Tag: Green Climate Fund

Missing Money for the Green Climate Fund earns first Fossil from Lima Climate Talks - Fossil of the Day - Dec 1

COP20, Fossil of the Day, Day 1

The first Fossil of the Day in Lima at the UN Climate Talks goes to Australia, Belgium, Ireland, Austria, Iceland, Greece and Portugal for being the only developed countries who have so far failed to contribute to the Green Climate Fund. After a string of encouraging initial contributions, it seems a few free-riders within Annex 2 believe they are off the hook on this one. Their intransigence translates into several billions of dollars missing in the fund’s coffer - that’s money not being spent helping developing countries reduce their pollution and adapt to climate impacts. This is not acceptable and stands to jeopardize the Paris agreement, under which all countries are expected to take action. To the free-riding ministers: Don't forget to sign your check before you land in Lima.


Missing Money for the Green Climate Fund earns first Fossil from Lima Climate Talks

COP20, Fossil of the Day, Day 1

The first Fossil of the Day in Lima at the UN Climate Talks goes to Australia, Belgium, Ireland, Austria, Iceland, Greece and Portugal for being the only developed countries who have so far failed to contribute to the Green Climate Fund. After a string of encouraging initial contributions, it seems a few free-riders within Annex 2 believe they are off the hook on this one. Their intransigence translates into several billions of dollars missing in the fund’s coffer - that’s money not being spent helping developing countries reduce their pollution and adapt to climate impacts. This is not acceptable and stands to jeopardize the Paris agreement, under which all countries are expected to take action. To the free-riding ministers: Don't forget to sign your check before you land in Lima.



ECO’s Climate Summit expectations

As the UN Secretary General’s Climate Summit approaches, we are sure Parties, investors and businesses are wondering how to pack their bags and appropriately prepare for New York this September.

ECO would like to help. We know that Parties sometimes struggle with long lists of things they need to prepare. There is a regrettable tendency for some Parties to forget what they have already packed interventions in their bags already, or to wear old items of clothing in the hope that we don’t notice that it’s just the same old thing refashioned.

However, without any kind of a list to work from, ECO is concerned that Parties will arrive in New York completely not dressed appropriately for the occasion. Hot air and vague promises are not going to provide the cover needed at the summit. So here is what ECO recommends that Parties should pack for the Climate Summit:

1) New measures to scale up investment in, and deployment of, renewable energy and energy efficiency. This will to help fill the pre-2020 mitigation gap, but will also help you to pledge your support for a just transition to a fossil-free and 100% renewable future by 2050.

2) Then, if you are committed to a just transition, you will want to come to New York with substantial pledges for the Green Climate Fund and a commitment to increase the overall scale of climate finance.

3) And obviously, becoming fossil free means sending a strong signal that the age of coal is over. That means announcements from the US and China (inter alia) on domestic limits to coal use (going beyond current plans), the phase out of export credit and development bank finance for coal infrastructure from OECD countries, and coal divestment announcements by private sector actors.

If you arrive at the Summit with all of this in your suitcase, then you will be the talk of the town as all your clothing choices will make a climate fashion statement that the world will applaud about your determination to achieve a strong climate agreement in Paris and stop climate change.

Thanks in advance from ECO. We can’t wait!

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Green Climate Fund: from “If and When” to “How Much”

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is a cornerstone of the emerging architecture of the global climate regime. Just two weeks ago, the Board of the GCF surprised many observers when they reached agreement on the eight essential requirements for the GCF to begin to receive, manage, and disburse funds. This deprives those developed countries who bear the primary responsibility for contributing funds to the GCF, and had been holding back pending these board decisions, of an excuse to delay making substantial contributions to the fund. We now fully expect these countries to put substantial financing at the disposal of the fund by Lima, with disbursements starting in 2015.

Just what does “substantial” mean? The volume of funds must be sufficient to inspire developing country confidence in the commitment of developed countries to support climate action and inspire developing countries to put sufficient effort into creating projects and programs to make good use of this funding. It must also enable the GCF to create a paradigm shift in the transition to a low emissions, climate resilient world, and to contribute significantly to closing the mitigation gap in the pre-2020 period.

ECO wonders how serious developed countries are about the GCF, really. As soon as the GCF is fully operational, and the institutional arrangements are in place for direct access by developing countries, ECO suggests that regular contributions to the GCF increase rapidly, surpassing USD$10 billion annually. This must also scale up further to account for a substantial part of the $100 billion committed by developed countries by 2020.

