TRUST IN THE TIME OF PRE-2020

ECO is here to explain why pre-2020 action is still a thing, and why, with 2020 creeping up, all Parties should be preparing for the pre-2020 stocktake to be held at COP24. At the heart of this issue are two components: trust and urgency. With insufficient pre-2020 action, ECO sees a very real risk of setting a precedent of not honouring deals made and undermining trust between Parties, just as they are entering the implementation period of the Paris Agreement. Additionally, the IPCC 1.5°C special report coming out this fall is likely to remind us of the urgent action needed for countries to get on track with the Paris Agreement's long-term goals, and sooner will be cheaper. This is why pre-2020 climate action, as a topic in the UNFCCC, and in the form of action on the ground, is not just a box you have to tick at COP24.

At COP24 Parties will have the opportunity to honestly take stock of pre-2020 implementation and ambition and communicate how they will be closing the gaps that Sunday's Talanoa dialogue so clearly highlighted. This stocktake has value in itself, but it will also be valuable as input to the political phase of the Talanoa Dialogue. It's important to make room for a frank discussion on shortcomings, and what we can learn from them so as to not repeat these mistakes in the Paris period. Off the top of ECO's brilliant head - how about a coalition of developed countries willing to #StepUp and admit their shortcomings, and announce plans to rectify the situation? After all, parties agree on broad participation, so the food security family and environmental NGOs (indigenous peoples, small-scale farmers, youth, women and environmental NGOs) will always be there to refresh Parties' memory.

Finaly, now that these negotiators understand food security so perfectly, ECO hopes that they will talk to their APA colleagues so they can understand it as well.

Food Security in Koronivia: Tackling the Steep Learning Curve

Once upon a time at COP21, ECO fought for guiding principles in the Paris Agreement. One of them was food security. At that time, many countries were skeptical and asked, “what is this strange thing, food security? We only know food production.” So ECO worked really hard to socialize among Parties the internationally agreed FAO definition with the four pillars of food security. At COP23, ECO was thrilled to see the creation of the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture (KJWA) with a clear purpose that includes consideration of food security.

When negotiations on the KJWA roadmap began, ECO suggested Parties acknowledge FAO’s definition to operationalize this part of the COP23 decision. FAO is a UN body, after all. But no! ECO could not find any reference to this definition in the draft conclusions discussed this week.

Must we assume ECO’s hard work paid off and that this definition is now crystal-clear for all the parties leaving no need for a reminder of the FAO definition and its four pillars? What a steep learning curve this would be!

ECO is truly confident negotiators fully grasp the fundamental difference between the UNFCCC reference to food production and the KJWA’s focus on food security. ECO looks forward to your work to address food security and all four of its pillars in submissions and workshops.

And if you forget, don’t worry: ECO is reassured that Parties agreed on broad participation, so the food security family (indigenous peoples, small-scale farmers, youth, women and environmental NGOs) will always be there to refresh Parties’ memory.

And finally, now that these negotiators understand food security so perfectly, ECO hopes that they will talk to their APA colleagues so they can understand it as well.
Assessing Loss and Damage is Fundamental to the Global Stock Take

Just a quick reminder from ECO to Parties: The Global Stocktake (GST) is about “achieving the purpose of the Paris Agreement and its long-term goals,” which has to be done in a comprehensive manner. An integral part of the Paris Agreement is Article 8 which demands assessing the progress on “averting, minimizing and addressing Loss and Damage” Taking such progress into account in the GST is a litmus test of our collective progress towards these goals.

The Paris Agreement recognized loss and damage as the third pillar of climate action - alongside mitigation and adaptation. All three pillars are fundamentally connected: inadequate mitigation and insufficient adaptation will result in more loss and damage. Vulnerable countries, communities and ecosystems are already facing devastating impacts at ‘just’ 1ºC of warming. The long-term temperature goal of the Agreement defined in Article 2.1(a) explicitly recognizes that achieving this goal would significantly reduce the risk and impacts of climate change. If we want to collectively progress towards this goal, an assessment of the risks and impacts of the gap between current ambition and the long-term goals should therefore be included.

