



Doha Milestones and Action

COP18/CMP8 MUST INCREASE SHORT TERM AMBITION AND
ESTABLISH A CLEAR PATH TO 2015

October 2012

Summary

The planet is giving warning as to what dangerous climate change looks like – from historic droughts in East Africa, the United States and Mexico, to catastrophic floods in Brazil and China, and heat waves in Europe and elsewhere. The spectre of worldwide food shortages is growing. These warnings are being ignored by governments whose current lack of ambition has the world heading towards 3.5-6°C of warming and runaway climate catastrophe.

Agreements at Durban opened a window of opportunity for governments to put the world on a low emissions pathway, ready to leverage clean technologies for green development and create green jobs, investment and economic development, and to take important steps to build resilience to unavoidable impacts of climate change. However this window of opportunity is precarious. Fulfilling it will require governments to take decisive action at COP18/CMP8 in Doha. Short term (pre-2020) ambition must be urgently increased and a clear pathway mapped to negotiate a fair, ambitious and binding deal in 2015.

Essential elements to be concluded at Doha include:

- **A Doha amendment for a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol** applying immediately to a range of countries, including Australia and New Zealand; targets within the 25-40% range, with an adjustment procedure to increase ambition; removing the false emission reductions of carried over AAUs and improving CDM and JI rules;
- **Non Kyoto developed countries** must demonstrate that they are genuine about their responsibilities by adopting stringent quantified emission reduction commitments, comparable in effort and transparency with Kyoto Parties;
- **Developing countries** should register their mitigation actions and required support, and all developing countries should make pledges – including Qatar;
- Agreement that **global emissions will peak in 2015** which means that developed countries need to reduce their emissions much more quickly, and provide support for developing countries to take more mitigation action;
- Developed country commitment to provide a **2013-2015 public finance** package that (a) is at least double the amount of the Fast Start Finance period (2010-12) and ensures early and rapid progress towards the \$100 billion goal, and (b) includes at least **\$10-15bn in new public finance for the Green Climate Fund** over 2013-2015;
- Commitment to take meaningful steps to **develop innovative sources of public financing** and agree on a process to reassess the adequacy of financial pledges with

the first reassessment in 2013;

- Funding modalities for **National Adaptation Plans** established in order to scale-up work immediately and a second phase of the **work program for loss & damage** established to elaborate on the principles, functions, and institutional structure of an International mechanism to address loss and damage associated with climate impacts (including for rehabilitation and compensation);
- Operationalising the GCF, the Standing Committee, the NAMA registry, the Adaptation Committee, and the Technology Executive Committee and Climate Technology Centre and Network. Including initial capitalisation of the GCF and the Technology Mechanism.

At Doha an ADP workplan to increase short term ambition must be agreed:

- Informed by a **technical paper assessing the gap in ambition and ways to close it** and by the **progress of the Review**; increasing developed country economy wide targets to close the gap between existing ambition and that needed to keep warming below 1.5°C; ensuring that any **new market mechanisms add to overall ambition with stringent rules**; facilitating developing countries to reduce their emissions by **rapidly scaling-up public climate finance**, focusing on economy-wide or sector-wide actions that would **rapidly and significantly lower emission trajectories** and supporting initiatives that reduce costs and eliminate barriers and perceived risk, so that low and zero carbon technologies and approaches can quickly become competitive;
- To enable developing countries to increase their mitigation and adequately deal with adaptation **public finance from 2013-15 must be at least double the amount of the Fast Start Finance**, and there should be a **process to reassess the adequacy of financial pledges** in terms of overall scale required, thematic balance and geographical distribution starting in 2013. A **2 year Doha Capacity Action Plan** should be initiated.

Countries must learn from the disaster at Copenhagen by mapping out an **ADP workplan at COP18 with clear timelines, milestones and deadlines** for agreeing key issues on the pathway to negotiate a **fair, ambitious and binding global agreement in 2015**. The ADP workplan to 2015 must be:

- Informed by the **Review** incorporating IPCC drafts, and by an **equity work program** beginning immediately;
- Consistent with a **1.5°C** global carbon budget with high likelihood of success, including **targets and actions** within an **equitable framework** that provides the **financial, technology and capacity building support** to countries in need;
- Built on, developing and improving the **rules already agreed under the Kyoto Protocol and the Convention**, including transparency through common and accurate

accounting and effective compliance processes, respecting the principles of equity;

- Serious about ensuring sufficient support for dealing with the unavoidable impacts of climate change; and
- Shepherded by a **consistent Bureau** responsible for producing a compilation text by COP19, complete negotiating text by COP20, and a **draft fair, ambitious and legally binding protocol circulated by May 2015**.

After the disaster of Copenhagen, leaders do not have another 'trick up their sleeve'. Countries must deliver a fair, ambitious and binding deal by 2015 at the latest, putting in place the first steps in the pre 2020 ambition workplan in 2012, to ensure that we prevent catastrophic climate change. There is no atmospheric nor political space for a second failure.

Key Milestones toward a fair, ambitious and binding deal in 2015

At COP18 countries must agree a workplan with a timetable and milestones to negotiate a global agreement in 2015. A summary of key milestones is below. More detail is contained in later sections of this document:

	2012	2013	2014		2015	
	COP18	COP19			COP20	COP21
Legal/ Process	Adoption CP2 with all rules (incl adjustment proc) Agree ADP workplan: clear scope, linkages & milestones	Compilation text of the main elements Nature & form of commitments	Submission by issue of draft legal text	Design compliance regime MRV package	FULL NEGOTIATING TEXT	
Equity	Establish "dialogue" track	Agree principles & broad metrics	Integrate into negotiating streams			
SV Review	Peak year (2015) Review scope, body & work plan agreed					
Mitigation	A1 targets (25-40%) Common accounting rules A1 NAMAs all significant parties Parameters for low carbon development strategies agreed for developed & developing countries	HFC IMO ICAO		Agree level ambition	Adopt common accounting framework Mitigation actions for each country identified	Assess proposed mitigation (for ambition & equity)
Finance	Commitment to scale up finance from 2013-2015 LTF adopted	GCF Operational (with windows)			G20 innovative sources	
Adaptation	AC workplan Decision to build-up loss & damage; decide finance modalities; kick-off NAPs process	Stocktaking NAPs to scale-up implementation			Loss & damage mech	
Technology	TM fully operational Additional functionality for TEC and CTCN; initial capitalisation of CTCN	Map Tech needs Criteria 2°C Tech goals			Tech action plan	
Capacity Building	2-yr Doha CB action plan				Integrated capacity coordination function	

PROTOCOL COVERING ALL ISSUES

1

Mitigation Ambition

In order to keep global temperature increase to below 2°C with likely probability and to keep the possibility of warming staying below 1.5°C viable, global emissions must peak no later than 2015. According to UNEP¹, global emissions in 2020 should be not higher than 44 GtCO₂e for a reasonable change to stay below 2°C global warming. Yet, current pledges and lenient accounting rules are set to result in global emissions of 55 GtCO₂e in 2020 – and put the world on a pathway towards 3.5 – 6°C of warming². Parties that are unwilling to work towards an increase in ambition for the period before 2020 are putting millions of people and entire nations at risk. Measures to increase ambition in the short term (before 2020) must be an essential part of the negotiations for Doha and beyond, so that emissions remain within a trajectory compatible with the below 44GtCO₂e limit and a peaking of global emissions in 2015. Developed countries must take leadership though increasing their current, pathetic level of ambition, thereby creating space within the

“Developed country pledges should increase in the KP and LCA – to the top of pledged ranges and beyond. Appendix 1 lists country specific targets.”

remaining global carbon budget for developing countries to achieve sustainable development. Discussions on options for developing countries to increase their ambition (through supported and unsupported action) should not

be based on the residual ambition gap left by developed countries' low level of pledges.

A transition to lower emissions pathways offers opportunities in new markets and clean technologies -- driving innovation, investments, employment and economic growth. Additionally, tapping into the abundant potentials for domestic renewable energy sources, energy efficiency, and shifts towards more sustainable lifestyles, support national energy security, lowering dependencies on energy imports, as well as increased health benefits through reduced air pollution.

A good agreement in Doha requires considerable progress on mitigation issues. For 2012 there are four tracks for action that are in play and need to be utilized to the full. The needed decisions include:

Kyoto Protocol

- **Clarification of which countries will have quantified emission reduction commitments in Annex B in CP2:** CAN thinks that all developed countries should have their QELROs (targets) inscribed in Annex B of the Protocol and fulfill their other KP obligations. CAN therefore welcomes the agreement by the EU, Norway and Switzerland and others to be good faith actors by inscribing their targets in Annex B for the second commitment period while we note with concern that these targets remain inconsistent with a 1.5°C/2°C trajectory despite repeated rhetoric to the contrary by those parties. CAN is gravely appalled that the US, Canada, Russia and Japan have declared their intention to stay out or weasel out of acting under this treaty, shying away from their global responsibility at the brink of runaway climate change. CAN urges Australia and New Zealand to declare firmly that they will be part of a second commitment period of the KP.
- **Increase developed country pledges within the KP:** Developed countries should, by COP18/CMP8, increase their 2020 pledges so that the combined effort, with the developed country pledges under the LCA, moves into the 25-40% range (on the way to the more than 40% by 2020 pledges that developed countries must make³ to keep us on track to keep warming below 1.5/2°C). **CAN has identified how much each countries' pledge should increase, as a first step, at Appendix 1 of this document.** This would require countries that have pledged ranges of reductions to **move to the top end of their ranges.** In CAN's view, relevant conditions put forward by countries have been met, and the urgency of the problem allows for no further hiding behind those conditions. Translating pledges into quantified emission reduction commitments must happen with the highest possible environmental integrity and not lead to further *de facto* weakening of the pledges.
- **Agree the full package of amendments need for a ratifiable outcome:** amendments to Annex B, Annex A and to the body of the

¹ UNEP Bridging the Emissions Gap, 2011, pp 15, 16

² Climate Action Tracker & IEA – include links

³ Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources Defense Council and The Nature Conservancy do not endorse this position.

KP need to be agreed in Doha and adopted as a package, so the KP second commitment period can be ratified and enter into effect in 2013. To avoid a legal gap, the package of amendments will need to be provisionally applied pending ratification.

- **Agree a KP adjustment procedure to increase pledges** of the 2013-2017/2020 timeframe similar to the adjustment procedure under Article 2.9 of the Montreal Protocol that is **restricted to increasing ambition and specifically rules out decreasing ambition**. This adjustment procedure should allow both unilateral real increases in ambition by a country and for a ratcheting up of all KP Annex B countries resulting from an adequacy review.
- **Close existing loopholes and avoid new loopholes opening up in the KP:** The AAU surplus from the first commitment period could be as large as 13 Gt.⁴ The use of 'hot air' (surplus units due to pledges above BAU) should not be allowed after 2012, as outlined by the G-77 and China) proposal^{5,6}.
- Make the KP mechanisms fairer and more environmentally robust:
 - (a) Strengthen additionality and baseline rules for CDM and JI: CDM offsets that do not represent actual emission reductions could make up between 0.7 – 3.3 GtCO₂e of the gigatonne gap by 2020.⁷
 - (b) Require sustainable development monitoring for the CDM: The CDM has so far failed to deliver meaningful sustainability benefits. It is therefore necessary to introduce mandatory requirements to monitor and verify sustainability benefits throughout the crediting period of a project.
- **Eliminate JI track 2 and increase accountability, international oversight of JI and avoid "hot air laundering":** Only countries that enter a second Kyoto commitment period and have an emissions target that is below their 2012 emissions should be able to sell any ERUs in the second commitment period.
- **Formulate an independent NF₃ target for each country**, so the gas's inclusion in Annex A of the KP does not water down the already weak KP pledges.

LCA

The LCA should achieve the agreed outcome required by the Bali Action Plan – including **agreeing comparable effort, carbon budgets and common accounting for non Kyoto developed countries and nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) for developing countries, emphasising the need for predictable and stable support for NAMAs**. CAN stresses that mitigation in developed and developing countries should be undertaken in the context of zero carbon growth strategies and low carbon growth strategies, respectively.

CAN strongly supports the G77 proposal, made in Bangkok, for four COP decisions from 1bi that would require developed countries to 1) increase their ambition, 2) set common accounting standards building and improving on those of the KP, 3) define the carbon budgets to 2020, rather than having point targets, and 4) indicate how the common accounting methods impact on the carbon budgets, and calls on all countries to work cooperatively for a strong outcome to this end. CAN's expectations in these regards are expressed in greater detail below.

- **Increase developed country pledges within the LCA:** Developed countries should, by COP18/CMP8, increase their 2020 pledges so that the combined effort, with the pledges under the KP, moves into the 25-40% range at a minimum. More than 40% reductions by 2020⁸ is needed from developed country commitments to keep warming below 1.5°C/2°C. **CAN has identified how much each country's pledge should increase, as a first step, at Appendix 1 of this document.** This would require countries that have pledged ranges of reductions to move to the top end of their ranges. In CAN's view, relevant conditions put forward by countries have been met, and the urgency of the problem allows for no further hiding behind those conditions.
- **Calculate and agree developed countries' quantified emission reduction commitments:** Translating pledges into targets must happen with the highest possible environmental integrity and not lead to further *de facto* weakening of the pledges. A point target for 2020 is not an adequate response to climate change: knowledge of the trajectory and thus the country's carbon budget for the period is essential for the agreement to have environmental integrity.

