, predictable and sustainable provision of financial support to reach the \$100bn goal by 2020 and scale up the mobilization efforts above it, while ensuring that such efforts are new and additional to Official Development Assistance (ODA).

In addition to the crucial and continued effort of finance mobilization towards developing countries, all countries must seek to ensure that all financial flows are compatible with the Paris Agreement. This will help accelerate the much-needed shift of investments away from fossil fuels and towards low carbon and resilient societies and reach a net-zero carbon emissions future before mid-century.

## 2.1

### Meet And Scale-up Commitments In A Fair And Robust Way To Ensure The Implementation Of The Paris Agreement

**Contributor countries should strongly reaffirm the collective commitment to scale up climate finance to \$100bn per year by 2020, and back it up with concrete commitments.**

**In order to build trust in their intention to meet this collective goal, contributor countries must use the High-Level Ministerial dialogue on climate finance as a moment to take stock of**

**progress on climate finance, identify barriers and solutions to bridge the finance gap and provide additional real money for real action.** They should welcome with appreciation the conclusions of the Biennial Assessment and Overview of Financial Flows of the Standing Committee on Finance and say how they intend to enhance transparency of financial flows in the future. Countries should also use the information provided as part of the submissions from developed countries on the strategies and approaches to inform the High-Level Ministerial meeting.

As the preparations for the replenishment process are adopted, all countries should use COP24 to set expectations to ensure the first replenishment of the GCF as the main operating entity of the financial mechanism of the Paris Agreement is ambitious and fair and mindful of the needs of developing countries, including to fulfill their NDC commitments. Developed countries must give a clear signal of their willingness to significantly scale-up their individual contributions from the Initial Resource Mobilization (IRM) period and ensure that the overall financial goal for this replenishment is significantly higher than the previous level of 10.3 Billion commensurate with the needs of developing countries and the growing pipeline and capacity of the GCF, including through a growing number of direct access entities, to allocate and disburse funds to quality projects. Contributor developed countries who during the IRM committed in an ambitious way should continue to take the lead in further scaling-up their contributions and setting new best practices, with other developed countries that lagged behind during the IRM aiming to at a minimum reach a fair share of the overall contribution as a minimal threshold for the first GCF replenishment. Progress on key policy and governance issues are also be welcomed, to ensure an efficient and effective execution of the replenishment process and its subsequent utilization, as well as the long-term stability and capacity of the Fund to handle the increased upscaling and action needed.

Finally, to ensure financial progress beyond previous efforts, all Parties have to agree on accounting rules for climate finance which are robust and provide full transparency on actual assistance provided to developing countries for mitigation, adaptation and L&D. Parties must make sure that:

- **The new modalities include overarching principles so that contributor countries report grant equivalent amounts for loans and other non-grant instruments;** report the climate-specific part of finance provided — even for multilateral channels; provide information at the project level; and communicate mutually agreed reporting with developing countries. In addition, reporting should not comprise non-concessional instruments, including export credits.
- The reporting approach for mobilized private finance is conservative, limits the risk of double-counting and takes into account measures by developing countries to attract investors themselves. Reporting should not rely on flat leverage ratios, but instead on causality between public investment and mobilized private finance on a project-by-project basis.
- **The timely transfer of the work carried out by the SBSTA into the transparency mechanism of the Paris Agreement (Article 13 of the Paris Agreement) grants full integrity for the modalities defined under the SBSTA.**

## 2.2

### Lay the Ground for More Predictable, Adequate and Sustainable Climate Finance

To make climate finance more predictable, countries shall fully operationalize Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement. It requires that Parties at CMA1-3 agree on a process to provide qualitative and quantitative information in accordance to all sections of this article.

- **All contributor countries should agree to provide similar types of ex-ante information for every channel and source to ensure comparability and coherence** when informing on the mobilization of

climate finance. The process to be set up should recognize national circumstances and availability of information (such as specificities of national budgets) and allow for a flexible process where countries provide projected levels of public finance in accordance with the obligation under Article 9.5. Countries unable to provide sufficient quantitative information shall provide as much qualitative information as possible and explain why they cannot provide such quantitative information.

- **The process to be adopted by Parties must build on the Strategies and Approaches,** while at the same time ensure equal reporting modalities for all countries that are mandated or that will voluntarily inform and communicate in accordance to Article 9.5. **The process should define the timeline and format for submissions, allow for a synthesis of those submissions and plan for a biennial finance ministerial dialogue to discuss the information they contain.** It should also ensure linkages with the Global Stocktake as per Article 9.6 and over time to the assessment and overview of climate finance flows.
- To make progress beyond previous efforts, maintain trust in the long run and ensure climate finance is scaled up, Parties must agree to discuss the post-2025 goal in a structured, inclusive and balanced way. **At COP24, the APA should recommend that the CMA1 adopt a process to discuss this goal** and ensure sufficient time for Parties and observers to provide input. This process should include a clear timeline for the agreement of the target and should **welcome technical and scientific inputs from all bodies of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, including an updated needs assessment and review of past climate finance and its effectiveness.** The process should also consider the linkages between the post-2025 goal, the overarching financial goal of the Paris Agreement, and the Global Stocktake. The new goal could include a target matrix, with sub-targets for specific purposes (e.g. a sub-target to mobilize private investment, a sub-target to assist developing countries in adaptation to climate change, loss and damage finance etc.) and include qualitative and quantitative elements.

