Views on Options and Ways to Further Increase the Level of Ambition

28 February 2012
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Submission to the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action

Climate Action Network-International (CAN-International) is the world’s largest network of civil society organizations, with more than 700 members in over 90 countries, working together to promote government action to address the climate crisis.

1. Introduction

Current unconditional pledges and lenient accounting rules are set to result in global emissions of 55 GtCO2e in 2020. According to the Climate Action Tracker current pledges put the world on a pathway towards 3.5°C of warming and several potential global-scale tipping points. These tipping points include possible dieback of the Amazon rainforest, irreversible loss of the Greenland ice sheets, risk of release of methane hydrates in ocean floor sediments and permafrost thawing. The window of opportunity to prevent catastrophic climate change is rapidly closing.

An emissions pathway consistent with keeping global temperature increase to below 2°C with likely probability requires global emissions to peak by 2015 in accordance with the most ambitious scenario assessed by the IPCC.

According to UNEP\(^1\), global emissions in 2020 should be no higher than 44 GtCO2e, compared with 50 GtCO2e today. After 2020, global GHG emissions would have to steeply decline by at least 80% by 2050 below 1990 levels, and continue to decline thereafter to net negative emissions to have a likely chance to not exceed 1.5 degree in the long-term. While in theory there may be emission pathways consistent with current pledges (i.e. leading to 55 GtCO2e in 2020) and still keep long-term warming below 2°C, in practice such a scenario would require a rate of global reductions between 2020 and 2050 around 3.8% per year, which is economically and hence politically very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Proposals to not increase ambition for the 2013-2020 timeline beyond current pledges should be treated as what they are: attempts to dodge responsibility.

At the same time CAN urges Parties to see a transition to emissions pathways consistent with 2°C/1.5°C as offering opportunities including early-mover advantages for new markets and clean technologies, driving innovation, investments, employment and economic – low emission – growth. Additionally, tapping into the abundant potentials for domestic renewable energy sources, energy efficiency, and shifts towards more sustainable lifestyles support national energy security, lowering dependencies on energy imports, as well as increased health benefits through reduced air pollution.

2. Workplan process

CAN welcomes the launch of a workplan to increase mitigation ambition, especially in light of the low overall pledges brought forward by Parties so far for the period until 2020. The workplan should be an on-going process with regular assessments of the remaining gap and of progress towards objectives already agreed (such as staying below the 2°C limit or the 25-40% goal for developed country emission reductions) and identify and discuss mitigation potentials and options to further narrow the ambition gap.

The workplan should lead to regular recommendations for concrete steps for adoption at subsequent COPs or CMPs, starting with identifying actions for adoption at COP18 and CMP8.

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\(^1\) UNEP Bridging the Emissions Gap, 2011, pp 15, 16
The implementation of the workplan should start immediately and run in parallel to the negotiations of the Durban Platform for a new agreement by 2015. Work to increase short term ambition cannot be held back until then, as this would mean further actions to increase ambition will not take effect soon enough to close the ambition gap in the 2013-2020 timeframe that UNEP has identified.

A first tier of the work plan should look specifically at increasing ambition of the period until 2020. There could be a complementary agenda item under the SBI that would undertake the regular assessments and develop further guidance on the workplan in conjunction with the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action.

In a second tier (that can run in parallel with the first), Parties should look at options and agree Decisions to ensure high ambition consistent with emission pathways allowing for high probability to stay below 2°C/1.5°C in the context of the ADP’s work on the 2015/2020 agreement.

The workplan should have strong links to the 2013-2015 review that will have the findings of the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC (AR5) as an important source of input, giving additional clarity on the scale of the ambition gap as well as on progress towards achieving agreed temperature goals. Proposed actions resulting from the review (as per para 158 from LCA decision -/CP.17) should be consistent, and build on, the ambition workplan, and vice versa. To ensure the review results in increasing ambition, CAN suggests that COP18 decide on a limited and workable scope of the review, enabled by a well-adjusted process related to the workshops feeding into the AR5, to ensure their findings can be of use during the review, as well as timely collection of other inputs (e.g. inputs from the biannual reports under the agreed MRV rules).

Another crucial condition for a successful implementation of the ambition workplan is continuous information on the scale of the ambition gap. COP18 could request UNEP or the UNFCCC secretariat to regularly provide updated information on the scale of the gap, through technical papers and reports as well as workshop presentations. UNEP and civil society experts should be invited to the first workshop at the May session.

3. Options for developed countries

CAN recommends more frankness on the lack of ambition and leadership shown by many developed countries, recognising the inadequately low pledges from almost all developed countries, attempts to further weaken already low pledges through accounting loopholes or hot air, and attempts to shift the ambition discussion to post-2020, and walking away from the Kyoto Protocol.