ECO warns developed countries that the funds allocated to the GCF cannot simply be transferred from a static, or even worse, shrinking budget for climate finance. Rather, developed countries must scale up their overall level of finance and take full advantage of the growing interest across the developing world to pursue low carbon climate resilient development.  Many developing countries are already taking ambitious actions with their own resources, but the sum of efforts worldwide still falls short of what is necessary. Funds channeled through the GCF, as well as other sources, can magnify these efforts and leverage much greater actions. 

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*By compromise, ECO mean somewhere in between what is scientifically needed and what YOU tell us is currently feasible.

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling Article 4, paragraphs 1, 3, 4 and 5 and 7 of the Convention,

Reaffirming the unwavering commitment of parties to keep global average temperature increase well below 2 degrees C above pre-industrial levels and the continuum approach between mitigation, adaptation, loss & damage and finance that is required to ensure equity before 2020.

Reaffirming the urgency to address the current imbalance in mitigation and adaptation finance – in light of recent studies showing the adaptation and loss and damage costs in developing countries will very likely be well in excess of US$100 billion per year by 2020.

Reaffirming the need to raise mitigation ambition levels between now and 2020, and achieving emission reductions on the order of 8-13 Gigatonnes of emissions in the pre-2020 period, beyond existing commitments and actions registered under the UNFCCC.

Supporting the authoritative assessments demonstrating that staying well below 2°C will require several hundred billion of incremental finance per year and the shifting of trillions of dollars of existing private sector investments into low carbon technologies and solutions.

Emphasising that the commitment by developing countries to provide $100 billion for developing countries will be delivered in the form of new and additional public finance, through budgetary allocations from developed countries, supplemented by revenues from alternative sources of public finance

Emphasising the shortcomings of the main revenue stream for the Adaptation Fund in relation to the expected low price of CERs under the Clean Development Mechanism and the need for new and additional commitments by developed countries.


1. That developed country Parties shall provide jointly new and additional public finance amounting to an average of US$20 billion annually for the period 2013-2015, for mitigation and adaptation actions, including for REDD, technology and capacity building.

2. That for the periods of 2016-2018 and 2018-2020, developed country parties shall scale up financing in a linear manner from the current levels to reach $100 billion annually in public finance by 2020.

3. That developed countries shall allocate at least 50% of overall public finance to meeting developing country adaptation needs.

4. To establish a formal process to capitalise the GCF with an initial collective pledge of (…)** by COP19.

5. To call on the relevant bodies to design and implement global measures to raise new streams of public climate finance, particularly through:

i) Redirection of at least 100% of Annex 2 fossil fuel subsidies

ii) Carbon pricing mechanisms applied to the international aviation and maritime transport - in accordance with the principal of CBDRRC and existing commitments under the UNFCCC.



1. The pledges to the Adaptation Fund of (…)** collectively made by Annex 2 Parties for 2013/2014, as contained in Annex C of this decision, and those made by other Parties.

2. The initial pledges to the Green Climate Fund of (…)** collectively made by Annex 2 Parties as contained in Annex D of this decision.

3. The recent declaration by 11 EU Finance Ministers to earmark at least 100% of the revenue raised through their Financial Transaction Tax to the Green Climate Fund.


** "there is not enough space on this page to specify the number of billions ECO is expecting"

For official CAN positions, please refer to www.climatenetwork.org

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ADP Workstream 2 Roundtable – Talking, Yes, but Walking the Walk?


Listening to the ongoing discussions in the ADP Workstream 2 on short term mitigation ambition, ECO suspects that some might not have read—or have forgotten—the size of the pre-2020 mitigation ambition gap. For all the rhetoric in the room, one might be convinced that nations have forgotten that they have the power to decide whether the world will remain below the 2°C threshold  scientists maintain as critical. Technologically and economically feasible trajectories to remaining below the 2°C level have been outlined. Without acting now, they are wilfully choosing to neglect the known mitigation ambition gap science has shown, as well as the opportunities that exist to bridge it.

In this context, ECO would like to remind delegates of what India, China and others have helpfully underlined during Workstream 2 (WS2) discussions thus far: the time has come for developed countries to do their “fair share” in reducing emissions by at least 40% by 2020 (and reflecting on their consumption patterns).

The 2014 Kyoto Protocol ambition review is one opportunity for nations to reflect on the comparable upward revisiting of pledges; for instance, the EU has achieved its 20% target years ahead of schedule but with no expressed intention, yet, to step up its own ambition until 2020; or Australia, for whom, recent research shows, upping their pledge from 5% to 25% comes at essentially zero net costs.