## 2.3

### Technology

The Technology Mechanism (TM) is mandated to support countries to "achieve the full implementation of the Convention". The two critical components of the TM that are not yet fully defined are the Technology Framework (TF), which will provide overarching guidance; and the Periodic Assessment which will be the transparency vehicle of the TM to feed into the Global Stocktake. Negotiations on both of these instruments are due to be finalised at COP24.

COP24 must achieve a Framework which ensures the focus of technology development and transfer is on the most climate vulnerable populations, achieves a balance in addressing adaptation and mitigation technology support, and builds the means to ensure that technologies are environmentally and socially sound.

**CAN expects Parties to ensure the highest possible ambition in the TF text — including support beyond technical assistance — specific language to reflect the need for 'environmentally and socially sound technologies'<sup>1</sup>, and enhanced support for existing proven adaptation technologies, not just new and emerging technologies.**

The Periodic Assessment must ultimately stipulate that the bodies of the TM should collect data to assess its impact on technological development and transfer, and contribution to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement. In doing so, it must be consistent with the requirements of the Global Stocktake process, including ensuring the outputs of the PA are synchronised with the reporting timeline for the Global Stocktake.

While these two processes are critical, other important technology aspects at COP24 include further work between the TM and the Financial Mechanism (FM) to enhance linkages. It is vital that stronger linkages are made between the TM and FM as financial support for technology activities, particularly adaptation actions, is sorely lacking. There must be a clearer process linking the development of Technology Projects resulting from Technology Needs Assessments, and Green Climate Fund project proposals.

---

<sup>1</sup> Suggested definition: "Technologies which consider environmental and social risks, impacts and opportunities, including where appropriate assessment of potential transboundary risks and impacts, that follow good international industry practices, and which avoid, and where avoidance is impossible mitigate, adverse impacts to people and the environment, enhance equitable access to development benefits, and give due consideration to vulnerable and marginalised populations." (Adapted from the GCF Environmental and Social Policy)

# 3

# Preserving the Spirit of Paris by Agreeing on Robust and Fair Rules

## 3.1

### Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines for the Framework

At COP24 in Katowice, Parties should adopt the modalities, procedures, and guidelines (MPGs) necessary to implement the Paris Agreement's enhanced transparency framework (ETF).

Furthermore, technical details, e.g. developing common reporting tables, can be developed in the coming years. These MPGs should support the principles of the enhanced transparency framework as noted in Article 13. The first biennial transparency reports under the Paris Agreement should be submitted in 2022 to "inform the global stocktake" in line with Article 13.5 and 13.6 of the Paris Agreement. **The framework should adhere to the principles of the Paris Agreement, including ensuring the highest levels of environmental integrity and avoiding double counting.**

A successful set of guidelines will be common, flexible, and robust. Common guidelines, in the spirit of Paris, will present a single set of requirements for all Parties. However, these guidelines need to be flexible by recognizing different national starting points and providing flexibility for those developing country Parties that need it in the light of their capacities. Robust guidelines will ensure that reporting on emissions and progress match actual emissions and actual progress and the ETF lives up to its purpose.

A core set of robust and enforceable guidelines, that build on and enhance the existing systems of transparency, will be critical in driving forward the ambition necessary to ensure the success of the Paris Agreement. **The guidelines must ensure that the many linkages with other elements of the Paris Agreement are operationalized effectively.**

The modalities, procedures, and guidelines that govern the enhanced transparency framework under Article 13 should ensure:

- That accurate and robust information is provided by Parties in a methodological manner concerning efforts on greenhouse gas inventories, NDC implementation and achievement, adaptation, and finance, to

enable a consistent assessment of the quality of data, comprehensive understanding of progress, and to enhance trust between Parties and drive further implementation;

- That robust accounting rules for climate finance provide full transparency on actual assistance provided to developing countries;
- That the different starting points and experiences of Parties are recognized and that support is provided to facilitate the improvement of reporting and transparency over time;
- The careful consideration of the interconnected nature of the provisions of the Paris Agreement must ensure that they are workable, clear, efficient, and mutually reinforcing;

The final transparency framework must be transparent and inclusive. CAN calls on Parties to recognize the value of allowing observer organizations to participate in the transparency framework. CAN believes the framework should follow experience from other successful multilateral processes such as Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council, by enabling observer organisations with expertise to participate in the facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress.