Parties have confirmed several times in the past that developed countries emissions reductions should be in the range of 25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020, in line with the IPCC AR4 assessment, to give a 50% chance to keep warming below a 2-2.4°C range. Science indicates that developed countries must accept targets that result in reductions of more than 40% by 2020 below 1990 levels\(^2\) to be consistent with an emissions pathway that keeps warming below 2°C with high probability and does not foreclose the possibility to keep warming below 1.5°C, which is required to allow for the survival of entire nations.

At present, developed countries’ combined pledges will lead to emission reductions of only 12-18% below 1990 levels, in the best case. In a worst-case (though not unrealistic) scenario, loopholes may negate these pledges such that no mitigation will be achieved by developed countries by 2020. These loopholes include the LULUCF rules under the KP, and proposed options related to the carry-over of surplus allowances (AAUs, CERs and ERUs) as well as weak QELRO definitions, weak additionality rules for CDM and JI offsets, and possible double-counting financial flows related to offsets as climate finance.

For developed countries, CAN suggests that in 2012 the workplan on increasing ambition focuses is centred around four main elements:

1. Increase developed country pledges;
2. Agree a rigorous common accounting framework to ensure transparency on domestic emissions in developed countries;
3. Close and/or narrow existing loopholes and avoid new loopholes opening up; and

\(^2\) Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources Defense Council and The Nature Conservancy do not endorse this position.
CAN recommends the following non-exhaustive list of ways and options to increase pre-2020 ambition of developed countries for discussion during 2012 and adoption at COP18 and CMP8 respectively:

- **Increasing pledges:** Developed countries should, by COP18/CMP8, increase their 2020 pledges by COP18 so that the combined effort moves into the 25-40% range as a first step. CAN suggests that countries increase their pledges according to Annex 1 of this submission, as a first step. This would also require countries that have pledged ranges of reductions to move to the top end of their ranges. In CAN’s view, relevant conditions put forward by countries have been met, and the urgency of the problem allows for no further hiding behind those conditions. Translating pledges into QELROs must happen with the highest possible environmental integrity and not lead to further *de facto* weakening of the pledges.

- **Increase clarity on net 2020 emissions and monitor progress:** Developed countries should provide absolute clarity on what they assume their net domestic emissions to be in the year 2020, based on current pledges and the assumptions behind those pledges. Common accounting rules that allow accounting for what the atmosphere sees are needed to ensure coherence in the continuous assessment of the remaining gap.

- **Limit AAU carry-over and avoid new hot air:** The AAU surplus could be as large as 13 Gt.\(^3\) The use of this ‘hot air’ after 2012 should not be allowed, or should be limited to 1%, as was proposed by the African group and AOSIS. CAN is of the view that AAU surpluses should be retired by the end of the first commitment period, or that carry-over should be subject to the following restrictions:
  
  (a) AAUs surplus may be used domestically in surplus-holding countries for compliance in next commitment periods if the actual emissions would exceed the new assigned amount.
  
  (b) The discount factor must be set as such that no more than 1% of assigned amount in the first commitment period is carried over in surplus-holding countries.
  
  (c) Surplus-holding countries should commit to climate friendly-investment of the revenues from AAUs surplus selling through transparent and internationally monitored Green Investment Schemes (GIS), which are subject to MRV, and/or to funds supporting climate actions in developing country Parties. Each ton of AAU sold under GIS should result in 1 ton of GHG emission reduction.
  
  (d) AAUs would not be used for compliance in domestic cap and trade systems in Annex I countries.

If the entire surplus is not addressed through the above approach Annex I countries must raise their 2020 targets in aggregate, in order to absorb the (remaining) surplus out of the system. The targets adjustment must be shared equally among all Annex I parties.

- **Strengthen additionality rules for CDM and JI:** Estimates for the number of CDM offsets that do not lead to additional emissions reductions range from 0.7 to over 3 GtCO\(_2\)e by 2020.\(^7\) Additionality rules for the CDM and JI need to be considerably strengthened.

- **Eliminate JI track 1:** Countries with large amounts of AAU surplus can use JI track 1 to convert a significant number of AAUs to ERUs. It is not likely that such sudden and large quantities of ERUs come from projects that are real and additional. This type of “hot-air laundering” not only undermines environmental integrity but also threatens the viability of carbon markets. JI track 1 should be eliminated. Countries that do not enter a second Kyoto commitment period should not be able to buy or sell any ERUs in the second commitment period.

- **Prohibit double-counting of offsets:** Double-counting of international offsets could reduce the ambition of current pledges (developed and developing countries) by up to 1.6 GtCO\(_2\)e in 2020, equivalent to roughly 10% of the total abatement required in 2020 to stay on a 2°C pathway.\(^6\) The common framework of rules on new bilateral or regional market mechanisms has to be comprehensive and stringent to avoid double-counting and a


\(^{5}\) Environmental Defense Fund does not support this position.

race to the bottom for environmental integrity. Parties must ensure that the new market mechanism agreed at Durban does not become another version of the CDM with the same additionality problems.

