Annual Policy Document 2025: Fighting for Just Transition in Times of Injustice

COP30 represents a definitive test for the relevance of the multilateral climate regime. Third generation NDCs (NDCs 3.0), first iteration after the Global Stocktake (GST) reveal a devastating ambition gap placing the world on a trajectory for catastrophic levels of warming. This failure is not incidental but systemic, rooted in an economic order that fuels corporate plunder and inequality, leading to national plans heavy with accounting tricks and false solutions rather than genuine plans to transition away from fossil fuels, and fuelling a crisis in multilateralism and international cooperation. If COP30 cannot catalyze a course correction that is both rapid and equitable, it will signal the inability of the UNFCCC process to manage the core drivers of climate injustice, rendering it increasingly irrelevant to the lived realities of a planet in distress.

COP30 is the first UNFCCC COP since the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered its historic advisory opinion on the legal obligations of States in respect of climate change. Following a consensus request from the UN General Assembly to the ICJ, the Court affirmed earlier this year that States are duty bound to prevent climate harm, meaning that ambitious climate action is not a political option but legal  obligations rooted not only in the climate treaties but also in other multilateral environmental agreements, human rights law, and customary international law. The advisory opinion opens up avenues for legal action against countries if they fail to act in accordance with equity and CBDR-RC to prevent climate harm and limit warming to 1.5°C – by curbing production, licensing, and subsidization of fossil fuels – and uphold the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment. Outcomes of COP30 must demonstrate alignment with this ruling as a clear signal that Parties have heard this, and will act accordingly.

This climate crisis already describes the new normal, with climate impacts consistently exceeding projections and costing hundreds of billions annually. The losses are disproportionately borne by people made poor and vulnerable through marginalization, shattering lives and ecosystems and condemning generations to instability. This reality fuels a parallel crisis of legitimacy for global governance. Public faith in institutions is declining, and civic space is shrinking, precisely when solidarity and robust public pressure are most needed. A failure in Belém to deliver a response that is perceived as just and effective will further erode trust, undermining the very collaborative foundations upon which multilateralism is built and discrediting the process in the eyes of the world.

Across the world, from union halls to Indigenous communities, there is a unified demand for climate action to work for people, not against them. It is in this context that a just transition agenda becomes the essential connective tissue binding technical climate action and real-world legitimacy among people. How Parties respond to this demand will be the barometer of success at COP30. 

In order for COP30 to restore the relevance of multilateral climate governance, it must formally embed principles of inclusion, workers’ rights, and social protections within the energy transition and climate action, in addition to equity between countries, as a core component of climate justice. To this end, Parties must agree on shared principles of just transition and establish the Belém Action Mechanism (BAM) for a Global Just Transition. This mechanism would unify fragmented efforts, create accountability, and provide the means, particularly for developing countries to build fair, climate-safe economies. BAM would anchor the principles that bind rights, consultation, and real support together in implementation. By doing so, COP30 can demonstrate that the international community is capable of delivering a response that is not only scientifically rigorous but also socially equitable. A just transition is no longer a side-note; it is the true measure of seriousness and the only way to build the broad, durable public mandate required for the transformation ahead.