#### 3.1.1 Transparency of Action

Transparency of information on mitigation can be enhanced by clear accounting rules. Due to the diversity of NDC types, a single system for tracking progress on the implementation of NDCs, and aggregating and comparing them, will be challenging to design. **CAN supports the provision of further guidance for the accounting of different NDC types and accompanying information as soon as possible, to facilitate the development of MPGs for the transparency framework.**

In addition to developing guidelines for national inventory reports and information necessary to track progress, it is important for Parties to develop guidelines for reporting on climate change impacts and adaptation. CAN asks Parties to clarify the relationship between Article 7 and Article 13 communication and reporting requirements, respectively.

### **3.1.2 Transparency of Support**

To ensure enhanced transparency of information on support, negotiations on modalities for the accounting of climate finance have advanced under SBSTA. These modalities must be integrated with the transparency framework and should ensure reporting at project-by-project level, reporting of grant-equivalent for non-grant instruments, reporting of actual climate-specific (proportion of) funds, showing how the financial contributions by developed countries represent a progression beyond previous efforts and are new and additional, and mutual agreement between countries about projects/funds to be included in future reports.

The MPGs must include accounting modalities for financial support received as well as its use, impacts and estimated results. **Parties should also develop further guidance on how to report on non-financial support needed and received, to be able to fully capture all contributions and remaining gaps.**

### **3.1.3 Flexibility and Capacity Building in the Transparency Framework**

A fair and comprehensive transparency framework should respect the national circumstances of each country while facilitating improved reporting and transparency over time. **CAN encourages Parties to operationalize flexibility as a vehicle to enable countries to participate in the ETF in the light of their national circumstances and advance their reporting over time, as national circumstances evolve and capacities improve.** However, flexibility should not undermine efforts to develop robust guidelines.

Participation in voluntary, “opt-in” provisions of the Agreement, such as participating in flexible mechanisms under Article 6, is an inherent form of flexibility. **In order to not undermine environmental integrity, transparency in governance, and avoid double counting, no additional flexibility shall be granted for Article 6 mechanisms beyond the opt-in options for these mechanisms.**

**An important component of facilitating improved reporting and transparency over time is the provision of capacity building support.** The capacity building mechanisms must provide sustainable models and align with the needs of developing countries under the transparency framework to help them achieve maximum clarity and accuracy in submissions, and to continually improve as implementation progresses. **CAN urges Parties**

**to support and implement effective capacity building models that identify activities that need to be implemented to achieve the transparency objectives;** this should also include a calendar for their implementation and resources required for carrying out the capacity building needs.

### **3.1.4 Linkages with Other Elements of the Paris Agreement**

**It will be particularly important to specify what types of reports under the enhanced transparency framework could serve as input into the global stocktake and how the transparency framework relates to REDD+, mitigation accounting for NDCs, cooperative approaches and the mechanism under Article 6, the implementation committee and L&D.** There should be a clear understanding of climate change action to inform the global stocktake. More clarity on support should be provided beside providing a full overview of aggregate financial support to inform the global stocktake.

**It will also be important to get the timing right for both the reporting and review elements of the transparency framework which will be crucial to ensure that the information used to inform the global stocktake is as up-to-date and relevant as possible.**

## **3.2**

### **NDC Guidelines**

At COP24 in Katowice, Parties should adopt constructive guidelines for NDCs, including guidance for features of the NDCs, for the information in the NDCs to facilitate their clarity, transparency, and understanding, as well as for the accounting used in the NDCs.

#### **3.2.1 NDC Features**

The most important feature of NDC is what the name stands for: it is nationally determined. However, to better pursue the purpose of the Paris Agreement additional guidance is desirable. The Paris Agreement and the decision 1/CP.21 already give substantial guidance for NDCs, and it must be clear that this should guide future NDCs. This includes, but is not limited to, that the NDCs:

- Are in line with the long-term temperature goal (1.5°C). In practice, this requires that NDCs are developed in the framework of national Long-Term Low-Carbon Development Strategies;

- Contribute to sustainable development and poverty eradication. In practice this requires their integration into national development strategies and the implementation of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs);
- Are based on equity;
- Include leadership by developed countries as well as encouragement for developing country Parties to move towards economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets;
- Reflect the highest possible ambition while adjustments enhance ambitions;
- Include unconditional components and can include conditional components. Parties should be strongly encouraged to not only offer strong unconditional contributions but also to share in their NDCs the specific barriers that prevent them from achieving even more with their NDCs;
- Consider the support provided to developing country Parties for the implementation of their climate strategies;
- Are made with accounting that is based on environmental integrity, transparency, accuracy, completeness, comparability and consistency, without double counting; and
- The features should clearly specify the implementation timeframe.

