



# DURBAN EXPECTATIONS

NECESSARY, AMBITIOUS AND ACHIEVABLE STEPS FOR COP17/CMP7



*Climate Action Network International  
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working together to fight climate change*

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# Durban Expectations

- COP17 in Durban can establish the basis for a fair, ambitious and binding global climate change regime.
  - Implement Cancun Agreements
    - establish adaptation, finance, technology and capacity building institutions with sound rules to serve developing countries needs and deliver real action on the ground
  - Close the gigatonne gap
    - Increase developed country ambition & close loopholes
    - Increase developing country mitigation: supported and enabled
  - Ensure no legally binding gap
    - Secure a Kyoto Protocol second commitment period and a mandate to negotiate a legally binding instrument in the LCA
  - Deliver adequate finance from 2013 to the Green Climate Fund

# Shared vision:

Long term goal, effort sharing & Review

# Long term goal

- At Durban governments must agree to **peak emissions by 2015** and **reduce global emissions by at least 80% below 1990 levels by 2050**,
  - Give a high probability of keeping warming well below 2 degrees,
  - Keep open the possibility of staying below 1.5 degrees.

# Effort sharing / Equity

- The lack of an effort sharing agreement – an equitable approach to sharing the costs of mitigation and adaptation amongst countries - is a **major stumbling block** to agreeing a long term global goal.
- CAN sees this as a gap within the current negotiation agenda, and recommends that it be **inserted into the negotiation framework in 2011 and 2012.**
- COP17 should establish a **mandate to agree an equitable effort sharing approach between all countries by COP18**
  - consistent with the equity principles of the UNFCCC, the historical responsibility of developed countries, and the right to sustainable development of developing countries.

# Review

- At Durban parties should agree **detailed terms of reference for the Review**.
- As an initial step, parties should commission a **technical paper** to be delivered in 2012 on the scientific, technical and socio-economic issues relating to temperature increase of 1.5 degrees.
- The Review should include:
  - an **assessment of the gigatonne gap**
  - an **assessment of domestic actions by developed and developing countries** as well as the provision of **support** for mitigation actions in developing countries
- The **findings of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5)** should inform the review via a **workshop** as soon as the IPCC findings are available (final IPCC reports expected in April 2014, with much of the work available earlier).

# Close the gigatonne gap

# Close the gigatonne gap

- At Panama, Parties should request a **Technical Paper combining current pledges by developed and developing country Parties to assess the scale of the gigatonne gap** between current pledges and what is needed to keep 1.5 degree warming within reach and allowing for a high probability of meeting the 2 degree target.
- At Panama, **Parties should hold a workshop to consider ways to increase the levels of ambition.**
  - most countries have to move beyond the high end of current pledges.
  - for developing countries, this means increasing financial, technological and capacity building support.

# Developed country mitigation

- Before Durban, **developed countries must provide full clarity on their net domestic emissions in 2020** resulting from current pledges and assumptions
  - How is their pledge consistent with near-zero decarbonisation by 2050?
  - For countries with ranges - how to measure when **conditions to move to higher targets** have been met?
  - Countries with pledges below 25-40% to explain **how their low pledges will be compensated** by other developed countries
  - Countries with pledges below current Kyoto targets and/or BAU explain **how those pledges constitute progress**.
- Countries to investigate and report on the costs and benefits of going beyond current pledges.

# Developed country mitigation

- **Developed countries must increase their pledges to more than 40% reductions by 2020** as part of their fair share to stay below 2 degrees and to keep open the pathway to stay below 1.5 degrees.
  1. Before Durban developed countries must **increase targets to the top end of their pledged ranges**; and
  2. In Durban, developed countries must **agree to aggregate targets of at least 25-40%** below 1990 levels by 2020 as a **target floor**, and a **process to increase their ambition level to more than 40%**, for adoption by COP18/CMP8.