A cornerstone in WS2, clearly, are those International Cooperative Initiatives, of which we need many, given the size of the gap - but (as suggested by a few Parties) those must lead to new ambition rather than window-dressing existing (low) ambition. Right-on! Addressing international bunkers emissions from marine and aviation transport would be two prime ICI candidates, if ECO was to suggest a few, alongside phasing-out HFCs under the Montreal Protocol, which would also allow for making use of its existing funding mechanism. Another additional initiative would be to start, in earnest, what South Africa has called for during the early days of this session: immediate phase-out of fossil fuel subsidies in developed countries. Doing so, notes ECO, would free up billions of Dollars, Euros, Pounds or Yen for climate finance, including support for developing countries to gradually shift their fossil fuel subsidies both to renewable energy and energy efficiency.

ECO continues to be pleased by the engagement of AOSIS and their pragmatic approach of a step-by-step technical process to identify best practices suitable for scaling-up, overcoming the barriers to, and creating incentives for, new action in the areas of renewable energy and energy efficiency. Moreover, ECO commends their calls to elevate the results of the technical analysis to the ministerial level for agreeing to concrete action in 2014.

Yes, surely there are other mitigation areas to cover, too. And ECO could not agree more with the Philippines (and others) that similar approaches are needed in order to enhance pre-2020 adaptation – but ECO suggests this happens in parallel and need not stop us in advancing on other joint action. What ECO likes about the AOSIS proposal is that it could develop concrete plans to mobilise the entire UNFCCC architecture (e.g. for an action programme on renewable energy) with no new burdens for countries, yet the opportunity to participate in initiatives to expand renewable energy use. In that vein, ECO was pleased with Switzerland’s affirmation (from earlier this session, supporting India’s) that WS2 is not about shifting burdens from developed to developing countries. After all, such joint action to identify barriers and possible incentives could also help to better understand the financial and technological needs of developing countries, creating another pull for developed countries to deliver on their 100 billion per year by 2020 financing promise from Copenhagen and Cancun.

Funding, alas, remains key, as South Africa stressed yesterday once more, calling for scaled-up financing trajectories by developed countries in time for the Warsaw finance ministerial roundtable, and early and regular replenishment of the empty Green Climate Fund (GCF). The GCF could become a central pillar in the upward spiral of increased climate finance helping to trigger increased ambition. Meanwhile, the lack of clarity on scaling up short and mid-term climate finance is likely hampering ambition. Perhaps another theme for the upcoming Warsaw climate finance ministerial roundtable?

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We Saw Success for Warsaw


ECO was impressed by the creative moves of the delegates on the dance floor Saturday night. Now, with only 16 meeting days left this year, ECO expects to see an increasing amount of creative and ambitious Party moves inside the negotiation rooms too, to make the COP in Warsaw a success. (It is worth clarifying that this does not mean wiggling out of commitments!)

2014 - the year of ambition - is just around the corner. The foreseen KP Parties' revision of their targets next spring offers a timely moment for all countries to revise their near term targets, while Ban Ki-Moon’s leaders meeting in the autumn of 2014 presents a great opportunity for tabling new 2025 targets.

In Warsaw, Parties will need to commit to both strengthening their current targets (to bridge the 2020 gigatonne gap), as well as to putting forward new, post-2020 targets in 2014 that are fair and adequate. To ensure that the 2014 pledges will be transparent, quantified and comparable, Parties will need to agree on some guidelines in Warsaw. Equally, the Warsaw Decisions will need to give further clarity on the nature and scope of commitments for countries at different levels of responsibility, capability and development. Commitments should include mitigation and finance and be guided by an Equity Reference Framework (ERF), for which a formal process needs to be established.

While Parties have already agreed to deliver a negotiating text on the 2015 agreement before May 2015, Parties will need to adopt a work plan and milestones for producing this text in Warsaw. Specifically, Parties must agree on key elements for a structure of the 2015 deal so that subsequent sessions can build on them  to move steadily towards a comprehensive final agreement, and not leave all decisions to be resolved at Paris. We all know where that leads…

All developed countries must set out – in a comparable manner - what climate finance they will be providing over 2013-2015, as part of doubling fast start funding levels for this period, and commit to a roadmap for scaling-up global public climate finance and reaching $100bn per year by 2020.

ECO would like to extend a formal invitation to Finance Ministers to take part in the Warsaw COP so that the “high-level ministerial dialogue” (yes, parties in Doha wanted it to be THAT special) actually delivers the decisions we need so urgently on finance. Parties must also pledge specific amounts of finance to the Green Climate Fund, which must be operationalised in Warsaw, and to the Adaptation Fund.