⁴ Point Carbon (2012). Carry-over of AAUs from CP1 to CP2 –Future Implications for the Climate

⁵ Environmental Defense Fund does not endorse this position.

⁶ G77 and China Proposal: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/kp/application/pdf/awgkp_g77c_surplus_040912.pdf

⁷ See CDM Watch Policy Brief, 2011, available at <http://www.cdm-watch.org/?p=2969>

- **Agree a rigorous common accounting framework to ensure transparency on domestic emissions in developed countries**

– and ensure that the same transparent Kyoto Protocol accounting standards (including compliance rules) alongside the MRV rules under the Convention, apply to all developed countries. This is a prerequisite for allowing the comparability between countries agreed in the Bali Action Plan.

- **Countries that have not yet pledged NAMAs and are in position to do so should put forward their planned NAMA:**

CAN notes that developing countries with relatively high capabilities including Qatar, Argentina, Nigeria, Iran, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Thailand and others have yet to

put forward their proposed NAMAs. These and other developing countries that have yet to submit pledges and/or NAMAs should do so as early as possible in 2012. Additionally, **developing countries, which are in a**

position to do so, should further strengthen existing pledges/NAMAs to help narrow the ambition gap, with the recognition that this **increase in ambition by developing countries is only possible with enhanced support** (ie: finance, technology and capacity building) from developed countries.

- **Provide clarity on assumptions and projection of emissions in 2020 for developing countries, as well as support needs:** Developing countries, especially the advanced developing economies, should clarify the assumptions behind their pledges and proposed NAMAs. This should include key factors underlying BAU projections, including information on energy use and prices, economic development, population trajectories etc. Especially the more advanced developing countries should thus provide clarity on their expected net emissions for 2020, as an important step to further clarify the scale of the global ambition gap. An important element of the assumptions is how NAMAs would be funded, and developing countries should provide **clarity on what they would implement with their own resources, what actions would need support and the nature of the support needed.** This

is without prejudice to the call for increased ambition from developed countries on mitigation and support pledges. Financial, technological and capacity building support for developing countries is essential, thus **CAN fully supports the call of developing countries that developed countries should provide clarity and predictability of support** to enable effective planning by developing countries (see further below).

- **Inscribe developing country NAMAs in the NAMA registry:** To ensure quick start and taking into account the need to close the gap, developed countries must ensure there is sufficient and predictable funding (see further below) and developing countries should inscribe their NAMAs seeking support, either seeking support for implementation or for development, in the Registry before COP18/CMP8. In doing so developing countries should use common guidelines for timelines, baselines, expected emissions reductions, expected costs and support required. Developing countries with low capacity, such as least developed countries, may need more time to inscribe their NAMAs, and should be enabled, through finance and capacity building support, to register their NAMAs in the shortest possible timeframe in order to be able to take advantage of funding for NAMAs.

- **Tap into the full potential of REDD+:** REDD+ offers the potential for huge carbon savings. Deforestation alone accounts for about 17% of global emissions, and early action on REDD+ could make a valuable contribution to increasing ambition well before 2020.

- **Common rules and modalities and procedures for both the new market-based mechanism and the common framework** need to be drafted in such a way that they ensure high environmental integrity. Given that there is very limited demand for credits from any market mechanisms, such new mechanism only make sense if they go hand in hand with significantly increased ambition.

- **Prohibit double-counting of offsets from existing and new mechanisms:** Double-counting of international offsets could reduce ambition by up to 1.6 GtCO₂e in 2020, equivalent to roughly 10% of the total abatement required in 2020 to stay on a 2°C pathway.^{9,10} Parties must ensure that the new market mechanism agreed at Durban does

“All developing countries should pledge NAMAs, and where possible increase ambition. Developed countries must increase support.”

⁸ Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources Defense Council and The Nature Conservancy do not endorse this position.

not become another version of the CDM with the same additionality problems.

- **Addressing emissions from international aviation and shipping:**

- Emissions from international aviation and shipping are large and growing fast, yet there is great potential to reduce those emissions. The shared and overlapping jurisdiction between the UNFCCC and the specialized agencies of the ICAO and IMO with different conventions and regulations is currently a key factor blocking progress. It is clear that the principles of one body should not take precedence over another, however arrangements can be found that reflect the principles and customary practices of both.
- To this effect, parties to the UNFCCC should agree under the LCA in Doha to send a signal to the IMO and ICAO on how to reconcile the respective principals and customary practices of the different bodies and Conventions. This signal should consist of a call for global measures to reduce international transport emissions consistent with the procedures of the IMO and ICAO, while taking into account equity, national circumstances of various countries and the principles of the UNFCCC convention principally through the use of revenues. Additional financing generated should be channeled to developing countries for mitigation and adaptation actions through the Green Climate Fund, as well as for in-sector actions.
- After the conclusion of work under the LCA at CoP 18, any further consideration under the UNFCCC of measures to address emissions and financing from international transport should take place under the short-term mitigation track of the ADP.

ADP - pre-2020 ambition workplan for 2012

Under the ADP, Parties have recognized that current pledges for the period until 2020 is insufficient and hence a work plan on ambition has been launched. Given the closing window of opportunity to limit global warming to below 2°C/1.5°C, it is of vital importance that Parties take crucial action this year.

The ADP workplan for pre-2020 ambition should not duplicate work in other negotiating tracks. It should, however, provide a platform for discussions on the urgent need for developed countries to increase their current, pathetically low pledges. The workplan should also be seen as a platform whereby countries can hear and better understand the actions being taken by others, and learn from their experiences through discussion and development of low carbon development strategies.

The Durban Platform workplan on near-term ambition must include a **technical paper produced by the UNFCCC assessing the overall level of ambition** implied by mitigation commitments and long term low carbon development strategies and identify any subsequent gap between this collective ambition and a trajectory consistent with keeping warming below 1.5°C with a high probability.

Apart from that the work plan should focus on getting agreement, including adopting COP decisions triggering action, on ways to reduce emissions that are not currently covered in the UNFCCC regime. Such as:

- **Removal of fossil fuel subsidies:**

- Fossil fuel production and consumption subsidies distort markets, encourage the use of fossil fuels and thus increase greenhouse gas emissions and impede the transition to sustainable development. Annex 1 countries should take the lead in removing their fossil fuel subsidies which will result in emissions reductions as well as financial savings that could be used for climate finance. Analysis by the International Energy Agency (IEA) shows that phasing out subsidies for fossil fuel consumption in the 37 largest developing countries could reduce energy related carbon dioxide emissions by 6.9% in 2020 compared to business as usual, or 2.4 gigatonnes. Plans for removal of subsidies in developing countries should be developed and necessary support should be provided in the short term to ensure that subsidy removal does not negatively impact poverty eradication and decent livelihoods in cases where the poor might be harmed as result of rapid price increases or lack of affordable clean energy alternatives. Many subsidies are in fact socially regressive and such resources could be better spent on

⁹ Erickson P. and Lazarus M. (2011). The Implications of International Greenhouse Gas Offsets on Global Climate Mitigation. SEI Working Paper WP-US-1106

¹⁰ See SEI Working Paper and SEI Policy Brief, 2011, available at <http://sei-us.org/publications/id/424>

ensuring renewable energy access for all. In 2011, the IEA estimated that only 8% of consumption subsidies reach the poorest 20% of the population.

- A COP18 decision must establish the enabling conditions to achieve fossil fuel subsidy removal, including a timeline for phase out, identification of ways for some developing countries to pursue fossil fuel subsidy phase-out as a supported NAMA, and requirements to include fossil fuel subsidies existence and plans for removal as part of the National Communications and/or Biennial Reporting.
- **Zero emission development strategies for developed countries:**
 - Establishing emission pathways consistent with the 1.5/2°C limit requires the steady transformation of economies away from a high carbon economic growth model. Developed countries should produce low emission development strategies that are both visionary and pragmatic, and outline the pathway to near-zero emissions by 2050.
 - These low emission strategies should detail an emissions reduction trajectory through 2020, 2030, and 2040 consistent with near-complete decarbonization by 2050, and be further divided into 5-year emissions reduction budgets, the first of which will be countries targets for the 2020-2024 period (these parameters should be adopted as a decision in Doha), identify the policies and measures to transform all relevant sectors of its economy. Such policies and measures should include early and urgent domestic action to avoid lock-in of carbon intensive investments and infrastructure and short and medium term energy efficiency and renewable energy targets. They should outline a clear roadmap for investments in clean technology with sustained scaling up of development, diffusion and deployment of clean technologies in the short, medium and long term.
 - The ADP should be structured to use the opportunity for exchange of best practice and success stories, both of formulation of overall plans and for successful implementing policies and measures, especially for energy efficiency and
- renewable energy support mechanisms.
- **Low Emission Development Plans for developing countries:**
 - Enabled through appropriate financial and technical support from developed countries, developing countries should develop long-term Low Emission Development Plans as part of the country's overall development planning. Such plans would provide a visionary roadmap and outline a pathway to a low-carbon and climate resilient economy, building upon and be integrated into national development plans or planning processes already in place in many countries. These plans should be developed through a bottom-up country-driven process.
 - Depending on individual countries' capacities and support received, such plans could have different levels of scope and complexity. More economically advanced developing countries should start to develop their plans over the next 2-3 years. In those plans, countries could identify NAMAs they would do unilaterally, as well as emission reduction potential, cost and timeline estimates to implement additional NAMAs requiring support. Other developing countries may require more years to develop their plans, and for the time being focus on developing NAMAs and adaptation activities.
 - The ADP conversation should be structured in such a way as to demonstrate the high level of actions being undertaken and to facilitate exchange of experience.
- **HFCs** – In addition to (and not substituting) enhanced actions on CO₂, Parties should accelerate action on phasing out HFC gases. Parties should request that the Montreal Protocol agree to phase out production and consumption of these gases as a matter of urgency at MOP25 All Annex 1 Parties should also commit to an immediate ban on the use of HFC-23 offsets for compliance with Kyoto Protocol targets. Up to 1.3 GtCO₂e could be saved annually by 2020.
- **Black carbon** – A recent UNEP report¹¹ concludes that actions to cut Black Carbon

could reduce global warming by about 0.2°C by 2050. CAN recommends early actions to cut down emissions of black carbon, through agreement of strong action reducing emissions from international shipping and through addressing BC as part of the agriculture work program. This would have significant additional benefits related to health. In a COP decision in Doha, Parties should request relevant fora, such as those addressing access to clean and sustainable sources of energy for all, to take appropriate action.

- **Methane emissions:** While methane emissions are covered in the KP basket, there is real potential to address key sources of this gas in the agriculture and waste sectors, as noted in the same UNEP report. That extraction and transport of fossil fuels are major sources of the gas complements the need to phase out fossil fuel subsidies and to rapidly move towards efficient energy systems based on renewable energy sources as part of the development of zero- and low-carbon development plans.

ADP work related to mitigation ambition in the 2015 global deal

A central task for the 2015 deal will be to reconcile global action to cut greenhouse gas emission with what science requires in the long-term to keep warming below 1.5°/2°C and the remaining carbon budget to achieve a consistent emissions trajectory. The ADP work related to contributions by Parties to reaching such a trajectory should be based on the principles of the Convention, including the core principle of equity. A key need for Doha is, hence, to define a workplan until 2015 that can accommodate the relevant discussions with clear timelines for the specific packages of agreements to be reached at COP 19, COP20 and COP21.

- The work on **zero-emission development strategies and low emission development strategies** should be an important piece of work under the pre-2020 ambition workplan but will also have high relevance for the 2015 deal and ambition in the post-2020 period. As well as agreeing **common elements** to allow some degree of comparability of actions (common methodologies etc), CAN foresees that this work offers a good opportunity for countries to talk about what they are doing to decarbonise their economies, **sharing lessons** they have

learned (both positive and negative) from their experiences so that other countries can take these experiences into consideration in their own national work.

- The level of overall post-2020 ambition must be informed by science and be in line with that necessary to keep warming below 1.5°C. To this end, **the work undertaken in the 2013-2015 Review must be taken into account in establishing overall mitigation ambition.** It is crucial that this is provided in a timely basis – with initial findings in 2013. More on the Review further down in this submission.
- Parties must agree on a **process on equity**, as part of the Durban Platform workplan, to increase their common understanding on how to operationalise equity and identify appropriate criteria. An equity workplan is outlined further down in this submission. Once a sufficient level of joint understanding is reached on how to operationalise equity and CDBRRC, Parties must begin to seriously negotiate aggregate and individual levels of ambition. Including what form that ambition should take for countries at various stages of development. The provision of sufficient finance, technology and capacity building support should be part of the overall Durban Platform package to support, where appropriate, mitigation commitments and actions.
- Parties must set themselves a **deadline of having quantified emission reduction commitments (QERCs), quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives (QELROs) and nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA) commitments agreed by 2014**, a year before the deadline for the new international agreement to be adopted under the Durban Platform. This will allow the year 2015 to be focused on an assessment of how these commitments compare to adequacy and equity principles and criteria agreed by Parties as part of an increased effort sharing understanding. So that Parties can bridge a gap if necessary before they adopt the new agreement no later than 2015.