- **Agree an adjustment procedure to increase pledges of the 2013-2017/2020 timeframe:** CAN suggests an amendment of Article 21 (and in particular Article 21.7) of the Kyoto Protocol, in order to introduce an adjustment procedure that would allow developed countries under the KP to increase their ambition by lowering their QELRO numbers in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol, allowing for such amendments to be adopted by the COP and then implemented without a need for ratification by the Parties. This would be similar to the adjustment procedure under Article 2.9 of the Montreal Protocol. Such amendments of Annex B would of course need to be restricted to *increasing* ambition and specifically rule out decreasing ambition. CMP8 should specifically invite Annex B Parties to regularly consider such amendments of their respective QELRO and report to the CMP to that effect.

- **Improve the LULUCF rules:** The Durban platform process should not employ the accounting rules for LULUCF activities adopted for the KP’s second commitment period. New rules should be negotiated, which reliably and mandatorily account for all emissions and removals compared to a historical base period, including accurate and complete accounting of bioenergy emissions. The rules should ensure that LULUCF contributes positively to the overall level of ambition by developed countries. The negotiations should be informed by the discussions in the newly initiated SBSTA work programme which is exploring ‘more comprehensive accounting of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks from LULUCF’.

- **Phase-out of hydrofluorocarbons (HFC):** Parties should enhance the synergies between the UNFCCC and the Montreal Protocol and urge the Parties to the Montreal Protocol to swiftly implement measures to phase out HFC production and consumption and to eradicate HFC-23 by-product emissions. HFCs have very high global warming potentials (GWP) – hundreds to thousands of times higher than CO₂. All Annex 1 Parties should also commit to an immediate ban on the use of HFC-23 offsets for compliance with Kyoto Protocol targets, in both their traded and non-traded sectors. Addressing HFCs can contribute significantly to bridging the gap by 2020. Up to 1.3 GtCO₂e could be saved annually by 2020. A worldwide phase-out of HFCs has the potential to avoid 88-140 GtCO₂e by 2050. At the same time, emissions of HFCs are rapidly increasing, despite the availability of climate-friendly alternatives for almost all their uses. In 2008, global HFC emissions were around 0.5 GtCO₂e (ca. 1% of global GHG emissions) but could increase to 5.5–8.8 GtCO₂e (9-19% of global GHG emissions), by some estimates, due to growing use and demand for air conditioning and cooling rises.

- **Accounting standards:** Developed countries that are reneging upon their responsibilities and have not yet joined the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol must join as soon as possible, and until then abide by the Kyoto Protocol accounting standards (including compliance rules), alongside the MRV rules under the Convention.

- **Zero Carbon Action plans for developed countries:** Progress towards emission pathways consistent with the 1.5/2°C limit requires a long-term engagement to continuously and iteratively develop, implement and evaluate measures to steadily transform economies, away from a high carbon economic growth model. Hence, developed countries should produce Zero Carbon Action Plans that are both visionary and pragmatic, and outline the pathway to near-zero emissions by 2050. These ZCAPs should detail an emissions reduction trajectory through 2020, 2030, 2040, and 2050, identify the policies and measures to transform all relevant sectors of its economy, starting with early and urgent domestic action to avoid lock-in of carbon intensive investments and infrastructure. The ZCAPs would also outline a clear roadmap for the investments in clean technology with sustained scaling up of development, diffusion and deployment of clean technologies in the short, medium and long term.

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1 Information note submitted by the United States of America on hydrofluorocarbons, Open-ended Working Group of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer Thirty-first meeting, August 2011; Velders et al. 2009 ‘The large contribution of projected HFC emissions to future climate forcing’ PNAS Vol. 106, No. 27, pp.10949-10954
3 Velders et al., The large contribution of projected HFC emissions to future climate forcing, p.1, May 14 2009
4. Options for developing countries

Developing countries have pledged a wide range of mitigation actions – in many cases this mitigation action is ambitious. But there is room for most countries to increase their ambition and to clarify their existing pledges, indicating where they will need support and what actions they will take unilaterally. Specifically, CAN suggests country specific mitigation actions for developing countries as identified in Annex 1 below plus the following non-exhaustive list of options to increase developing country ambition:

• **Provide clarity on assumptions and expected emissions:** Developing countries, especially the emerging economies, should clarify their assumptions behind their pledges and proposed NAMAs. This should include key factors underlying BAU projections, including information on energy use and prices, economic development, population trajectories etc. Especially the more advanced developing countries should thus provide clarity on their expected net emissions for 2020, as an important step to further clarify the scale of the global ambition gap.