Summary of demands

Chapter 1: Just Transition to secure climate justice and equity

• Establish the Belém Action Mechanism (BAM): CAN demands that at COP30, Parties agree to establish the BAM, a new UNFCCC mechanism designed to coordinate fragmented global Just Transition efforts, provide direct support to and mobilize finance for countries, especially those in the Global South.
• The BAM would have three core functions
  • To ensure global efforts are coherent and aligned with Paris Agreement goals and the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) 
  • To act as a knowledge hub for sharing best practices
  • To provide a facilitative platform to match projects with non-debt-creating finance and technology transfer.
• Parties must agree on a set of guiding principles within the UNFCCC process to ensure all Just Transition actions are equitable, inclusive, and rights-based
  • These principles must guarantee human, labour, and Indigenous rights, including the Right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC), and establish robust, inclusive social dialogue and consultation processes for all affected communities and workers.
  • Just Transition must be designed to reduce, not deepen, inequalities. This involves creating decent work, ensuring gender-transformative social protection, recognizing the care economy, and upholding the right to quality public services like health and education.
  • The principles must be backed by international cooperation, including access to new, additional, and non-debt-creating climate finance to enable developing countries to implement Just Transition pathways and diversify their economies.
• CAN demands that Parties integrate comprehensive Just Transition plans, aligned with the agreed principles, directly into their core national climate policy and legislation, such as NDCs and Long-Term Strategies.
• Parties must take a formal mandate to Finance Just Transition by recognising the design and implementation of Just Transition policies, plans, programmes and practices as supportive of climate ambition and therefore eligible to be supported with means of implementation.

Chapter 2: Addressing the Vulnerability of people and Protecting Ecosystems to Build a Just and Resilient World

• Global Goal Adaptation (GGA) Indicators: At COP30, Parties must adopt a comprehensive package of robust GGA indicators. This list must include clear, actionable Means of Implementation (MoI) indicators that measure the provision of finance, technology, and capacity-building from developed to developing countries. These MoI indicators must exclude private finance and ODA, be used as cross-cutting metrics, and the overall list must integrate gender, human rights, and Indigenous perspectives.
• New Adaptation Finance Commitment: Parties must agree to establish a new, predictable public-grant based adaptation finance commitment under the GGA decision at COP30 that responds to the needs of developing countries, estimated to be over US$ 300 billion per year. Additionally, developed countries must increase provision of adaptation finance to meet the Adaptation Fund’s minimum resource mobilization target of US$300 million on a multi-year basis.
• Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR): COP30 must ensure the BAR is an effective implementation tool by giving it a clear structure. Its mandate must include creating pathways for action, facilitating access to MoI for developing countries, and integrating procedural justice to ensure the meaningful participation of vulnerable groups.
• Scale up Loss and Damage Finance: Developed country Parties must drastically scale up grants-based finance for the Loss and Damage Fund (FRLD), in line with their legal obligations. COP30 must follow up the initial US$ 250 million needed to launch the Fund with clear signals that the Fund’s long-term resource mobilization strategy will be aligned with the scale of needs, estimated at hundreds of billions annually.
• Guidance to the Loss and Damage Fund (FRLD): COP30 must provide direct guidance to the FRLD Board to ensure it operates justly. This includes prioritizing direct community access (e.g., small grants), developing a public participation framework, creating strong human rights and safeguards policies, and fully integrating the ICJ Advisory Opinion into its work.
• Permanent Agenda and Tracking for Loss and Damage: Parties at COP30 must agree to a permanent agenda item on Loss and Damage to maintain political focus. CAN also calls for better tracking and accountability of all L&D finance flows to ensure it meets the scale required, including through a dedicated Loss and Damage Gap Report.

Chapter 3: Addressing needs-based climate finance

• Prioritize Public Finance & Accountability: COP30 must establish a dedicated negotiation track to implement the NCQG, focusing on the quality and provision of public finance from developed countries. This includes harmonizing reporting and defining climate finance, and setting time-bound milestones to increase the share of public grants, particularly for adaptation and loss and damage, but also for mitigation,  including through progressive environmental taxation rooted in the polluter pays principle and CBDR-RC as a way to significantly scale up public finance. 
• Clarify Developed Country Obligations and Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement: CAN supports the G77’s call for an agenda item on Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement. This is essential to reinforce the legal obligation of developed countries to provide public climate finance and to secure new, increased pledges from them by COP31.
• Baku to Belém Roadmap: The Presidency-led Roadmap must identify gaps in the climate finance architecture. It should clarify the qualitative elements of the NCQG (e.g., grants, predictability) and connect UNFCCC discussions with external processes tackling systemic issues like tax reform, sovereign debt, and the cost of credit for developing countries.
• Article 2.1c: The mandate on Article 2.1c must be renewed with a more action-oriented approach. This work should lay the foundation for a COP31 decision with time-bound targets to end fossil fuel finance and shift flows to climate-resilient development, reflecting CBDR,, and focus on taxing big polluters. It must also address global “disablers” like debt distress and unfair tax rules that undermine climate action.
• Targets for UNFCCC Funds & Loss and Damage: As part of the NCQG follow-up, Parties must adopt a clear plan to triple the outflows of UNFCCC climate funds by 2030 (as per the NCQG decision) and establish a coherent architecture for loss and damage finance that goes beyond the current fund to meet the full scale of needs.