“Work on zero-emission and low emission development strategies is important for pre-2020 ambition and highly relevant for the 2015 deal.”

¹¹ UNEP & WMO, Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone, www.unep.org/dewa/Portals/67/pdf/Black_Carbon.pdf

- Parties must set out a pathway for agreeing common accounting and MRV provisions for the new global agreement. See the MRV section below for details.
- **Any new market mechanisms must have principles and modalities for their integrity as core parts of their agreement.** This should include measures to ensure that there is no double counting of effort or financial support obligations being counted again as mitigation support.
- **Improve the LULUCF rules:** The Durban platform process should not employ the accounting rules for LULUCF activities adopted for the KP's second commitment period. New rules should be negotiated, which reliably and mandatorily account for all emissions and removals compared

"A climate finance roadmap from 2013-2020 is a precondition for increased mitigation action in developing countries."

to a historical base period, including accurate and complete accounting of bioenergy emissions. The rules should ensure that LULUCF contributes positively to the overall level of ambition by developed countries.

The negotiations should be informed by the discussions in the newly initiated SBSTA work program which is exploring 'more comprehensive accounting of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks from LULUCF'.

The role of climate finance in raising the level of mitigation ambition in developing countries

Many developing countries have proposed targets and actions based on their own resources that are at least as ambitious as those submitted by many developed countries. There are opportunities to increase ambition further using available financial resources, both domestic and international. However, developing countries would be able to do much more with adequate financial support from developed countries in the future. This understanding that international financial support is a critical driver of developing country mitigation action is a basic principle of the Framework Convention,¹² and has been reiterated in the Kyoto Protocol,¹³ the Bali Action Plan,¹⁴ the Copenhagen Accord,¹⁵ the Cancun Agreement¹⁶ and the Durban AWG-LCA decision.¹⁷

Increased mitigation in developing countries is dependent on increased provision of new and additional climate finance. Yet there is still no plan for how to scale up finance commitments, following the fast start finance period and towards the commitment by developed countries to mobilise further resources to reach \$100bn per year by 2020.

Most assessments show that the shift to low carbon emission pathways in developing countries will require overall financing magnitudes much larger than the \$100bn commitment made by developed countries. Assuming that much of the total finance needed will come from the private sector, the \$100bn commitment by developed countries will need to be met from public finance to leverage and incentivise the much larger shifts in additional private sector investments, and support actions that cannot attract private sector investments.

A climate finance roadmap from 2013-2020 is a key precondition for increased mitigation ambition in developing countries. In this regard, CAN recognizes the launch of a 2012 work programme for long term finance¹⁸ as a first step toward such a roadmap. However, it is crucial that the results of this work programme are turned into recommendations for decisions at COP18, leading to a rapid scale-up of climate finance, especially public finance, towards the 2020 target and sufficient to meet the climate finance needs of developing countries.

The Green Climate Fund can play a critical role in this regard, especially if it manages to maximise the impact of its resources. The governing instrument of the GCF sets a proper objective here, by directing the Fund to focus on promoting a "paradigm shift". Such a paradigm shift involves a strategic, long-term, and fundamental re-orientation towards low-carbon, climate-friendly, climate-resilient, gender-equitable, pro-poor and country-driven development. Such a transformation must be undertaken on the basis of country-owned strategies, plans and programmes that are developed and implemented through participatory and inclusive processes and that are integrated into developing countries' core development plans.

Under the Durban decisions and Article 11 of the Convention, the COP is to provide guidance to the Board of the Green Climate Fund on matters related to policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria. Accordingly, an important

¹² UNFCCC, Art 4(7), ("The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology...")

¹³ Kyoto Protocol, Art. 11.

¹⁴ Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP.13, paras. 1(b)(ii), 1(e).

¹⁵ Copenhagen Accord, paras. 5, 8.

¹⁶ Cancun Agreements, Decision 1/CP.16, SIII(B) ("Recognizing that developing country Parties are already contributing and will continue to contribute to a global mitigation effort in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Convention, and could enhance their mitigation actions, depending on the provision of finance, technology and capacity-building support provided by developed country Parties,"), see also paras. 52, 53.

¹⁷ Draft Decision -/CP.17, SII(B);

¹⁸ Draft Decision -/CP.17, paras. 127, 130.

MILESTONES RELATED TO AGREEING SUFFICIENTLY AMBITIOUS MITIGATION ACTION

2012 COP18	Higher pre2020 targets and carbon budgets agreed for developed countries ¹⁹ NAMA Registry in operation and all developing countries have registered NAMAs ¹⁹ Agree 2015 as the peak year Developed countries submit low carbon development strategies. Developing countries with sufficient institutional capacity produce low carbon development strategies.	KP / LCA / COP Decisions
2013 Q1	Technical paper assessing long term pathway, taking into account 2020 targets and where possible pre-2020 emissions trajectories, low carbon development strategies, NAMAs, mitigation financing and other input, and include an assessment of the gap between planned action and global goal.	ADP
2013 Q2-3	Assess relative pre-2020 ambition levels of all countries, and identify in general terms those that need to improve to have comparable ambition levels, and required increase in overall ambition levels	ADP
2013 COP19	Developing countries (with the exception of LDCs and other low-income, low-institutional-capacity countries) should submit low carbon development strategies and plans. All countries review ambition and where appropriate increase ambition levels, submitting more ambitious emission reduction targets and NAMAs for pre-2020 period.	ADP
2014 Q1	Updated gap technical paper Negotiations on collective and differentiated post-2020 individual country ambition based on equity principles	ADP
2014 Q2	Negotiations on collective and differentiated post-2020 individual country ambition based on equity principles	ADP
2014 Q3	Negotiations on collective and differentiated post-2020 individual country ambition based on equity principles	ADP
2014 COP20	Mitigation actions for each country	ADP
2015 Q1	Technical paper assessing each countries mitigation actions against agreed equity principles and criteria and calculating any gap between global ambition and country level ambition.	ADP
2015 Q2	Negotiations to check and finalise collective and differentiated post-2020 individual country ambition based on equity principles	ADP
2015 Q3	Negotiations to check and finalise collective and differentiated post-2020 individual country ambition based on equity principles	ADP
2015 COP21	Final mitigation actions for 2025 locked in. Indicative rolling forecasts for mitigation action at aggregate level agreed	ADP

outcome of the Durban Platform's workplan on enhancing mitigation ambition should be to provide guidance to the GCF on the policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria that would be most effective in catalysing the necessary paradigm shift.

Two categories of actions should be prioritised. First, the GCF should focus on funding economy-wide or sector-wide actions in all GCF-eligible countries that would rapidly and significantly lower emissions trajectories of a country (or regions within a country). The GCF should assess programmatic interventions with high mitigation potential, taking into account environmental and social safeguards, social, economic and development co-benefits and a gender-sensitive approach. To achieve a real paradigm shift, the GCF should only finance clean, safe, sustainable and efficient and non-fossil fuel-based energy technologies. Second, paradigm shifting

actions should also include initiatives that may deliver smaller immediate reductions, but can contribute towards transforming markets and patterns of private-sector investment over the medium to long term.

In addition, while there is broad agreement that the GCF should have the capacity to "leverage private-sector investment," encouraging private-sector co-financing of GCF supported actions will not necessarily spark a paradigm shift. The GCF should focus on supporting initiatives that reduce costs and eliminate barriers and perceived risks, so that low- and zero- carbon technologies and approaches can more quickly out-compete high-emitting technologies. Feed-in tariffs are an example of an approach that can catalyse the diffusion of near market technologies, and thus accelerate learning and the achievement of economies of scale.

¹⁹ See Appendix 1 which includes country by country targets and actions that should be agreed at COP18

2

Peak year and process for a decision on long term global goal

Parties are long overdue in agreeing a peak year and a global goal. The current emissions pathway places the world on a catastrophic path toward 3.5°C to 6°C of warming²⁰. In order to turn this around and put global emissions on a pathway to keep warming well below 2°C, and to keep 1.5°C within reach, global emissions must peak by 2015. This means that Parties cannot wait until the completion of the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action negotiations in 2015 and must instead agree a global peak year in the LCA at COP18. Global peaking by 2015 will require developed country emissions to reduce by much more than current pledges and much more quickly. Furthermore developed countries must provide support for developing countries to take more mitigation action. Developing country emissions growth will need to slow and peak a few years after 2015. Scaled

“At COP18 parties must agree a global peak year of 2015.”

up financing, technology and capacity building support will be required to enable this. Even

Parties and Observers who consider that global emissions must peak by 2020, should acknowledge that waiting for the conclusion of the ADP negotiations in 2015, and the implementation of the agreed deal in 2020, will foreclose on a safe peaking date.

A consensus on the long term global goal will require an increased understanding amongst Parties of how to shape an equitable approach, as outlined in the equity and effort sharing section of this submission. Parties need to commit to a solid process to identify and agree on a long term global goal and commit to inscribing it in the 2015 legally-binding outcome. CAN suggests a global emission reduction of at least 80% by 2050.

3

REDD

REDD+ has the potential to make a major contribution to global climate mitigation, and a framework for doing so was agreed in Cancun. A number of technical issues remain to be resolved this year in SBSTA, whilst the LCA is to further address the question of finance. It is, however, unlikely that all matters associated with REDD+ will be resolved this year. REDD+ should thus be folded into the Durban Platform process, with input from SBSTA and the SBI on technical issues, where requested.

²⁰ 3.5°C according to the Climate Action Tracker <http://climateactiontracker.org/news/116/Durban-Agreements-a-step-towards-a-global-agreement-but-risk-of-exceeding-3C-warming-remains-scientists.html> and 6°C according to the IEA.

4

Review

All elements of the Durban Platform workplan should be informed by the 2013-2015 review.

The first periodical review (2013-15) should translate intelligence from the latest science, notably the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) to UNFCCC negotiations by inspecting what is required for emissions to keep warming below 1.5°C. The review should provide additional clarity on the scale of the ambition gap as well as on progress towards achieving agreed temperature goals. It provides the opportunity for scientific findings to re-enter the political negotiations.

For its timely start and effective implementation two decisions are required from COP18 in Qatar: Firstly, a decision on the scope is required at Qatar for a timely start of the first periodical review in 2013. CAN suggests sticking to the in Cancun agreed language on the scope, guaranteeing a limited and workable scope. Secondly, a better definition of a strong body to conduct the review ensures its efficient operationalisation.

The workshops that will feed in the scientific results compiled by the IPCC must be constructive and well adjusted to the needs of the UNFCCC review. Therefore these workshops on new Special Reports and on the different Working Groups of the IPCC get high priority and input must be provided from the IPCC once working group reports reach draft form – if not beforehand. The IPCC Special Reports SRREN and SREX and UNEP gap report should be discussed in early 2013 while the ICPP AR5 working group publications should follow promptly in 2013 and 2014. Results of this work for the review should feed into the ADP without delay. It will be too late to be of use for the Durban Platform negotiations if Parties wait for the entire AR5 to be finalized and compiled before considering this input. The review will only be of help to raise the overall ambition if the other inputs are collected according to a tight timeline (inputs from the biannual reports under MRV, etc.). This political phase of the review must be conducted in 2014/15 with a workshop on analysis of National Communications, MRV bi-annual report, etc. in mid 2015 resulting in a draft decision for COP21.

MILESTONES RELATED TO THE REVIEW

2012 COP18	COP18 decision on scope, body and work plan for timely and structured start in 2015
2013 Q1	Workshop to analyze SRREN and SREX and UNEP gap rep, etc
2013 Q2-3	Workshop to analyze WGI of AR5 including a report to secure outcome of IPCC AR5 inputs, inform ADP
2013 COP19	
2014 Q1	workshop to analyze WGII and III of AR5
2014 Q2-3	compile a report to secure first outcomes of review from 2013, inform ADP
2014 COP20	COP mandate on preparation of draft decision on COP21 on action
2015 Q1-2	political phase: workshop for analysis of National Communications, MRV bi-annual rep., etc draft COP21 decision on action
2015 COP21	adoption of draft decision on action

The 2013-2015 review must inform the ambition of mitigation targets in line with science and equity. Thus, the results of this 2013-2015 review must be a crucial input into the ADP negotiations in 2015 and form the basis for post-2020 emission reduction commitments but also to increase pre-2020 ambition. In order to play this role, the Review must provide initial findings in 2013 and report at COP20, and these should be established as milestones in the ADP workplan.

Moreover, the review does not only give input to ADP but direct action should result from its work. Therefore, COP20 in 2014 should decide that draft text on action based on the review would be formulated by the mid-term sessions in 2015. This would enable COP21 in 2015 to decide on ambitious pre-2020 action as result of the first periodical review.

Even after 2020, scientific reviews of the action undertaken need to be conducted. CAN therefore welcomes the Durban LCA Decision on the Review that periodic reviews will be scheduled after 2015 as future IPCC reports become available to assess the adequacy of the collective steps taken by Parties and the long-term goal.