• **Low Carbon Development Plans for developing countries:** Enabled through appropriate financial and technical support from developed countries, developing countries should develop long-term Low Carbon Development Plans as part of the country’s overall development planning: Such plans would provide a visionary roadmap and outline a pathway to a low-carbon and climate resilient economy, building upon and be integrated into national development plans or planning processes already in place in many countries. Depending on individual countries’ capacities and support received, such plans could have different levels of scope and complexity. These plans should be developed through a bottom-up country-driven process. In those plans, countries could identify NAMAs they would do unilaterally, as well as emission reduction potential, cost and timeline estimates to implement additional NAMAs requiring support. More economically advanced developing countries should start to develop their plans over the next 2-3 years. Other developing countries may require take more years to develop their plans, and for the time being focus on developing NAMAs and adaptation activities.

• **New/adjusted pledges and clarity on required support:** As part of the implementation of the workplan in 2012, developing countries that have yet to submit pledges and/or NAMAs should do so as soon as possible, including providing information on NAMAs they would aim to achieve by themselves and what additional NAMAs would require additional support, also specifying the amount of support needed. CAN notes that developing countries with relatively high capabilities including Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria, Iran, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Thailand and others have yet to put forward their planned NAMAs. Developing countries that are in a position to do so should further strengthen existing pledges/NAMAs to help narrowing the ambition gap. Developing country Parties with pledges such as intensity pledges should provide clarity on what proportion of their pledges they are planning to achieve unilaterally, and what proportions are dependent on the provision of finance, technology and capacity building support, including providing information on the level of support needed.

• **Inscribe NAMAs in the NAMA registry:** Developing countries that are in a position to do so should inscribe their NAMAs into the NAMA registry well before COP18/CMP8 using common guidelines for timelines, baselines, expected emissions reductions, expected costs and indicate what support, if any, is required. Developing countries with low capacity may need more time to inscribe their NAMAs, and should be enabled to do so through finance and capacity building support to register their NAMAs, in the shortest possible timeframe in order to be able to take advantage of funding for NAMAs. Developed countries must ensure there is sufficient funding (see further below).

• **Tap into the full potential of REDD+:** REDD+ offers the potential for huge carbon savings. Deforestation alone accounts for about 17% of global emissions, and early action on REDD+ could make a valuable contribution to increasing ambition well before 2020.
5. The role of climate finance in raising the level of ambition in developing countries

Many developing countries have proposed targets and actions based on their own resources that are at least as ambitious as those submitted by many developed countries. There are opportunities to increase ambition further using available financial resources, both domestic and international. However, developing countries would be able to do much more with adequate financial support from developed countries in the future. This understanding that international financial support is a critical driver of developing country mitigation action is a basic principle of the Framework Convention,10 and has been reiterated in the Kyoto Protocol,11 the Bali Action Plan,12 the Copenhagen Accord,13 the Cancun Agreement14 and the Durban AWG-LCA decision.15

Increased mitigation in developing countries is dependent on increased provision of new and additional climate finance. Yet there is still no plan for how to scale up finance commitments, following the fast start finance period and towards the commitment by developed countries to mobilise further resources to reach $100bn per year by 2020.

Most assessments show that the shift to low carbon emission pathways in developing countries will require overall financing several times larger than the $100bn commitment made by developed countries. Assuming that much of the total financing needed will come from the private sector, most of the $100bn commitment by developed countries will need to be met from public finance – to leverage and incentivise the much larger shifts in additional private sector investments, and to support the actions that cannot attract private sector investments.

A climate finance roadmap 2013-2020 is a key precondition for the work to increase mitigation ambition in developing countries. In this regard, CAN welcomes the launch of a 2012 work programme for long term finance16. It is crucial that the results of this work programme are turned into recommendations for decisions at COP18, leading to a rapid scale-up of climate finance towards the 2020 target and sufficient to meet the needs of developing countries to realise proposed pledges and NAMAs and further increase their levels of ambition.

The Green Climate Fund can play a critical role in this regard, especially if it manages to maximise the impact of its resources. The governing instrument of the GCF sets a proper objective here, by directing the Fund to focus on promoting a “paradigm shift”. Such a paradigm shift involves a strategic, long-term, and fundamental re-orientation towards low-carbon, climate-friendly, climate-resilient, gender-equitable, pro-poor and country-driven development. Such a transformation must be undertaken on the basis of country-owned strategies, plans and programmes that are developed and implemented through participatory and inclusive processes and that are integrated into developing countries’ core development plans.

Under the Durban decisions and Article 11 of the Convention, the COP is to provide guidance to the Board of the Green Climate Fund on matters related to policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria. Accordingly, an important outcome of the Durban Platform’s workplan on enhancing mitigation ambition should be to provide guidance to the GCF on the policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria that would be most effective in catalysing the necessary paradigm shift.

