CAN thanks the Parties for this opportunity to share our thinking on the Technology Framework. Our submission contains five key components: Strategic Vision; Innovation and RDD; Support for implementation; Enabling Environments and Capacity Building; and Collaboration and Stakeholder Engagement.
CAN thanks the Parties for the opportunity to present our initial thinking on the scope and modalities for the Periodic Assessment (PA) of the Technology Mechanism (TM).
Our KEY IDEAS:
1.The Technology Framework should provide guidance for the regular evaluation of the TM through the Periodic Assessment (PA). The Assessment must include metrics and indicators developed from the mandate of the TM.
2.The TM has the opportunity to play a central role in supporting the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) of developing countries within its existing mandate, but in order to meet the scale of Parties’ needs, the TM must further build cooperation among institutions that have capacity to work in this space.
3.The PA should assess the mandates of the TEC in terms of how its guidance is actually having influence on appropriate technology decisions in developing countries and how well the outcomes of Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs) and Technology Action Plans (TAPs) are mainstreamed into planning at various levels, and translated into bankable projects.
4.The PA should assess the ability of the CTCN to meet its mandate in providing technical assistance to NDEs, ensuring that the knowledge generated is accessible and actionable by others, and provides adequate support for developing country NDCs.
The PA should assess the effectiveness of the TM to create and maintain the linkages with other institutions needed to ensure that technology-related climate action can be implemented at scale.
It’s always nice to have money in your pocket, so the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) must be feeling cheerful. In a long anticipated announcement that was sprung as a surprise in Marrakech, the CTCN received the grand sum of… US$23 million!
While not as much money as expected, these voluntary contributions provide welcome assurance for the survival of the CTCN and its ability to deliver technical assistance to developing countries. Presented in an undramatic fashion, Canada, the EU, Korea, Switzerland, and the US hope to set an example for supporting ‘technology sharing’. These founding contributors hope to reemphasise the importance of the CTCN as a core mechanism for delivering technology for climate action.
To be clear, this is desperately needed. CTCN staff have spent an extraordinary amount of time securing funding. Of course, their time is better spent on delivering technology support—not having to carry a begging bowl to the capitals. A reliance on voluntary contributions impairs the sustainability and predictability of the CTCN budget and erodes its effectiveness and its mandate. Parties need to support a more regular process for replenishing CTCN funding, especially in the new Technology Framework.
ECO hopes the example set by these donor countries galvanises others to contribute and support developing countries in effectively developing and deploying technology to address mitigation and adaptation.
There’s a simple truth for what’s needed in technology transfer at COP22. Here are some suggestions on how to make it so:
1. The massive scale of technology deployment that is needed to meet the 1.5°C goal with pre and post 2020 action requires that the Climate Technology Centre and Network, the operational arm of the Technology Mechanism, is ready for a sharply rising influx of country requests. The CTCN needs to use its resources wisely, for example, by improving the transparency of its funding, and by prioritising the Network provider of services, by the member with the most closely-related experience and reasonable, but not necessarily lowest cost. Quality and local knowledge do matter. Add the periodic assessment of the TM and a solid draft for the Technology Framework for a winning combination.
2. We need to create a “Stakeholder Cooperative Technology Assessment Space” to take a hard look at both the co-benefits and risks of projects, particularly “unknown” or “unknowable” negative impacts when a technology is untested or can only be properly tested in the open atmosphere or ocean.
Cooperative Technology Assessment engages all stakeholders and endeavours to answer a range of questions:
1. How do we know which technologies’ emission reductions and/or increased resilience/co-benefits are worth the risk that they might pose?
2. How do we protect communities, particularly the most vulnerable, against unforeseen cross-boundary impacts?
3. How can we best apply the precautionary principle to climate technology research and development in order to channel the safest and most effective innovations?
3. We need to stress the “soft side” of technologies — the capacity building, training, and stakeholder engagement — that empowers communities to fully utilise and champion their deployment for a long useful life.
There – was that so hard?
As nations consider whether to introduce a new, improved technology framework in advance of COP22, ECO has a plaintive question for delegates: Is this the year when you plan to show us the money?
COP veterans can trace debate over the technology framework back to COP7 in Marrakesh. ECO has heard about the fundamental dissatisfaction with the current tech framework and its limited utility in meeting the Paris goals. ECO has also seen developing countries driven into successive rounds of technology needs assessments (TNAs), project registries and bilateral/multilateral funding mechanisms. At every turn, precious time has been spent developing funding methodologies and accountability tools, so that projects could roll out.
It’s been a long and tortuous enough process to leave ECO counting the grey hairs on its head.
They’re much more plentiful than they were the last time we were in Marrakesh!
With the momentum and ambition that nations worked so hard to build into the Paris Agreement, COP22 must set the stage to turn TNAs into fundable projects. We need institutions that can move with lightning speed to mobilise funds, build capacity and introduce structures that make it easier for countries to adapt and adopt the technologies that pretty much every nation wants.