“The Review should translate the latest science to UNFCCC negotiations, starting in 2013 and providing regular input.”

Finance

Long-Term Finance

Most credible assessments, including those presented at the Workshop on Long-term Finance, estimate that at least several hundred billion dollars per year of new and additional financing will be needed to keep the global temperature rise below 2°C, keep open the pathway to stay below 1.5°C, and help developing countries adapt to the unavoidable impacts of a changing climate²¹. This will require substantial new and additional resources from developed country budgets and innovative sources of public finance.

With the expiration of the fast-start finance period at the end of this year, developed country Parties have offered virtually no indication of how these needs will be met going forward. Predictability of support is crucial. In order to better enable developing countries to raise their mitigation ambition and plan and implement urgent adaptation actions, the Parties should take decisions at CoP 18 on the resources that

will be made available in the 2013-2015 period, and indicate how those resources will be scaled up to meet anticipated needs over time.

The commitment by developed countries to mobilize \$100 billion annually by 2020 to support actions in developing

countries could make a substantial contribution toward their financing needs. However, to approach the scale that is needed, leverage and incentivise the much larger shifts in private-sector investments, and guarantee sufficient funding for adaptation, this commitment will need to be met from public sources.

Given that the need for climate finance is several times larger than \$100 billion, any private financial flows that may be mobilized/leveraged by public funds should not be considered as meeting developed countries' \$100 billion commitment. Furthermore, what constitutes

"mobilization" and "leverage", and how leverage is calculated, are unresolved, complex topics, and there is no accepted baseline against which to measure additionality.

To ensure the success of CoP 18 in scaling up mitigation ambition and helping developing countries to meet their adaptation needs, CAN recommends that Parties take decisions which address the following:

Scaling up climate finance

- Developed countries should commit to provide a 2013-2015 public finance package that (a) is at least double the amount of the Fast Start Finance period (2010-12) and ensures early and rapid progress towards the \$100 billion goal, and (b) includes at least \$10-15bn in new public finance for the Green Climate Fund over 2013-2015
- Parties must take into account the output of the Work Programme on Long-term Finance and agree a decision in Doha to annually scale up developed countries' public finance obligation so as to reach \$100 billion in public finance per year by 2020..
- Parties must provide clarity on how the finance-related work mandated by the LCA will be completed, and how finance issues will be addressed after the LCA is closed. After the LCA is concluded, finance issues should be delegated to a workstream that can address outstanding political issues, and can address both adaptation and mitigation financing needs.
- Parties should agree on a process to reassess the adequacy of financial pledges in terms of overall scale required, thematic balance (mitigation/adaptation) and geographical balance of resource distribution. This should be done in light of estimates of developing country needs, the best available climate science, and projected emissions reductions based on existing pledges. The first assessment should be completed no later than 2013.
- In light of the scale of expected needs, Parties should agree that the obligation on developed countries to provide \$100 billion annually by 2020 should be met through public funds from developed countries (from national budgets and innovative sources of public finance).

"Developed countries should commit to provide a 2013-15 public finance package that is double fast start finance; includes \$10-15bn in new public finance for the GCF; and rapidly progresses toward \$100bn"

²¹ IEA, 2009. *World Energy Outlook 2009*, at 9 ("On an annual basis, global additional [energy infrastructure] investment needs reach \$430 billion (0.5% of GDP) in 2020 and \$1.2 trillion (1.1% of GDP) in 2030."); World Bank, 2010. *World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change*, at 6.1 ("Over the next 20 years, mitigation in developing countries could cost \$240-600 billion a year, and adaptation \$10-90 billion a year.")

Sources

- Parties should agree on innovative sources of public financing that can contribute to raising finance at the scale required.
- On specific innovative sources of public finance, CAN recommends that: COP18 send a signal to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) that:
 - (a) supports efforts by ICAO and IMO to develop global schemes to address GHG emissions from international aviation and maritime transport, respectively, including carbon pricing of their emissions,
 - (b) clarifies how these carbon pricing schemes can take into account national circumstances of various countries, impact on developing country consumers, and the principles of the different conventions especially CBDRRC under the UNFCCC without distorting competition and avoiding carbon leakage,
 - (c) recommends that revenues resulting from carbon pricing of international transport should be used to support global action on climate change, with a share of the revenue channeled through the Green Climate Fund.
- COP-18 welcomes progress made toward establishing a financial transactions tax under Enhanced Cooperation among some EU nations and urges relevant Parties to ensure that a significant share of revenues generated are directed to international climate finance through the Green Climate Fund.
- Parties take meaningful steps to develop other innovative sources of public finance, such as from special drawing rights, auctioning AAUs, or carbon taxes. In addition, by redirecting fossil fuel subsidies in developed countries, mitigation incentives could be set along with raising climate finance. Developed countries could also explore further options for expanding space in national budgets for increasing international climate finance, such as by addressing tax evasion and avoidance by multinational corporations and reducing military spending.

Reporting and accounting

- To enhance transparency and comparability, Parties should agree on improving existing guidelines and further develop a common framework to measure, report and verify delivery of financial support, including at the project level. This methodology should ensure that financial information is measured and reported in a consistent, timely, comprehensive and publicly accessible manner. It should establish a common metric for "additionality". It should also clearly set out (a) the type of support and sector, (b) the sources of funds, (c) the channels and financial instruments used, (d) amounts pledged and committed, distinguishing between loans and grants, (e) the portion of the contribution that is "new and additional", and the basis for that characterization, and (f) clear distinctions between the portions that are generated from public coffers and from private sources.
- Parties should agree that for loans, guarantees, or other non-grant financial instruments through which public funds may be channeled, only the grant equivalent should be counted toward the public contribution.

Operationalization and strengthening of institutions

- Parties should ensure the rapid operationalization and full functionality of the Green Climate Fund, the Standing Committee, the registry, the Adaptation Committee, and the Technology Executive Committee and Climate Technology Center and Network. Parties should also ensure mechanisms are put in place to capture lessons learned from these entities and set operational linkages between them (eg between the GCF and the AC, the Registry for designing eligibility criteria and modalities).
- The adaptation window under the GCF should incorporate and build on the experience of Adaptation Fund in adopting direct access, grant base, full financing, country-driven, gender-sensitive, participatory and transparent approach in financing adaptation for developing countries, communities and ecosystems. The AF, as the only fund under the Convention with a proven track record and clear focus on urgent and concrete adaptation actions could play a

In addition to decisions taken by the COP, the Board of the GCF must also take a number of decisions to operationalize the GCF as soon as possible. These include decisions related to:

Role of the private sector – The role of the private sector should be determined by national strategies that are developed through fully participatory processes. GCF resources directed toward the private-sector should make substantial contributions to sustainable, vibrant local economies, including in low-income countries. In order to support endogenous development that stimulates local entrepreneurship, the GCF should assure access to financing for small, medium and microenterprises. To help ensure country ownership of private sector projects, host country Parties must be able to exercise the no-objection procedure at the early stages of any GCF activity. Instruments that pose excessive risk, either financially or environmentally, should be excluded, and effectiveness should be ensured.

National designated authorities and genuine country ownership – GCF support must be based on principles and modalities of inclusive country ownership through the national designated authorities (NDAs). Funding should be provided according to a country-led strategy and plans, such as NAMAs, low-carbon development strategies, NAPAs, NAPs, etc. Country-led strategies and their implementation should be developed and overseen by the NDAs through a fully participatory multi-stakeholder mechanism that includes government, all segments of civil society, affected communities (with special consideration and equitable representation for women and Indigenous Peoples), and domestic private sector actors. These processes will need to be designed by countries according to their particular circumstances.

Global Standards – GCF-funded activities should apply internationally recognized human rights and social, gender, environmental and transparency standards.

Civil society engagement – The GCF must put in place inclusive, representative, transparent and effective processes for participation by civil society and affected communities, both at the national level and at the board level. At the board level, this should include the process for selection of and participation by the active observers and for broad civil society participation, engagement and consultation. A process must also be put in place to allow Indigenous Peoples to represent themselves at the board level. The GCF should also ensure participation of a diverse range of private sector actors, including micro, small and medium enterprises from developing and developed countries. At the national level, the national designated authorities (NDAs) should ensure the full and effective participation of civil society, affected communities and domestic private sector actors in the NDAs. At the national level, the NDAs should also ensure balanced gender representation and special consideration of Indigenous Peoples. Lastly, a robust easily accessible accountability mechanism must be established at every level of decision-making.

Direct access – In order to ensure country ownership for the management of climate finance, it is also vital that the GCF fully implement the direct access modality as the preferred method by which developing countries will access finance. This should include providing financing through nationally-based implementing entities, perhaps including multiple entities in individual countries, to coordinate the implementation of country-led strategy and plans. When developing direct access modalities, the GCF Board should take into account the lessons learned from the Adaptation Fund and seek to facilitate the use of National Implementing Entities already accredited under the AF, where appropriate.

complementary role to the longer term and programmatic approach of the GCF. Therefore it is essential not only to strengthen the AF - while ensuring effective coordination with the Green Climate Fund - but also to explore ways to diversify and scale up its scarce resources so it can adequately respond to the increasing funding needs of developing countries.

Green Climate Fund

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) should be the primary channel of climate finance as soon as it is fully operationalised and capable of receiving and disbursing finance. Towards this end, developed countries should commit in Doha to provide substantial initial contributions to the GCF. These initial commitments should be the first step toward scaling up the GCF so that its annual turnover in 2020 constitutes the majority of the \$100 billion per year of resources committed by developed countries.

To expedite the operationalization of the GCF in Doha:

- Parties should take decisions necessary for the full operationalization of the Green Climate Fund, including (a) selecting the host country; (b) launching a process to select a head for the Secretariat; and (c) concluding an agreement between the Board and the COP that sets out the basic parameters of their working relationship, in accordance with Article 11 of the Convention and the GCF Governing Instrument.
- As part of its overall 2013-15 finance package, developed country Parties should commit at least \$10-15 billion in new and additional public finance to be disbursed to the GCF over the years 2013-2015. Fifty percent of these initial resources should be allocated by the GCF to adaptation, through direct access where possible and preferable;
- Developed country Parties that contributed to the World Bank's Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) should pivot away from provision of future funds for the CIFs and similar initiatives under the multilateral development banks, and commit to redirecting these monies toward the GCF.

6

Technology

The Technology issue seems to be one that has moved substantially relative to other issues. However, closer inspection exposes the substantial work that remains to be done by Qatar. CAN is of the view that the Technology Mechanism needs to be fully operational from 2013 onwards and that requires all the pending issues for establishing the institutions of the Mechanism to be completed by Qatar. There needs to be a decision in the Doha COP on the functioning of the Mechanism, which includes the following:

1. Initial capitalisation of the Mechanism needs to be planned under the UNFCCC for at least five years;
2. Conclusion of the constitution and terms of reference of the Advisory Board of the CTCN;
3. Reporting lines for the Technology mechanism, specifically including how it would report to the COP and the linkages of the bodies of the technology mechanism in the reporting structure;
4. Establishment of coherent linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the various relevant bodies that are established under arrangements of LCA.

CAN asks COP18 to make provision for taking up resolution of any ongoing political elements of these issues at appropriate level under the ADP, and so, asks that specific placeholders be provided for these issues under the ADP track.

Further, CAN asks the COP to consider any issues relating to creating enabling environments for technology diffusion, development, and deployment that are offered by the Technology Executive Committee, and to give political guidance to the TEC as needed. Based on TEC reports we ask the COP to provide a time-lined roadmap to address the issues of enabling environments and provide appropriate mandates to the TEC or other bodies of the Technology Mechanism. CAN was pleased to respond to the TEC's call for submission in this area and looks forward to our input being well considered. CAN recognizes the need for political guidance from the COP on the issue of intellectual property

rights (IPR) and calls for a decision at COP18 to create a forum to consider cooperative actions on technology development and transfer. This forum would be mandated to address barriers to the transfer of technologies and know-how for adaptation and mitigation, including IPR issues raised by Parties on a case by case basis, and would facilitate Party cooperation to undertake a range of appropriate measures to address these issues. CAN suggests that the forum prioritize the following cooperative actions:

1. cooperate with existing international bodies with relevant expertise;
2. facilitate information exchange about IPR related challenges through a web-based platform;
3. create a multi-stakeholder platform on information sharing and enforcement on anti-competitive practices in climate mitigation and adaptation technology markets; and
4. create an arbitration mechanism to address IPR licensing problems that arise in the context of any legal dispute.

Finally, CAN points out that there is yet an omission in the structure of the Technology Mechanism: it lacks a process to redress concerns that stakeholders might raise on the impacts of implementations of technology transfer. CAN believes that such a procedure is critical to ensuring the TM's responsiveness to developing country needs and ultimately its success. CAN would welcome the opportunity to make further input on this issue.

“The Technology Mechanism needs to be fully operational from 2013 onwards – all pending issues must be completed by Qatar”

7

Capacity Building

Capacity and capability are so closely related that in many circumstances, they almost amount to the same thing. Parties must appreciate that capacity building is absolutely essential to effectively operationalising the “respective capability” element of the CBDRRC principle. In terms of ensuring equitable access to sustainable development, initial capacity to access, optimise and operationalise the tools of sustainable development is an important pre-condition for ultimate success.