Two categories of actions should be prioritised. First, the GCF should focus on economy-wide or sector-wide actions that would rapidly and significantly lower emissions trajectories of a country (or regions within a country). The GCF should assess programmatic interventions with high mitigation potential, taking into account development objectives and environmental and social safeguards. To achieve a real paradigm shift, the GCF should only finance clean, safe, sustainable and efficient and non-fossil fuel-based energy technologies. Second, paradigm shifting

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10 UNFCCC, Art 4(7), (“The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology...”)
11 Kyoto Protocol, Art. 11.
12 Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP.13, paras. 1(b)(ii), 1(e).
13 Copenhagen Accord, paras. 5. 8.
14 Cancun Agreements, Decision 1/CP.16, §III(B) (“Recognizing that developing country Parties are already contributing and will continue to contribute to a global mitigation effort in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Convention, and could enhance their mitigation actions, depending on the provision of finance, technology and capacity-building support provided by developed country Parties.”), see also paras. 52, 53.
15 Draft Decision -/CP.17, §II(B);
16 Draft Decision -/CP.17, paras. 127, 130.

CAN-I : submission on ways to increase ambition
actions should also include initiatives that may deliver smaller immediate reductions, but can contribute towards transforming markets and patterns of private-sector investment over the medium to long term.

In addition, while there is broad agreement that the GCF should have the capacity to “leverage private-sector investment,” encouraging private-sector co-financing of GCF supported actions will not necessarily spark a paradigm shift. The GCF should focus on supporting initiatives that reduce costs and eliminate barriers and perceived risks, so that low- and zero- carbon technologies and approaches can more quickly out-compete high-emitting technologies. Feed-in tariffs are an example of an approach that can catalyse the diffusion of near market technologies, and thus accelerate learning and the achievement of economies of scale.

6. Additional opportunities to increase the level of ambition

The following options are not specifically linked to developed or developing countries but could help increase the level of ambition further:

- **Addressing emissions from international aviation and shipping:** International aviation and shipping are major and fast-growing sources of greenhouse gas emissions. Yet there is high potential to reduce those emissions. While ICAO and IMO are the most appropriate bodies to develop the detail of measures to address emissions from aviation and shipping (bunker fuels), COP18 should adopt a decision to request IMO and ICAO to develop appropriate mechanisms. This could be done through an emissions trading or a levy-based mechanism that would ensure global coverage but comply with the UNFCCC principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, for instance by including provisions to compensate developing countries for the impacts they experience on their economies as a result of any such mechanism. The concept of ‘no net incidence’ on developing countries is also discussed in the report of the UN High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Finance (AGF). The AGF further found that up to $18 billion could be raised from shipping and up to $6 billion from aviation, at a carbon price of $25/tCO2. That way, an emissions mechanism for international shipping and one for international aviation could allow for generating substantial amount of revenues that could be channelled directly to the Green Climate fund as climate finance.

- **Addressing Black Carbon:** In addition to (and not substituting) enhanced actions on CO2, CAN recommends strong and early actions on Black Carbon which is not listed as a greenhouse gas but according to new science contributes highly to global warming. A recent UNEP report concludes that ambitious actions to cut Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone could reduce global warming by about 0.5°C by 2050 and even 0.7°C in the Arctic compared to a reference case; there are additional benefits related to health and food security, avoiding more than 2 million premature deaths and the loss of more than 50 million tons of cereal and soybean production.

- **Removal of fossil fuel subsidies:** Market distorting and environmentally harmful subsidies impede the transition to sustainable development and should be phased out. CAN highlights in particular the subsidies that support the fossil fuel industry, contributing to greenhouse gas emissions that cause climate change. Phasing out such subsidies should be a priority issue at Rio+20, whilst ensuring safeguards to protect vulnerable groups in the transition to a sustainable development pathway. A COP18 decision could strongly encourage Parties to implement such a phase out of fossil fuels subsidies.

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17 UNEP predicts that under BAU assumptions, global aviation and shipping combined could be between 1.7 to 2.5 Gt CO2 in 2020. The Potsdam Institute assume total emission to be 1.8 Gt in 2020 (Rogelj et al 2010). Business-as-usual projections by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and International Maritime Organisation (IMO) suggest that in the absence of policies to control them, emissions could triple by 2050. Such unchecked emissions would take up a substantial proportion of any global carbon budget to stay below 2°C.

18 A 2009 IMO report estimates that 250 MtCO2 reductions in 2020 are achievable with no-regret measures (with an uncertainty range from 130 to 360 MtCO2). The potential in the international aviation sector is not yet fully estimated; preliminary conservative estimates indicate the sector could achieve at least 110 MtCO2 reductions by 2020. The UNEP report estimates a potential to close the gap by 1.3 GtCO2 with mitigation actions considered by ICAO/IMO.