**Further guidance should include:**

- As a principal communication tool, NDCs should also include adaptation communications focusing on forward-looking adaptation aspects including plans and needs. In contrast to NAPs that mainly guide national processes, NDCs are an external communication tool and, hence, are the suitable vehicle to report about forward-looking adaptation aspects;
- NDCs to be in line with, and be an important part of, domestic development and poverty eradication strategies (not really a new feature, as it follows directly from Article 4.2 of the Paris Agreement);
- Development and implementation of NDCs shall be inclusive, involve stakeholders, including civil society (not really a new feature as it follows from the Paris Agreement)

preamble in which Parties affirm the importance of public participation, public access to information and cooperation at all levels on the matters addressed in this Agreement);

- Features listed in 1/CP21 para. 31, including to identify unaccounted sectors;
- NDCs shall identify sectors included in transactions of Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes; and
- NDCs shall include a summary of mitigation measures linked to bunker fuels.

**For some features, CAN believes that elaboration of guidance is needed beyond what is possible during COP24 and that COP24 should start a process for this.** This elaboration of guidance shall assist countries further in developing robust NDCs that are transparent in their accounting and in their integration in national development strategies. It shall also include a toolkit of good practice in NDC development that includes how the process becomes inclusive, how the Party reaches the highest possible ambition etc.

**Some features have accounting implications, which means accounting guidance is required and should be followed by those NDCs using such features. Nevertheless, despite the potential accounting implications, all features of the NDCs need to be communicated at the time of the NDC's submission in order to ensure the clarity, transparency and understanding of a respective NDC.** Some of the additional requirements of decision 1/CP.21 are not considered to be features of the NDC but are relevant in terms of information for CTU. In such a case, guidance is required on how this information for CTU should be communicated.

**3.2.2 Information in NDCs to facilitate CTU**  
**The information included in NDCs and the quality of this information are key to facilitating the clarity, transparency, and understanding (CTU) among Parties and observers. This information is essential for building trust and confidence in the Paris Agreement.** For instance, Parties' willingness to implement ambitious climate action is sometimes dependent on their expectations about how ambitiously other Parties will implement climate action.

**CAN believes CTU information is an integral part of the NDC and the Paris Agreement.** CTU information should be included for the following topics (this list is not exhaustive):

*"The information included in NDCs and the quality of this information are key to facilitating the clarity, transparency, and understanding (CTU) among Parties and observers. This information is essential for building trust and confidence in the Paris Agreement."*

- Information to specify emission pathways and clear metrics indicating the baseline assumptions used in the contribution, as well as details on scope and coverage;
- Participation of civil society, indigenous peoples, and affected local communities in the design and implementation of the NDC;
- How the respect for and promotion of human rights, including the rights of indigenous peoples and gender equality is included in the development and implementation of the NDC (if land-use and forestry is included, methodological approaches used for LULUCF, treatment in NDC, and details of eventual use of REDD+);
- The intended use of international markets, including the use of international credits to meet targets in NDCs, the use of voluntary cooperation under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, or any other mechanism inside or outside of the UNFCCC used to generate credits, and how emission reductions are allocated between meeting its NDC targets and generating credits;
- Renewable and energy efficiency targets and fossil fuel phase-out;
- Relations to sustainable development strategies, poverty eradication strategies, and long-term climate strategies, just transition, gender balance, food security, ecosystem integrity and the protection of biodiversity, and intergenerational equity; and
- Fairness and ambition indicators.

## 3.3

### LULUCF Accounting

CAN is disappointed that this agenda item did not progress significantly at the intersessional in Bangkok. Accounting, especially for LULUCF, has been both complex and contentious in the past. We appreciate that the mandate from 1/CP.21 mentions "drawing from approaches from established under the Convention and *its related legal instruments*" but some of the Kyoto Protocol LULUCF accounting rules for Annex 1 countries are perverse and contain significant loopholes. These Kyoto accounting rules have enabled some Annex I countries to hide or ignore emissions whilst accounting predominantly for removals, thus failing to reflect what the atmosphere sees in terms of emissions and removals. This approach is not fit for purpose for the Paris Agreement and should not be used. **It is preferable to develop accounting guidance based on inventory reporting under the Convention.**

CAN's main concerns about the current tool are that i) it might reflect some Kyoto Protocol LULUCF accounting, ii) its employment of a projected reference level could mean a failure to measure progress against an historical baseline or base period, and iii) other vital issues regarding treatment of bioenergy and of carbon stocks remain unaddressed.