Parties must also agree on a way to ensure that international aviation and maritime transport, which are not included in national emissions targets, make a fair contribution to emissions reductions, and to financing climate actions in developing countries. These are the fastest growing emissions sectors worldwide, and their fuels are currently not taxed, unlike domestic transport sectors, which means they are not paying for their climate impacts, and have an unfair advantage over other sectors.

As should be clear by this point, dear ECO reader, there is much to do in Warsaw and afterwards. This week, the ADP should focus on its work plan from now until the COP. As time is short and ECO is completely fed up with procedural nonsense (SBI anyone?), this does not mean spending the week discussing whether to suspend or conclude the ADP (as ECO can only imagine the potential mess of trying to open another ADP session and the agenda discussion that would ensue). Rather, Parties must set a deadline for the next round of submissions and clarify the content sought. Here, views on the decisions from Warsaw including guidance on a deadline for initial pledges (2014), information on the details of those pledges and the process for review (i.e. the ERF process), as well as initial thoughts on the overall structure of the 2015 agreement, are a minimum.

Finally, you can’t spend all of your time planning. You’ve got to also be doing. So, in addition to the ADP work programme forward, ECO urges Parties to take time preparing the actual tangible outcomes for Warsaw, including in terms of 2013-2015 finance pledges, loss and damage mechanism and near-term ambition. Here’s to a productive week!

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CAN Intervention in the SB38/ADP2-2 Bonn Intersessional: Special Event with Co-Chairs on Finance, 8 June, 2013

Thank you for this opportunity. My name is Alix Mazounie and I’m speaking on behalf of Climate Action Network.

The importance of finance to both raising pre-2020 mitigation ambition and getting a successful deal in 2015 cannot be overstated.

But climate finance is currently in no man's land. After the end of the Fast Start Finance period last year, 2013 should mark the start of a new finance period.

Instead, we are almost half way through the year and we've seen no new commitments on finance beyond the small handful of pledges made in Doha.

 As CAN we think no developed country should be coming back to this process empty handed.

The various streams of work on finance this year, in particular the Long Term Finance work Programme and the Ministerial on finance at COP 19 (which crucially must involve finance ministers or ministers with mandate on finance), need to secure concrete decision options for consideration and agreement at COP 19:

(1) We need ALL developed countries to set out what climate finance they will provide over 2013-2015, and commit to a roadmap for scaling-up global public climate finance and reaching $100bn per year by 2020.

(2) We need agreement that a minimum of 50% of all public climate finance between now and 2020 will be spent on adaptation. Better than that, we need developed countries to make a collective pledge to save the Adaptation Fund and keep implementing ambitious projects on the ground.

(3) We need confidence that the Green Climate Fund is operational and ready to receive substantial pledges in 2014. A first round of pledges in Warsaw will send a strong political signal that the Green Climate Fund must not be left an empty shell for a fourth COP in a row.

With the LCA finance negotiations behind us, and ADP negotiations on pre-2020 ambition focused on mitigation, this year’s LTF WP is the main space for making progress on finance.

We need all countries to understand that forward steps on climate finance pre-2020 are key to ADP outcomes in both work-streams.

A new agreement applicable to all seems unlikely to emerge if developing countries have not seen existing promises of financial support being met.

So - in response to your question on our role in this process - we believe we would be fruitfully contributing to the ADP process if developed country parties agreed to our longstanding asks to scale up public finance. 


Less Talk, More Money, More Action

“A little less conversation, a little more action” needs to be the soundtrack of this year’s Long Term Finance (LTF) Work Programme. The Fast Start period is behind us, and we are already starting the period that we used to call “Long Term Finance”, which makes little sense when it refers to yesterday, today and tomorrow. We’ve had processes under the UN Secretary General, the G20, and the UNFCCC. But to date these processes have failed to result in any decisions for, or commitments to, a given level of funding from now to 2020. So this year’s work programme must be different from last year’s in one fundamental respect: concrete outcomes on scaling up.

With the LCA finance negotiations behind us, and ADP negotiations on pre-2020 ambition focused on mitigation, this year’s LTF Work Programme is the main space for making progress on finance. If not here, where? If not now, when?

So unlike last year’s work programme, this year’s needs to be firmly geared towards options for decisions in Warsaw. These options then need to be discussed and agreed at the “in-session high-level ministerial dialogue” that the Doha outcome mandated for COP19. Failure to provide concrete options for ministers to consider would likely result in a missed opportunity that developing countries cannot afford. 