Article 14 is very clear in this regard: The purpose of the GST is to take stock of the implementation of the entire Paris Agreement. So, taking stock of the progress on enhancing understanding, action, and support with respect to loss and damage as mandated in Article 8.3 is necessary. Furthermore, Article 14.1 makes it clear that the GST shall be done in a comprehensive and facilitative manner and in the light of equity and the best available science. Hence, the GST must consider all components of the Paris Agreement in a holistic manner by considering impacts on poor and vulnerable people and ecosystems, and include the best available science on Loss and Damage.

Therefore, when the textual negotiations begin, ECO urges Parties, especially the developed countries, to ensure the inclusion of loss and damage in a meaningful manner in order to achieve the real purpose of the GST, that would then guide the future course of action.

Healthy Wetlands To Address Water Stress and Human Mobility

As the demand for water, land and food increases, and as climate change intensifies, wetlands are the most rapidly declining ecosystems in the world. When these natural buffers lose their ability to effectively store and regulate water, and support food production, people are deprived of their well-being, resulting in social tensions, conflict and sometimes human mobility. And, as both the IPCC and IPBES recognise, some wetlands also function as important carbon stores and natural defenses against flood damage. Wetland conservation and restoration therefore make perfect climate sense!

Although the exact relationship will be context specific, the nexus between the health of wetland ecosystems, human mobility and security deserves much greater attention in the context of climate adaptation, development and humanitarian strategies.

The WIM ExCom in 2016 called for more information on reasons for internal and cross-border migration, displacement and other forms of human mobility related to climate change impacts. At least 32 of the 69 submissions received referred to water hazards and stressors as drivers of human mobility, but only few of them referred to freshwater ecosystem degradation. In addition, little information was brought forward about how to address such hazards and degradations.

COP21 requested the ExCom to establish a task force to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change. These recommendations will be forwarded to the ExCom for consideration and submission at COP24.

What should these recommendations include?

The lessons learned and the effective practices on adaptation and sustainable use, and management of wetlands need to be shared more widely. ECO expects the Task force on Displacement and the ExCom to provide the COP with a set of recommendations aiming at recognising that unsustainable use of land and water resources and degradation of ecosystems, in particular freshwater ecosystems, which is a driver of human insecurity, migration, forced displacement and conflict. Climate change strategies offer opportunities for governments to seek a better understanding of “wetland hotspots,” contributing to climate resilience and peace, as well as the risks associated with wetlands degradation or disappearance.

A Common Timeframe Needed to Decide the Common Timeframe

ECO is getting worried that the negotiators do not have a common view on the timeframe issue to make a decision on the Common Timeframes. How ironic is it to negotiate on common timeframes without a common timeframe for adopting a decision? ECO believes that a good timeframe for this decision to be made would be by December, when it should be concluded as part of the PAWP package in Katowice.

ECO looks forward to “sunny Bangkok” to the further discussions on the draft conclusion together with the CRP documents. Echoing AOSIS, African Group, LDC, and Brazil, ECO is a big fan of a shorter NDC implementation period. And therefore encourages countries to adopt the positive spirit outlined by China by considering the “advantages” of a 5 year commitment period. A common timeframe of NDC implementation between 2031 and 2035 would help us avoid locking in low levels of ambition, harness rapidly evolving real world opportunities, incentivize early action, and synchronize better with the broader Paris climate regime.

CMA’s L&D rAPA

Boum chAPAlakalaka Boum chAPAlakalaka

Hey CMA, this is for you!
Address loss and damage as you all agreed to
8.2 are the words you should heed
To give WIM guidance and authority

Boum chAPAlakalaka Boum chAPAlakalaka

If you don’t want L&D under the APA
Just agree in Bonn to start the work at the next CMA
8.3, enhance action and support!
Through WIM and beyond, CMA1 start the work!

Boum chAPAlakalaka Boum chAPAlakalaka

What do you need to do?

CMA1 start the work!

Boum chAPAlakalaka Boum chAPAlakalaka

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