**Under the sub-heading of LULUCF, forests, and REDD+, whilst we agree that accounting guidance is required, it seems unlikely that such guidance can be reliably concluded in the few days remaining for APA negotiations, and that rushing could produce a poor outcome. COP24 will need to mandate more detailed negotiations, probably in the SBSTA, concluding well before 2020.**

Such a work plan should include i) coverage of all land-based emission sources, ii) how to build from inventory reporting and cater for capacity via the 3 tiers of accuracy, iii) avoiding policy derived baselines in favour of historical ones that compare current emissions with real emissions in the past, iv) exploring accounting approaches that ensure responsibility for emissions resides with the polluter — not currently the case for bioenergy emissions and thus creating perverse incentives and inequity, and v) running a concurrent balance sheet of carbon stocks to complement flow-based (profit and loss style) accounting — in recognition of the importance of identifying location and quantum of resilient and long-lived carbon stocks in the landscape to enable their maintenance and enhancement for most effective climate actions.

## 3.4

### Flexible Mechanisms

Flexible mitigation mechanisms should enhance ambition of climate action, and not delay the efforts needed to decarbonize economies to protect the climate. **Any transfer of international emissions reductions should help enhance ambition of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in line with Parties' fair shares of what is needed to stay below a 1.5°C increase in global temperatures.** To ensure this, it is essential to:

- **Phase out the Kyoto Protocol's flexible mechanisms and not recognize Kyoto emissions units for compliance with non-Kyoto mitigation commitments.** Existing projects should also be re-assessed against robust environmental and social criteria before they can be transitioned to qualify under Article 6 mechanisms.
  - **Establish rules to ensure environmental integrity by requiring that emission reductions are real, additional, verifiable, and permanent; are supplemental to ambitious national mitigation which would place the country on a 1.5°C compatible trajectory, and ensure overall mitigation;**
  - **Avoid double claiming, issuance and use by ensuring a publicly accessible common accounting system for all international transfers, both inside and outside of the UNFCCC mechanism.** Double counting should be avoided with all types of targets, including voluntary programs and those set out under the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA). Parties should therefore track all units, and apply corresponding adjustments for all transfers of credits in an account based on the country's GHG inventory;
  - **Limit eligible activity sectors to within the scope of the host country's NDC to support and encourage all Parties to move toward economy-wide emission targets as called for in Article 4.4 of the Paris Agreement.** The ability to sell emissions units not included within NDCs would provide a perverse incentive against this progression and undermine ambition.
- If the CMA decides to allow issuance of credits from activities outside the scope of a host country's NDC, a corresponding adjustment should be applied for the transfer of those units:**

- Set participation criteria allowing only countries that have ambitious, quantifiable NDCs to generate and use international emissions unit transfers;
- For all transferred credits, **consider an appropriate discount rate or automatic cancellation of an appropriate percentage of credits** applied at first transfer/point of issuance/each transfer, provided inflation of crediting baselines and other gaming can be prevented, in order to achieve an overall mitigation in global GHGs;
- Set a quantitative limit (e.g. 10% of NDC's reductions needed) on the number of international emission reductions which can be used to meet an NDC, in order to promote ambitious domestic action.

**The promotion of sustainable development and human rights under the Sustainable Development Mechanism is also of the utmost importance.** In order to do so, CAN calls on Parties to:

- **Establish clearly defined international sustainable development criteria for flexible mitigation mechanisms** that are applied throughout project activities, consistent with international obligations, including the human rights and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and reflecting the local environmental and social context;
- **Ensure respect for human rights when developing and implementing actions under the flexible mitigation mechanisms,** including by creating a grievance process governed by an independent body, for those adversely affected by activities under Article 6;
- **Establish clear guidance for local and global stakeholder consultation processes to ensure meaningful and effective participation (including free, prior and informed consent when appropriate).**

To promote higher ambition and enhanced support, CAN calls on Parties to establish a Work Program under Article 6.8 to consider how to enhance linkages and create synergies between mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer, and capacity building. The work program should also include a track that, by 2020, develops and operationalizes a new "**Matching Facility**" that would support country-to-country climate cooperation, provide international recognition for these countries, and enhance future climate mitigation or adaptation collaboration efforts. As a first step towards developing a matching-facility, countries could begin evaluating lessons learned from the NAMAs experience.

# 4

# Robustness of the Paris Agreement Now and Over Time

## 4.1

### Five-Year Common Time Frame

Parties need to decide on a single five-year common time frame for NDC implementation at COP24. This is in line with Article 4.1 of the Paris Agreement and will enhance consistency and comparability of NDCs as well as facilitate the assessment of collective efforts.

**To harmonize the timeframes of NDCs with key components of the Paris Agreement, such as the Global Stocktake and the communication of NDCs every five years, a single five-year common time frame should be adopted for the NDC implementation period starting from 2031. The NDCs for the period from 2031-2035 should be communicated by Parties in 2025.**

Compared with ten-year timeframes, a single five-year timeframe will better harness rapidly evolving real-world opportunities and incentivize early action. It enables the best synchronization with the Paris climate regime and its cycles while maintaining political accountability and avoiding low ambition lock-in.