In the 2012-2015 period, Parties need to concentrate on an intensive effort at designing and delivering an operational framework for much enhanced capacity building and capacity development through a series of COP/CMP decisions supervised by **a dedicated and specific workstream on capacity, capacity building, and capacity development as a basic component of the overall ADP workplans.**

Following a consultation phase in 2012, the ADP should facilitate and supervise a 2-year programme of work on capacity, capacity development and capacity building primarily negotiated in the SBI, COP and CMP, resulting in the full establishment by COP-20/CMP-10 (2014) of a new capacity coordination and supervision structure capable of being fully operational by the end of 2014, and working seamlessly with new or enhanced structures for finance, technology, adaptation, forests, MRV, mechanisms, the registry and the development and oversight of low-carbon development strategies (LEDS).

The right of developing countries to be able to access capacity for sustainable development, and the obligation of more developed countries to support it, should be part of the 2015 agreed outcome.

Timeline:

2012 – Bonn: Durban Forum in-depth discussion on CB outcome for the ADP, elements of ADP CB workplan; SBI initial text for Doha CB conclusions.

2012 – Bangkok: Continued discussion of CB architecture to be delivered by ADP, finalisation of CB elements of ADP workplan

2012 – Doha, COP-18/CMP-8 decision to initiate 2-year Doha Capacity Action Plan to deliver fully integrated capacity co-ordination function by end of 2014. Call for submission of views from Parties, IGOs and Observers on architecture(s) for capacity co-ordination, delivery and implementation

2013 – SBI/ADP/COP/CMP: Consultation and design phase for fully integrated capacity co-ordination function – Durban Forum and subsequent workshops to consider views from Parties, IGO’s, and Observers. Consolidation of options for architecture(s), including linkages inside ADP with finance, technology, adaptation, forests, MRV, mechanisms, the registry and the development and oversight of low-carbon development strategies (LEDS). Elements of text for legal expression of right of developing countries to access capacity for sustainable development and obligation of more developed countries to support it.

(2013) - COP-19/CMP-9 decision on basic elements for governance, authority and resourcing of fully integrated capacity co-ordination function to be established by end of 2014, including outline legal relationships with other UNFCCC constituted bodies.

2014 – SBI/ADP/COP/CMP: Finalisation of full elements of governance, authority and resourcing for fully integrated capacity co-ordination function. Further development of text for the legal expression of the right of developing countries to access capacity for sustainable development and the obligation of more developed countries to support it. Text for other capacity and capacity development elements required for effective post-2020 ADP agreement.

(2014) - COP-20/CMP-10: Establishment of fully integrated capacity co-ordination function.

2015 – SBI/ADP/COP/CMP: Final negotiation of text for legal expression of right of developing countries to access capacity for sustainable development and obligation of more developed countries to support it, including new capacity and capacity development elements required for an effective post-2020 agreement.

8

Measurement, Reporting & Verification (MRV)

Parties made the MRV system operational in Durban: Parties developed guidelines for reporting and review including: biennial reports by developed countries; biennial update reports (BUR) by developing countries; international assessment and review (IAR) for developed countries, and international consultation and analysis (ICA) for developing countries. However, the outcome fell significantly short of what is needed for a robust regime to account for mitigation actions and finance. Further work is critical to help ensure the environmental integrity of the regime.

On clarification of pledges, a common template for A1 Parties was agreed, but not for NA1 Parties, and this is needed. More clarity and detail is critical for tracking progress toward national goals and progress toward the agreed aggregate global goal of limiting warming to less than 2°C, and ensuring that the option to limit warming to less than 1.5°C remains viable. Additionally, Parties should agree on general guidelines for developing country domestic MRV, and initiate immediate steps to provide support for building the necessary capacities and arrangements for effective in-country MRV, as well as for the robust preparation of GHG inventories.

With respect to review, the current IAR and ICA processes do not provide the authority for the expert review team (ERT) or the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to make recommendations to the Party under review. Thus, in addition agreeing on the modalities for the composition of ERTs for ICA and IAR, Parties should agree at COP 18 to allow recommendations by ERTs and the SBI to Parties under review. Furthermore, the IAR process must have compliance consequences attached to the review.

It is also critical to ensure that important opportunities for public participation in MRV processes that were stripped from the final decision are brought back into MRV rules and agreed at COP18.

Parties should also agree on a common process to measure, report and verify financial contributions. The common reporting format should ensure comparable, consistent, accurate, and transparent reporting of financial contributions.

Robust MRV rules will be particularly important in the design of the new market-based mechanism called for ¶ 83 of the Durban LCA text. Parties must develop strong rules to ensure commitments are being achieved and that double counting of emission reductions is avoided. Such rules must apply to all Parties who participate in international market-based mechanisms, for both pre-2020 and post-2020 commitments.

Parties should agree to incorporate reporting on the existence of fossil fuel subsidies and, separately, efforts to remove these subsidies in their reporting (either through National Communications or Biennial Reports, as appropriate). Increased transparency on this issue is critical to ensuring that efforts to remove these subsidies are comprehensive and well-planned in order to be successful.

Significant work is needed to agree to common, consistent, complete, comparable, transparent and accurate accounting rules for all developed countries to help ensure comparability and compliance.

Respecting CBDRRRC, a work program should be established to assess mitigation reductions from developing countries in a facilitative manner to help gauge aggregate global emission reductions and keep track of progress against the 2 degree / 1.5 degree goal. At present, developing countries have varying, often limited, capacities to participate in a common accounting framework. Over time, this capacity will need to be built up. The international framework should allow for a reasonably smooth transition in methodologies, reporting requirements, and capabilities, over nationally-appropriate time periods; it should facilitate moving from accounting and reporting for project-level NAMAs through to wider scale NAMAs (including sectoral NAMAs), and eventually to economy-wide plans and actions. Such transitions could continue to be addressed through a tiering of accounting and reporting

“Further work on MRV of action and support is critical to help ensure environmental integrity. The ADP must build on and strengthen current MRV and compliance.”

methodologies, respecting CDBRRC. Over time common accounting rules will have to apply to an ever growing set of Parties.

Moving beyond existing processes and in the context of a post-2015 regime, the ADP must build on and strengthen current MRV rules. If there are outstanding issues in the LCA, the COP should delegate remaining work to relevant subsidiary bodies to carry forward into the ADP. Additionally, the text must include a mandate to elaborate future compliance mechanisms with both facilitative and enforcement aspects, while respecting CDBRRC. Also, the Durban Platform must agree on common criteria for the technology registry for support framework under the Durban Platform by the end of 2013, which should be made operational by 2015 under the MRV system.

9

Equity, Effort sharing, equitable access to sustainable development (EASD)

The lack of an effort sharing agreement – an equitable approach to sharing the costs of mitigation and adaptation amongst countries – has long been a stumbling block to agreeing sufficient mitigation. Countries are concerned that they will be asked to do more than is their fair share, and conversely that other countries will 'free ride' off their effort. Developing countries, in particular, are extremely concerned that global emissions restrictions will limit their ability to develop, and thus to attain decent living standards for their citizens.

A common, science-based understanding of fair shares among countries, one specific enough to mark out an equity corridor that can help to overcome the trust barrier and lead to higher levels of ambition from all. The situation is extremely challenging: developed-world emissions must drop as demanded by science, and even in developing countries, where most people have much lower incomes, very challenging emissions pathways will be necessary. In this context, Parties must launch an urgent work program designed to increase understanding of, and further agreement on, ways and options for the allocation of fair shares of the necessary global effort.

To emphasize – if the negotiations are to be successful, the Parties must work towards **a common understanding** of equity principles and indicators. To that end, we must all realize that it is very unlikely that any single formula, indicator or metric will ever be fully agreed, to the point where it can be used to determine the fair-shares obligations of different countries. On the other hand, such an agreement is not strictly necessary. What is necessary is **a range of agreed principles and objective indicators and metrics**, one that is concrete enough to clarify the distinction

between the kinds of “national circumstances” that are relevant within the equity debate (those that bear upon the challenge of sustainable development for all) and the kinds that are not. The goal, ultimately, is to inform the political negotiations and shape Parties’ perceptions of what can reasonably be expected of others.

Discussions within the ADP need to integrate science and equity to share the necessary global effort among Parties in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Convention. The goal can only be to cooperatively limit climate disruption, while supporting the developing countries with the means to keep within the remaining constrained carbon budget, and to adapt to the inevitable impacts of climate change.

To deliver the Parties vision for the ADP under Workstream 1, Parties must work under the ADP to interactively exchange their views and positions on equity. How should equity principles be applied in the new agreement? What indicators best specify those principles? How can we best ensure each Party is doing its fair share of the global effort without compromising its sustainable development needs? How will we provide developing countries with the means to implement their commitments and how will we cooperatively ensure that the global emissions reach a rapid and sustainable peak, one consistent with an agreed temperature goal and cumulative emission reduction pathways that would allow the world to stay within that goal.

We believe the new negotiations under the ADP provides a vital opportunity to advance the discussions that took place in the EASD workshop in Bonn, and the interest expressed by the Parties in the ADP roundtable discussions in Bangkok, through a continuing work programme on equity. It is critical to create a special space for the equity dialogue to continue, in order to take this issue forward to enable Parties to deliver a fair, ambitious and effective international agreement in 2015.

The current lack of agreement should not stand in the way of an immediate and necessary increase in mitigation ambition from all countries and an immediate and necessary increase in finance from developed countries. These increases in short term ambition should take place within the existing framework, including the existing Annexes. This is a matter of basic trust, and a precondition of success in the now

very near-term future. We already know that developed countries’ mitigation pledges fall well short of their fair share as required by science and under any reasonable approach to effort sharing. And developed countries are far from providing the financing necessary to actually meet the adaptation and mitigation needs of developing countries. Increased 2020 mitigation targets, nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) and commensurate financial and other support must be agreed at COP18/CMP8.

A comprehensive agreement in 2015 that allocates mitigation and financial effort will require at least a rough common understanding on equity. CAN envisages a number of phases and processes in such negotiations.

Our strategy should be to establish a commonly understood “equity corridor,” a channel of broader principles and approaches within which to begin moving, even as we narrow the debate to more detailed, more technical and more difficult questions.

Phase 1: Discussions should begin anew, with **all parties making good faith efforts to understand each other’s’ predicaments**. Expert external input is essential during this phase. The May 16LCA session on equitable access to sustainable development, in particular, should be a first step in a new effort towards a shared understanding of equity, one that reconciles responsibility (past and future), capacity, sustainable development as a right and a political necessity, scientifically driven mitigation imperatives and, irreducibly, the right to survival. The problem of finance and technology transfer must be understood in the context of vanishing global carbon budgets, and the simultaneous, and equally implacable necessity of sustainable development.

Other opportunities must be created at the Qatar COP. **The key is that equity must formally become integral to the ADP agenda. To that end, country submissions, Secretariat analyses, and further workshops are needed to feed into the ADP workplan that will**

“Parties must launch an equity work program to increase understanding and agreement on ways and options for allocating fair shares of the necessary global effort.”

emerge from Qatar. The ADP should encourage broad discussions by various bodies and organisations, including civil society, and request them to bring their findings through in-session workshops into the ADP process so that the Parties can agree on a work programme for embedding equity issues under the ADP discussions.

Phase 2: In 2013 Parties should begin negotiations with the aim of reaching agreement on equity principles and criteria for their appropriate operationalization. These negotiations should specify the agenda items under which this work would be undertaken, and be supplemented by the work of SBSTA and SBI, particularly with respect to the technical unpacking of the concept of “equitable access to sustainable development.”

Phase 3: In 2014 Parties should begin negotiations on the application of principles and criteria to the issues under negotiation – the level of collective ambition, differentiated post-2020 commitments on mitigation and finance, adaptation, and so on. This phase would necessarily require discussion on the interaction between finance, mitigation and adaptation. This phase should include an indicative set of COP 20 commitments, thus allowing 2015 to be treated a milestone by which to assess the overall adequacy of commitments.

These discussions and negotiations must begin with a determination to establish a principled foundation, even as we negotiate on the application of principles and criteria to the key issues – the level of collective ambition in light of the ambitious global goal, justly differentiated post-2020 commitments, the interaction between finance, mitigation and adaptation, and all the rest.