19 Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone, 2011
Annex 1: Country by country 2020 mitigation ambition

The following table offers CAN’s current view on what a selection of Parties should do to increase their individual level of ambition – as a first step. This would bring developed countries within the 25-40% range, but require still further action for them to increase their targets to the more than 40% below 1990 levels by 2020 necessary to keep the possibility of staying below 1.5°C alive. Developing countries can also increase their mitigation ambition – in many cases this will need financial, technology and capacity building support.

Annex 2 contains an analysis of these country pledges on an individual country and aggregate level, and compares against a pathway consistent with 2°C/1.5°C.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Existing Unconditional pledge on the table</th>
<th>Existing Conditional pledge (upper end)</th>
<th>Next step to increase ambition by COP18</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>5% below 2000 levels by 2020 (4% below 1990)</td>
<td>25% below 2000 levels by 2020</td>
<td>This year: a KP QELRO consistent with cuts of at least 25% below 2000 levels by 2020. And a commitment to work in the DPA process to raise ambition further (toward 40% by 2020).</td>
<td>Australia has set conditions for moving its target from 5% to 15% to 25%. The conditions for the 15% target have been met, according to government briefings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>10% below 1990 levels by 2020</td>
<td>35% below 1990 levels by 2020</td>
<td>10% reductions by 2020 would hardly be an achievement, but rather the result of increasing emissions in the country without any really significant actions towards reductions. It’s time for Belarus to stop deceiving themselves and others, putting unrealistic GDP growth in emissions forecasts and exploiting the “economy in transition” status.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>-17 below 2005 /+3% above 1990</td>
<td>25% below 1990 by 2020</td>
<td>Canada was the only party to leave Copenhagen and weaken their GHG reductions target. Worse, in December 2011 Canada set another negative precedent by withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol before the end of the first commitment period. -25% below 1990 is the minimum amount that Canada needs to do and still be within the IPCC’s indicative range, however, there is no sign that the current federal government (likely in power until fall 2015) has any intention to even deliver on its own very weak target. Furthermore, economic modelling by the Toronto Dominion Bank has shown that Canada can reach a 25% target while maintaining a healthy economy and strong job creation.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>20% below 1990 levels by 2020</td>
<td>30% below 1990 levels by 2020</td>
<td>40% below 1990 levels by 2020 (of which 30% domestic)</td>
<td>Emission reductions in the EU in 2009 were already 17.3% below the 1990, so the 20% target for 2020 is practically met. And as if this wasn’t easy enough, simply by implementing the EU’s existing renewable energy and energy efficiency targets would result in domestic emission reductions of 25% in 2020 as has been acknowledged by the European Commission in the 2050 Low Carbon Roadmap published in March 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>25% below 1990 levels by 2020</td>
<td>Confirm and keep the 25% GHG below 1990 levels by 2020 and 80% by 2050 Process for Low Carbon Development Strategy</td>
<td>Japan has not confirmed and legalized the mid-term and long-term reduction targets. After the earthquake and nuclear accident, the government decided to consider post 2012 climate policy including the unconditional national target. There is tremendous pressure to withdraw the mid-term target. The climate change bill is on the table, but it is uncertain when and whether it is going to be discussed in the Diet. It is unlikely to pass the legislation with the mid-term target.</td>
<td></td>
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20 This table will be updated on an on-going basis. Updates will be posted on www.climatenetwork.org
21 Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources Defense Council and The Nature Conservancy do not endorse this position.
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>None [New Zealand has made a pledge of 10% below 1990 levels by 2020 conditional upon international accounting rules changing to suit NZ]</td>
<td>20% below 1990 levels by 2020</td>
<td>Unconditional 40% reduction in net emissions below 1990 net levels by 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>30% below 1990 by 2020</td>
<td>40% by 2020 with at least two thirds of the target to be achieved through domestic mitigation</td>
<td>Norway has pledged to move to a target of -40% if this will contribute to achieving an ambitious global agreement. Increased mitigation ambition from rich countries such as Norway is probably the most important thing that can contribute to increasing overall ambition at the moment, so Norway should make good on this promise right away. Secondly, Norway needs to make clear that it intends to meet its target mainly through domestic action rather than offsetting. This is important for Norway’s credibility in the UNFCCC negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>-15% below 1990 by 202022 with uncertainty about accounting of LULUCF and AAU carry over from Kyoto-1. It is extremely weak proposal.</td>
<td>-25% below 1990 by 2020 with uncertainty about accounting of LULUCF and AAU carry over (this uncertainty is the worse feature of the Russian proposal)</td>
<td>-40% by 2020 with LULUCF (but without any AAU carry over from Kyoto-1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>20% below 1990 levels by 2020</td>
<td>30% below 1990 levels by 2020</td>
<td>40% below 1990 levels by 2020 (of which 25% domestic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Ukraine is ready to take more ambitious pledge for emission reduction with access to international climate finance and technology transfer.</td>
<td>20% below 1990 levels by 2020. Full AAUs carry over.</td>
<td>57% below 1990 levels by 2020 no AAUs carry over to 2nd and subsequent commitment periods or post-Kyoto agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>No unconditional pledge, business as usual</td>
<td>17% below 2000 levels (3% below 1990)</td>
<td>25-40% range below 1990 levels by 2020</td>
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22. FCCC/SB/2011/INF.1
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<th>Additional actions each country should agree as their 2020 contribution as a minimum</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Endeavour to lower emissions intensity by 40-45% by 2020 compared with 2005. Intends to increase non fossil energy consumption to 15% by 2020. Intends to increase forest coverage by 40 million ha and forest stock volume by 1.3bn m³ by 2020, compared with 2005</td>
<td>Domestic actions should include the introduction of a cap on coal; energy price reform and fossil fuel subsidy removal; a carbon tax and (/or) Emission Trading System by 2020. Work with civil society to monitor the implementation of policies and plans for the 12th Five Year Plan (2011-2015) and promotion of higher 13th Five Year Plan reduction target (17-20%) and its implementation.</td>