## 4.2

### A Global Stocktake fit for purpose

The Global Stocktake is the central piece of the Paris Ambition Mechanism. At COP24, the general design of the Global Stocktake must be finalized. **Most fundamentally, this design must ensure the Global Stocktake to be fit for purpose — providing the momentum to turn the ambition ratchet.** In CAN's view, this can only be achieved by a Global Stocktake whose outcomes include strong, specific and useful political signals and information on gaps, opportunities, and benchmarks based on science and equity. Based on these signals and information, Parties must then prepare their NDCs to reflect their "highest possible ambition."


While designing the Global Stocktake, Parties should not preclude that subsequent stocktakes

can learn from experience and allow for future possibilities, such as new information sources, more ambitious treatment of equity, and additional aspects of the scope of the stocktake.

For CAN, such a successful design will have:

- **A sufficient duration of 18-24 months,** wherein some phases (e.g. input gathering and technical consideration) can overlap;
- **A suitable body to conduct the process** with sufficiently frequent meetings, e.g., a joint working group under the Subsidiary Bodies, while the final political phase should remain under the CMA to ensure ownership of the outcomes and participation by the highest political level;
- **Four work streams of mitigation; adaptation; loss and damage; and financial flows,** ensuring that each receives necessary attention to increase ambition in each of these areas.
- **Means of implementation (finance, technology and capacity building) as a cross-cutting issue** needs to be considered in each of these workstreams as they impact how countries can enhance their ambition in NDCs and cooperation between countries.
- **For the stocktake to be "conducted in the light of equity" means to treat equity as an overarching issue across all work streams and design.** To fulfill the "in the light of equity" mandate, the stocktake must result in outputs that allow parties to assess whether theirs is a "fair and ambitious" (1/ CP.21 para 27) contribution toward the Paris Agreement's long-term goals. A science and equity-based assessment of NDCs could perform this function as long as it is conducted in a non-intrusive, non-punitive and non-finger-pointing manner.

By analysing the ways in which parties have expressed fairness and ambition in their NDC submissions, a menu of equity concepts and indicators can be identified, applied and utilized in subsequent national determination processes.



**Figure 1:** Possible structure of the Global Stocktake with 4 work streams; equity, and means of implementation and support as cross-cutting issues; partial overlap of activities A and B; a start at the CMA in 2020 or 2021; and a duration of 24 months.

**The definition of inputs to the stocktake must be kept somewhat flexible, to allow inputs from authoritative non-party sources as well as from sources that may become available in the future.**

of certain communities and to building broad public support for adequate climate policies. **A declaration on just transition must recognise that harnessing the opportunities from the transition, will require a carefully planned process building on social dialogue, including developing national long-term decarbonization and sustainable development strategies.** This process should involve workers and impacted communities and consider the different policy options and harness the socio-economic benefits of a just transition to net-zero GHG-emission and climate-resilient economies.

**Three years after the adoption of the Paris Agreement, only 10 parties have submitted their long-term greenhouse gas emission development strategies in line with Article 4.19 of the Agreement. The Climate Action Network urges other parties to accelerate the formulation and communication of such plans through participatory processes.**

## 4.3

### Long-Term Planning for a Just Transition

Transitioning to a future that is compatible with the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement will require economy-wide transformational change. **Decision-makers must ensure they are fully informed on the options to guide the transition, taking a long-term view to create the appropriate policies for a just transition.** This transition can only be just if it avoids the worst impacts of climate change and measures taken are in line with the long-term goal of Paris Agreement to limit temperature rise to 1.5 degrees.

Growth in green industries outpaces nearly all others, providing jobs and benefits to communities; yet a false narrative of "jobs-versus-environment" is employed by incumbent, high-polluting industries to protect their economic self-interest. Guaranteeing a just transition is critical to managing the social and economic risks

# 5

# Advancing Work Beyond the Paris Agreement Work Program

## 5.1

### Recommendations for modalities for the upcoming KJWA

The work of the KJWA will begin at COP24 and will continue for a number of years. A series of workshops will be held, examining a number of topics. Before embarking on the in-depth thematic discussions, CAN recommends that Parties agree on several key elements to help shape the process. This must be done to ensure efficient progress, so that the KJWA remains relevant to climate goals and agricultural contexts on the ground.

The work of the KJWA must enable Parties and other actors to take action that builds adaptive capacity and resilience, contributes to the equitable achievement of the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C goal, and safeguards food security, the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities, gender equality, environmental integrity, and human rights.

CAN proposes a set of "**inputs**" to orient the KJWA workshops and technical meetings, and some suggestions for deliverables (or "**outputs**") to come from the KJWA process. The "inputs" and the "outputs" should be agreed upon at the outset, to frame and steer the work in a useful direction.