# Low carbon development strategies

Developed countries:

- Ensure a common template, scope, guidelines, deadline and a review process.
- LCDS identify transformation pathways, policies and measures, with intermediate targets through 2020, 2030, 2040 culminating in near-complete decarbonisation by 2050
- Updated every 5 years
- Agree to submit first iteration **by October 2012.**

# Close the loopholes

- Close loopholes to ensure developed countries honestly meet their emissions reduction targets:
  - LULUCF rules to increase accountability and strengthen the ambition of developed countries so that **forestry and land use sectors deliver emissions reductions**,
  - Rules for any new market and non market mechanisms must not diminish already low levels of ambition and must **disallow double counting** of emissions reductions and financial flows,
  - Rules to **minimise damage from hot air** (surplus AAUs) for example setting a discount factor or higher aggregate emission reduction targets for all developed countries to compensate for the hot air.
- These rules should be taken into account in setting targets.

# Close the loopholes: LULUCF

- **Accounting for increases in emissions** from forest management **above historical emission levels must be mandatory.**
- Accounting for emissions and removals from cropland management, grazing land management, revegetation and rewetting and drainage must also be mandatory, once data quality issues resolved.
- In 2011, Parties must resolve data quality issues to enable a move to **comprehensive accounting** for emissions from land. The IPCC “key categories” approach is a useful interim.
- All domestic or imported **bioenergy emissions** must be accounted for, either in the energy or LULUCF sector.
- Only extraordinary (statistically rare) natural disturbances should be excluded from LULUCF accounting.
- **LULUCF rules should be agreed before targets** – so that targets are meaningful.

# Close the loopholes: flexible mechanisms

- **Changes to existing mechanisms could have major impacts** on overall environmental effectiveness, eg:
  - new standardized baselines in the CDM could affect the ability to screen out non-additional projects with massive consequences for the gigatonne gap,
  - a stringent discount-factor of credits could contribute to net global emission reductions.
- Carbon capture and storage (CCS) and forests in exhaustion (FIE) should not be included in the CDM, as they do not meet the criteria of contributing to sustainable development, nor of being ‘safe and sound’.

# Close the loopholes: flexible mechanisms

## Key Principles for possible new mechanisms:

- Raise the level of ambition: Without ambitious emission reduction targets, there is no need for flex mex.
- Supplementarity to substantial domestic emission reductions in developed countries.
- **Disallow double-counting of emission reduction and financial flows**: the Cancun Agreements is missing this important item.
- Supplementary to international support: New mechanisms must be in addition to existing obligation of developed country parties to enable and support mitigation actions in developing countries.
- Low-hanging fruit: negative or low cost mitigation opportunities of developing countries should not offset emissions in developed countries – such activities must be retained for developing country unilateral and MRV-supported domestic action.

# Close the loopholes: flexible mechanisms

## Key Principles for possible new mechanisms:

- Depart from project-based mechanisms: Experience has shown that it is impossible to accurately assess the additionality of emission reductions of individual projects
- Do not credit business as usual reductions.
- Crediting threshold crucial in sectoral approaches: A too lenient threshold will create more 'hot air'. It must be set substantially below conservative BAU projections.
- Share of proceeds levy applied to all new market mechanisms, with proceeds flowing through the UNFCCC's Green Climate Fund.
- Safeguard environmental treaties, international obligations and sustainable development, including human rights.

# Developing country mitigation

- Many developing countries are already taking substantial mitigation effort. Accelerated action, enabled with support, is urgently needed and possible.
- **Clear and common guidelines for NAMAs** should be adopted as recommendations at Durban.
- Develop **common guidelines for methodologies and assumptions underpinning the definition of BAU**, via a process of submissions and workshops. This will allow an assessment of the overall effort and environmental integrity of the combined effort of Parties.
- Develop a clear **plan showing how support** - financial, technological and capacity building – **will be provided** for the development and implementation of NAMAs, as well as a system of MRV for support.