<td>Based on the Interim Report, Expert Group on Low Carbon Strategies for Inclusive Growth, Planning Commission Government of India: <a href="http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/generp/Inter_Exp.pdf">http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/generp/Inter_Exp.pdf</a></td>
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<td>Sth Africa</td>
<td>Emissions Peak between 2020 and 2025, plateau for up to a decade and then decline; Bring emissions below business-as-usual trajectory (BAU) by 34% by 2020 and 42% by 2025; 9% of electricity supply from new renewables (excl. hydro) by 2030.</td>
<td>Total national emissions to peak by 2020 and as far as possible below 550 Mt/annum; 15% of electricity from new renewable energy technologies by 2020; Targets for electrification of transport, including a minimum 15% of government fleets to be electric vehicles by 2020; Safe and affordable public transport networks servicing all high population density areas; Over 25 million square metres of solar water heating collection deployed; Enforcement of comprehensive energy efficiency labelling regulations, with phase out of low efficiency rated equipment, and mandatory efficiency standards for production processes, increasing over time. Introduce a carbon tax in the Feb 2012 Budget Speech; Adopt a process, with timeline, to establish a national carbon budget, or at least sectoral budgets covering at least 80% of national emissions, by mid October 2013 (as per White Paper).</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Expected reduction of 36.1 – 38.9% below projected emissions by 2020 through: • Deforestation reduction • Grazing land restoration • Farming practice changes • Energy efficiency • Biofuel increase • Alternative energy, incl Hydro</td>
<td>Reform the Forest Law without negative loop-holes. Complete and finish the revision of the National Climate Plan with the Sectorial plans and include how they will be financed. In COP18 Brazil should provide a long</td>
<td>Sector plans have to be delivered by Gov departments by 16 April detailing actions to undertake in order to fulfil their respective share of the national-wide emission reduction target. 2020 level of ambitious is good (or very good) but based exclusively on avoided deforestation. After 2020, energy emissions could peak again.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24 This information is drawn from country based CAN members, and from: [http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/awglca14/eng/inf01.pdf](http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/awglca14/eng/inf01.pdf)
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| • Iron & steel bioenergy | term vision/plan, and clear list of NAMAs, indicating which ones require support. | The 2009 Special Climate Change Program finishes in 2012. The key areas for the Mexican Government to consider in its’ next program are:  
• Approve the General Law of Climate change to establish reduction goals in key sectors  
• Work in the elaboration of LEDS including ambition goals in energy and transportation sectors.  
• Increased in at least 15% the participation of renewable energy in 2020  
• Increased the budget allocation in renewable energy, sustainable transport and sustainable forest management.  
Mexico is having presidential elections this year. We look forward to candidates guaranteeing the continuation and improvement of the climate policy in the country. |
| Mexico | Aims to reduce GHG emissions by up to 30% compared with BAU by 2020 with adequate financial support via programs identified in 2009 Special Climate Change Program. | Create a Low Emission Growth Strategy to officialise the reduction of the 30% in 2020.  
Establish a peak of emissions in 2015.  
Adopt a target to produce clean and renewable energy to 2020, at least 15% without hydroelectric and nuclear.  
Create sustainable and efficient transportation programs in all the cities that have more than 100,000 habitants, and approve a vehicle efficiency standard to reduce at least 60% of the emissions that come from the transportation sector in 2020. |
| Argentina | No national-wide target has been communicated to the UNFCCC, only pre-existing climate policies (energy efficiency, renewables, biofuels, forest and solid waste management) | Strengthen existing climate policies and ensure that the set of rules that will guide the implementation of the policies is enacted.  
Develop and communicate a comprehensive mitigation plan covering the pre-2020 and post-2020 period. Provide detailed information about new unilateral and potential supported NAMAs. |
| Iran | 30% emission reduction by 2025 in comparison by BAU scenario. Financed by the government (BAU scenario for 2025: 2,248.5 million tonne CO2) Iran supports the way that keeps warming below 2°C | 64% emission reduction by 2025 in comparison by BAU scenario (Only if international technical/financial assistance under UNFCCC become available) (BAU scenario for 2025: 2,248.5 million tonne CO2)  
Iran has no official NAMA. And did not associate with the Copenhagen accord. The mitigation targets are extracted from Iran second communication to UNFCCC that was published in Durban COP17.  
Iran takes the BAU scenario for 2025 for its mitigation plan and does not refer to any time in the past. |
| Malaysia | No mitigation action has been communicated to the UNFCCC. Malaysia should register their existing domestic pledge of 40% reduction in carbon intensity below 2005 levels by 2020. | Adopt a target to reduce emissions by 20% below 2007 levels by 2020 and develop and communicate NAMAs that will meet this overall target and form part of an overall sustainable development plan, as well as identify what assumptions are included in calculations.  
Malaysia has made a domestic pledge of 40% reduction of carbon intensity below 2005 levels by 2020. Malaysia has the institutional capacity to turn this pledge into MRV-able NAMAs. Malaysia has the ability to reduce emissions 20% below 2007 levels by 2020 by reducing areas including forestry, energy, transport, solid waste, industrial processes. |
<p>| Qatar | No mitigation action has been communicated to the UNFCCC | Develop and communicate a comprehensive low carbon development strategy supported by a range of NAMAs that will demonstrate how Qatar will reduce their absolute emissions from current In order for Qatar to host a successful COP/CMP they need to show leadership. As a high per capita emitter and a wealthy per capita country, Qatar can afford to develop a comprehensive mitigation plan that will demonstrate how they will reduce their emissions. |</p>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>No mitigation action has been communicated to the UNFCCC</td>
<td>Develop and communicate a comprehensive low carbon development strategy, including reductions targets and NAMAs to reach those targets.</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia is one of the highest per capita emitters, with high levels of per capita wealth. Saudi Arabia has long fought for a permanent forum on response measures, and at Durban this forum was established. If Saudi Arabia is serious about wanting to stop dangerous climate change, they need to show what they are willing to contribute.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Annex 2: Assessment of country by country mitigation ambition