#### *Inputs to the KJWA process should include:*

- **Objectives and principles for the KJWA,** to effectively focus the work and activities. The agreed objectives, which should act as guiding principles for the KJWA, against which proposed interventions should be assessed, must include:
  - Food security (based on the agreed FAO definition of "the four pillars of food security" which are: physical availability of food; economic and physical access to food; food utilization influenced by sanitary and nutritional quality of food, stability of the above three dimensions of food security over time.
  - Adaptation
  - Absolute and equitable emission reductions
  - Ecosystem integrity
  - Gender-responsiveness

- **A guiding framework for the workshops and submissions.**
- **Principles of participation (particularly observer participation) and on conflicts of interest.**
- Baseline information gathering by the UNFCCC Secretariat for SB49, to inform submissions and workshops. For example: a rapid landscape analysis of other relevant UNFCCC bodies related to the work of the KJWA and agriculture; a rapid review of available means of implementation; and a rapid review of existing criteria and safeguards relevant to climate action in agriculture.

#### *Outputs from the KJWA Process include:*

- Criteria, Guidance or Best Practices. The KJWA should consider and plan to develop effective outputs that can shape climate action in agriculture.
- Recommendations to other UNFCCC bodies to address gaps in guidance and support, for example to the Green Climate Fund (GCF).

## 5.2

### Effective Operationalization of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform

As climate change, and some climate response measures, pose existential threats to indigenous peoples — protecting the indigenous peoples' rights in the context of climate policies must be a priority. As noted by the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming by 1.5c, indigenous peoples and traditional knowledge are also essential to combating effectively climate change — both to mitigate climate change effectively while protecting natural ecosystems as well as to build resilience.

In Paris, Parties agreed to establish a Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIP-P) for the exchange of experience and sharing of good practices related to indigenous and local knowledge. A COP23 decision laid out the basis for the effective operationalization of

the LCIP-P in the spirit of partnership between States and indigenous peoples representatives. Building on this momentum, the COP24 must now finalize the effective operationalization of the LCIP-P, learning from good practices in other multilateral forums and collectively agreed principles, as well as providing it with adequate resources to perform its work. This operationalization is key to the successful implementation of the Paris Agreement.

**Climate Action Network International (CAN)** is the world's largest network of civil society organizations working together to promote government action to address the climate crisis, with more than 1300 members in over 120 countries.

## CAN Regional & National Nodes

### AFRICA

#### Eastern Africa (CANEA)

Geoffrey Kamese, [kameseus@yahoo.com](mailto:kameseus@yahoo.com)

#### Uganda (CAN-U)

Isaac Kabongo, [kaboisaack@gmail.com](mailto:kaboisaack@gmail.com)

#### CAN Arab World (CANAW)

Safa' Al Jayoussi, [safaaljayoussi@gmail.com](mailto:safaaljayoussi@gmail.com)

Said Chakri, [said.chakri3@gmail.com](mailto:said.chakri3@gmail.com)

#### Southern Africa (SARCAN)

Rajen Awotor, [maudesco@intnet.mu](mailto:maudesco@intnet.mu)

#### South Africa (SACAN)

Happy Khambule, [happy@90by2030.org.za](mailto:happy@90by2030.org.za)

#### Tanzania (CANTZ)

Sixbert Mwanga, [sixbertmwanga@yahoo.com](mailto:sixbertmwanga@yahoo.com)

#### West and Central Africa (CANWA)

Aissatou Diouf, [dioufastou@hotmail.com](mailto:dioufastou@hotmail.com)

### AMERICAS

#### Canada (CAN Rac Canada)

Catherine Abreu, [catherineabreu@climateactionnetwork.ca](mailto:catherineabreu@climateactionnetwork.ca)

#### Latin America (CANLA)

Gianfranco Ciccia, [giccicia@dar.org.pe](mailto:giccicia@dar.org.pe)

#### United States (USCAN)

Keya Chatterjee, [kchatterjee@climatenetwork.org](mailto:kchatterjee@climatenetwork.org)

### ASIA

#### China

Wang Xiangyi, [wangxiangyi@cango.org](mailto:wangxiangyi@cango.org)

#### Japan (CAN Japan)

Kimiko Hirata, [khirata@kikonet.org](mailto:khirata@kikonet.org)

#### South Asia (CANSA)

Sanjay Vashist, [sanjay@cansouthasia.net](mailto:sanjay@cansouthasia.net)

#### Southeast Asia (CANSEA)

Nithi Nesarudai, [nithiya@pc.jaring.asia](mailto:nithiya@pc.jaring.asia)

#### Indonesia (ICAN)

Fabby Tumiwa, [Fabby@iesr.or.id](mailto:Fabby@iesr.or.id)

### EUROPE

#### Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia (CAN-EECCA)

Iryna Stavchuk, [iryna.stavchuk@necu.org.ua](mailto:iryna.stavchuk@necu.org.ua)