A successful mechanism will also require institutional architecture that enables developing countries to set their own technology priorities. That will mean transferring the “software” as well as the “hardware”. Solar panels, grid-scale batteries and soil remediation technologies will help developing countries to function as full participants in the Paris implementation. But they’ll also need the information, analysis and know-how to put those systems to use.
Countries started the technology dialogue the last time the COP was in Marrakesh. Let’s close the loop and get the right solutions in place when we go back this year.
In December 2015, the G20, as part of the 196 Parties to the UNFCCC, committed to a historic global agreement to address climate change and pursue efforts to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels, so as to mitigate the harmful effects on the world’s people, biodiversity and the global environment.
According to the IPCC, the global carbon budget consistent with a 66% chance of limiting the temperature rise to 1.5ºC will be used up by 2021 if we carry on under current projections. For any fair likelihood of meeting the Paris temperature targets, our collective mitigation efforts need to be multiplied as soon as possible. Otherwise, our countries and economies will face severe impacts of unstoppable climate change, including social, environmental and economic instability. In recent years, we have seen the G20 countries take more serious notice of the role that climate change plays on its overall objectives, in particular its objective to promote financial stability. G20 leadership on climate change is extremely important since the greenhouse gas emissions of the G20 member countries account for approximately 81% of total global emissions. It is therefore imperative that the G20 countries start collaborating immediately on the implementation of the Paris Agreement, using their influence, to develop a consensus-building approach and focus on financial stability to drive stronger action on climate change.
Climate Action Network has eight key demands for the G20:
- Ratify the Paris Agreement as soon as possible;
- Develop and communicate interim National Long-term Strategies for Sustainable Development and Decarbonization by 2018;
- Achieve an ambitious outcome on HFC phase-down this year;
- Introduce mandatory climate-risk disclosure for investments;
- Remove fossil-fuel subsidies;
- Accelerate renewable energy initiatives towards 100% RE;
- Ensure that new infrastructure is pro-poor and climate compatible;
- Support effective ambition for international aviation and shipping.
Paris delivered the Technology Framework to advance more rapid demonstration and implementation of climate-friendly technologies. This included building on existing efforts such as Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs) and the Technology Action Plans (TAPs), and improving the effectiveness of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). The first meeting of the TEC this year got down to business on that front, with a South-South/circular cooperation thematic dialogue.
We know that, under this framework, developed countries are not specifically on the hook to provide support, but demonstrations and implementation cannot happen without funding. As such, the SBSTA should put forward a sustainable funding model for the TEC and CTCN (e.g. through country pledges), as well as ways to support developing countries in their pursuit of financial support from the GCF and/or other UNFCCC financial mechanisms.
SBSTA should also delineate criteria on how to assess technologies that are ready for transfer, and mandate the TEC to carry out such an assessment, which, amongst other things, should report on the development stage of a technology, its commercialisation prospects, its current penetration in relevant developing countries’ markets, and the risk assessment undertaken by producers and providers.
SBSTA should facilitate technology transactions by identifying ways to link domestic technology transfer offices based in universities or national research institutions to international platforms, such as WIPO Green. The Knowledge Platform at the CTCN could facilitate such linkages.
By taking these steps, Parties can help push climate technology to the scale required to support the Paris mitigation and adaptation goals. Parties, how far we can go on the technology transfer journey is up to you.
The current agreement text removes all substantive commitments found in the original Geneva text, in favour of vague statements in optional paragraphs 7.4 and 7.5. The proposed decision text focuses primarily on technology needs assessments (TNAs). Only in paragraph 50 does it include specific commitments by developed countries on intellectual property (IPRs) and financial support.
History suggests that:
1) Substantive commitments are likely to be limited to TNAs unless developing countries hold strong on demands for finance and policies and measures to be included in the decision text;
2) Developing country demands for technology support and policies will be traded for institutional changes and the development of the technology framework .
The largest amount of technology text is aimed at the establishment of a new technology framework, to be developed by the new Intergovernmental Preparatory Committee (IPC) and adopted by the CMA at its first session. What this framework will entail remains unclear, but references to the 4/CP.7 framework suggest it will address: technology needs assessment, technology information, enabling environments, capacity building and mechanisms for technology transfer.
History also shows that TNAs were the only elements of that framework properly implemented. Enabling environments in developed countries were never addressed and remain a subject of contention. The institution established by that framework, the Expert Group on Technology Transfer, was specifically prevented from engaging in implementation and was largely considered ineffective.
Given this history, ECO hopes that Paris will break with this history by producing real substantive commitments on technology development and transfer, rather than weak institutional outcomes.
CAN thanks the Secretariat of the UNFCCC and the members of the Technology Executive Committee for the opportunity to comment on the Technology Needs Assessment and the Technology Action Plan processes. In response to the questions posed by the Secretariat on this topic, CAN submits the following responses, on which we would welcome a broader discussion with the TEC.