The information contained in this Annex is not CAN position. To explore the implications of scenarios for increasing the ambition of mitigation action we worked with Climate Interactive to explore the collective impact on emissions of various reduction scenarios, including the country by country mitigation asks listed here, using their C-ROADS model.

Some of the information contained in these graphs is based on assumptions made by the C-ROADS model. In particular, as the CAN submission does not identify full asks for all developing countries, C-ROADS have assumed business as usual growth lines for these countries. CAN presents this information in a spirit of openness, transparency and to reflect the importance of taking into account scientific assessments.

C-ROADS is a system dynamics computer simulation that is oriented towards decision-makers to help users understand the long-term climate impacts of policy scenarios to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It allows for the rapid summation of national greenhouse gas reduction pledges. C-ROADS is based on the science in the IPCC’s 4th Assessment Report, and the model has been calibrated to the suite of climate models used in that report.

For the analysis undertaken here, a reference scenario based on the IPCC SRES A1FI was used, with the A1FI assumptions about future emissions, GDP and population downscaled to the 15 regions of C-ROADS.

C-ROADS is freely available to parties and observers of the UNFCCC as well as to educators and others. Full documentation is available online.

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Global CO2e Emissions
(fossil fuels + deforestation + non CO2 GHGs)

![Graph showing Global CO2e Emissions](image)

Note: “Low Emissions Path” is a representative path with 44 Gt tons CO2e emissions in 2020, consistent with the pathways explored in the UNEP Emissions gap report with a likely chance of limiting temperature increase to 2°C and a medium chance of limiting temperature increase to 1.5°C.
Reduction in 2020 CO2e emissions

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A1FI</th>
<th>CAN Minimum Needed</th>
<th>Existing Unconditional</th>
<th>Existing Conditional</th>
<th>Low Emissions Path</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global CO2e emissions (GtonsCO2/year)</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO2e avoided (GtonsCO2/year)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Emissions per Capita in 2020
CAN minimum required scenario
This graph eliminates many of the NA1 countries for which CAN has not indicated an appropriate level of mitigation action.

BAU is based on the IPCC's A1FI scenario. The SRES scenarios don't allocate emissions to specific countries, but they have 4 broad regions. Basic trajectories are applied in those regions to the countries within them.