Nastassia Bekish, [nasta.haliak@gmail.com](mailto:nasta.haliak@gmail.com)

#### Europe (CAN Europe)

Wendel Trio, [wendel@caneurope.org](mailto:wendel@caneurope.org)

#### France (RAC France)

Lucile Dufour, [lucile@rac-f.org](mailto:lucile@rac-f.org)

### PACIFIC & OCEANIA

#### Australia (CANA)

Alex Rafalowicz, [alex@cana.net.au](mailto:alex@cana.net.au)

#### New Zealand (NZCAN)

David Tong, [david@davidtong.co.nz](mailto:david@davidtong.co.nz)

#### Pacific (PICAN)

Genevieve Jiva, [gjiva19@gmail.com](mailto:gjiva19@gmail.com)

## Working Group Co-Chairs

### Adaptation and Loss and Damage

Sven Harmeling, CARE International, [sharmeling@careclimatechange.org](mailto:sharmeling@careclimatechange.org)  
Harjeet Singh, Action Aid, [harjeet.singh@actionaid.org](mailto:harjeet.singh@actionaid.org)

### Agenda 2030

Diego Martínez-Schutt, CAFOD, [dmartinez@cafod.org.uk](mailto:dmartinez@cafod.org.uk)

### Agriculture

Teresa Anderson, Action Aid, [Teresa.Anderson@actionaid.org](mailto:Teresa.Anderson@actionaid.org)  
Ram Kishan, Christian Aid, [ramkishan2000@gmail.com](mailto:ramkishan2000@gmail.com)

### Bunkers

Mark Lutes, WWF International, [mark.lutes@wwf.panda.org](mailto:mark.lutes@wwf.panda.org)

### Finance

Lucile Dufour, Réseau Action Climat France, [lucile.dufour@reseauactionclimat.org](mailto:lucile.dufour@reseauactionclimat.org)  
Kashmala Kakakhel, WEDO, [kashmalakakakhel@gmail.com](mailto:kashmalakakakhel@gmail.com)  
Eddy Pérez, CAN Canada, [eddy@climateactionnetwork.ca](mailto:eddy@climateactionnetwork.ca)

### Flexible Mechanisms

Andy Katz, Sierra Club, [andykatz@sonic.net](mailto:andykatz@sonic.net)  
Gilles Dufrasne, Carbon Market Watch, [gilles.dufrasne@carbonmarketwatch.org](mailto:gilles.dufrasne@carbonmarketwatch.org)

### Global Stocktake

Eliza Northrop, WRI, [enorthrop@wri.org](mailto:enorthrop@wri.org)  
Naoyuki Yamagishi, WWF, [yamagishi@wwf.or.jp](mailto:yamagishi@wwf.or.jp)  
Christian Holz, Climate Equity Reference Project, [cholz@climate.works](mailto:cholz@climate.works)

### Long Term Strategies

Lina Dabbagh, CAN International, [ldabbagh@climatenetwork.org](mailto:ldabbagh@climatenetwork.org)  
Andreas Sieber, CAN International, [asieber@climatenetwork.org](mailto:asieber@climatenetwork.org)

### NGO Participation and Human Rights

Sébastien Duyck, CIEL, [duycks@gmail.com](mailto:duycks@gmail.com)

### REDD & LULUCF

John Lanchbery (†), RSPB, [john.lanchbery@rspb.org.uk](mailto:john.lanchbery@rspb.org.uk)  
Melanie Coath (interim), RSPB, [Melanie.Coath@rspb.org.uk](mailto:Melanie.Coath@rspb.org.uk)  
Peg Putt (interim), PFPI, [peg.putt@gmail.com](mailto:peg.putt@gmail.com)

### Science Policy

Manfred Treber, Germanwatch, [treber@germanwatch.org](mailto:treber@germanwatch.org)  
Reinhold Pape, Air Pollution and Climate Secretariat (AirClim), [reinhold.pape@snf.se](mailto:reinhold.pape@snf.se)  
Neth Elenita Dano, ETC Group, [neth@etcgroup.org](mailto:neth@etcgroup.org)

### Technology

Janice Meier, Sierra Club US, [jsmeier@verizon.net](mailto:jsmeier@verizon.net)

### Transparency

Nathan Cogswell, WRI, [Nathan.Cogswell@wri.org](mailto:Nathan.Cogswell@wri.org)  
Norbert Nyandire, [nobnyandire05@gmail.com](mailto:nobnyandire05@gmail.com)

For further information: [www.climate-network.org](http://www.climate-network.org)

Follow us on twitter: [@CANIntl](https://twitter.com/CANIntl)

Subscribe to our ECO newsletter: [www.climate-network.org/eco-newsletters](http://www.climate-network.org/eco-newsletters)

Contact: [policy@climate-network.org](mailto:policy@climate-network.org)