# Developing country mitigation

- Both the **NAMA registry** and a robust **MRV system** to be **operationalised at Durban** – enabling recognition of early action and matching enhanced action with support.
- At Bangkok and Bonn a number of parties presented ways in which they were locating their NAMAs within longer-term low emission plans for their countries; parties must explore this further with a view to creating an architecture where **NAMAs can be developed within the context of long-term Low Carbon Development Strategies (LCDS) / Plans**

# REDD+

- Durban needs to decide on a mechanism for REDD+ that delivers adequate, predictable and sustainable **finance of at least US\$15 to 35 billion per year by 2020.**
- SBSTA guidance by Durban on an **information system for REDD+ safeguards.**
- National forest carbon **measuring, monitoring, reporting, and verifying frameworks** must provide transparency, consistency, and comparability of REDD+ results. Existing IPCC guidelines and good practice should form the basis with additional guidance from SBSTA.
- **Reference levels** to be developed by SBSTA should meet at least three basic principles: increase transparency, lead to emission reductions and prevent leakage of those emissions. In particular reference levels should ...

# REDD+

**Reference levels** should:

- Contribute to the mitigation of climate change. **REDD+ should permanently reduce emissions, increase removals and conserve and enhance carbon stocks** (thereby avoiding emissions).
- Be based on national **historical baselines**.
- Encourage **maximum participation** and minimise international leakage.
- Be **fully transparent**. Values, calculations, and assumptions for developing reference levels should involve in-county consultations with all stakeholders and should be posted freely and openly online, with sufficient time for comment, before reference emissions levels are accepted by the COP.
- Ensure **consistency** across all countries.

## **No gap in legally binding commitments:**

- ✓ Kyoto Protocol second commitment period
- ✓ LCA mandate for legally binding instrument

# No legally binding gap: Kyoto Protocol 2CP

- Secure a second commitment period of the KP at Durban.
  - Crucial to ensure commitments are legally binding with environmental integrity.
    - Top down approach, setting an overall objective, an aggregate goal, allowing consideration of **science and equity**
    - Legally binding, economy-wide, absolute emissions reduction **targets** for developed countries
    - Comparability of effort through respective targets
    - **Monitoring, review and international verification** system
    - **Compliance** mechanism -- facilitative and enforcement
    - Mandatory **review**
    - Complementarity of external action (ie CDM) to **domestic actions**
    - Required **reporting** on "demonstrable progress"
    - Common accounting
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# LCA Mandate for legally binding instrument

- A legally binding instrument is the highest form of commitment; given the urgency of climate change, the greatest level of commitment is needed from all parties
- **Secure a mandate to negotiate a legally binding instrument under the LCA to be adopted no later than 2015 and enter into force by the end of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.**

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- In the interim, all Annex I Kyoto Protocol Parties' targets should be listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol
- **Finance and other support commitments and the commitments or actions of all other Parties should be inscribed in COP decisions.**

**No finance gap**

# Scale of finance 2013-2020 and beyond

- Durban must agree significant new and additional budget contributions for 2013 onwards.
- Build on fast-start commitments of \$10bn per year in 2010-2012, and increase by \$10bn each year, so that \$100bn by 2020 commitment is met predominately with public finance, leveraging much greater private finance for mitigation actions.

# Sources of finance 2013-2020 and beyond

- A workstream on sources of public finance must start now, and include submissions, workshops in Panama and Durban, ministerial and expert meetings, and input from outside bodies, including the AGF, G20, civil society etc.
- **Reliable sources of finance** for the Green Climate Fund could be generated from Financial Transaction Taxes, Special Drawing Rights and international transport.
- A decision in Durban, under ‘Sectoral Approaches’, should give guidance to the IMO and ICAO on **international transportation emissions** (maritime and aviation bunker fuels)
  - Ensuring no net incidence or burden on developing countries
  - Achieving appropriate mitigation
  - Generating climate finance for developing countries.