The importance of equity is reflected in the overarching principle of the UNFCCC that Parties act “on the basis of equity” (Article 3.1). CAN has undertaken a detailed assessment of the principles of equity contained within the Convention and invites Parties to peruse our Effort Sharing **Principles Paper**²² which offers an assessment of the equity principles of the Convention. Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities

(CBDRRC) remains a key and underlying principle of the Convention and, along with the other equity principles of the Convention including the precautionary approach to avoiding the adverse impacts of climate change, should form the basis of discussions. CAN’s assessment of the wide range of equity principles indicates that a small number of “core” principles that should form the foundation of the discussion and negotiation outlined above:

Core equity principles:

- **The adequacy principle**, which is an equity principle for the simple reason that climate catastrophe would be the ultimate injustice. If any proposed regime is incapable of delivering an ambitious global mobilization (using 1.5°C and the survival of the most vulnerable as our benchmark) it simply cannot be accepted as equitable.
- **The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRRC)** remains key. We badly need a common understanding of equitable effort sharing, one that reconciles the abstract principle of CBDRRC with a concrete model of global differentiation that is adequate to the complexities of the emerging world system. Such an approach, obviously, must give due account to both *responsibility* for the climate problem and the *capability* to act on it.
- **The right to sustainable development.** This principle (and its reach beyond “poverty eradication”) is inevitably controversial, but, in truth, there will be no effective global ambition without it. To be very clear, “equitable access to sustainable development” implies no right to unconstrained emissions but, but very much does imply the right of developing countries to attain a decent living standards for their people; such a misinterpretation would conflict with the fundamental objective of the Convention (to protect the climate system).

²² The CAN Fair Effort Sharing Principles Position Paper: <http://www.climatenetwork.org/publication/can-position-effort-sharing-principles-nov-2011> identifies the equity principles within the Convention, and gives some ideas as to how these could be measured and operationalised. The CAN Discussion Paper – Fair Effort Sharing: <http://www.climatenetwork.org/publication/can-discussion-paper-fair-effort-sharing-jul-2011> analyses how various models meet equity parameters, including GDRs, the Oxfam approach, equal per capita approaches, the Indian carbon budget approach, the South/North Dialogue approach and the European Commission proposal.

MILESTONES OF THE DURBAN PLATFORM WORKPLAN RELEVANT TO AN INCREASED UNDERSTANDING OF EQUITY

2012 Q2	Phase 1 Workshop: Discussion, sharing ideas on equity Workplan and process agreed, including milestones	LCA/ADP
2012 Q3	Technical paper on equity principles and possible criteria to judge or measure equity principles, including CDDRRC Submissions on principles and criteria to judge or measure equity principles Discussions within Bangkok workshop on principles and criteria, based on technical paper & submissions	LCA
2012 Q4 COP18	Durban provides sufficient space, at a workshop or other, for discussions to continue on principles and criteria, based on technical paper & submissions. Workplan for next 3 years agreed under the Durban Platform, identifying milestones.	LCA /ADP COP Decision
2013 Q1	Phase 2 Negotiations begin with the aim to reach agreement on equity principles and broad criteria appropriate to those principles. UNFCCC Secretariat Technical Paper on equity principles and appropriate criteria.	ADP
2013 Q2	Submissions and negotiations on ways to operationalise equity principles including CDDRRC	ADP
2013 Q3	Equity negotiations	ADP
2013 Q4 COP19	Agreement on equity principles and broad, appropriate criteria	COP Decision
2014 Q1	Phase 3 Negotiations on how to operationalise equity principles, including how to apply principles and criteria to level of collective ambition, differentiated post-2020 commitments on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology and capacity building etc.	ADP
2014 Q2	Negotiations on how to operationalise equity principles, including how to apply principles and criteria to level of collective ambition, differentiated post-2020 commitments on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology and capacity building etc.	ADP
2014 Q3	Negotiations on how to operationalise equity principles, including how to apply principles and criteria to level of collective ambition, differentiated post-2020 commitments on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology and capacity building etc.	ADP
2014 Q4 COP20	Operationalisation of equity principles and criteria agreed. As well as the interaction between mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology and capacity building etc. This might include a series of Annexes with graduation criteria or a responsibility and capacity index approach.	ADP agreed text and COP Decision
2015 Q1	Within the mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology and capacity building streams assess commitments on the table to ensure they are adequate to reach the global goal and in line with the equity principles and criteria agreed.	

- Gender disparities** within countries (women and men contribute more/less to GHG emissions, are more/less impacted by climate change, have more/less access to adaptation measures – including finance, technology and capacity building)

When climate protection instruments are developed, these disparities must be taken into proper account.
- Geographic disparities** within countries (mountainous areas, delta areas, rural areas, slum areas – have different impacts and access to adaptation measures)
- Economic disparities** within countries (economic stratification, marginalized and vulnerable groups)

Adaptation

Adaptation to the adverse impacts of climate change is now more urgent than ever. While increasing the level of ambition in mitigation actions remains crucial to prevent further dangerous climate change, it is clear that climate change has already started causing catastrophic disasters and its impacts are unavoidable due to past emissions and lock-in for further impacts. This totally undermines efforts to ensure the fulfilment of human rights of the poorest and most vulnerable, and protecting them from suffering from their vulnerability.

The adaptation agenda under UNFCCC has made significant progress in the last years, with the adoption of the Cancun Adaptation Framework an important milestone and initiation of important processes and institutions such as the National Adaptation Plans, the Loss and Damage Work Programme and the Adaptation Committee. In Durban, Parties further consolidated these processes and institutions. Issues not adequately addressed recently found their initial place e.g. on the Adaptation Committee agenda (such as regional centers), which should elaborate

“COP18 must scale up adaptation actions and start to address the growing loss and damage facing the poorest and most vulnerable due to lack of ambition.”

a basis for further action. However, it is now important to strengthen the operationalisation of these aspects as a starting point for a more consolidated adaptation framework, and to take the next steps with decisions in due course. Key issues

remaining include full financing for adaptation and for developed nations to fulfil their historic but unmet pledges on climate finance and also to resolve what happens when adaptive capacity is exceeded and loss and damage occurs. Since it's expected that climate change impacts will substantially increase in the coming years, time is pressing to scale-up adaptation in the context of climate-resilient development at all levels in developing countries.

We urge Parties to take decisions at COP18 which ensure the scaling-up of adaptation actions, while at the same time start to address seriously the growing loss and damage that

in particular the poorest and most vulnerable people will face due to lack of ambition in mitigation and adaptation action.

Key issues to progress on the adaptation agenda are in particular the following:

- **National Adaptation Plans:** Developing countries must be actively supported in preparing their NAPs in the next two years. The process must include coming up with better estimates of the adaptation costs as well as the potential loss and damage from climate change, which will occur due to the lack of adaptation and mitigation. Full implementation of NAPA and NAPs should be a key element for the post-2020 agreement and substantive progress must be made well before 2020. The learning from the development and implementation of NAPA and NAPs will also provide valuable inputs on the post-2020 adaptation needs. The process must not only be limited to the LDCs but other developing countries should also be supported. In this regard, **COP18** needs to agree on the funding modalities for NAPs in order to scale-up the work immediately as well as provide predictability for the delivery of resources for NAPs implementation. It was also agreed in Durban to review the NAPs guidelines by COP19. This should then also include to assess whether these adequately address loss and damage in the adaptation context.
- **Loss and damage** from the adverse effects of climate change cuts across mitigation and adaptation. Given the continued lack of mitigation ambition and inadequate resources to implement adaptation actions, poor and vulnerable communities and countries are facing the risk of significant loss and damage from climate change impacts. At the same time there is an obvious lack of governments to live up to their responsibilities in creating the problem. The situation is likely to get worse in future. Increasing mitigation ambition and rapid scaling up of adaptation action must happen simultaneously to reduce loss and damage. The work programme currently going on under SBI with its regional expert meetings is already delivering progress in understanding the issues and challenges. **COP18**, based on the inputs from the ongoing work programme, must progress in developing a comprehensive response to loss and damage. Given the needs and gaps identified in the regional

expert meetings, CAN sees the need for the establishment of an international mechanism to address loss and damage. Potential functions include to assist in particular developing countries in understanding loss and damage, to coordinate relevant work that is going on with regard to the diverse risks (both rapid and slow-onset) and to provide increased finance for the full range of approaches for addressing loss and damage, including by rehabilitating and compensating the losses and damage. The seriousness and scale of the problem is still not reflected in the way that Parties, in particular those from developed countries respond on the international political level. Enhanced action on loss and damage, both economic and non-economic losses, should not come on the expense of pro-active adaptation finance, however, should neither provide incentives for mal-adaptation. A second phase of a work programme should be established at **COP18** to elaborate the principle, function and the institutional structure of international mechanism on loss and damage. While this will require substantial technical considerations, it is clear that loss and damage is of a truly political nature, given its existential implications for whole countries due to its link to the level of mitigation ambition. Thus, there must be a place for addressing loss and damage also under the **ADP** and by the **COP**, based on the link to the more technical work undertaken in the SBI

- The **Adaptation Committee**, unfortunately, has not yet been able to play its role due to the delay in nominations. By COP18, the initial work plan should be agreed, at least for the first year. In the perspective until 2015, this should include providing input into the ADP as a contribution to the 2015 negotiations. Elements of this workplan could be proposals how to strengthen the role of regional centers, how to support a scaling-up of community and ecosystem-based adaptation including regional and trans-boundary adaptation approaches. Key lessons learnt from adaptation finance need to be assessed and fed back into the financial mechanism and the Standing Committee. Linkages with other bodies under the UNFCCC, as well as outside, need to be established in order to advance the effective implementation of the Cancun Adaptation Framework. With a view to working towards a more integrated framework in 2015, this should also include liaising with the Hyogo

Framework for Action, the SDG and post-MDG process, CBD and UNCCD, in order to overall strengthen climate-resilient development.

In further building up the global adaptation response, hopes also lay with the Nairobi Work Programme (NWP). At COP18 under SBSTA new inputs are expected from a technical workshop on water and climate change impacts and adaptation strategies held in Mexico in July 2012, from country progress reports, as well as from a compilation of case studies on national adaptation planning processes that will be handed out by the secretariat. It will be essential that those inputs further enhance the views about potential future areas of work of the NWP, which the SBSTA is requested to consider at its 38th session to provide recommendations to the COP at its 19th session. The NWP should look at particular gaps, such as issues like loss and damage related to slow-onset processes, as well as the concurrent problem of ocean acidification. This can also inform the work programme on loss and damage towards building up an international mechanism. In addition, the the engagement with organizations and institutions outside UNFCCC, such as WMO, FAO, WHO, Rio Convention, UNISDR, UNEP, UNDP needs to be enhanced, as well as the strengthening of the catalytic role of the NWP by improving the applicability of information and knowledge gathered by stakeholders at different levels around the world.

Building up a global response towards 2015

With regard to the ADP and the negotiations towards a 2015 agreement, it will be crucial that the ADP makes a significant contribution in delivering an adaptation approach, which adequately responds to the immediate needs and future threats for particularly the vulnerable developing countries, communities and ecosystems. Adaptation must be treated with the same priority as mitigation in the agreement. Also, its inherent equity dimensions need to be taken into account, such as a fair distribution of adaptation finance according to risks and needs with particular attention to the most vulnerable countries, ecosystem and people. It is important that the ADP strengthens the existing international adaptation regime and structures, to advance implementation of the Cancun Adaptation Framework at the earliest, including through specific COP decisions in the road to the 2015 agreement.

A stepwise approach to adaptation must be

implemented also addressing “unfinished business” from the past years’ of negotiations as well as the identification of adaptation needs post-2020, either in the ADP in connection with ADP process. Unfinished business, in addition to the points raised above, includes

- The means of implementation for adaptation implementation (finance including for 2012-2020, technology and capacity building), including the inadequate implementation of the NAPAs
- strengthening and where necessary establishing regional centers and networks and national institutional arrangements;
- the lack of recognition in past agreements that lack of mitigation ambition directly increases the threats as well as adaptation needs of the poorest and most vulnerable people and ecosystems in the developing world. Strengthening such principles in future agreements is therefore important not only from equity perspective but also to take into account the growing risks from climate change inherent in the gap in mitigation ambition. The implementation and adequacy of the Cancún Adaptation Framework must be regularly reviewed in light of the mitigation ambition and the needs of, and support provided to, the developing countries.

The ADP workplan should include the development of a workplan for addressing the post-2020 adaptation needs, building on the inputs, in particular, from the Adaptation Committee, the IPCC AR5, the Loss and Damage work programme, the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) process and the Nairobi Work Programme (NWP). This workplan must include progress in the operationalization of adaptation decisions, prepared in the different bodies under the Convention, and must strengthen and build in continuous feedback and learning systems, so that present and future needs can be met.

In terms of financing, adaptation should be treated with equal priority as mitigation. Currently there is a massive shortfall of finance available compared to the needs of World Bank and others in the order of USD 100bn. This figure doesn’t include misery or loss of life or degradation of ecosystems nor is in line with current figures of increasingly high emissions and impacts. Instruments to raise international funds for adaptation actions in developing countries should be from public sources primarily

and also incentivise mitigation, where possible (e.g. revenues from bunkers, redirected fossil fuel subsidies, see finance section). A periodic review of the available finance and the funds needed should be established, based also on mitigation ambition and future climate impacts projections. The international institutional set-up of adaptation finance must be strengthened. The adaptation window under the GCF must be build up rapidly and increasingly provide comprehensive support for the vulnerable developing countries’ domestically identified adaptation needs. The access of any adaptation finance from GCF should be through direct access and in the form of grants and not loans, with special attention to the poorest and particularly vulnerable countries. The implementation of NAPs with all its elements should become a main task from 2020 onwards, but also before. The implementation of concrete adaptation projects and programmes remains crucial. CAN therefore recognises the important role of the Adaptation Fund, both as a pilot for direct access as well as a funding instruments which pursues the strategic priority to focus on the needs of the most vulnerable communities. It should receive increasing attention. Developed countries should pledge additional resources into the AF at COP18 and beyond. However, the effective delivery of adaptation finance is crucial and must be build on key principles, including those contained in the Cancún Adaptation Framework, and strengthen their application. Investments which result in maladaptation or which undermine the livelihoods of the most vulnerable people must be avoided.

