Legal scope, structure and design of the 2015 agreement
The scope, structure and design of the 2015 agreement should be consistent with a 1.5ºC global carbon budget with high likelihood of success, including targets and actions within an equitable framework that provides the financial, technology and capacity building support to countries with low capacity. It should be serious about ensuring sufficient support for dealing with the unavoidable impacts of climate change. It should be built on, developing and improving the rules already agreed under the Kyoto Protocol and the Convention including transparency through common and accurate accounting and effective compliance processes, respecting the principles of equity. The form of the 2015 agreement should be a fair, ambitious and legally binding protocol.
Kyoto Protocol as a basis for the ADP
The Kyoto Protocol provides a good basis for future Protocol, its rules have been tested and should be improved and built upon. Existing elements of the Kyoto Protocol that provide a basis for the new Protocol include:
· Long-term viability: the KP provides a framework that can be updated for each 5-year commitment period, while maintaining its essential elements
· Top down approach, setting an overall objective, an aggregate goal, for developed countries, allowing appropriate consideration of the science, with comparability of effort between countries established through their respective targets (Article 3.1)
· Legally binding, economy-wide, absolute emissions reduction targets (QELROs) for countries with high responsibility and capacity, expressed as a percentage below the 1990 base year (Annex B)
· A system of 5-year commitment periods, with comparability of effort measured against a common base year allowing for reasonable cycles of review linked to the IPCC reports and for comparability of effort (Articles 3.1 and 3.7). A commitment regime under the new 2015 agreement should set at least two 5-year commitment periods, so that there are clear consequences in the already-agreed second period for failure to comply with the first 5-year target, and so that a next set of two 5-year targets is in place before the first 5-year period expires. The system should include an adjustment procedure similar to the adjustment procedure under Article 2.9 of the Montreal Protocol that is restricted to increasing ambition. This adjustment procedure should allow both unilateral real increases in ambition by a country and for a ratcheting up of all countries resulting from an adequacy review.
· Monitoring, review, and international verification system (Articles, 5,7,8 and associated decisions)
· Compliance mechanism composed of two tracks – facilitative and enforcement (Article 18). Compliance with the new 2015 legally binding outcome will depend in large part on effective *domestic* compliance processes, which can be facilitated by sharing of domestic best practices in compliance design. This will in turn facilitate better compliance with international obligations.
· Mandatory review of provisions of the Protocol for subsequent commitment periods (Article 3.9)
· Supplementarity – ensuring that market or non-market mechanisms are supplementary to (ie, CDM) to domestic actions, and don’t undermine the fundamental need to decarbonize all economies (Article 6.1d)
· Required reporting on ”demonstrable progress”, establishing an important reporting requirement and stocktaking (Article 3.2)
· Basket approach to GHGs, and the ability to list new gases and classes of gases (Annex A)
· Use of Global Warming Potentials (GWP) to allow comparability of the impacts of different gases on global warming (Article 5.3)
The Equity Reference Framework
Equity is back on the negotiating table, and this is no surprise. Climate change negotiations under the UNFCCC were never going to succeed unless they faced the challenge of “equitable access to sustainable development.” Unless they faced, more precisely, the equity challenge of not just holding to a 2°C or even 1.5°C-compliant global emission budget but also supporting sustainable development and adaptation. These are the preconditions of any successful climate transition.
SBSTA Closing Plenary Intervention by CAN
-Delivered by Enrique Maurtua Konstantinidis
Thank you Co-Chairs,
We thank you and Parties for having a very focused session and urge the work to continue forward with the same motivation and attention.
Nevertheless going forward,
Parties must ensure that climate policies encompassing agriculture include considerations and safeguards that protect and promote food security, biodiversity, equitable access to resources, the right to food, animal welfare, and the rights of indigenous peoples and local populations, while promoting poverty reduction and climate adaptation.
The design of the framework for various approaches and new market-based mechanism must be based on the lessons learned from existing mechanisms. These mechanisms and framework will function under the convention and therefore have to be consistent with the rules and requirements of the convention. Using such mechanisms to meet emissions targets requires a strict accounting framework and increased mitigation ambition.
Lastly, the compromise on MRV provides a lesson for other streams, but the toothless safeguards reporting gives no assurance that safeguards will be implemented. The outcome on drivers is encouraging, but all parties must be clearly obligated to act, and the language on livelihoods not only contradicts the science but also threatens the involvement of indigenous peoples in REDD+.
CAN Intervention for COP Work Program Workshop
-Delivered by Josefina Brana-Varela
Thank you chairs. I’m speaking on behalf of the Climate Action Network.
We welcome the opportunity to be present in this workshop and we would like to share our views on how to approach the issue of result-based finance for REDD+.
While we understand that there are many discussions that are taking place in other bodies and groups under the UNFCCC with respect to the issue of finance, we believe that Parties here can start shaping a results-based mechanism for REDD+. Therefore, Parties can start focusing in:
1. Talking about the modalities and procedures for financing results-based actions for REDD+, despite the sources of funding
2. Parties should focus in establishing a mechanism that enables support for REDD+ countries that have met successfully the requirements established in the Cancun Agreements, including safeguards.