# Green Climate Fund

- Transitional Committee should conduct a transparent process that enables active civil society participation, and makes the following recommendations to the Durban COP:
  - Ensure that the **governance of the GCF** and its secretariat are under the guidance of and fully accountable to the UNFCCC and independent of IFIs and MDBs,
  - Establish **dedicated funding windows** eg: adaptation, mitigation, REDD+, technology, capacity building. Allocating 50% to adaptation initially,
  - Ensure an environmental and social safeguards framework,
  - Provide meaningful participation of civil society,
  - Representation including development and gender expertise,
  - Limit the role of the trustee in accordance with international fiduciary standards.

# Adaptation

# Adaptation

- Advance and potentially agree **modalities and guidelines for National Adaptation Plans (NAPs)**
  - inclusive and integrate a country-driven, gender-sensitive, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems,
  - flexible to address national circumstances,
  - **ensure support will be delivered to implement NAPs.**
- **Agree modalities and composition for the Adaptation Committee**, including meaningful observer access and participation, so that the Adaptation Committee becomes operational in 2012.
  - Committee Members should be adaptation and development experts and include non-governmental stakeholders. The committee should have a gender-balanced composition.

# Adaptation

- **Agree a further phase of the Nairobi Work Programme** that will facilitate the dissemination of knowledge on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation practices reaching local levels of government, civil society and communities.
- **A clear way forward to advance the role of regional centers**, including a call for submissions and a workshop to be programmed for 2012 on regional centres and their role, function and governance in supporting adaptation work (including national planning) in developing countries and at regional level

# Loss and Damage

- **Agree on further activities in the work programme on loss and damage** and a clear mandate for a decision at **COP 18** that includes:
  - Scaled up **disaster risk reduction and risk management**,
  - International climate risk **insurance** mechanism,
  - **Rehabilitation** mechanism to deal with long-term loss & damage.
- The work programme should:
  - **Galvanize immediate action**, compiling different experiences in understanding loss & damage and addressing each of its components.
  - Highlight the outlook of loss & damage vis-à-vis **current ambition** in mitigation and adaptation finance and the implications of failing to reach the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC, and of Parties' failure to meet their commitments

# Technology

# Technology

Durban should:

- Define **how the Technology mechanism will be linked to the Finance** mechanism
- Address the lack of focus on **adaptation technologies**, including through developing functional linkages between the Technology Mechanism and appropriate adaptation bodies.
- Develop a clear picture of the **scale of resources**.
- Nail down the **structure, functions, components and locations of the Climate Technology Centre and the Network**.
- Detail the **workplan for the CTCN**
- Agree details of a **MRV framework** for the work of the Technology Mechanism

# Capacity Building

# Capacity Building

- Dedicated and focused negotiations on the **establishment of a Capacity Building Coordinating Body (CBCB) by COP17**;
- The CBCB to be tasked with the design and build of a **new programme for enhanced CB** based on scaled-up, new and additional capacity building **funding**;
- Close **co-operation** with transitional frameworks for finance and technology, aimed at efficient delivery of resources, and capable of **rapidly focusing and building in-country capacity** to manage and deliver national adaptation, technology, REDD and mitigation resources and actions, aligned with developing countries' own sustainable development objectives;
- clarity on the legally-binding commitment to capacity building as well as precise modalities for **MRV of support and results**.

# Measurement, Reporting & Verification (MRV)

# Build a robust MRV framework

- Adopt guidelines and timetables for **biennial reports**, critical for the 2013-2015 review.
- Adopt procedures for International Assessment and Review (**IAR**) for developed countries and International Consultation and Analysis (**ICA**) for developing countries,
- Establish a **common reporting form for finance**
- Kyoto Protocol MRV rules continue in the second commitment period and serve as the basis for comparable provisions for developed country MRV under the Convention,
- Establish public access and participation in all MRV processes,
- Guidance for monitoring and implementation of REDD+ safeguards, and establish a comprehensive safeguard system for the Green Climate Fund.

# Durban Expectations (recap)

- COP17 in Durban can establish the basis for a fair, ambitious and binding global climate change regime.
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for more information see:  
[www.climatenetwork.org](http://www.climatenetwork.org)

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