Chapter 4: Enhancing ambition and accountability

• Deliver a Global Response to the Ambition Gap: CAN demands that COP30 conclude with a strong, formal outcome that presents a credible global response to close the glaring ambition and implementation gap. This response must be based on equity and common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR-RC), alongside scaled-up climate finance to enable greater ambition.  
• Deliver Fair Shares NDCs: Developed and G20 countries, whose climate plans are not in line with their fair shares, should revise their inadequate NDCs before COP31, aligning them with their fair share and the 1.5°C limit.
• Process to formulate an equitable Fossil Fuel Phase-Out Roadmap: Parties must agree to a process to formulate a just and equitable roadmap for the global fossil fuel phase-out, which would include an assessment of how to lift the systemic barriers to the transition. This should be done by mandating the COP30 and COP31 Presidencies to lead this work, ensuring the transition away from fossil fuels is planned and executed in line with equity and CBDR-RC.
• Reject Carbon Markets as Offsetting Tools: CAN strongly rejects carbon offsetting and insists that revenues from Article 6 do not count as climate finance from developed countries. The rules for the Article 6.4 mechanism and supervisory body must not be weakened at COP30, and the Presidency must ensure a balanced, critical discussion on the risks carbon markets pose to NDC ambition.
• Ensure an Effective GST-1 Follow-Up Process (UAE Dialogue): Parties must agree at COP30 to operationalize the UAE Dialogue to review the implementation of GST-1. This dialogue must start by June 2026, have a substantive scope addressing barriers and international cooperation, and result in a formal output. If this fails, the COP Presidency must ensure an alternative high-level follow-up process is established.
• Adopt Robust and Inclusive Modalities for GST-2: The decision on the second GST cycle (GST-2) must be finalized at COP30. CAN demands it includes new inclusive tools, such as citizens’ assemblies, and is fully aligned with the best available science. It must also be better coordinated with the finance agenda, including the first review of the new climate finance goal (NCQG).
• Integrate Just Transition into Climate Ambition: The outcomes of the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP), including the establishment of the Belém Action Mechanism (BAM), are essential for enabling higher climate ambition and must be a core part of the response to the ambition gap.

Chapter 5: Climate justice through meaningful multilateralism

• Adopt an Accountability Framework and address Conflict of Interest at the UNFCCC: CAN demands the UNFCCC strengthen its policies to address the undue influence of polluting industries. This must go beyond current disclosure rules for observers and explicitly address conflicts of interest among Parties and Presidencies, particularly those with plans to expand fossil fuel production.
• Guarantee Freedom of Expression and Peaceful Protest: CAN calls on the UNFCCC, the COP30 Presidency, and the Brazilian government to publicly commit to and ensure the full protection of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. This includes safeguarding protests on all issues, including those related to fossil fuels, militarization, and human rights situations in Palestine, Sudan, the DRC, Ukraine, and the host country, among others.
• Ensure Logistical Arrangements Enable Inclusive Participation: CAN demands that logistical arrangements actively facilitate broad and meaningful participation. This includes providing affordable accommodation, effective remote participation options, adequate meeting space, and full accessibility for people with disabilities and children, addressing the specific challenges faced in Belém.