Today's Long Term Finance Work Programme event will focus on pathways for mobilisation of climate finance to USD 100 billion per year by 2020. ECO urges Parties to consider that by COP19, we need ALL developed countries to set out what PUBLIC climate finance they will provide over the period 2013-2015, and commit to a roadmap for scaling-up global PUBLIC climate finance, and reaching $100bn per year by 2020. ECO would like Parties to note that COP19 is already very, very late to make decisions on finance that should have been available from the start of 2013.

This year, we need new initiatives and increased ambition to close the mitigation gap and get on a pathway to staying below 2 degrees C of warming. This will be only be possible if there is an assurance that finance will be available for renewed mitigation efforts in developing countries. We also need agreement that a minimum of 50% of all public climate finance between now and 2020 will be spent on adaptation. And the Green Climate Fund must not be left an empty shell for a 4th COP in a row – that's one broken record we're tired of listening to.

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CAN Speaking Notes from GCF Board Meeting, March 12 - 15


Resource Mobilization:

·      In our earlier interventions we emphasized that the GCF should narrowly focus on ambitious, paradigm shifting actions. That, of course, implies that resources will be made available at the scale and urgency that the task requires, in accordance with the commitments of Article 4.3 and 11.3 of the Convention. So these are, in large measure, two sides of same coin.

·      Developed countries should put forward initial pledges as a matter of urgency in 2013, that could be reported back to COP19, as indicator of progress taking place here, and to prepare the way for disbursements next year.

·      We’d support Derek and several other’s preference for option 2, step-wise approach, with a caveat.

·      As a matter of credibility and impact, rapid resourcing leading to disbursements as soon as possible is critical, in the context of adequate environmental, social and fiduciary standards. .

·      Resourcing need not await agreement on a burden sharing allocation. Neither should it prejudge the outcome of a future agreement on burden sharing arrangements for future replenishment processes.

·      The longer term framework must be designed to deliver adequate and predictable resources. To that end, the resource mobilisation framework should be designed to also allow the receipt of revenues from sources of additional public finance other than direct contributions from developed countries, such as from financial transaction taxes, the use of special drawing rights, carbon taxes, and aviation and maritime levies.

·      The scale of the GCF’s ambition should not be limited by the claim that there is a scarcity of public money. Certainly, enormous sums have been made rapidly available to pay for other actions governments have seen as urgent, wars and financial bailouts.

·      Multiple feasible proposals exist for generating large amounts of public money from innovative sources, such as carbon pricing, closing tax loopholes, and redirecting fossil fuel subsidies in developed countries, etc.  At the end of the day, its an issue of political scarcity, not economic scarcity.

·      Finally, regarding section 6.3 on earmarking. We wouldn’t want to see individual contributors circumvent Board decision-making through earmarking. Allocation of funds should be decided by the GCF board, reflecting developing country needs and in accordance with the GI’s requirement for a balanced allocation between mitigation and adaptation. In particular, we are concerned that adaptation will be given short shrift under an earmarking arrangement.


Addressing "to promote a paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways.":

·      Address first 2 guiding questions: what it means to “to promote a paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways”.

·      Given the scale of the challenge and the unique mandate of the GCF, the objective of achieving a “paradigm shift” should be the central organizing principle of the GCF’s work.  How the GCF defines and prioritizes actions to spur a “paradigm shift” will be a key determinant of its impact and effectiveness on the climate crisis and in making a significant difference in the lives of affected people.

·      It is therefore critical for the Board to reach understanding on the “paradigm shift” the GCF will promote for mitigation and adaptation. This includes a discussion on how to apply it also to the PS facility. We believe the “paradigm shift” must include these three pillars: (1) ambition, (2) country-driven planning, and (3) multi-stakeholder, participatory and inclusive decision-making.

·      All 3 are critically important to us, but country led planning and participatory decision-making have other textual homes in the GI, so won’t address them further now. Ambition—what is suitably ambitious to merit GCF support? does not, so I’d like to spend the time discussing.

·      A couple introductory points:

·      Rough and ready understanding: When BAU for decisions by governments, investors and consumers, and civil society lead to the low carbon and climate resilient actions.

·      Consensus that GCF Funded initiatives should deliver sustainable development and resiliency benefits, including at the local level. Board should be clear about how those values be integrated in decision-making? 