The existing bodies and institutions should invite inputs from civil society into contact groups and workshops and create conditions for their meaningful participation at the ADP meeting in the upcoming COPs and intersessionals. Such interaction will help in taking stock of the progress made and identifying issues and actions to be covered by the 2015 agreement.

Agriculture

Agricultural production is threatened by climate change, thus jeopardizing global food security. Smallholders, comprising approximately 500 million small farms, are particularly vulnerable to climate change, potentially making nearly two billion people food insecure worldwide. Therefore, Parties must ensure that climate policies encompassing agriculture include considerations and safeguards that protect and promote food security, biodiversity, equitable access to resources, the right to food, animal welfare, and the rights of indigenous peoples and local populations, while promoting poverty reduction and climate adaptation. Climate policies addressing agriculture must have adaptation as a primary focus, due to the strong and growing impacts of climate on food insecurity.

In the final Declaration of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio (20-22 June 2012) UN member states reaffirmed the right of everyone to have access to safe, sufficient and nutritious food, consistent with the right to adequate food and the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger. They recognized the importance of supporting developing countries in their efforts to develop sustainable agriculture and their commitment to enhance food security, emphasizing the need for agricultural development to occur in an economically, socially, and environmentally sustainable manner.

The text reaffirms that sustainable agriculture:

- improves food security,
- eradicates hunger,
- is economically viable,
- conserves land, water, plant and animal genetic resources,
- protects biodiversity and ecosystems,
- enhances resilience to climate change and natural disasters, and
- maintains natural ecological processes that support food production systems.

UNFCCC efforts should support and match these commitments and take place within the context of other international policy decisions on climate change and agriculture; for example, those of the Committee on World Food Security. UNFCCC needs to incorporate the Maastricht Principles on

Extraterritorial Obligations of States.

Policies need to promote biodiverse, resilient agricultural systems that achieve social and gender equity and are led by small producers. Wherever required, such systems should be developed, demonstrated, tested, and implemented, so as to transform currently unsustainable agricultural systems into ones that improve ecosystem health, communities, and cultures – even in the face of a changing climate.

SBSTA should facilitate the exchange of views among Parties on:

- Identifying agro-ecological practices that contribute to food security, soil health, and climate resilience, in a sustainable way;
- Assessing the impact of large-scale, high-input agriculture on soil, ecosystems, food security, small-scale producers, and farm animal welfare;
- Documenting and disseminating examples of smallholder farming that employ sustainable farming techniques, which can improve soil fertility, conserve natural resources, support biodiversity, reduce dependency on expensive inputs, raise yields and promote gender equity;
- Analysing the impact of biofuels on the global agricultural system and food security;
- Identifying approaches that improve access to information, enhance interactions among and between farmers and the scientific community, promote farmer-driven research and innovations to increase the utilization of agro-ecological approaches;
- Assessing existing adaptation policies whether they are designed to avoid aggravating existing inequalities and support the most vulnerable;
- Assessing full and comprehensive accounting of the emissions associated with agricultural activities in developed countries, including bio-energy production and use;

“Current unsustainable agriculture systems should be transformed into ones that improve ecosystem health, communities and cultures – even in the face of a changing climate.”

- Assessing the environmental and social integrity of climate policies in agricultural sector, including their impacts on food security;
- Assessing policies that avoid and phase out perverse incentives and subsidies that have negative impact on climate change by promoting the utilization of chemical pesticides and synthetic fertilizers;
- Assessing opportunities to sustainably reduce emissions from the agricultural sector; while fully acknowledging the relative role of small-scale food producers in developing countries in terms of emissions responsibility and capacity to act; and
- Identifying ways to reduce emissions from the conversion of other land to agriculture, while also fully acknowledging the relative role of small-scale food producers in developing countries in terms of emissions responsibility and capacity to act, as well as the role of large-scale industrial agriculture in land-use change.

12

Legal

The internationally legally binding protocol²³ now under negotiation should build on, develop and improve the rules already agreed under the Kyoto Protocol and the Convention. As well as maintain the five year commitment period length.

Relevant milestones and deadlines include:

2013 Creation of a legal group to draft the 'final clauses' of the agreement (i.e. provisions for signature, ratification, entry into force, withdrawal, depositary, etc) and address or advise on any other legal matters that may arise from other issue-specific negotiating groups.

Analytical work to be done by UNFCCC secretariat to clarify legal issues re: adoption/entry into force of legally binding instrument(s).

Early 2014 Submission by all relevant negotiating Groups of draft legal text on issues to include in the Protocol for synthesis and circulation by the Chair.

Mid 2014 (no later than COP 20) Circulation by the Secretariat of a Chair's negotiating text to Parties to fulfil the requirements of relevant Articles of the Convention and to allow for political guidance and early adoption of the agreement.

No later than 2015 Adoption of the Protocol.

²³ Greenovation Hub and Institute of Environment and Development (IED) do not endorse this position.

Process

As is clear elsewhere in this submission, the ADP will need to agree two distinct workstreams – one to increase ambition before 2020, and a separate workstream to work toward a fair, ambitious and legally binding 2015 agreement. At Qatar Parties must agree plans with milestones for each of these workstreams.

Parties must learn the lessons of Copenhagen, and agree detailed ADP workplans in 2012, with milestones and progression on issues, to ensure that not everything is left until the last moment to agree. These workplans must have sufficient flexibility to insert more workshops, technical papers etc so that stepwise progress is able to be made. This must be balanced with Parties not wasting valuable negotiating time arguing over agendas each year. In this regard Parties should seek and take input from the UNFCCC Secretariat on the design of the workplans.

The ADP workplans should take into account work that is undertaken or has been undertaken in the other negotiating tracks, the LCA, KP and SBs, and ensure that it does not build in duplication of work. There should be clarity on scope and institutional linkages (AWG-LCAs/KP and SBI/SBSTA, GCF, Adaptation Committee, new work on Loss and damage, MRV/compliance) and any other relevant areas.

Parties should appoint a comprehensive bureau to work with the Co-Chairs, including chairs or facilitators of spinoff issues, to ensure continuity for the period of the ADP. This bureau should include representation across all regional groupings, and be tasked with assisting the Co-Chairs to ensure a good outcome in 2015. Individuals should be asked to nominate if they feel confident in being able to provide continuity through to 2015.

Parties must agree a budget for adequate numbers of meetings, including support for at least three delegates from each LDC and low income country with substantial climate impacts eg: AOSIS and Africa Group to attend formal and informal UNFCCC meetings, ensure there is representation at meetings of specialist work areas and ensure sufficient budget for positive LDC and AOSIS representation at negotiation meetings hosted by Parties designed to inform

the UNFCCC negotiations.

Parties must ensure that there is greater civil society access to the ADP discussions and negotiations than has hitherto been the norm in the UNFCCC negotiations, including ensuring that experts from civil society are called upon to provide input into workshops etc, that submissions from civil society are included in summaries and technical papers that the UNFCCC prepare for Parties, that civil society has access to the vast majority of negotiations (an appropriate standard would be 80% of negotiation sessions open to civil society), that civil society has exposure to coordination discussions of the 'friends of the Chair' group and that negotiation meetings hosted by Parties designed to inform the UNFCCC negotiations are open to civil society.

Parties must build in a deliberate Leaders track to provide input into negotiations. This track should begin in 2012, providing high level input on the crucial political decisions into the ADP negotiations. The ad hoc process at Copenhagen illustrates how not to undertake high level political engagement – a case of too little too late. Instead there should be a clear set of objectives and political guidance sought from leaders on a small set of relevant topics that address issues that seemingly only leaders can now answer (eg on legal form, mitigation ambition and finance provision), with parallel negotiations continuing at the ministerial level at COP and continuing to be undertaken at a technical level to support this high level guidance.

Parties must commit to having a draft final fair, ambitious and legally binding agreement at COP20-CMP10 in 2014, in order to have a year to cross check various elements of these complicated negotiations – particularly to ensure that sufficient ambition and equity is incorporated.

2012: Agree two clear workplans – one for increasing short term (pre 2020) ambition, and a second for agreeing in 2015 a fair, ambitious & legally binding instrument. The workplans must have clarity on scope and institutional linkages (AWG-LCAs/KP and SBI/

“Parties must agree detailed ADP workplans with milestones and progression on issues, to ensure that not everything is left until the last moment.”

SBSTA, GCF, Adaptation, Committee, new work on Loss and damage, MRV/ compliance), clarity on terms of officers, and Parties must agree the membership of the Bureau for the 2015 FAB deal negotiations, a budget for an adequate numbers of meetings with adequate representation from vulnerable countries and civil society.

2013: For the 2015 fair, ambitious & legally binding instrument the workplan should foreshadow a series of Parties' submissions, workshops. By end of 2013 at COP 19, Co-Chair of ADP put forward ***a compilation text of the main elements based on Parties submissions.***

2014: Parties should refine their workplan with all key analytical gaps met through new work, papers done by UNFCCC secretariat. For the 2015 fair, ambitious & legally binding instrument by COP 20 at the latest, ADP Co-Chair put forward ***a negotiating text identifying agreement, divergent options and areas where high level political input is needed. If these can be resolved then adoption of the new legally binding protocol can be at COP-20 itself.***

2015: For the 2015 fair, ambitious & legally binding instrument intensive political and technical negotiations must take place from Jan- May with finalization of text by May 2015 to meet the "six month rule" for advance circulation of legal texts to all Parties and to ensure delegations come to COP-21 with legal and political authority to adopt a treaty complete with ambition mitigation and finance numbers. As was done for Kyoto, the political homework to effect a "prompt start" of the new LBA must have been done prior to COP 21 so that it can take effect immediately and not await entry into force procedures.

Appendix 1

Country by country 2020 mitigation ambition

The following table offers CAN's current²⁴ view on what a selection of Parties should do to increase their individual level of ambition – as a first step. This would bring developed countries within the 25-40% range, but require still further action for them to increase their targets to the more than 40% below 1990 levels by 2020²⁵ necessary to keep the possibility of staying below 1.5°C alive. Developing countries can also increase their mitigation ambition – in many cases this will need financial, technology and capacity building support.

	Existing Unconditional pledge on the table	Existing Conditional pledge (upper end)	Next step to increase ambition by COP18	Rationale
Australia	5% below 2000 levels by 2020 (4% below 1990)	25% below 2000 levels by 2020	This year: a KP QELRO consistent with cuts of at least 25% below 2000 levels by 2020. And a commitment to work in the DPA process to raise ambition further (toward 40% by 2020).	Australia has set conditions for moving its target from 5% to 15% to 25%. The conditions for the 15% target have been met, according to government briefings ²⁶
Belarus		10% below 1990 levels by 2020	35% below 1990 levels by 2020	10% reductions by 2020 would hardly be an achievement, but rather the result of increasing emissions in the country without any really significant actions towards reductions. It's time for Belarus to stop deceiving themselves and others, putting unrealistic GDP growth in emissions forecasts and exploiting the "economy in transition" status.
Canada		-17 below 2005 /+3% above 1990	25% below 1990 by 2020	Canada was the only party to leave Copenhagen and weaken their GHG reductions target. Worse, in December 2011 Canada set another negative precedent by withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol before the end of the first commitment period. -25% below 1990 is the minimum amount that Canada needs to do and still be within the IPCC's indicative range, however, there is no sign that the current federal government (likely in power until fall 2015) has any intention to even deliver on its own very weak target. Furthermore, economic modelling by the Toronto Dominion Bank has shown that Canada can reach a 25% target while maintaining a healthy economy and strong job creation.
European Union	20% below 1990 levels by 2020	30% below 1990 levels by 2020	40% below 1990 levels by 2020 (of which 30% domestic)	Emission reductions in the EU in 2009 were already 17.3% below the 1990, so the 20% target for 2020 is practically met. And as if this wasn't easy enough, simply by implementing the EU's existing renewable energy and energy efficiency targets would result in domestic emission reductions of 25% in 2020 as has been acknowledged by the European Commission in the 2050 Low Carbon Roadmap published in March 2011.
Japan		25% below 1990 levels by 2020	Confirm and keep the 25% GHG below 1990 levels by 2020 and 80% by 2050 Process for Low Carbon Development Strategy	Japan has not confirmed the mid-term targets. After the earthquake and nuclear accident, the government has reviewed climate policy including the unconditional national target. The innovative energy and environment strategy, decided in September, shows the range of GHG emissions in 2020 is only 5 to 9% reduction from 1990, far lower than the pledged 25% target. The new climate plan will be decided by end of 2012 based on the strategy, which will likely result in weaker target.

²⁴ This table will be updated on an on-going basis. Updates will be posted on www.climateinstitute.org

²⁵ Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources Defense Council and The Nature Conservancy do not endorse this position.