3. The design elements of such a mechanism should ensure environmental integrity, through the establishment of registries and reserves to avoid double counting and addressing risks of reversals.
4. Parties should discuss the relationship between reference levels and the access to payments.
5. Discussions here and towards Warsaw should promote equity by ensuring adequate incentives for countries with less capacity as well as countries with significant carbon stocks but lower deforestation rates, while ensuring the integrity of the climate system.
6. Finally, Parties should aim for transparency and efficiency, avoiding creating mechanisms with high transactions costs.
Chairs, are you planning to ask for submissions on these matters in preparation to the second workshop that the Work Program under the COP is considering? If so, we as observers will be happy to share our ideas.
*By compromise, ECO mean somewhere in between what is scientifically needed and what YOU tell us is currently feasible.
The Conference of the Parties,
Recalling Article 4, paragraphs 1, 3, 4 and 5 and 7 of the Convention,
Reaffirming the unwavering commitment of parties to keep global average temperature increase well below 2 degrees C above pre-industrial levels and the continuum approach between mitigation, adaptation, loss & damage and finance that is required to ensure equity before 2020.
Reaffirming the urgency to address the current imbalance in mitigation and adaptation finance – in light of recent studies showing the adaptation and loss and damage costs in developing countries will very likely be well in excess of US$100 billion per year by 2020.
Reaffirming the need to raise mitigation ambition levels between now and 2020, and achieving emission reductions on the order of 8-13 Gigatonnes of emissions in the pre-2020 period, beyond existing commitments and actions registered under the UNFCCC.
Supporting the authoritative assessments demonstrating that staying well below 2°C will require several hundred billion of incremental finance per year and the shifting of trillions of dollars of existing private sector investments into low carbon technologies and solutions.
Emphasising that the commitment by developing countries to provide $100 billion for developing countries will be delivered in the form of new and additional public finance, through budgetary allocations from developed countries, supplemented by revenues from alternative sources of public finance
Emphasising the shortcomings of the main revenue stream for the Adaptation Fund in relation to the expected low price of CERs under the Clean Development Mechanism and the need for new and additional commitments by developed countries.
1. That developed country Parties shall provide jointly new and additional public finance amounting to an average of US$20 billion annually for the period 2013-2015, for mitigation and adaptation actions, including for REDD, technology and capacity building.
2. That for the periods of 2016-2018 and 2018-2020, developed country parties shall scale up financing in a linear manner from the current levels to reach $100 billion annually in public finance by 2020.
3. That developed countries shall allocate at least 50% of overall public finance to meeting developing country adaptation needs.
4. To establish a formal process to capitalise the GCF with an initial collective pledge of (…)** by COP19.
5. To call on the relevant bodies to design and implement global measures to raise new streams of public climate finance, particularly through:
i) Redirection of at least 100% of Annex 2 fossil fuel subsidies
ii) Carbon pricing mechanisms applied to the international aviation and maritime transport - in accordance with the principal of CBDRRC and existing commitments under the UNFCCC.
1. The pledges to the Adaptation Fund of (…)** collectively made by Annex 2 Parties for 2013/2014, as contained in Annex C of this decision, and those made by other Parties.
2. The initial pledges to the Green Climate Fund of (…)** collectively made by Annex 2 Parties as contained in Annex D of this decision.
3. The recent declaration by 11 EU Finance Ministers to earmark at least 100% of the revenue raised through their Financial Transaction Tax to the Green Climate Fund.
** "there is not enough space on this page to specify the number of billions ECO is expecting"
For official CAN positions, please refer to www.climatenetwork.org
Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries (SBSTA/SBI)
CAN International views on existing institutional arrangements or potential governance alternatives including a body, a board or a committee (matters referred to in paragraphs 34 and 35 of FCCC/CP/2012/L.14/Rev.1, including potential functions, modalities and procedures (FCCC/CP/2012/L.14/Rev.1, paragraph 36).
CAN welcomes this opportunity to contribute to the work of SBSTA and SBI by giving our views on the matters referred to in paragraphs 34 and 35 of FCCC/CP/2012/L.14/Rev.1, including potential functions, modalities and procedures.
CAN considers that REDD+ should be a key component of the new agreement being negotiated by the ADP. REDD+ can contribute significantly to global emission reductions both in the longer term (ADP workstream 1) and in the shorter term (ADP workstream 2), as well as delivering both biodiversity and social benefits. However, if REDD+ is to deliver significant emission reductions in the short term then much more effort is urgently needed, by both donor and host countries during phases one and two of REDD+.
We agree with paragraph 34 of the Doha decision on REDD+ finance (FCCC/CP/2012/L.14/Rev.1) that there is a need to improve coordination in the implementation of REDD+ activities (paragraph 70 of 1/CP16). We are not, however, convinced that a new REDD+ institution would achieve this aim, certainly not at this stage. We consider that it would be best to decide what needs to be done first and then decide upon how best to do it, via new or existing institutions.