·      GCF needs to be strategic and add value. For example, actions that would go forward without GCF support cannot, by definition, promote a paradigm shift.

·      Mitigation:

o   First, the GCF should focus on enabling a rapid shifting of emissions trajectories, taking into account environmental and social safeguards, and taking a gender-sensitive approach, ensuring social, economic and development co-benefits particularly for the poor.

o   Second, paradigm shifting actions should also include initiatives that may deliver smaller immediate reductions, but can contribute towards transforming markets and patterns of consumption and investment over the medium to long term.

o   In this regard, initiatives to support SME are critical. Many of the most transformational initiatives underway today are happening at the local level, scaling up these initiatives can be an extremely effective way to catalyze a paradigm shift at the scale and ambition that is required. Resist the idea that ambition and transformation are synomymous with big infrastructure.

o   In general, preference for supporting policy level shifts over one-off investments.

·      Adaptation:

o   Ambition in adaptation context is tougher to define. It means building resilience at different levels--national, regional and local—to the variety of climate induced stressors that need to be addressed comprehensively.

o   It must be understood in the context of developing country needs and the rights of those directly impacted, including critically, equitable resource access and the participation of affected communities in adaptation decision-making.

Thank you for the opportunity to come speak at this informal session, and we look forward to contributing to a rich discussion over the next 3 days. 


BMF Intervention Notes

·      URGENCY! When we next come together in June, it will be 3.5 years after announced in Copenhagen, 2.5 years after agreed in Cancun. still talking about vision of fund, not even yet about mobilizing resources at scale and urgency required, let alone supporting action on the ground! We know this not easy, but urge board to redouble efforts to find a way forward.

·      That said, We fully support the effort to clarify proposed areas of work, objectives, gaps and opportunities in existing architecture, and indicators of success, as a matter of priority and indeed urgency.

·      But, This work should be undertaken in the context of the overarching objective of promoting a paradigm shift and resiliency in context of sustainable development.—so within each area of work, and for each proposed objective, this effort should identify the approaches that are likely to be suitably ambitious and transformational in their impacts, and will also serve the interests of the poor. Need for the overarching objectives to be translated into specific, measurable criteria for evaluating and prioritizing proposals.

Section C

·      Also don’t find wholesale/retail illuminating.

·      Convergence on principle of direct access and country drivenness—further work will need to include analysis of options how the PSF can serve to further the country-driven approach, and the role of national designated authorities in that process AND modalities for subnational and non-governmental access. 

·      transparency and accountability, input from CSO and PSO, (c5)

·      On leveraging:

o   Emphasize the importance of policy shifts, which may often have the potential to leverage greater change than discrete investments. This is true, even if you think that leveraging the private secotr is a critical priority. so a critical question here is the extent to which the Fund will focus on supporting those shifts.

o   Leveraging finance not an objective in itself, need to relate back to overarching objectives of paradigm shift, and promoting sustainable development and resilience, esp for the poor.  narrow indicators of leverage may not be helpful in benchmarking impact.

·      Annex and CONSULTANCY

·      We recognize this is an enormously difficult undertaking, and that the Board needs to bring an extremely broad array of expertise to bear.

·      But obviously, the full range of necessary expertise is unlikely to reside in any one consultancy or think tank, and so it is critically important that this process be open to a broad range of inputs. A couple of specific recommendations:

o   Build on the enormous body of work already undertaken under the convention, country needs assessments, national communications, country plans, and the work of the transitional committee.

o   Consultancy or think tanks should include developing country perspectives, and expertise beyond the financial realm

o   The TOR should be put out for public comment.

o   The TOR should make clear that the work should be based on broad consultation and public input

o   The report should present options and alternatives, not just recommendations.

 On safeguards in Annex I (f) (1): includes analysis of best practices in the participatory decisionmaking and application of safeguards/standards in funding decisions and implementation of activities, including the PCF


Notes for intervention

Readiness, including needs assessments, organizational capacity building and the development of strategic plans from which funding proposals can be derived will be essential.

Show real value in two ways:

·      Readiness will expand the universe of countries who can come forward with the kind of high quality, transformational proposals that the Board will be looking for.

·      Improve the overall quality of proposals that will be put before the Board, as countries learn from each other and build on previous proposals.

We also believe that at least an initial strategy for supporting readiness could be fast tracked within the broader BMF conversation, and I would submit that this might provide a useful way forward on the sequencing issue that arose in the last session. The preparation of a fast tracked readiness strategy might unlock  opportunities for more rapid capitalization, in advance of resolving all of the outstanding BMF issues.




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