²⁶ <http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/our-publications/reports/762-foi-request-documents-regarding-australian-emission-reduction-targets>

	Existing Unconditional pledge on the table	Existing Conditional pledge (upper end)	Next step to increase ambition by COP18	Rationale
Japan (continued)				The climate bill has been on the table, but it is uncertain when and whether it is going to be discussed in the Diet. So the target and plan have no legal status under this situation.
New Zealand	None [New Zealand has made a pledge of 10% below 1990 levels by 2020 conditional upon international accounting rules changing to suit NZ]	20% below 1990 levels by 2020	Unconditional 40% reduction in net emissions below 1990 net levels by 2020	NZ's top three climate priorities for 2012 should be: (1) stop the fossil frenzy to dig up Southland lignite, build new coal mines and drill for deep sea oil and shale gas in NZ waters; (2) stop promoting emissions accounting rules that will undermine Kyoto and a post 2020 deal; and (3) write the low carbon development plan that you agreed in Durban developed countries should. Other priorities include: Listen to nearly a quarter of a million New Zealanders who have called on the Government to adopt a 40% target and match Denmark. Convert your emissions trading scheme into a credible tool for cutting emissions rather than a covert means of corporate welfare.
Norway	30% below 1990 by 2020	40% below 1990 by 2020	40% by 2020 with at least two thirds of the target to be achieved through domestic mitigation	Norway has pledged to move to a target of -40% if this will contribute to achieving an ambitious global agreement. Increased mitigation ambition from rich countries such as Norway is probably the most important thing that can contribute to increasing overall ambition at the moment, so Norway should make good on this promise right away. Secondly, Norway needs to make clear that it intends to meet its target mainly through domestic action rather than offsetting. This is important for Norway's credibility in the UNFCCC negotiations.
Russia	-15% below 1990 by 2020 ²⁷ with uncertainty about accounting of LULUCF and AAU carry over from Kyoto-1. It is extremely weak proposal.	-25% below 1990 by 2020 with uncertainty about accounting of LULUCF and AAU carry over (this uncertainty is the worse feature of the Russian proposal)	-40% by 2020 with LULUCF (but without any AAU carry over from Kyoto-1)	In 2009, Russian greenhouse gas emissions without LULUCF were -35%, with LULUCF Russia was at -59% from 1990 levels! Excluding contributions from LULUCF and AAU carry over, Russian government scenarios vary from -14% by 2020 (based on unrealistically fast economic growth with old technologies), to a more reasonable scenario with greenhouse gas emissions at -28% at 2020, that could be achieved through concerted energy savings and energy efficiency.
Switzerland	20% below 1990 levels by 2020	30% below 1990 levels by 2020	40% below 1990 levels by 2020 (of which 25% domestic)	The new CO2 law that enters into force on January 2013 gives the federal council the confidence to set this 40% reduction target.
Ukraine	Ukraine is ready to take more ambitious pledge for emission reduction with access to international climate finance and technology transfer.	20% below 1990 levels by 2020. Full AAUs carry over.	57% below 1990 levels by 2020 no AAUs carry over to 2nd and subsequent commitment periods or post-Kyoto agreement.	The official position of Ukraine in fact means doubled emission growth from now until 2020. In addition the unconditional pledge on the table includes a huge amount of new hot air into the system. Ukraine's business as usual scenario for 2020 will be as much as 54% below 1990 levels.
United States	No unconditional pledge, business as usual	17% below 2000 levels (3% below 1990)	25-40% range below 1990 levels by 2020	As the US is about half of A1 emissions, to achieve overall A1 reductions of 25-40%, the US target needs to be at least in the range. It's important to note that the US's conditional current pledge is weak. Despite the weak pledge and lack of comprehensive policies, new and strengthened Clean Air Act regulations reducing greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles and stationary sources will have a noticeable impact, essentially holding US emissions flat through 2030 rather than growing by 10%. Given that 2012 is a presidential election year, an increase in the US's formal position on ambition is unfortunately unlikely in 2012.

²⁷ FCCC/SB/2011/INF.1

	Existing action on the table ²⁸	Additional actions each country should agree as their 2020 contribution as a minimum	Rationale
China	<p>Endeavour to lower emissions intensity by 40-45% by 2020 compared with 2005.</p> <p>Intends to increase non fossil energy consumption to 15% by 2020.</p> <p>Intends to increase forest coverage by 40 million ha and forest stock volume by 1.3bn m³ by 2020, compared with 2005</p>	<p>Domestic actions should include the introduction of a cap on coal; energy price reform and fossil fuel subsidy removal; a carbon tax and (or) Emission Trading System by 2020.</p> <p>Work with civil society to monitor the implementation of policies and plans for the 12th Five Year Plan (2011-2015) and promotion of higher 13rd Five Year Plan reduction target (17-20%) and its implementation.</p>	
India	<p>Endeavour to reduce emissions intensity by 23-25% by 2020 compared with 2005 (excl agriculture).</p>	<p>33-35% emission intensity reduction by 2020 compared with 2005, with additional finance and technology support.</p>	<p>Based on the Interim Report, Expert Group on Low Carbon Strategies for Inclusive Growth, Planning Commission Government of India: http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/Inter_Exp.pdf</p>
Sth Africa	<p>Emissions Peak between 2020 and 2025, plateau for up to a decade and then decline; Bring emissions below business-as-usual trajectory (BAU) by 34% by 2020 and 42% by 2025; 9% of electricity supply from new renewables (excl. hydro) by 2030.</p>	<p>Total national emissions to peak by 2020 and as far as possible below 550 Mt/annum; 15% of electricity from new renewable energy technologies by 2020; Targets for electrification of transport, including a minimum 15% of government fleets to be electric vehicles by 2020; Safe and affordable public transport networks servicing all high population density areas; Over 25 million square metres of solar water heating collection deployed; Enforcement of comprehensive energy efficiency labelling regulations, with phase out of low efficiency rated equipment, and mandatory efficiency standards for production processes, increasing over time.</p> <p>Implement the carbon tax (escalating from R150/tCO₂e) through Feb 2013 Budget Speech, without blanket or unqualified exemptions; Adopt a process, with timeline, to establish a national carbon budget, or at least sectoral budgets covering at least 80% of national emissions, by mid October 2013 (as per White Paper).</p>	
Brazil	<p>Expected reduction of 36.1 – 38.9% below projected emissions by 2020 through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deforestation reduction • Grazing land restoration • Farming practice changes • Energy efficiency • Biofuel increase • Alternative energy, incl Hydro • Iron & steel bioenergy 	<p>Reform the Forest Law without negative loopholes.</p> <p>Complete and finish the revision of the National Climate Plan with the Sectorial plans and include how they will be financed.</p> <p>In COP18 Brazil should provide a long term vision/plan, and clear list of NAMAs, indicating which ones require support.</p>	<p>Sector plans have to be delivered by Gov departments by 16 April detailing actions to undertake in order to fulfil their respective share of the national-wide emission reduction target. 2020 level of ambitious is good (or very good) but based exclusively on avoided deforestation. After 2020, energy emissions could peak again.</p>
South Korea	<p>Aims to reduce national ghge by 30% below BAU by 2020 (4% below 2005 by 2020)</p>	<p>20% below 2005 by 2020</p>	
Mexico	<p>Aims to reduce GHG emissions by up to 30% compared with BAU by 2020 with adequate financial support via programs identified in 2009 Special Climate Change Program.</p>	<p>Create a Low Emission Growth Strategy to officialise the reduction of the 30% in 2020.</p> <p>Establish a peak of emissions in 2015.</p> <p>Adopt a target to produce clean and renewable energy to 2020, at least 15% without hydroelectric and nuclear.</p> <p>Create sustainable and efficient transportation programs in all the cities that have more than 100,000 habitants, and approve a vehicle efficiency standard to reduce at least 60% of the emissions that come from the transportation sector in 2020.</p>	<p>The 2009 Special Climate Change Program finishes in 2012. The key areas for the Mexican Government to consider in its next program are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Approve the General Law of Climate change to establish reduction goals in key sectors • Work in the elaboration of LEDS including ambition goals in energy and transportation sectors.

	Existing action on the table ²⁸	Additional actions each country should agree as their 2020 contribution as a minimum	Rationale
Mexico (continued)			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased in at least 15% the participation of renewable energy in 2020 Increased the budget allocation in renewable energy, sustainable transport and sustainable forest management.
Argentina	No national-wide target has been communicated to the UNFCCC, only pre-existing climate policies (energy efficiency, renewables, biofuels, forest and solid waste management)	<p>Strengthen existing climate policies and ensure that the set of rules that will guide the implementation of the policies is enacted.</p> <p>Develop and communicate a comprehensive mitigation plan covering the pre-2020 and post-2020 period. Provide detailed information about new unilateral and potential supported NAMAs.</p>	
Malaysia	<p>No mitigation action has been communicated to the UNFCCC.</p> <p>Malaysia should register their existing domestic pledge of 40% reduction in carbon intensity below 2005 levels by 2020.</p>	Adopt a target to reduce emissions by 20% below 2007 levels by 2020 and develop and communicate NAMAs that will meet this overall target and form part of an overall sustainable development plan, as well as identify what assumptions are included in calculations.	Malaysia has made a domestic pledge of 40% reduction of carbon intensity below 2005 levels by 2020. Malaysia has the institutional capacity to turn this pledge into MRV-able NAMAs. Malaysia has the ability to reduce emissions 20% below 2007 levels by 2020 by reducing areas including forestry, energy, transport, solid waste, industrial processes.
Qatar	No mitigation action has been communicated to the UNFCCC	<p>Develop and communicate a comprehensive low carbon development strategy. Submit national mitigation pledges for 2020 by COP18 that will reduce their absolute emissions from current high levels.</p> <p>In addition as a wealthy Gulf Arab country, and as host of COP18, Qatar should contribute to global finance for climate action.</p>	<p>Qatar as the host of COP18, should play a political role (not only logistical role) and use its diplomatic power to ensure the strongest possible outcome from COP18</p> <p>In order for Qatar to host a successful COP/CMP they need to show leadership. As a high per capita emitter and a wealthy per capita country, Qatar can afford to develop a comprehensive mitigation plan that will demonstrate how they will reduce their absolute emissions from current high levels.</p>
Saudi Arabia	No mitigation action has been communicated to the UNFCCC	<p>Develop and communicate a comprehensive low carbon development strategy. Submit national mitigation pledges for 2020 by COP18 that will reduce their absolute emissions from current high levels.</p> <p>In addition as a wealthy Gulf Arab country, Saudi Arabia should contribute to global finance for climate action.</p>	<p>Saudi Arabia should realize that climate change threatens its existence and should stop playing an obstructionist role in the international climate negotiations.</p> <p>Saudi Arabia is one of the highest per capita emitters, with high levels of per capita wealth. Saudi Arabia has long fought for a permanent forum on response measures, and at Durban this forum was established. If Saudi Arabia is serious about wanting to stop dangerous climate change, they need to show what they are willing to contribute.</p>
Iran	<p>30% emission reduction by 2025 in comparison to BAU. Financed by the government. Conditional pledge of 34% reductions conditional on international technical/financial support under the UNFCCC (emissions in BAU scenario for 2025: 2,248.5 million tonne CO₂)</p> <p>Iran supports keeping warming below 2°C</p>	<p>64% emission reduction by 2025 in comparison to BAU (conditional on international technical/ financial assistance under the UNFCCC)</p> <p>(emissions in BAU scenario for 2025: 2,248.5 million tonne CO₂)</p>	<p>Iran has no official NAMA and did not associate with the Copenhagen accord. The mitigation targets are extracted from Iran's second communication to UNFCCC that was published in Durban COP17.</p> <p>Iran takes the BAU scenario for 2025 for its mitigation plan and does not refer to any historical reference year.</p>

	Existing action on the table ²⁸	Additional actions each country should agree as their 2020 contribution as a minimum	Rationale
Kuwait	No mitigation action has been communicated to the UNFCCC	Develop and communicate a comprehensive low carbon development strategy. Submit national mitigation pledges for 2020 by COP18. In addition as a wealthy Gulf Arab country, Kuwait should contribute to global finance for climate action.	
Oman	No mitigation action has been communicated to the UNFCCC	Develop and communicate a comprehensive low carbon development strategy. Submit national mitigation pledges for 2020 by COP18. In addition as a wealthy Gulf Arab country, Oman should contribute to global finance for climate action.	
United Arab Emirates	No mitigation action has been communicated to the UNFCCC	Develop and communicate a comprehensive low carbon development strategy. Submit national mitigation pledges for 2020 by COP18. In addition as a wealthy Gulf Arab country, UAE should contribute to global finance for climate action.	
All other Arab countries		Develop and communicate a comprehensive low carbon development strategy. Submit national mitigation pledges for 2020 by COP18.	

²⁸ This information is drawn from country based CAN members, and from: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/awglca14/eng/inf01.pdf>

Climate Action Network (CAN) is the world's largest network of civil society organizations, with 700 member organisations in over 90 countries, working together to address the climate crisis. For more on CAN please see climatenetwork.org

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